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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 This thesis analyses the international criminalisation of war rape and forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict under the statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). It addresses the ongoing challenge of how to define the two crimes in a way that 
adequately reflects women’s experiences, as well as the nature of the crimes.  
The ICC definition of war rape is considered one of the most progressive1 and 
broad definitions of rape under international and national law.2 This, however, overlooks 
the awkward, limiting and partly regressive wording3 of the first element, defining rape as 
an invasion resulting in penetration.4 This formulation is puzzling considering that actors 
in the ICC negotiations could have relied on a more progressive precedent in defining rape. 
Contrastingly, the crime of forced marriage was understood as a form of sexual slavery and 
was not discussed in any depth.5 This neglect is perplexing considering the widespread use 
of forced marriage in conflicts that were ongoing while the ICC instruments were 
negotiated6 and would likely be considered by the court.7  
Based on this critique of the ICC’s definition of war rape and forced marriage, the 
thesis analyses the process of how those definitions came about. Using a feminist and 
                                                          
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, progressive definitions of war rape and forced marriage are understood to 
adequately reflect women’s experiences as well as the nature of the crimes. 
2
 Interview 13 (15 May 2014). 
3
 Christopher Keith Hall, ‘The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 773, 778; Human Rights Watch, 
‘Commentary on the Second Preparatory Commission on Rules of Procedure and Elements of Crime’ (July 
1999) <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRWComment2ndPrepComJuly99.pdf> accessed 09 February 
2012; United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict’ (22 June 1998) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13. 
4
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 3 art 7(1)(g), art 8(b)(xxii), art 
8(e)(vi). 
5
 Interview 17 (17 June 2014); Interview 18 (25 June 2014). 
6
 Khristopher Carlson and Dyan Mazurana, ‘Forced Marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda’ 
(2008) Tufts University Feinstein International Center 
<https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/14553676/Forced+Marriage+within+the+LRA.
pdf?version=1> accessed 08 July 2013; Women Under Siege, ‘Liberia’ 
<http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/Liberia> accessed 23 January 2015; Women 
Under Siege, ‘Sierra Leone’ <http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/sierra-leone> 
accessed 23 January 2015. 
7
 International Criminal Court, ‘Situations and Cases: Uganda’ <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20ind
ex.aspx> 23 January 2015. 
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constructivist lens, it focuses on the driving actors, what influenced them, how they 
understood the crimes of war rape and forced marriage, and how they shaped the ICC 
negotiations. It is argued that, in addition to state delegations, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in 
developing the definitions of war rape and forced marriage. Actors represented all parts of 
the world and included survivors of sexualised war violence.8 Opposition to progressive 
definitions of rape and forced marriage came mainly from states with strong patriarchal 
structures where religion plays a leading role in legal and social matters. Influenced by 
national and international norms, rape and forced marriage were interpreted as honour 
crimes as well as acts of structural violence. Actors shaped the ICC definitions of the two 
crimes by conducting research and policy analysis, producing and distributing reports and 
proposals, organising briefings, and lobbing. Non-state actors also influenced the 
negotiations as civil society members of state delegations. 
The aim and potential contribution of this thesis is to deepen the understanding of 
the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage. By comparing the criminalisation of 
war rape and forced marriage, this thesis highlights relevant factors that need to be 
considered when criminalising acts of sexualised war violence under International Law. By 
considering forced marriage in the context of the ICC negotiations, the thesis also aims at 
raising awareness of the crime and intends to contribute towards a better understanding of 
it.  
 
                                                          
8
 Susan Brownmiller, ‘Making Female Bodies the Battlefield’ in Ronald J Berger and Patricia Searles (eds), 
Rape and Society: Readings on the Problem of Sexual Assault (Westview Press 1995); Slavenka Drakulić, 
‘The Rape of Women in Bosnia’ in Miranda Davies (ed), Women and Violence: Realities and Responses 
World Wide (Zed Books 1994) 180; Christine Eifler, ‘Krieg – Gewalt – Geschlecht’ in medica mondiale, 
Marlies W Fröse and Ina Volpp-Teuscher (eds), Krieg, Geschlecht und Traumatisierung: Erfahrungen und 
Reflexionen in der Arbeit mit traumatisierten Frauen in Kriegs- und Krisengebieten (IKO-Verlag für 
Interkulturelle Kommunikation 1999) 91; Joshua S Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the 
War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge University Press 2001) 359; Gabriela Mischkowski, ‘Sexualisierte 
Gewalt im Krieg: Eine Chronik’ in medica mondiale and Karin Griese (eds), Sexualisierte Kriegsgewalt und 
ihre Folgen: Handbuch zur Unterstützung traumatisierter Frauen in verschiedenen Arbeitsfeldern (2nd edn, 
Mabuse-Verlag 2006); Ruth Seifert, ‘Krieg und Vergewaltigung: Ansätze zu einer Analyse’ in Alexandra 
Stiglemayer (ed), Massenvergewaltigungen: Krieg gegen die Frauen (Fischer Taschenbuchverlag 1993) 88: 
This thesis uses the term ‘sexualised’ rather than ‘sexual’ violence. The term ‘sexual’ violence emphasises 
sexuality in the context of violence and can lead to a confusion of sexuality, and violence using sexual 
means. ‘Sexualised’ violence, in contrast, highlights the act of violence itself. It describes a form of violence 
which is deliberately directed against the most intimate part of a person’s body. An act of sexualised violence 
demonstrates power and domination by debasing, subordinating and humiliating another person. The term 
‘sexualised’ violence is broader than ‘sexual’ violence. It includes rape but also acts such as forced 
undressing, touching without permission, forced shaving of pubic hair, inflicting deliberate harm to breasts 
and genitals, purposefully infecting someone with sexually transmitted diseases, and forced pregnancy. 
Sexualised violence includes gender-based violence. Therefore, in this thesis, the term ‘sexualised’ violence 
is used. 
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1.2 Context 
1.2.1 Legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage 
From ancient to modern times, sexualised war violence against women was viewed 
as a socially acceptable practice in war, as collateral damage. Women were spoils of war, a 
reward to which the victors had a right. Sexualised violence was tolerated, if not 
encouraged, as a means of propaganda, humiliation and terror.9 The criminalisation of 
sexualised war violence has been attempted at the international level at least since the 18th 
century when bilateral and multilateral conventions criminalised sexualised war violence in 
the form of rape as an honour crime. This understanding was maintained in international 
agreements of the early and mid-20th century as well as by the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals established after the Second World War. International instruments of the second 
half of the 20th century moved away from an honour-based interpretation of sexualised war 
violence towards an understanding of it as a gender-based violation of women’s integrity. 
Sexualised war violence was framed as an issue of discrimination against as well as of 
protecting women and their fundamental rights. A connection was established between the 
vulnerability of women in wartime and the discrimination and disadvantages they 
experience in everyday life. Despite this growing recognition of sexualised war violence as 
a wrong, acts of sexualised war violence were perpetrated publicly and systematically on a 
massive scale during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. War 
rape was used as a strategic method to destroy culture and life as well as a method of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. This was a known fact, condoned, encouraged and even 
ordered.10 In response, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) explicitly 
included war rape as a crime against humanity. The ICTR statute also explicitly listed rape 
as an outrage upon personal dignity which constitutes a violation of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol II.11 In the tribunals’ jurisprudence, 
                                                          
9
 Anne-Marie LM de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the 
Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (Insertia 2005); Mischkowski, ‘Sexualisierte Gewalt im Krieg’ (n 8); 
Seifert (n 8). 
10
 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (2nd edn, African Rights 1995); Brouwer (n 9); 
Christine Chinkin, ‘Violence Against Women: The International Legal Response’ (1995) 3 (2) Gender and 
Development 23; Goldstein (n 8) 563; Diane Otto, ‘Disconcerting “Masculinities”: Reinventing the Gendered 
Subject(s) of International Human Rights Law’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds), International Law: 
Modern Feminist Approaches (Hart Publishing 2005); Alexandra Stiglemayer (ed), 
Massenvergewaltigungen: Krieg gegen die Frauen (Fischer Taschenbuchverlag 1993). 
11
 UNSC Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827; UNSC Resolution 955 (08 November 1994) 
UN Doc S/RES/955. 
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war rape was defined as a crime against humanity,12 a war crime,13 as constituting 
torture,14 an act of genocide15 and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.16 Before the 
ICC negotiations had been completed, the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals developed 
different definitions of the crime of rape as such. In Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, the 
ICTR introduced a definition using the term ‘invasion’.17 The term ‘penetration’ was used 
in definitions developed in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija18 and in Prosecutor v Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Foča case).19 The latter can also be found in 
most national definitions.20  
                                                          
12
 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Amended Indictment) ICTR-96-4-I (16 February 1996) Count 13; 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (02 September 1998); Prosecutor v 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Indictment) IT-96-23-T “Foča case” (19 June 
1996) para 4.8. 
13
 Foča Indictment (n 12) para 4.8; Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (Trial Judgment) ICTY IT-95-17/1-T (10 
December 1998) section IX. 
14
 Foča Indictment (n 12) para 4.8. 
15
 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 12) para 507-508. 
16
 Foča Indictment (n 12) para 4.8 and counts 56-59. 
17
 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 12) para 598. 
18
 Furundžija Trial Judgment (n 13) para 185. 
19
 Foča Indictment (n 12) para 4.8; Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković 
(Trial Judgment) ICTY IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T “Foča case” (22 February 2001) para 460. 
20
 For example see Bahrain Penal Code (1976) art 344, art 346 
<http://www.bahrainrights.org/sites/default/files/Bahrain-Penal-Code.doc> accessed 17 March 2014; The 
Criminal Act of 1991 (Sudan) art 149(1) <http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-
nat.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/applic/ihl/ihl-
nat.nsf/B9EEBA1CA8F54121C1256DC9005573F2/TEXT/Criminal%20Act%20-%20Sudan%20-
%20EN.pdf> accessed 01 April 2014; Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 (1969) art 21(1)(f), art 393(1) 
<http://www.iraq-lg-law.org/en/webfm_send/1350> accessed 18 March 2014; Ley No 599 de 2000 Por la 
cual se expide el Código Penal (24 July 2000) (Colombia) art 205 
<http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=6388> accessed 08 May 2015; The Libyan 
Penal Code (1953) art 407 
<https://ia600704.us.archive.org/25/items/LibyanPenalCodeenglish/LibyanPenalCode.pdf> accessed 24 
March 2014; Omani Penal Code (1974) art 218(1) <http://www.fiu.gov.om/forms.html> accessed 24 March 
2014; Qatari Penal Code (2004) art 
279<http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/wcm/connect/8abaea8046be1deaae97ef70b3652ad8/Penal+Code.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES&useDefaultText=0&useDefaultDesc=0> accessed 24 March 2014; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about the Change in the UCR Definition of Rape’ (11 December 
2014) <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/recent-program-updates/new-rape-definition-frequently-asked-
questions> accessed 19 January 2015; Mona Chemali Khalaf, ‘Lebanon’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly 
(eds), Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010) 6 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Lebanon.pdf> accessed 21 March 2014; 
U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: 
Saudi Arabia’ (2010) <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136079.htm> accessed 01 April 2014; 
U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: 
Syria’ (2010) <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136080.htm> accessed 01 April 2014. 
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While the ad hoc tribunals largely focused on war rape, some, especially women’s 
rights advocates, began to criticise the overemphasis on war rape in the discussion of 
sexualised war violence. They stressed that women also experience other acts and forms of 
violence in wartime. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, for example, directly mentioned forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict in her reports from 1995 on.21 The first definition of forced 
marriage, however, was put forward by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict. At a 
time when the ICC’s Rome Statute had been passed and the discussion of the Elements of 
Crimes had begun, she found the constituting elements of forced marriage to include being 
forced into a conjugal relationship, forced labour and acts of sexualised violence.22 After 
the ICC Elements of Crimes were passed, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
addressed the issue as a form of sexual slavery and an inhumane act in Prosecutor v Alex 
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (AFRC case),23 Prosecutor 
v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (RUF case)24 and Prosecutor v 
Charles Taylor.25 In these cases, the Special Court also developed different ways of 
referring to the crime.  
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228; United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to 
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Human Rights ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1997/44’ (26 January 
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 United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict’ (n 3) para 30. 
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 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Appeals Chamber 
Judgment) SCSL SLS-2004-16-A “AFRC case” (22 February 2008); Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima 
Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (Trial Judgment) SCSL-04-16-T “AFRC Case” (20 June 2007). 
The AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) was a Sierra Leone fighting group that participated in the 
conflict in the 1990s and early 2000s. For further information see for example Davidson SHW Nicol, ‘Sierra 
Leone’ (13 May 2014) Encyclopaedia Britannica <http://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-
war#ref978722> accessed 02 July 2015. 
24
 Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial Judgment) SCSL-04-15-PT 
“RUF Case” (02 March 2009). 
The RUF (Revolutionary United Front) was a Sierra Leonean fighting group that participated in the conflict 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. For further information see for example Richard McHugh, ‘RUF’ (23 
November 2015) Encyclopaedia Britannica <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Revolutionary-United-Front> 
accessed 20 February 2016. 
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 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (Trial Judgment) SCSL-03-01-T (18 May 2012). 
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1.2.2 War rape, forced marriage and the ICC 
 The ICC,26 based in The Hague in the Netherlands, is the first independent, 
permanent international criminal court established to try persons accused of the most 
serious crimes of international concern: genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.27  
 The ICC is a treaty-based court, governed by the Rome Statute that is binding only 
on those states which formally express their consent to be bound by its provisions. The 
Rome Statute was negotiated between 1994 and 1998.28 A draft statute for an international 
criminal court was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by the 
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in 1994. The ILC recommended 
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(eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002); 
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> accessed 28 January 2015; International Criminal Court, ‘Factsheet’ <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/factsheets/Pages/fact%20sheets.aspx
> accessed 28 January 2015. 
28
 M Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (Transnational Publishers 
2005) 31-34, 54-64; Fanny Benedetti, Karine Bonneau and John Washburn, Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Brill 2013) 15-16; Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (n 26); 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘History of the ICC’ 
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory> accessed 03 December 2013; Lee, The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (n 26); Schabas (n 26): The history of the establishment of an 
international criminal court goes back further than 1994 though. Efforts to create a global criminal court can 
be traced back to the 19th century when Gustav Moynier proposed a permanent court in response to the 
crimes perpetrated in the context of the Franco-Prussian War. After the First World War, the drafters of the 
Treaty of Versailles envisaged an ad hoc international court to try the German Kaiser and other war 
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Second World War to try Axis war criminals. Article 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (09 December 1948) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention) calls for violations to 
be dealt with “by such international penal tribunals as may have jurisdiction”. In the early 1950s, the 
International Law Commission (ILC) drafted a Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(28 July 1954) 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, UN Doc A/2693 (1954), 45 AJIL 123 (1951). A United 
Nations (UN) Committee established by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) prepared two drafts 
of a statute for an international criminal court. Disagreement over the definition of the crime of aggression as 
well as the Cold War, however, got in the way of these efforts and the UNGA effectively abandoned the 
project without an agreement on how to define the crime of aggression and on an international Code of 
Crimes having been reached. Motivated partly by the desire to combat drug trafficking, Trinidad and Tobago 
revived a pre-existing proposal for the establishment of an international criminal court in June 1989. The 
UNGA asked the ILC to resume its work on drafting a statute. After the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda in the early 1990s, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established two ad hoc 
tribunals to hold individuals accountable for crimes committed during these conflicts. 
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convening a conference of plenipotentiaries to negotiate a treaty and enact the draft statute. 
The UNGA, however, decided to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court to “review the major substantive and administrative issues 
arising out of the draft statute prepared by the [ILC] and, in the light of that review, to 
consider arrangements for the convening of an international conference of 
plenipotentiaries.”29 After meeting twice, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its report to the 
UNGA in 1995. It proposed to “combine further discussions [of issues] with the drafting of 
texts, with a view to preparing a consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries.”30 
After considering the report, the UNGA created the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom) to prepare a consolidated 
draft text. Between March 1996 and April 1998, the PrepCom met six times at the UN 
headquarters in New York. In January 1998, the inter-sessional meeting in Zutphen, the 
Netherlands, took place to technically consolidate and restructure the draft articles into a 
draft statute. Based on the PrepCom’s draft, the UNGA convened the United Nations 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Rome Conference) to finalise and adopt a convention on the establishment of an 
international criminal court. The Rome Conference took place from 15 June to 17 July 
1998 in Rome, Italy. The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 with 120 state 
delegations voting in favour, seven against and 21 states abstaining.31 After the Rome 
Conference, the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (PrepCom2) 
was charged with completing the establishment and enabling smooth functioning of the 
ICC by negotiating complementary documents32 setting out the court’s structure, 
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 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court ‘Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (06 September 1995) UN Doc A/50/22 
para 255. 
The Ad Hoc Committee discussed issues related to the establishment and composition of the ICC, the 
principle of complementarity, applicable law and jurisdiction of the court, exercise of jurisdiction, methods 
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 ibid. 
31
 International Criminal Court, ‘About the Court’ (n 27): By 11 April 2002, the Rome Statute had been 
ratified by 60 states and entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
32
 Those include the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Elements of Crimes, the Relationship Agreement 
between the Court and the United Nations, the Financial Regulations and the Agreement on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Court. According to Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes “assist 
the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8.” Articles 6-8 cover genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes respectively. 
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jurisdiction and functions. Of particular relevance to this thesis are the Elements of Crimes 
that were negotiated between February 1999 and July 2000.33 
 State and non-state delegations participated in the ICC negotiations. States were the 
main actors in the sense that they made the final decisions. They acted individually as well 
as in groups. NGOs attended the negotiations under the umbrella of the international NGO 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). This facilitated networking and 
cooperation between NGOs at multiple levels, as well as between NGOs and states. NGOs 
closely monitored the discussions and produced and distributed information on 
developments. They also produced, distributed and promoted new research, expert 
documents and news articles. Additionally, they briefed and lobbied state delegations. This 
way, they facilitated exchange and provided input into the discussions. NGOs provided 
more detailed and specific contexts for the decisions that were to be made by states. 
However, members of NGOs also influenced states’ decisions by becoming members of 
state delegations. Furthermore, NGOs had an impact on the ICC negotiations by 
undertaking preliminary drafting work. NGOs engaged in capacity building, provided 
orientation and guidance and mobilised other NGOs. NGOs also facilitated parallel 
activities, raising awareness of the ICC.34 
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International Law (Oxford University Press 2007); Mark S Ellis, ‘The Contribution of Non-Governmental 
Organizations to the Creation of International Criminal Tribunals’ in Bartram S Brown (ed), Research 
Handbook on International Criminal Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011); Marlies Glasius, The 
International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Initiative (Routledge 2006); Janet Halley, ‘Rape at 
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Criminal Law’ (2009) 30 Michigan Journal of International Law 1; Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-
Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005) 460-179; William R 
Pace and Jennifer Schense, ‘Coalition for the International Criminal Court at the Preparatory Commission’ in 
Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
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 The Rome Statute’s provisions on sexualised violence are considered to be great 
achievements. They build on existing international laws, especially the experience and 
expertise of the ICTY and ICTR, and recognise rape as a war crime and a crime against 
humanity.35 Going further than the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC Elements of Crimes also 
specify that rape can cause serious bodily or mental harm36 and therefore constitute an act 
of genocide if the qualifying elements of genocide are met.37 In addition to rape, the Rome 
Statute also explicitly recognises “sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, [and] any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”38 as 
well as gender-based persecution.39 
 Previous research on the evolution of the ICC and its instruments considered the 
process of including rape as a war crime and crime against humanity in the Rome Statute 
and the outcome of the process of defining the crime.40 The final definition of war rape is 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International 
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Quarterly 486; Chinkin, ‘Violence Against Women’ (n 10); Martha Alter Chen, ‘Engendering World 
Conferences: The International Women’s Movement and the UN’ (1995) 16 Third World Quarterly 477; 
Karen Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
(2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 778; John Hagen, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War 
Crimes in the Hague Tribunal (University of Chicago Press 2003); Halley, ‘Rape at Rome’ (n 34) 1; Julie 
Mertus, ‘When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ (2008) 38 Seton Hall Journal of Law 1297; Vahida Nainar and Pam Spees, ‘The 
International Criminal Court: The Beijing Platform IN Action’ (2000) 
<http://www.iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/resources/bplus5/bplus5index.htm> accessed 30 
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Used to Attack Women’s Organizing (International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission and Center 
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38
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 Benedetti, Bonneau and Washburn (n 28); Machteld Boot, ‘Article 7 Crimes against Humanity para. 1 (g) 
Rape … or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn, CH Beck 
2008); Brouwer (n 9); Nichole Eva Erb, ‘Gender-Based Crimes under the Draft Statute of the Permanent 
International Criminal Court’ (1998) 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 401; Brook Sari Moshan, 
‘Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent International Criminal Court’s 
Definition of Crimes against Humanity’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 154. 
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generally considered one of the most progressive and broad definitions of rape under 
international and national law.41 However, from a feminist perspective, the formulation 
‘invasion resulting in penetration’ in the first element of the ICC definition42 is puzzling. 
While the actors in the ICC negotiations could have relied solely on the broad and gender-
neutral Akayesu precedent,43 they combined it with the rape definition developed by the 
ICTY in the Furundžija case that reflects many national laws.44 This can be interpreted as 
regressive and limiting.45 By using the term ‘penetration’, the ICC reverted to a male 
definition of rape that is “rooted in social preoccupation with women’s chastity and 
ascertaining paternity of children, that tends to shift the focus to honor rather than the 
integrity of the person.”46 It represents the perpetrator’s point of view and focuses on the 
physical aspect of rape. ‘Invasion’, in contrast, illustrates the survivor’s point of view.47 
This term is broader than ‘penetration’ as it connotes not only a physical, but also a 
psychological invasion of a person’s autonomy, self-determination and integrity. 
Moreover, the ICC rape definition includes a limiting reference to body parts, which 
potentially makes it more difficult for survivors to build a case because they have to go 
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 Human Rights Watch, ‘Commentary on the Second Preparatory Commission on Rules of Procedure and 
Elements of Crime’ (n 3); United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed 
Conflict’ (n 3) para 24. 
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 Kristen Boon, ‘Rape and Forced Pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and 
Consent’ (2001) 32 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 625; Brouwer (n 9) 107. 
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into great detail about the physical aspects of the rape. Not only can this be difficult for 
survivors, it may also infringe upon cultural sensitivities.48  
While research on the evolution of the ICC and its instruments analyses and 
assesses the court’s rape definition, it seldom examines the process of defining rape itself, 
which took place after the Rome Conference in the PrepCom2. When the process of 
defining rape is considered, it is merely noted that the ad hoc tribunals’ definitions 
influenced the ICC definition.49 
 While war rape was extensively discussed in the ICC negotiations, forced marriage 
in times of armed conflict was mentioned as a form of sexual slavery but not discussed 
further.50 This disregard is puzzling, considering the widespread use of forced marriage in, 
for example, the conflicts in Liberia,51 Sierra Leone52 and Uganda53 that were ongoing 
while the ICC instruments were negotiated and could have been considered by the court.54 
It is a lost opportunity to raise awareness of and directly acknowledge forced marriage not 
only as a harmful experience, but also as a wrong requiring legal redress. Explicitly 
including forced marriage in the Rome Statute would have legitimised women’s 
experiences during and after armed conflicts and enabled the court to fully address them.55  
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1.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
 Against this background, it is of interest and importance to analyse how the ICC 
definitions of war rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict came about. 
Secondary research questions are:  
1. Who were the driving actors in the process of defining war rape and seeking to 
define forced marriage? 
2. What influenced them? 
3. What was their understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
4. How did the driving actors influence the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced 
marriage? 
 
 The following hypotheses are considered: 
1. NGOs in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in the 
development of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage; 
2. States with strong patriarchal structures, where religion plays a leading role in 
legal and social matters, opposed the development of progressive definitions of 
war rape and forced marriage; 
3. Domestic norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of 
war rape and forced marriage; 
4. Survivors of war rape and forced marriage and actors from the global South were 
not involved; 
5. War rape and forced marriage were interpreted as honour crimes; 
6. Structural causes of the perpetration of war rape and forced marriage were not 
addressed. 
  
 From a feminist and constructivist perspective, it is necessary to consider the actors 
as well as the normative structures that shape actors’ understandings of war rape and 
forced marriage, and consequently law-making. International Law is made by women and 
men, state and non-state actors. Their interests and actions are shaped by personal, national 
and international values, norms and rules and influence law-making processes and 
outcomes. Therefore, law(-making) is biased. Arguably, this bias can be decreased through 
the intervention of outside actors.  
 Supported by preliminary research, a combined feminist and constructivist analysis 
of the actors in the ICC negotiations suggested that NGOs in general and women’s 
43 
organisations in particular played a role in the development of the ICC definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage. Preliminary research also suggested that states with strong 
patriarchal structures, where religion plays a leading role in legal and social matters, 
opposed the development of more progressive laws. This claim supports the constructivist 
theory that domestic norms matter in international relations and law-making, here in the 
sense of opposing progressive definitions of rape and forced marriage. A feminist analysis 
of the ICC negotiations raises the question whether survivors of sexualised war violence 
were involved as their participation would give a voice to those unheard and contribute to 
women’s empowerment. Considering that the ICC is an international court with 
jurisdiction over all states that ratified the Rome Statute, it is of interest and relevance to 
examine whether that was reflected in the ICC negotiations or whether actors from the 
global South were not involved. Tracing progress in the understanding of sexualised 
crimes, it has to be analysed whether sexualised crimes where understood as honour crimes 
or forms of structural violence. By addressing these hypotheses, continuities and/or 
discontinuities in international law-making processes can be highlighted and state-centric 
notions as well as the priority of international norms and rules in international treaty 
negotiations can be challenged.  
 
 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
This thesis addresses these research questions and hypotheses in three steps. Part I 
consists of Chapters 2 and 3, setting out the theoretical and methods framework of this 
thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 form part II, which examines the legislative histories of war rape 
and forced marriage. Part III includes Chapters 6-9. They directly address the ICC 
negotiations and how the court’s definitions of war rape and forced marriage came about. 
 
 Chapter 2 outlines feminism and constructivism as the main theories underpinning 
and applied in this thesis. Feminist and constructivist theorists understand reality to be 
constructed and are interested in its change. However, constructivists such as Martha 
Finnemore and Peter Katzenstein are interested in the fact that reality is constructed and 
the process of how it is constructed and how it changes. They emphasise the role of 
normative structures in international relations and law-making, shaping and being shaped 
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by actors (constructivist circle).56 In their analysis of change, constructivist theorists focus 
on the role of domestic as well as international normative structures and on impetuses that 
are internal as well as external to actors. Constructivists establish the logics of 
consequences, arguing, practicality, purposive role playing, appropriateness, habit and 
emotions as possible explanations for normative change. Feminists, in contrast, are 
interested in the outcome of construction processes and their gendered implications. They 
are interested in the substance of reality and change. Feminist legal theories unmask and 
highlight sex/gender issues that are hidden by patriarchal structures such as legal rules, 
institutions and processes.57  
 
 After Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, Chapter 3 
outlines the methods used. Qualitative research methods are used as they are more 
appropriate than quantitative methods to create a better understanding of the ICC 
negotiations and how the definitions of war rape and forced marriage came about. 
Consistent with the theoretical basis of this thesis, feminist research methods58 are 
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employed. Their emphasis on reflexivity and authenticity necessitates reflecting on the 
present researcher’s own biases and making them known to the reader. Chapter 3 also 
contains an outline of the critical analysis of existing literature and relevant documents as 
well as of the semi-structured interviews conducted with people who participated in the 
ICC negotiations for this research project. 
 
 
 Chapters 4 and 5 make up the second part of this thesis. Where they refer to the 
research questions and hypotheses stated above, they address the general focus thereof but 
do not contribute to an answer or confirmation of the specifics. The research questions and 
hypotheses specifically address the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage and 
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the thematic context for their analysis. Chapter 4 retraces the pre-
ICC legislative histories of the two crimes.59 Chapter 5 focuses on legal discussions and 
developments that took place after the negotiations of the Rome Statute and the Elements 
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of Crimes were completed as well as on more theoretical considerations regarding the 
causes and meanings of war rape and forced marriage. Chapters 4 and 5 highlight that war 
rape was first defined as an honour crime before it was more adequately understood as a 
breach of a person’s fundamental rights and established as a crime in its own right as well 
as potentially constituting other crimes such as torture and an act of genocide. Regarding 
the definition of rape itself, it developed from a conceptual coercion-based definition 
towards a mechanical coercion- and consent-based definition. In regard to forced marriage, 
a similar pattern can be noticed. First forced marriage was defined as a form of sexual 
slavery before it was considered whether it would be more adequate to see it as another 
inhumane act. As such, forced marriage was understood to include a forced conjugal 
association, acts of sexualised violence and forced labour. Regarding the causes and 
meanings of war rape and forced marriage, both crimes are understood to be weapons of 
war that are grounded in patriarchy, attributable to peacetime gender norms and 
stereotypes, and ways to regulate gender relationships. Forced marriages are also formed in 
wartime to create dependency structures within fighting groups. War rape is also used as a 
theme in propaganda. Comparing the legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage 
highlights that a conduct is established as a serious problem first and then discussed in the 
context of existing crimes before it is criminalised in its own right.  
 
 
 Part III of this thesis analyses how the ICC definitions of war rape and forced 
marriage came about and addresses the research questions and hypotheses stated above.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the identity of actors involved in the ICC negotiations in 
general and on what generally influenced them. While this emphasis is derived from the 
general focus of Research Questions 160 and 2,61 it does not attend to their specifics which 
address the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage specifically. Chapter 6 
argues that individuals, states and NGOs played an important role in the ICC negotiations. 
Refuting Hypothesis 4,62 actors represented all parts of the world and included survivors of 
sexualised war violence. They were shaped and being shaped by personal, national and 
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international values, norms and rules. However, practical and strategic considerations also 
came to play. Moreover, Chapter 6 argues that while participation of, and equality 
between, actors was furthered through their work in coalitions and caucuses, it was 
impeded by perpetuated traditional power dynamics. In addition, actors’ ability to 
influence the ICC negotiations was limited by the need for consensus in all decisions. 
Despite this, actors influenced the ICC negotiations by conducting research and policy 
analysis, producing and distributing reports and proposals, organising briefings, and 
lobbing. Non-state actors’ ability to influence the ICC negotiations was increased by being 
perceived as strategic partners of state actors. This enabled them to become members of 
state delegations or to teach their views to states.63  
 
While Chapter 6 demonstrates how NGOs taught their views to states (Research 
Question 4),64 Chapter 7 shows that they succeeded. It contains a detailed analysis of the 
developments in the ICC negotiations regarding the definitions of war rape and forced 
marriage, outlining who the main state and non-state actors were (Research Question 1), 
why they got involved in the ICC negotiations of the crimes of war rape and forced 
marriage specifically and what influenced their positions (Research Question 2) as well as 
how they interpreted the crimes (Research Question 3). 
Confirming Hypothesis 1,65 Chapter 7 demonstrates that the international Women’s 
Caucus, an umbrella organisation of women’s organisations and advocates, was a driving 
actor regarding the process of defining war rape and especially forced marriage in times of 
armed conflict. The Arab block66 raised concerns regarding the definition of rape and 
sexual slavery (confirming Hypothesis 267). In addition to the Women’s Caucus and the 
Arab block, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the delegations of 
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Colombia and the United States of America (USA, US) drove the ICC negotiations of the 
crimes of war rape and forced marriage.  
The Women’s Caucus became active in the ICC negotiations of war rape and 
forced marriage to ensure that sexualised crimes were appropriately addressed, keeping 
women’s concerns in mind. The ICRC’s participation was motivated by its role as the 
guardian and expert of International Humanitarian Law. The Arab block engaged in this 
particular aspect of the ICC negotiations to protect national marriage laws and practices 
from international interference and from falling within the reach of crimes against 
humanity. Colombia was aware that it might fall to be investigated by the ICC. Therefore it 
had an interest in shaping the definitions of crimes its citizens might be accused of. The US 
insisted on defining the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC as it was concerned about 
its national sovereignty and worried that its own citizens might be prosecuted.  
Refuting Hypothesis 6,68 the Women’s Caucus understood war rape to be a form of 
structural violence that is rooted in discrimination against women in peacetime. Based on 
the Akayesu definition, the Women’s Caucus proposed an inclusive coercion-based rape 
definition that uses the term ‘invasion’. The ICRC, in contrast, built its definition of rape 
on the Furundžija case and suggested to use the term ‘penetration’. Contrary to the 
Women’s Caucus and the ICRC, the US initially was influenced by its national laws and 
advanced a consent-based rape definition using the term ‘penetration’. Eventually, 
however, it followed the Women’s Caucus and suggested a coercion-based definition. Like 
the US, Colombia initially developed a definition of rape based on its national laws and 
suggested using the phrase ‘to have sexual access to’ before following the ICRC and 
suggesting a definition using the term ‘penetration. National normative structures also 
influenced the Arab block’s understanding of rape as an honour crime which excludes 
marital sexual intercourse (confirming Hypotheses 369 and 570). Chapter 7 argues that the 
final definition of rape as ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ was a compromise based on 
international and national rules. 
Regarding forced marriage, the Women’s Caucus was the first actor to bring up the 
issue in the ICC negotiations. Later, it was also explicitly mentioned by the ICRC. 
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Following the understanding of the international community as well as the Final Report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC 
understood forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. Therefore, it was seen as an 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership and an emphasis was placed on the 
sexual elements of a forced marriage. Contrary to establishing a link between forced 
marriage and sexual slavery like the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC, the Arab block 
explicitly suggested disconnecting sexual slavery from marital rights and duties. In a 
proposal submitted by the Holy See, the crime of sexual slavery was replaced by 
enslavement and involuntary servitude which could still include forced marriage. Like the 
crime of rape, forced marriage was understood as a question of honour by some and as a 
form of structural violence by others, confirming Hypothesis 571 and refuting Hypothesis 
6.72 Chapter 7 argues that the definition of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery was 
guided by international normative structures in which it had only ever been discussed in 
that context. The outline of actors’ understanding of forced marriage indicates that, in the 
negotiations of the crime of sexual slavery, the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC as well as 
the Arab block and the Holy See played a role. In addition, the US, Colombia and Canada 
were also involved. Eventually, actors agreed that sexual slavery includes direct and 
indirect threats but not necessarily a pecuniary element. It was also recognised that the 
crime can be perpetrated by more than one person. The discussions confirmed the 
distinction between traditional and contemporary forms of slavery and established sexual 
slavery, enslavement and human trafficking as separate crimes despite overlaps.  
 
Building on Chapters 6 and especially 7, Chapters 8 and 9 present a more detailed 
snapshot of specific parts of the ICC negotiations. Chapter 8 analyses how the Women’s 
Caucus came to understand forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. It explores if the 
Caucus incorrectly viewed forced marriage as essentially a sexual crime or if the sexual 
elements of a forced marriage were overemphasised. This could explain the group’s 
interpretation of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. As mentioned in relation to 
Chapter 7, accounts of the discussions in the ICC negotiations also suggest that the 
Women’s Caucus followed the opinion of the international community, interpreting forced 
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marriage as a form of sexual slavery. Interpretations of the written recommendations and 
comments submitted by the Caucus at different stages of the negotiation process, however, 
suggest the group might have followed the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict and 
strategically framed forced marriage as a form of slavery to benefit from the connotations 
of the jus cogens nature of the norm. 
 
Chapter 9 focuses on a proposal submitted by the Arab block,73 dissenting from 
developments in International Criminal Law regarding the crimes of war rape and sexual 
slavery. This was motivated by the Arab block’s wish to protect national marriage laws 
and practices from amounting to rape or sexual slavery, constituting crimes against 
humanity. Chapter 9 explores which national norms and rules exactly the Arab block might 
have wanted to protect. Therefore, it addresses Research Question 2.74 Chapter 9 argues 
that domestic non-criminalisation of marital rape could explain the Arab block’s 
suggestions regarding the ICC definition of rape. Two explanations are advanced for the 
non-criminalisation of marital rape under the Arab block’s national laws: the “[Islamic 
legal principle that] a woman must always be obedient [and sexually available] to her 
husband”75 and the patriarchal understanding of rape as an honour crime. Chapter 9 
furthermore argues that the Arab block sought to exclude marriage rights, duties and 
obligations such as the ideal of an obedient wife, the accepted language of a marriage 
offer, understandings of dowry and maintenance as well as irregular and temporary 
marriages from powers attaching to the right of ownership because they allow for husbands 
to subjugate their wives. Fundamental to the Arab block’s dissent towards developments in 
national and international law in regard to sexualised crimes is the wish to maintain 
existing patriarchal power structures.  
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Finally, the Conclusion recapitulates the nature and expediency of feminist and 
constructivist theories for this research project. It summarises the main findings, drawing 
together the discussion of war rape and forced marriage respectively, the theories behind 
their perpetration, their legislative histories, the critique of the ICC definitions of war rape 
and forced marriage, and the analysis of the process of defining the two crimes. Based on 
this, the Conclusion considers whether the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage 
could have been different. It argues that actors’ incompatible mandates, divergent or non-
existent precedents, the policy of unanimity, differences in standing between state and non-
state actors and the work in coalitions made different outcomes of the ICC negotiations in 
this regard unlikely. Comparing the criminalisation of war rape and forced marriage 
highlights that the unequal standing of the two crimes at the time of the ICC negotiation 
influenced the actors’ approach to them. In addition to defining crimes in an adequate way, 
it is crucial that crimes are addressed in a suitable framework. Therefore, the Conclusion 
also addresses the bigger question whether International Criminal Law is an appropriate 
way to deal with war rape and forced marriage. When answering this question, 
shortcomings of International Criminal Law such as its male structures and 
oversimplification of complex problems as well as survivors’ reluctance to participate in 
legal proceedings have to be considered. However, it also has to be acknowledged that 
international courts and tribunals take the causes, meanings, purposes and consequences of 
war rape and forced marriage into account in their deliberations. If one concludes that the 
international legal system is an appropriate framework to deal with war rape and forced 
marriage, arguably war rape is more suitable to be addressed through International 
Criminal Law than forced marriage as it is seen as a narrow act rather than a complex 
process. In addition to recapitulating the nature and expediency of feminist and 
constructivist theories, summarising the main findings, discussing whether the ICC 
definitions of war rape and forced marriage could have been different, and whether 
International Criminal Law is an adequate way to deal with the two crimes, the Conclusion 
addresses the thesis’ potential contributions regarding deepening the understanding of the 
ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage, narrowing gaps in the existing 
literature, contributing a different view on the ICC rape definition, raising awareness of 
forced marriage in times of armed conflict and highlighting relevant factors that need to be 
considered in the process of internationally criminalising yet unrecognised acts of 
sexualised war violence. The Conclusion also draws attention to problems encountered in 
the course of this research project such as the state-centric focus of the official record of 
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the ICC negotiations. Lastly, it introduces areas for future research emerging from this 
thesis, including a different theoretical approach to the ICC negotiations and the relevance 
and role of national normative structures as well as an analysis of the application, influence 
and impact of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage on national and 
international jurisprudence.  
 
 
 
1.5 Aims and potential contributions 
 Based on the above-mentioned critique of the ICC’s approach to war rape and 
forced marriage, the aim of this thesis is to narrow the two aforementioned gaps in the 
existing literature regarding the process of defining war rape in itself and the neglect of 
forced marriage in the ICC negotiations. 
By addressing forced marriage in the context of the ICC negotiations, the aim of 
this thesis is to raise awareness of the crime and to contribute towards its theorisation. By 
comparing war rape, a well-theorised and well-established crime, and forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict, which is still undergoing definition and theorisation, relevant 
factors that need to be considered in the process of criminalising yet unrecognised acts of 
sexualised war violence under International Law are highlighted. 
 Identifying shortcomings of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage 
and how they came about can be a lesson for the future. Law-makers can learn from past 
mistakes and develop more adequate definitions of sexualised crimes committed in 
wartime in the future. More adequate definitions that better match survivors’ experiences 
will facilitate obtaining legal redress.76 Therefore, analysing the process of defining war 
rape and forced marriage in the ICC negotiations cannot only help law-makers to make 
better laws, but it can also help survivors. It serves the outcome of the law and therefore 
the survivors rather than the political fictions that are being protected. 
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1.6 Scope 
 Even though International Criminal Law overlaps with Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law, it has to be stressed that those are not core areas of this 
thesis. 
 While national and regional norms and laws covering acts of sexualised war 
violence are referred to, this thesis places a clear focus on International Law as these are 
supposedly universal standards that all consenting parties should adhere to.  
 The present researcher is very aware that women and men play different and often 
overlapping roles in times of armed conflict. While men also become targets for acts of 
sexualised war violence, this thesis focuses on women as the majority of survivors. 
However, the thesis makes clear that this is not the only way in which women experience 
war. Their roles as survivors, witnesses and perpetrators of acts of war violence are 
touched upon but an in-depth analysis and discussion of all of them is too comprehensive 
and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 While acts of war rape are implicitly covered by other crimes such as genocide by 
imposing measures intended to prevent births,77 this thesis focuses on provisions that 
explicitly mention war rape. While definitions of war rape, for example as an outrage upon 
personal dignity, are relevant for an analysis of the legislative history of the crime, this 
thesis focuses on the definition of rape as a crime in and of itself. This is motivated by the 
view that it is crucial to directly name crimes for what they are in order to advance 
women’s rights. However, since no definition of the crime of forced marriage itself existed 
at the time of the ICC negotiations, this thesis also analyses forced marriage defined as a 
form of sexual slavery. This decision is further informed by the fact that the SCSL also 
discussed forced marriage in that context. However, even though the thesis discusses 
sexual slavery in relation to forced marriage, it is not examined independently. 
 Even though crimes like forced prostitution, trafficking in human beings and the 
recruitment of child soldiers can also become relevant when discussing forced marriage, 
this thesis does not place a particular emphasis on them or their relationship to forced 
marriage.  
The analysis of the ICC definition of rape is clearly focused on the first element of 
the definition which, as explained above, raises questions especially in light of the initial 
progress made by the ICTR in defining rape. 
                                                          
77
 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 12) para 507-508. 
54 
 As highlighted above, this thesis analyses and assesses the ICC definition of war 
rape and forced marriage. This serves as the starting point and motivation for the 
exploration of the process of how these definitions came about. It is not the aim of the 
thesis to analyse and assess the ICC definitions of the two crimes in detail as this has been 
done elsewhere.78 
 
 Since the focus of this thesis is on definitions of crimes and how they came about, 
the research does not consider the ICC’s rules and procedures, staffing requirements, 
structures or special measures for survivors of sexualised war violence. It also does not 
examine how the definitions are used in the court’s jurisprudence as this thesis focuses on 
the legislative process. 
  
  
 To contextualise women’s and NGOs’ involvement in the ICC negotiations, the 
participation of outside actors in other international fora is mentioned. A thorough analysis 
and comparison, however, is too comprehensive and therefore beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 While this thesis uses feminist and constructivist theories to guide the analysis of 
the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage, it does not intend to analyse the 
theories themselves but to apply them to practice. 
In accord with feminist and constructivist scepticism of generalisability, only a 
limited generalisability is aimed for in this thesis in relation to its potential contribution 
mentioned above. 
 Although potentially offering valuable insights, the addition of other theoretical 
lenses such as postcolonialism would sacrifice the depth of this research for breadth. 
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2 Theories 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Feminism and constructivism are the two main theories underpinning this thesis. 
Chapter 2 explains first feminist theories, then constructivist theories, and their respective 
value for this research project. Within the outline of feminist theories, Chapter 2 discusses 
law as a product of, and producing, realities, the male substance of law, male methods of 
law and the male legal subject. Within the field of constructivist theories, a focus is placed 
on Martha Finnemore’s and Peter Katzenstein’s claims regarding the relevance of 
international and national normative structures respectively in international relations. The 
chapter concludes with considering the shortcomings of feminism and constructivism, and 
advantages of a combined theoretical approach. 
 
 
 
2.2 Feminism 
 “Feminism is a varied and evolving philosophy and those who consider themselves 
to be ‘feminist’ are a diverse group with a broad range of perspectives.”79 This thesis does 
not follow one single feminist theory as many realities would be lost. Instead, it follows 
Hilary Charlesworth’s understanding of feminist theories as “less a series of rival 
interpretations than a sort of archaeological dig where different methods are appropriate at 
the different levels of the excavation[;] a feminist explorer or […] a world traveller, using 
different modes of transport according to the terrain.”80 While the present researcher is 
aware of the multitude of feminist theories, the singular ‘feminism’ is used throughout this 
thesis for reasons of readability. For the purpose of this thesis, feminists are considered to 
share the view that sex/gender is one important social structure or axis of social 
organisation and differentiation.81 However, it is also recognised that sex/gender “is not the 
only, and even necessarily the most important way in which people are differentiated from 
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each other.”82 Depending on the particular context, nationality, race, culture, class, age, 
education, profession and sexual orientation may also play a role. In addition, feminist 
theories come together in taking a critical stance in their analysis of patriarchy.83 For the 
purpose of this thesis, patriarchy is defined as “a system of society or government in which 
the father or eldest male is head of the family and descent is reckoned through the male 
line; a system of society or government in which men hold the power and women are 
largely excluded from it.”84 This understanding highlights that “patriarchy is not a 
temporary imperfection in an otherwise adequate system; it is part of the structure of the 
system and is constantly reinforced by it.”85 
 Feminist legal theories are not so much a discrete theory but rather a genre which 
places sex/gender issues on the agenda of legal scholarship.86 Feminist legal theories aim 
to show how, where and why the law, legal institutions and legal processes fail women.87 
Their project is to uncover and claim as valid the experiences of women.88  
 
 
 
2.2.1 The male substance of law 
 “Feminist legal theories offer a thoroughgoing critique of law’s claim to be 
impartial and objective.”89 They understand the substance of law to reflect a male point of 
view90 as it is made by men and based on their norms, knowledge and experiences. 
“[I]ssues traditionally of concern to men become seen [and legitimised] as general human 
concerns, while ‘women’s concerns’ are relegated to a special, limited category.”91 This is 
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furthered by the public/private dichotomy92 law rests on.93 The first in the pair is 
established as dominant and associated with male characteristics while the second is seen 
as subordinate and associated with feminine characteristics. This shows that the distinction 
between the public and private sphere in law is not a neutral or objective qualification.94 
“Its consequences are gendered because in all societies men dominate the public sphere of 
politics and government and women are associated with the private sphere of home and 
family.”95 Here, it has to be emphasised that “[w]omen are not always opposed to men in 
the same ways: what is considered ‘public’ in one society may well be seen as ‘private’ in 
another. But a universal pattern of identifying women’s activities as private, and thus of 
lesser value, can be detected.”96 This creates gendered hierarchies. Specialised 
international legal instruments,97 for example, distance ‘women’s issues’ from the 
mainstream of International Law. This marginalisation is aggravated by the extensive 
reservations from states to a number of provisions98 and weak enforcement mechanisms.99 
Another effect of the public/private dichotomy is to factor out the realities of 
women’s lives and to silence women’s voices in law. Demonstrating that law is a product 
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of, and produces, realities,100 rape laws (superficially) were enacted to address the concerns 
of women and protect them against acts of sexualised violence perpetrated by men. 
However, they also determine what counts as rape. Therefore, they construct a limited 
range of truths that can be testified to in court. This at least partially silences survivors and 
tailors their stories.101 It can distort the picture drawn of survivors’ realities and establish a 
legal truth that is based on incomplete facts. If a rape definition for example does not 
recognise rape with objects, inserting objects into a woman’s vagina legally does not count 
as rape. Since an element of invasion/penetration is key to rape definitions, acts falling 
short of that are not recognised as rape legally even though the survivor might have 
experienced or would describe them as such. When speaking about their experiences in a 
non-legal setting, survivors of war rape often focus on their feelings and on how having 
been raped changed their relationship to their family and community rather than on the 
perpetrator.102 However, in a courtroom only the actions that demonstrate something about 
the perpetrator are of interest.103  
In addition to creating gendered hierarchies and reinforcing gender stereotypes, law 
shapes identities.104 It often portrays women as having to be protected, corrected or treated 
equally to men.105 Rape laws, for example, construct women as vulnerable victims and 
men as aggressive perpetrators. Rape definitions that include references to body parts 
imply an underlying assumption that the victim is a woman and the perpetrator is a man. 
This becomes apparent, for example, in the view advanced in Article 219 of the Omani 
Penal Code that rape is “accomplished when the penis penetrates, to a minimal degree, the 
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vagina or anus of the victim, either resulting in ejaculation or not.”106 Article 439 of the 
Syrian penal code defines rape as a situation “when a man forces a woman […] to have 
intercourse.”107 Protective rape definitions like the one set out in Article 27(2) of the fourth 
Geneva Convention reading “[w]omen shall be […] protected against any attack on their 
honour, in particular against rape”108 stress women’s vulnerability. Force requirements like 
the second element of the Furundžija definition, specifying that sexual penetration was 
achieved “by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person”,109 
indicate the aggressive nature of the perpetrator’s acts.  
As indicated above, the crimes of rape and forced marriage are excellent examples 
of substantively male laws. A definition of war rape using the term ‘penetration’ can be 
seen as male as it is “rooted in social preoccupation with women’s chastity and 
ascertaining paternity of children, that tends to shift the focus to honor rather than the 
integrity of the person.”110 This advances a male understanding of women as reproducers, 
preservers of civil society and the property of men. The categorisation of rape as an honour 
crime “legitimise[s] and entrench[es] the idea that the rape […] harmed a wife, daughter, 
or sister because it impugned a husband’s, father’s, or brother’s honor.”111 Therefore, the 
understanding of war rape as an honour crime leads to women being seen only in relation 
to another (male) person instead of as an individual.112 
 The categorisation of forced marriage in times of armed conflict as a form of sexual 
slavery can also be understood as male as it leaves the traditionally patriarchal institution 
of marriage untouched. Moreover, the classification of forced marriage as a form of sexual 
slavery narrowly focuses on sexualised crimes. It fails to capture the full range of women’s 
                                                          
106
 Omani Penal Code (n 20). 
107
 U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: 
Syria’ (n 20). 
108
 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 
75 UNTS 287, 6 UST 3516, TIAS 3365. 
109
 Furundžija Trial Judgment (n 13) para 185. 
110
 Human Rights Watch, ‘Commentary on the Second Preparatory Commission on Rules of Procedure and 
Elements of Crime’ (n 3); United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Final Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed 
Conflict’ (n 3) para 24. 
111
 Halley, ‘Rape at Rome’ (n 34) 57. 
112
 Halley, ‘Rape at Rome’ (n 34) 56-58; Quénivet (n 59) 94-95. 
60 
experiences in times of war as well as of harms encompassed within gender-based 
violence.113 
 In addition, the classification of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery as well 
as a mechanical definition of rape could be described as non-female, if not male, as they 
differ from the understanding female survivors have of the event. Forced wives see 
themselves just as that, forced wives who have all duties related to this status including, 
but not limited to, sexual intercourse. They do not consider themselves as slaves.114 For 
many rape survivors, it is irrelevant if they were raped vaginally, anally or orally with a 
body part or an object. They do not experience rape merely as a physical violation but also 
as a psychological one. Additionally, women may experience acts falling short of 
penetration as rape in the sense of a violation of their integrity.115  
 While it has been demonstrated here that the crimes of rape and forced marriage are 
examples of substantively male laws, the following chapters of this thesis show that, based 
on the sex/gender of the actors who participated in the process of defining war rape and 
forced marriage in the ICC negotiations, the ICC definitions cannot be classified as such. 
Women’s groups and advocates were highly involved in the process of defining sexualised 
crimes.116 However, as further outlined below, they followed male reasoning processes. 
Following Carol Smart, this means that the actors can be classified as male after all as 
“maleness or masculinity, once embedded in values and practices [such as legal reasoning 
processes], need not be exhaustively anchored to the male biological referent, that is, 
men.”117 
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2.2.2 Male methods of law 
 Building on the above arguments regarding the substance of law, feminists view the 
very methods of law, its reasoning processes, as gendered to the disadvantage of women. 
This assessment can be linked to the work of Carol Gilligan.118 Based on her rights and 
responsibilities study that was designed to explore different conceptions of morality and 
self, Gilligan claimed that a masculine type of reasoning focuses on ethics of individual 
rights and justice, and includes notions of fairness, logic and rationality. A feminine type 
of reasoning, in contrast, emphasises ethics of care, including relationships, contexts and 
communication. Law “lays claim to [autonomy, impartiality,] rationality, objectiveness, 
and abstraction, characteristics traditionally associated with men, and is defined in contrast 
to emotion, subjectivity, and contextualized thinking.”119 Bridging or even breaking down 
the divide between male and female reasoning, commentators, however, suggest that 
contextualised reasoning is not incompatible with a male model of abstract thinking.  
  
“All major forms of legal reasoning encompass processes of both 
contextualization and abstraction. Even the most conventional legal methods 
require that one look carefully at the factual context of a case in order to 
identify similarities and differences between that case and others.”120 
 
Just as conventional methods require contextualisation, feminist methods need to separate 
the insignificant from the significant, for example facts related to ‘the woman question’.121 
Based on this process of abstraction, facts can be contextualised and compared to other 
cases. Vice versa, noticing similarities between cases and contextualising them this way 
can be the basis for identifying these facts as significant for a particular purpose.122 
 Similar to the relationship between contextualisation and abstraction, feminine 
subjectivity and emotions are not incompatible with male rationality. Feminist methods 
value openly revealing one’s biases by stating explicitly which moral and political choices 
underlie that partiality. Linked to this, recognising one’s own implications on research 
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processes and outcomes is valued. In addition, feminist methods strive to integrate emotive 
elements. Nevertheless, feminist methods are, and must be, reasonable. After all, they 
strive to make more sense of human experience, not less.123 
 
 Legal methods and reasoning processes in the ICC negotiations of sexualised 
crimes followed traditional legal reasoning. The ICC negotiations were a conservative 
exercise, clarifying existing law but not creating new crimes.124 The ICC negotiations of 
the crime of rape are an excellent example:125 Based on fifty years of developments 
regarding the criminalisation of war rape, the actors in the ICC negotiations defined 
sexualised war violence as an issue that needed to be addressed. They chose to deviate 
from the definition of rape set out in the fourth Geneva Convention and employ precedents 
especially from the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Due to 
different views on the rape definitions developed by the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals 
as well as divergent national laws, delegates arrived at a compromise definition including 
elements of various rape definitions that existed at the time. 
 In contrast, the inclusion of the crime of sexual slavery in the list of sexualised 
crimes of the Rome Statute as well as developing its definition was a more creative legal 
exercise.126 Sexual slavery had not constituted an international crime in its own right 
before the adoption of the Rome Statute and related international rules were not very 
precise. Even though slavery was one of the earliest Human Rights violations to be 
recognised as a crime under International Law, it only became the subject of an 
international treaty in 1926.127 International rules evolved to address new forms of slavery 
including servitude and forced labour.128 The explicit inclusion of sexual slavery in the 
Rome Statute was further facilitated by international norms related to the crime as 
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discussed previously at the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna Conference) and 
the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Conference) and also in reports of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-
Like Practices during Armed Conflict and the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences.129 Reflecting customary law, the explicit inclusion 
of sexual slavery in the Rome Statute represents the codification of a specific kind of 
slavery that is increasingly recognised as a major problem worldwide. It reflects a 
development of thought. What had historically been categorised as forced prostitution − for 
example the treatment of the comfort women during the Second World War − was 
understood to be more accurately and appropriately termed sexual slavery fifty years later 
when the ICC negotiations took place. However, the cautious approach delegates took in 
defining sexual slavery reveals traditional legal reasoning and the importance of legal 
precedents. Delegates stayed away from a more progressive definition that could have 
explicitly included forced marriage in times of armed conflict and relied on established 
international rules like the (Supplementary) Slavery Convention in defining the crime. The 
ICC negotiations of the crime of sexual slavery are an excellent example that existing rules 
cannot be rejected as they 
 
“represent accumulated past wisdom, which must be reconciled with the 
contingencies and practicalities presented by fresh facts. […] Ideally, however, 
rules leave room for the new insights and perspectives generated by new 
contexts. […] [T]he specific circumstances of a new case may dictate novel 
readings and applications of rules, readings and applications that not only were 
not, but could not or should not have been determined in advance.”130  
 
 This excursus on the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage 
demonstrated that actors used male methods of law and reasoning processes as they 
defined an issue, analysed relevant precedents and recommended a conclusion based on 
logic and abstraction. However, sexualised war violence against women was defined as an 
issue to be legally addressed. Employing female reasoning in the sense of 
contextualisation, precedents were analysed open-mindedly, making room for the new 
insights and perspectives generated by new contexts. 
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2.2.3 The male legal subject 
 In addition to a male legal substance and method, feminist legal theories claim that 
the legal subject is implicitly a man “[t]o the extent that law’s construction of its subjects is 
in terms of the characteristics of the first members of [binary] pairs [such as male/female, 
subject/object and public/private].”131 As we see in the example of the ICC definition of 
rape,132 it is explicitly stated in a footnote that the definition is intended to be gender-
neutral. However, the specification that the “perpetrator invaded […] any part of the body 
of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ”133 implicitly assumes that the 
perpetrator and subject of the definition is a man. Similarly, at first glance, the ICC 
definition of sexual slavery is gender-neutral. However, as mentioned above, a footnote 
elaborates that “[i]t is […] understood that the conduct described in [the elements of the 
crime of sexual slavery] includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children.”134 While this does not necessarily establish men as the subject of this particular 
law, it constructs women (and children) as its objects. Thus it could be argued that it 
implicitly makes men the subject. 
In relation to the claim that the substance, method and subject of law are male, it 
has to be stressed that men just as women are not a homogenous group. Differences exist 
between different men and different women as well as between the sexes. While the first 
members of the binary pairs mentioned above are culturally marked as masculine and the 
second as feminine, they do not express the whole of men’s and women’s lives.135 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind the problematic implication that men and 
women are naturally endowed with certain characteristics. This easily slides into socio-
biologism, ignoring that the feminine is defined by a patriarchal culture where difference 
implies gender hierarchies.136 It also has to be stressed that different men and different 
women hold different views on different issues. Where this thesis interprets the substance, 
method and subject of law as male based on feminist theories, the present researcher is 
aware that that does not reflect the (only) viewpoint of (all) men. 
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2.2.4 Rationales for using feminist theories 
 Feminist ideas underpin the present researcher’s understandings of the research 
topic and its relevance. In this sense, the decision to apply feminist theories was a practical 
one. The subject of the research project is an issue of gender. War rape and forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict are gendered crimes as they target women and men to 
different extents, in different ways and for different purposes. Acts of gender-based 
violence include violations that are based on, and perpetuate, socially constructed or 
stereotyped gender roles, and the power differences between women and men. In addition 
to the crimes discussed in this thesis, law-making is gendered. Women and men are 
involved in law-making processes to different extents. Consequently, law-making and its 
outcomes reflect a male type of reasoning and male concerns. Feminist theories are useful 
to address these issues of gender. 
 
 
 
2.3 Constructivism 
Like feminism, constructivism is not a single, unified approach.137 “[T]here is 
vibrant debate within constructivism, with competing understandings [amongst others] of 
logics of interaction.”138 Nevertheless, it is possible to define certain key assumptions and 
ideas that are held in common by most constructivist scholars. They “focus on the analysis 
of processes of social construction and the role of identity in politics; emphasise the 
importance of ideas, norms and inter-subjectivity in social actions; and highlight 
possibilities of social change.”139 Constructivists assume that the world is socially 
constructed by people. Therefore it can change and constructivists seek to explain these 
changes. They understand people’s backgrounds to influence their identities140 and 
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interests, and to be largely made up of normative structures. Constructivists also recognise 
material structures but understand their content and significance to be directed by 
normative structures. Normative structures influence actors’ identities and interests through 
the logic of consequences (instrumentalism), appropriateness (morality and ethics), arguing 
(rational oppositional discourse), practicality (practice), purposive role playing, habit 
(unreflected action) and emotions. Actors’ identities and interests influence their actions 
which can lead to change in normative structures (constructivist circle).141  
The relevant actors for this thesis are state and NGO delegations and their members 
that participated in the ICC negotiations. For the purpose of this thesis, a state is an entity 
with “a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states.”142 NGOs are defined as “a not-for-profit group, 
principally independent from government, which is organized on a local, national or 
international level to address issues in support of the public good. [An NGO is] [t]ask-
oriented and made up of people with a common interest”.143 Although some organisations 
have government officials as their members, they are still considered NGOs here. Even 
though the ICRC has a hybrid nature, including characteristics of an NGO and an 
International Organisation,144 for the purpose of this thesis, it is included in the category of 
NGOs as this is the role of interest for this research. The terms ‘NGO’, ‘civil society’ and 
‘non-state actors’ are used synonymously.145 
Structures that will be considered are relevant personal, national and international 
values, norms and rules. Constructivist theories in themselves are unclear about how 
values, norms and rules are defined.146 For the purpose of this thesis, a value is one’s 
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judgment of what is important in life. Norms are “standards of behaviour created through 
mutual expectation in a social setting.”147 They are understood as emanating from shared 
values and as the basis of legally enforceable rules.148 Rules are legal norms, sets of 
regulations governing conduct. Using the example of war rape, the judgment in Prosecutor 
v Jean-Paul Akayesu passed by the ICTR defines rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”.149 Enforcing this 
rule, Jean-Paul Akayesu was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for rape, constituting a 
crime against humanity.150 In the Furundžija trial,151 the ICTY defined rape as  
 
“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”  
 
Anto Furundžija was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for outrages upon personal 
dignity, including rape, constituting a war crime.152 Even though the rules on rape referred 
to above differ from each other, they are based on the same norm of ‘do not touch’ which 
is based on the value of bodily integrity. 
Since normative structures with regard to marriage differ considerably depending 
on the social context, this thought-experiment is more complex in the case of forced 
marriage. In a Western European context, the value of self-determination gives rise to the 
norm to be free to choose whom, when and how to marry. This creates the foundation for 
rules such as Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which 
states that “[m]arriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses”.153 Another rule on marriage is Article 16 of the Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)154 which calls on 
states to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all 
matters relating to marriage and family relations”,155 including the same right to freely 
enter into marriage. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 The constructivist theories of Martha Finnemore and Peter Katzenstein 
Martha Finnemore can be understood as a representative of systemic 
constructivism, concentrating on interactions between state actors rather than on what 
happens within states. Therefore, systemic constructivism focuses on the international 
domain. Finnemore placed a focus on international norms and the way they influence 
actors’ identities and in turn interests and actions. Finnemore claimed that NGOs are 
“active teachers” of states. NGOs as outside actors present problems and solutions to state 
governments. They teach their views to states by setting agendas, defining tasks and 
shaping interests of states.156 This way, NGOs not only influence states’ actions but also 
their identities. Therefore, Finnemore’s theory allows for examining shifts in states’ 
actions and for tracing the causes of these shifts back to normative claims made by 
NGOs.157 To demonstrate this, she used the example of the ICRC established by Henry 
Dunant and other committed policy entrepreneurs. The non-governmental organisation was 
built specifically to promote humanitarian norms that were opposed by states at the time as 
limiting their sovereignty or war-making powers.158 By focusing on structures and actors, 
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Finnemore’s theory also allows for exploring how NGOs came to hold certain normative 
views and the mechanisms enabling NGOs to teach their views to states.159 
 
Contrary to systemic constructivism, unit-level constructivism as advocated by 
Peter Katzenstein offers domestic normative structures as explanations of variations in 
actors’ identities, interests and actions.160 Therefore, Katzenstein’s theory is of particular 
relevance to Hypotheses 2161 and 3.162 According to Katzenstein, actors’ interests and 
courses of action are flexible when norms of collective identity are uncontested. And vice 
versa, when norms of collective identity are contested, actors’ interests and courses of 
action are in a stalemate.163 An illustrating example of this is the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in the ICC negotiations. The Movement held rigid positions on a number of issues 
(actors’ interests and courses of action in stalemate). Its influence on the ICC negotiations, 
however, was weakened due to historical enmities between the members of the group, 
preventing it from growing together (contested norms of collective identity).164  
 
 Taken together, Martha Finnemore’s and Peter Katzenstein’s theories create a 
holistic constructivist explanation of the factors influencing the process of defining war 
rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict under the ICC. Holistic constructivism 
seeks to bridge the dichotomy between the international and the domestic domain 
reproduced by systemic and unit-level constructivism. It enables explanations of the 
development of normative structures of the present international system as well as the 
social identities they have created.165 
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2.3.2 A ‘political’ theory in a ‘legal’ thesis 
 Applying constructivist theories, which traditionally have their seeds in political 
science or international relations scholarship, may raise eyebrows in legal scholarship 
circles. For this thesis, however, using a ‘political’ theory in a ‘legal’ thesis is not 
considered a problem but rather enrichment. This research project takes an 
interdisciplinary approach to the criminalisation of war rape and forced marriage under the 
ICC instruments based on an understanding of law and politics as being interconnected and 
mutually shaping.166 Law regulates state practice and, at the same time, is created through 
it.167 Therefore, law is political, legalising current political, economic and social 
situations.168 Law and legal institutions like the ICC give politics shape and content.169 For 
example, the prohibition of sexualised crimes set out in the Rome Statute communicates to 
states that these kinds of acts are wrong and should not be tolerated. Therefore, law 
constrains politics. It teaches states what not to allow. However, when rules are 
indeterminate or situations arise that were not anticipated, law also serves as a discursive 
medium in which states make, address and assess legal claims.170  
 The ICC negotiations of rape and forced marriage are a good example.171 At the 
time when the ICC negotiations began, rape had been categorised and defined in different 
ways. State and non-state actors used this indeterminate status to discuss their 
understandings of rape, eventually agreeing on a compromise definition. While war rape 
had been a well-established and well-theorised crime at the time of the ICC negotiations 
(albeit with varying classifications and definitions), forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict only just began to appear on the international agenda. The Women’s Caucus took 
the opportunity offered by the negotiations of the Rome Statute and raised the issue in the 
context of the discussions of the crime of sexual slavery. The Caucus’ aim was to achieve 
gender-sensitive legal recognition of the various experiences of women in war, resulting in 
an expanded list of sexualised crimes not limited to rape and forced prostitution. Its efforts 
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were met with strong opposition from a group of mainly Arab states who engaged in this 
particular aspect of the ICC negotiations to protect national marriage laws and practices 
from falling within the reach of crimes against humanity as well as from international 
interference. 
  
“By broadening the concept of politics to include issues of identity and purpose 
as well as strategy, by treating rules, norms, and ideas as constitutive, not just 
constraining, and by stressing the importance of discourse, communication, and 
socialisation in framing human behaviour, constructivism offers [rich] 
resources for understanding the politics of international law”.172 
 
“Constructivism, and its sophisticated understanding of norms, makes possible a 
sociologically-rich and historically-grounded understanding of […] law.”173 
Constructivism is interesting for legal scholars as they are interested in conformity of 
action with rules174 and constructivism provides arguments about why behaviour may be 
rule-driven. Law is prescriptive, whereas constructivism is descriptive and explanatory. 
Questions about why particular rules exist and not others, or why states do or do not 
comply with them are marginal to legal scholarship but central to constructivists. However, 
if laws are not based on informed understandings about actors’ identities, interests and 
actions as well as the normative structures that shaped them, laws will be dismissed as 
unrealistic or naive. By explaining why and how actions may be driven by normative 
structures, constructivist theories deal with issues that are foundational for law.175  
 
 
 
2.4 In place of a conclusion: Shortcomings of feminism and constructivism, and 
advantages of a combined theoretical approach 
 Various criticisms are raised against feminists and feminist theories. Critics argue 
that feminists apply a top-down approach, only looking at the top of society and drawing 
conclusions about society as a whole. Along the same lines, feminists claim to represent all 
women while often focusing on actors and structures of the global North. Based on 
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essentialist understandings of sex/gender, feminism’s critics argue that women and men are 
fundamentally different. Therefore, their different roles in society should be maintained 
and traditional values or religious beliefs resulting in inequality between women and men 
should be respected. Critics also claim that feminists further disharmony between women 
and men, even promote hatred or dislike of men and boys, and exaggerate patriarchy. Even 
though feminism is committed to gender equality, it is biased towards women and to 
elevate women’s interests above men’s. Feminism is pre-committed to making distinctions 
between m and f ‒ men and women, male and female, masculine and feminine ‒ where f is 
subordinate or disadvantaged to m. Feminism is pre-committed to side with f.176 This 
priority for m/f and of siding with f results in a neglect to examine m and f without 
assuming a domination-subordination relationship that necessarily takes the form of m>f. 
Not every issue and every challenge can be attributed to m/f in the first place.177 
 
 Regarding constructivism, it is argued that it builds on an often unconscious 
positivist bias regarding International Law, focuses too little on the difference between 
social and legal norms, and is preoccupied with compliance issues. More generally, 
constructivism’s state-centricity and its idea of the nature of social agency are criticised 
and debated.178 It is suggested that mainstream constructivism ignores power structures 
like gender and patriarchy that prevent change. This leads to hierarchies and inequalities 
not being adequately addressed. Linked to this, the criticism is raised that the constructivist 
idea that actors and structures mutually constitute each other assumes equality of actors.179 
 
 Taken together, feminism and constructivism resolve some of their respective 
limitations. Feminism emphasises power structures in a constructivist analysis. 
Constructivism goes beyond feminism’s focus on m/f and m>f and enables a gender-
neutral approach.  
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 Feminism and constructivism share the desire to challenge and rethink what is 
treated as given, including traditional power structures. Feminism and constructivism stress 
the importance, diversity and changeability of normative structures and actors. This 
highlights the importance of contexts and makes communication necessary. It also raises 
scepticism about absolutes and objective grand theories.  
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3 Research methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 After Chapter 2 outlined the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, Chapter 3 
discusses the methods used. First, Chapter 3 elaborates on the main preoccupations and 
limitations of qualitative research methods. Establishing a link to the theoretical basis of 
this thesis, the feminist research method of asking ‘the woman question’ is explained and 
illustrated, and a reflective excursus on the present researcher’s bias is included. Parts 3.5 
and 3.6 contain a detailed discussion of the foundational literature and document analysis, 
and of the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research project. The methods of 
synthesis of research findings are covered before the chapter concludes with a reflection 
upon lessons learned. 
 
 
 
3.2 Qualitative research methods 
 The decision which methods to use in this research project was mainly guided by 
practical considerations. Consistent with the research project’s objectives and questions, 
qualitative rather than quantitative research methods were used.180 A better understanding 
of the ICC negotiations and how the definitions of war rape and forced marriage came 
about cannot be meaningfully created by numbers. A qualitative approach is necessary to 
answer the research questions stated in Chapter 1 as they focus on processes and aim to 
develop an understanding of actors’ identities, interests and actions in the context of the 
ICC negotiations. In addition to the research questions and hypotheses, the choice of 
research methods was also guided by feminist and constructivist theories. However, the 
present researcher also sought to remain flexible181 so as not to mechanically impose a pre-
determined format on the ICC negotiations and to limit the area of enquiry too much. In 
the interviews conducted for this thesis, flexibility allowed for genuinely revealing the 
perspectives of research participants182 (interviewees) that might not have crossed the 
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present researcher’s mind before. To generate a better contextual understanding of events 
such as the ICC negotiations, qualitative research methods probe beneath surface 
appearances.183 This is in accord with feminist and constructivist theories that aim to 
deconstruct what is taken for granted. Since feminist and constructivist theories understand 
experiences to be socially constructed and to vary over time and space, a flexible and 
context-sensitive research approach was necessary.184 Qualitative research methods in 
general also place an emphasis on contexts as well as on processes. This demonstrates 
concern for how events or patterns unfold over time. A context- and process-sensitive 
research approach facilitates rich and multi-layered (thick) descriptions.185 Linked to this is 
feminism’s and constructivism’s scepticism of absolutes, generalisations and objectivity. 
Consequently, feminists make cautious claims about the data constructed.186 
 
 While qualitative research methods are appropriate for this research project, their 
limitations have to be taken into account. Critics often assert that qualitative research is too 
subjective and findings rely upon personal relationships between the researcher and the 
research participants. This makes qualitative studies difficult to replicate.187 Within the 
feminist and constructivist framework set out in Chapter 2 as well as below, however, 
subjectivity and even biases are generally considered unavoidable and acceptable as long 
as the researcher reflects on them and communicates them to the research participants.188 
In contrast to the objectivity that usually is expected from a researcher in the sense of 
impartiality, being unbiased and operating in as value-free a way as possible,189 for 
example when conducting an interview, feminism and constructivism establish the 
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researcher as a real, authentic individual with concrete, specific interests that he or she 
conveys in the research process. Arising emotions are considered part of the research 
experience and should be taken into account. Consequently, the researcher is understood to 
affect the research process and outcomes.190 Consequently, any findings are tentative as 
they are subjective and depend on the researcher’s identity, interests and focus as well as 
on his or her construction, selection and interpretation of information.191 This makes 
findings difficult to replicate and hence to verify. 
 As explained above, while it is criticised that findings resulting from qualitative 
research rely upon personal relationships between the researcher and the research 
participants, this is unproblematic according to feminist values that emphasise trusting 
relationships, mutual understanding and true dialogues.192 
 In addition to difficulties in replicating qualitative studies, qualitative findings are 
difficult to generalise due to the small number of research participants or cases (small n).193 
A certain degree of generalisability is nevertheless achieved in this research project 
through linkages established to, and comparisons drawn with, other researchers’ work or 
other cases. In addition to questions of generalisability, another criticism raised in the 
context of studies involving a small number of research participants problematizes their 
validity. It is argued that small n studies are not representative and therefore misleading. 
This criticism, however, ignores that qualitative research involving a small number of 
participants often provides more intense accounts, considerable detail and more insights 
into a situation or event than studies involving larger samples. Particularly relevant for this 
thesis, small n studies allow for acquiring a better sense of an experience at an individual 
and subjective level.194 
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3.3 Feminist research methods: Asking ‘the woman question’ 
 Before discussing feminist research methods used in this thesis, it is important to 
note that the use of the label ‘feminist’ 
 
“can create an expectation of feminist originality or invention that feminists do 
not intend and cannot fulfil. […] Still, labelling methods or practices or 
attitudes as feminist identifies them as a chosen part of a larger, critical agenda 
originating in the experiences of gender subordination. Although not every 
component of feminist practice and reform is unique, these components 
together address a set of concerns not reached by existing traditions.”195  
 
Feminist research methods are “critical and constructive”196 and aim to uncover aspects of 
an issue which more traditional methods tend to neglect or suppress.197 Emanating from 
feminist politics, “feminist methods […] find their justification […] in their ability to 
advance substantive feminist goals.”198 Feminist methods are not discrete but rather use 
“analytic and critical methods shared with, for example the sociology of law, Marxism or 
critical legal theory to illuminate sex/gender issues”.199  
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, feminist legal theories show that women’s realities are 
shaped by male law, legal institutions and legal processes. Therefore, law produces, but is 
also a product of, realities that are different for women and men as well as for different 
women and men.200 This assumption that some features of law are not only biased but also 
male is linked to asking ‘the woman question’. ‘The woman question’ asks about the 
gender implications of rules and social practices which may otherwise appear to be 
objective or neutral. It includes questions such as the following: Have women been 
considered? If not, in what way have they been left out? How could that be corrected? 
What difference would a correction make?201 Asking ‘the woman question’ in law means  
• asking how, where and why the law, legal institutions and legal processes fail 
women; 
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• analysing the production of a system of rules;  
• challenging assumptions, power structures and stereotypes;  
• questioning who examines an issue, who makes a law and whom particular rules 
serve;  
• scrutinising the definition of, and explanation for, an issue, the focus of an inquiry 
and which social conditions are reflected and impacted; 
• uncovering silences; and 
• examining possibilities for an empowering transformation of the law.202  
Consequently, 
 
“[a]sking the woman question reveals the ways in which political choice and 
institutional arrangements contribute to women’s subordination. Without the 
woman question, differences associated with women are taken for granted and, 
unexamined, may serve as a justification for laws that disadvantage women. 
The woman question reveals how the position of women reflects the 
organization of society rather than the inherent characteristics of women. As 
many feminists have pointed out, difference is located in relationships and 
social institutions […] not in women themselves. In exposing the hidden effects 
of law that do not explicitly discriminate on the basis of sex, the woman 
question helps to demonstrate how social structures embody norms that 
implicitly render women different and thereby subordinate.”203 
 
 In addition to asking ‘the woman question’ as a method to analyse the 
criminalisation of war rape and forced marriage under the ICC instruments, it can be 
argued that the substance of the thesis’ subject itself is asking ‘the woman question’. After 
all, as argued in Chapter 2, the thesis focuses on issues of gender within the making of 
International Law. However, from a constructivist perspective, this is unavoidable as 
methods do not only shape the substance of research,204 but substance also shapes the 
research methods that are used. 
 As a general word of caution, when asking ‘the woman question’ it is crucial to 
keep in mind that women are not a homogenous group. As stressed in Chapter 2, women 
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differ for example on the basis of nationality, race, culture, class, age, education, 
profession and sexual orientation.205  Patriarchal culture essentialises women and 
establishes hierarchies based on the degree as to which women adhere to their patriarchal 
definition.206 
 
 
 
3.4 The present researcher’s biases 
 As mentioned above, feminist and constructivist theories and methods acknowledge 
that a researcher’s identity, interests and actions shape the research process and 
outcomes.207 This requires including a reflection on the nature of the present researcher’s 
biases and how they affected the research process, approaches, style, questions and 
outcomes. 
 The present researcher is a young, middle-class, white, Western-European, feminist 
woman. Her feminist values formed the foundation for the project. They played a role in 
selecting the subject of research, formulating research questions, choosing and using 
theories and methods of research as well as in the way data was analysed and interpreted. 
Therefore, the present researcher’s feminist values also had an impact on the research 
outcomes. The formulation of research questions, data analysis and interpretation as well 
as the research outcomes were further influenced by the generally positive view the present 
researcher holds of NGOs, their specialised subject knowledge for example of sexualised 
war violence against women, and their ability to influence states’ interests and actions. 
Shared with most research participants, the researcher’s social, professional and 
geographic status provided the means, and facilitated access to, sources of information. 
Her professional background in the studies of politics shaped the way the research project 
was approached and carried out. The researcher’s professional background as an academic 
more generally positively shaped her rapport with research participants. Her sex and 
gender, in contrast, sometimes proved challenging when matched by the interviewee. On 
one occasion, her identity as a young, Western-European female feminist let to 
unnecessary caution when speaking to an older, male Arab. Here, however, the shared 
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social and professional status was perceived by the researcher to build bridges. The 
research style in general was more influenced by the researcher’s very organised, friendly, 
open, respectful, non-pretentious and non-judgmental personality. This enabled her to 
follow the pace of the interview.208 
 
 
 
3.5 Critical analysis of existing literature and relevant documents 
 This thesis employed a critical analysis of existing literature and relevant 
documents related to the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage as the 
foundational research method. The aim was to draw conclusions about the factors that 
influenced the definition of war rape and forced marriage. A document analysis is a 
necessary part of every research project and was of significance here as this research 
project not only analyses secondary literature but also primary sources. Furthermore, a 
document analysis is an important research tool in its own right and an invaluable part of 
most triangulation.209 
 The documents analysed for this thesis were mainly documents available in the 
public domain. On a number of occasions, authors and organisations were contacted to 
provide documents that were not publicly available. The documents analysed included 
official documents deriving from state and private sources, mass media and virtual outputs 
as well as secondary literature.210 Examples are conventions and statutes, UN documents, 
other legal documents as well as case reports of national and international courts. 
Furthermore, books, chapters in edited books, journal articles, (research) reports and 
working papers mainly from the fields of International Law, International Politics and 
Gender Studies were examined. ICC advocacy papers, commentaries, recommendations, 
reports and working papers were also analysed. In addition, conference presentations and 
papers, (online) newspaper and magazine articles, radio broadcasts and blog entries were 
studied. Together, these sources are considered to establish a comprehensive record of the 
ICC negotiations. 
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 Secondary literature was found through library-based and online searches. Based 
on the context created by secondary literature, primary sources were found through online 
searches using the ICC Legal Tools database, UN databases such as the Official Document 
System of the United Nations and the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, the 
CICC website and the websites of relevant international courts and tribunals as well as 
through using the Google search engine. The research project profited from the existence 
and easy availability of documents. It has to be kept in mind, however, that library and 
online searches provide only partial and limited access to information in the sense that 
library catalogues do not include every book possible and not all documents may be 
available in the public domain and therefore in a database.211 To access as many 
documents as possible, various libraries and databases were used for this research project. 
Although Google was the only search engine used, searches in different languages and the 
use of different key words provided access to a wider part of the web. Nevertheless, 
working with the official record of the ICC negotiations proved to be a challenge. The 
official record of the ICC negotiations includes lists of delegates who participated in 
different meetings.212 However, those lists are not available for all meetings, not even all 
official ones. They are incomplete in the sense that they focus on state delegations and do 
not record the participation of non-state actors. Therefore, finding out which NGOs 
participated and who was part of their delegation was virtually impossible. This proved 
challenging when sampling for interviews. Just as the official record does not include lists 
of delegates for all meetings, it also does not include crucial records of informal meetings 
and of drafting work. The documents that are available record outcomes but seldom give 
enough information to trace how the outcomes came about. They seldom indicate what 
influenced a state’s proposal. These challenges were met by conducting research 
interviews.  
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 In general, the documents used in this research project were deemed authentic, 
credible and meaningful.213 They were regarded to be reliable, clear and comprehensible 
and would not have been used if they were not. A large majority of documents is of 
unquestioned authorship. Comparisons were established between information constructed 
from different documents as well as between information constructed from documents and 
in interviews to ensure their credibility. This way, erroneous or distorted information was 
balanced.  
 The documents were analysed thematically as well as theoretically. This is 
discussed further in part 3.7 below. In addition, documents informing Chapters 8 and 9 
were analysed hermeneutically, seeking to bring out the meanings of texts from the 
perspective of its authors.214 Moreover, the importance of analysing documents in their 
historic context became apparent especially in relation to the legislative histories of war 
rape and forced marriage and their relationship to, and impact on, the ICC negotiations.215  
 
 
 
3.6 Interviews 
 When the document analysis reached theoretical saturation, many research 
questions could still not be answered to the satisfaction of the present researcher. Therefore 
the critical document analysis was supplemented with interviews aimed at gaining a better 
understanding of the dynamics of the ICC negotiations, the main actors, their positions on 
sexualised violence, particularly war rape and forced marriage, and how these developed. 
In a way, this made the interviews comparable to narrative interviews.216 However, as the 
interview also aimed at uncovering the interviewees’ taken-for-granted assumptions and 
therefore explored conceptual understandings of terms like ‘forced marriage’ and how 
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these were positioned in relation, and linked to, other concepts, the interviews can also be 
characterised as conceptual interviews.217  
 As the interviews can be described as an “interactive and collaborative process of 
articulating one’s experiences and making meaning of them with others who also articulate 
their experiences”,218 they fit in with feminist consciousness-raising. In consciousness-
raising, all participants are established as real, authentic individuals with their own 
personal experiences which shape, and are shaped by, theory.219 “The interplay between 
experience and theory ‘reveals the social dimension of individual experience and the 
individual dimension of the social experience’ and hence the political nature of personal 
experience.”220 Consciousness-raising values non-hierarchical relationships, reciprocity, 
empathy, active listening and engaging as well as being open and paying attention to 
subtleties.221 However, especially the researcher’s self-disclosure creates the risk of being 
stereotyped and increasingly vulnerable to criticism.222 Based on the researcher’s values, 
research participants may second-guess their answers in an interview.223 Furthermore, if 
the researcher’s views are not shared or present a challenge to research participants, the 
question arises if feminist researchers should prioritise an interviewee-centred approach or 
stay true to their politics. This dilemma raises the question of how far the commitment of 
seeing through the eyes of the research participant can and should be stretched.224 Such a 
situation arose in this research when the present researcher spoke to a member of the Arab 
block. However, different views did not create tension as the researcher was aware of 
personal biases and of the possibility that a challenging situation could arise. Continuing 
positive rapport between the researcher and the interviewee was facilitated by the aim of 
the interviewer to understand rather than to judge the Arab block’s positions in the ICC 
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negotiations. For less favourable situations, it is suggested to remain non-judgmental while 
sensitively and reasonably challenging patriarchal attitudes.  
 
 Research participants were sampled applying a generic purpose sampling approach. 
This approach is relatively open-ended. Emphasising the generation of concepts and 
contextual understanding, it increased the prospect that research participants would have 
something of relevance to say about the research questions central to this thesis.225 In 
sampling members of various state and non-state delegations that participated in the ICC 
negotiations, a great deal of variety in the resulting sample was ensured. Consequently, 
different points of view were heard and considered. A sequential approach to purposive 
sampling ensured the necessary flexibility to add to the initial sample as benefited the 
research questions and expected answers. This indicates that this thesis employed a 
combination of critical case sampling and snowball sampling. Using critical case sampling, 
research participants were chosen because it was expected that they would allow a 
hypothesis to be tested.226 For example, interviews with members of the CICC were 
conducted to test Hypothesis 1 that NGOs played a role in the ICC negotiations. As the 
research questions remained the same throughout the research process, an a priori 
sampling approach was used where the criteria for selecting participants were established 
at the outset.227 The delegations included in the sample were determined based on 
preliminary research on the main actors in the ICC negotiations, especially in relation to 
sexualised violence, particularly war rape and forced marriage. Nevertheless, the sample 
itself grew as research participants proposed other participants who could contribute to the 
research project (snowball sampling).228 Snowball sampling also limited the negative 
effects of the availability of only incomplete information about the actors who participated 
in the ICC negotiations.  
 This sampling approach required the researcher to have a clear idea of the research 
project’s goals. The fact that research participants were sampled according to these goals 
can be perceived as limiting for the research findings. For this research project, however, it 
was considered to be a focused and efficient approach. It is also criticised that the sampling 
                                                          
225
 Bryman (n 180) 418, 422-423. 
226
 Bryman (n 180) 418-419. 
227
 Bryman (n 180) 418. 
228
 Bryman (n 180) 418, 424. 
85 
approach taken here does not allow the researcher to generalise to a population.229 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this is also not the aim of this thesis. 
 
 As the research participants were members of various state and non-state 
delegations that participated in the ICC negotiations, the concept of elite interviews230 
would have become relevant to the methods applied in this thesis had a different theoretical 
and methods framework been used. A feminist frame, however, renders the concept 
redundant. As mentioned above, it stresses non-hierarchical relationships231 and 
understands interviews as an interviewee-orientated but reciprocal process where the 
research participant as well as the researcher are considered knowledgeable and offer 
information. This makes them co-constructors of meaning independent of their 
background.232 Feminist research methods emphasise trusting relationships, mutual 
understanding and true dialogues.233 Contrary to this, understanding interview situations 
within an elite frame may create mistrust of the research participants – politicians and 
lobbyists – by the researcher. In addition, an elite frame would have created and 
perpetuated a dualism contested by feminists. Interviewees would have been constructed as 
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powerful knowers, as privileged, influential experts while the interviewer would have been 
viewed as a powerless footman.234 Following a poststructuralist view of power, however, 
power is a diffuse, fluid and mobile concept rather than an inscribed capacity. It is 
exercised rather than appropriated by particular individuals or groups. Power is exercised 
in a variety of modalities and therefore is negotiable. In this context, the constructivist 
view that elites do not only make decisions that affect others but are also affected by 
decisions made by others235 becomes relevant. However, it has to be considered that the 
feminist emphasis on reciprocal, equal relationships between the researcher and the 
research participant could also hide actually existing power differences.236  
 
 Modern technology and the use of email and social networks greatly facilitated 
access to potential research participants. The overall response rate to initial enquiries was 
high. Eventually, the sample consisted of sixteen research participants who were involved 
in the ICC negotiations and eventually were available for an interview. Based on the 
purpose of this thesis, this number was judged big enough to ensure meaningful 
contributions to the understanding of the ICC negotiations, especially of the main actors 
and their positions in relation to the crimes of war rape and forced marriage in times of 
armed conflict. At the same time, it was small enough to undertake a deep, case-orientated 
analysis.237 
 
 In the initial email sent to potential interviewees, they were informed about the 
purpose of the interview and the research project as well as the way in which the interview 
would be conducted. A list of general themes that would be discussed was included to give 
further information about the topic of the interviews. Including a list of general themes 
rather than of questions aimed at preventing the research participants from fully preparing 
and adjusting their answers beforehand. The list of themes, however, was considered 
precise enough to allow the interviewees to generally prepare for the interview and refresh 
their memories. Attached to this initial email were two letters of support from the present 
researcher’s supervisors setting out her status and lending legitimacy and credibility to her 
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work and interview request. After the researcher received initial agreement of research 
participants to take part in an interview, informed consent forms were emailed to them. 
These included information on confidentiality, anonymity, the right to withdraw and the 
researcher’s right to publish data constructed in the interviews. As arrangements regarding 
confidentiality and anonymity were respected, no negative consequences for the 
interviewees were expected.  
 
 For reasons of access as well as efficiency and effectiveness regarding time and 
costs, the interviews were carried out via Skype or telephone. However, this is not 
considered to have resulted in any disadvantages in terms of outcomes. Following feminist 
research methods, the fact that both the researcher and the research participants remained 
in familiar environments can even be understood as an advantage as it influenced the 
situational and spatial power dynamics of the interview situation, facilitating equality.238 
Also stressing context naturalness, another critique raised against Skype or telephone 
interviews is that responses in face-to-face interviews are more accurate because the 
researcher and research participant have a ‘normal’ conversation.239 This view, however, is 
deemed outdated since video and telephone calls are a frequently used part of modern 
communication. Additionally, evidence suggests that little difference exists in the kinds of 
responses researchers get when asking questions in person or on the phone.240 This 
counters arguments that face-to-face interviews would be more fruitful than telephone 
interviews. The critique that it is not possible to observe participants’ body language in 
telephone interviews can be and was addressed through Skype’s video call function. 
However, plain telephone interviews were perceived as the most fruitful ones as the 
researcher and interviewee could fully concentrate on the substance of the conversation 
without being distracted by physical appearances.  
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 Before the interviews began, the interviewees were briefed again as to the purpose 
of the interviews since some time could have passed between the initial email contact and 
the interview itself. In the verbal briefing as well as in the verbal and written debriefing, 
participants were also asked if they had any questions or (further) comments. This aimed at 
balancing the forms of engagement. It conveyed an additional sense of interviewee-
orientation. More practically, it also aimed at preventing misunderstandings and to ensure 
the research participant did not feel that any relevant points remained unsaid. Some of the 
main points the researcher learned from an interview were fed back to the interviewee. 
This conveyed a sense of relevance of what was said for the research project. Additionally, 
feeding back the main points prepared the researcher and research participant for follow-up 
questions. 
 
 The interviews themselves were semi-structured. This open-ended and discursive 
format was chosen so as to allow for flexibility on the side of the researcher and the 
research participants as well as to facilitate the process of developing and refining 
hypotheses. Semi-structured interviews are guided by a list of questions or topics to be 
covered.241 However, in most cases in this research, the questions were not followed in the 
way outlined in the interview guide and questions were added spontaneously, depending 
on the situation. For example, if relevant, lines of thought identified by earlier research 
participants were taken up and presented to later ones. Interviewees were also invited to 
raise additional or complementary issues to those brought up by the interviewer. As 
mentioned above, this facilitated an appreciation of what interviewees saw as relevant for 
the research area.  
 
 In addition to lines of thought identified by earlier interviewees, the questions 
asked in the interviews were also based on the initial research questions stated in Chapter 
1, existing literature and document-based research on the ICC negotiations carried out 
previously as well as on discussions with the present researcher’s colleagues. The 
questions mainly asked about values, behaviours, opinions, formal and informal roles, as 
well as about relationships. In accordance with the semi-structured format of the 
interviews, most questions varied from interviewee to interviewee, based on the person’s 
background, to which delegation they belonged, the nature and position of this delegation 
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in the ICC negotiations, and the issues with which it engaged. In general, the questions 
constructed the thematic structure of the interviews.242 
 The interview questions were formulated indefinitely so as to keep alternative lines 
of enquiry open. However, to prevent interviewees from avoiding unfamiliar or sensitive 
topics that were important for the research, follow-up questions, probing questions, 
specifying questions, direct questions and interpreting questions were asked.243 Being 
explorative,244 every interview began with introducing questions245 about how the research 
participant became involved in the ICC negotiations and his/her (delegation’s) roles, 
positions and strategies. The rest of the interview questions were a varied combination of: 
• Follow-up questions to get the interviewee to elaborate on something he/she said, 
for example: “Could you expand on that?”; 
• Probing questions directly following up on something that had been said, for 
example: “Do you have other examples of this?”; 
• Specifying questions, for example: “Could you give me an example of how you 
engaged with the Women’s Caucus?” 
• Direct and indirect questions, for example: “Do you think forced marriage would 
have been understood differently if the ICC negotiations would have taken place 
today?”, “Did you get a sense that certain states led this effort?” 
• Structuring questions, for example: “I would like to move on to something we 
have not discussed yet.”; 
• Interpreting questions, for example: “Do you mean that the concept of human 
dignity underlies those of personal autonomy and integrity?” 
• Silence, giving time to reflect. 
Most questions were linked to information about and/or proposals submitted by the 
delegation in question during the ICC negotiations to demonstrate the researcher’s 
knowledge and preparation as well as to make the question relevant to the research 
participant.  
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 With the consent of the research participants, every interview was digitally 
recorded. To prevent loss of data in case of technical problems, notes were taken in the 
course of every interview. These were completed extensively when reviewing the 
interview recordings. Taking notes during the interviews also facilitated being responsive 
and flexible in asking follow-up questions. It allowed for an initial interpretation and 
analysis of the data simultaneously with its construction.  
 As the interviews were not concerned with the way things were said but rather with 
what was said, they were not transcribed. This decision was further motivated by a view of 
transcriptions as different sources than the original interview recordings since an 
interpretation would have slipped in. Although it is possible to record non-verbal 
communication in transcriptions, gestures, facial expressions, tone of voice and pauses 
would have been likely to be neglected here. On a more practical note, the extensive notes 
taken during and after the interview were considered to serve the same purpose as 
transcriptions in terms of becoming familiar with what was said and conducting an initial 
analysis of the interviews. 
 
 Based on the extensive notes and original interview recordings, the interviews were 
analysed thematically as well as theoretically.246 This way, a sound understanding of the 
data was obtained. The constructed data was judged to be reliable. Following feminist 
research methods, the researcher relied on the authority of the interviewees’ experiences 
and understood reality to be what the research participants perceived it to be.247 This is not 
to say that it was taken at face value without critically triangulating it with other data from 
different sources of information. Taking into account that the ICC negotiations took place 
ten to twenty years ago, biases due to memory lapses and distortion were allowed for. This 
follows a constructivist point of view according to which memory is a social construct that 
changes over time. Therefore, judged by the trustworthiness of the interviewees’ reports248 
and their credibility based on triangulation and a thorough data analysis, the constructed 
data was considered to be valid, sound and worth depending on.249 The interviews 
investigated what they intended to investigate. 
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 In terms of a thematic evaluation250 of the interviews, it can be concluded that the 
interviews contributed to the researcher’s knowledge and understanding of the ICC 
negotiations. They provided first-hand accounts and information that was not on record 
before. The interviews helped to understand the context and established the atmosphere of 
the negotiations. They also contributed towards a better understanding of what drove the 
actors who participated in the negotiations. Speaking to some of the authors of crucial 
proposals facilitated a more thorough interpretation thereof. Therefore, the results of the 
interviews were considered worthwhile, valuable, insightful and beneficial.251 
 In terms of a dynamic evaluation, the interaction between the researcher and 
interviewees was good and the atmosphere friendly, open, supportive and inspiring. 
Interviewees replied to the questions posed in an expansive, detailed and considered 
fashion. Indicated by the use of the personal pronoun ‘we’ or phrases like ‘in my opinion’, 
they gave private and/or public accounts252 of the ICC negotiations. While public accounts 
affirmed and reproduced a certain order, private accounts went beyond official party lines 
and conveyed personal views. The researcher was aware that the interviewees’ accounts of 
the ICC negotiations were snapshots rather than the full story. They were accounts drawn 
from individual and personal experience and might have been presented in a way to 
impress. This meant they had to be interpreted with care. It also meant, however, that the 
accounts provided strong impressions of characters, ideas and objects, and allowed themes 
to be drawn from their telling. They promoted awareness and understanding of a situation 
and therefore had an educational force.253 In most interviews, the conversation between the 
researcher and research participant was on equal footing. The conversation was regarded 
by the researcher as a reciprocal co-construction of meaning in the sense that both 
interviewer and interviewees shared relevant knowledge and influenced each other in what 
information was shared and where a focus was placed.254 Therefore, despite the impression 
that most interviewees were used to giving interviews and to speaking in public, the 
interviews were not perceived by the researcher as elite interviews. On the contrary: the 
research participants’ experience in public speaking was considered to contribute to the 
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clearness of articulation as well as to the consistency of their accounts. One or two 
interviewees suggested that some of the answers could be found in the literature. In some 
situations, the interviewees became vague and evasive when they could not answer a 
question directly, and defensive when a critical follow-up question was asked. Some 
research participants asked for a list of questions to be sent prior to the interview. 
Therefore, they had and used the opportunity to prepare their responses. This occasionally 
limited the spontaneity of the interviewer and reduced interaction between the interviewee 
and the interviewer. Overall, however, the interviews where questions were sent to the 
research participant beforehand were not viewed as less informative as the ones where only 
general topics were shared with the interviewee prior to the interview. In general the 
researcher’s outsider status in terms of experience and age as well as in most cases 
profession and gender was not regarded by the researcher to have had a negative impact on 
the interview process and outcomes. The shared status of gender proved challenging as 
some female interviewees were on occasion patronising and defensive when challenged. 
The shared status of profession in contrast proved beneficial in that the interviews with 
fellow academics who had participated in the ICC negotiations were perceived by the 
present researcher to be the most fruitful since the interviewees did not only have an 
understanding of the subject matter, but also of the research process. 
 Evaluating the potential impact of the knowledge and understanding gained from 
the interviews, it could provide practitioner-readers (for example actors involved in 
international law-making) with an occasion to reflect on their own practices and potentially 
spur change. Especially the more substantive discussions could be used in actors’ advocacy 
to influence international law-making regarding sexualised crimes. However, it has to be 
noted that the researcher makes no claim to superior knowledge and simply wishes to 
contribute towards an understanding of the factors that influenced the definition of war 
rape and forced marriage in the ICC instruments.255 
 
 Reflecting on possible points of critique of interviews as a method of research, 
feminist and constructivist theories and methods render many of these points irrelevant. As 
with qualitative research methods in general, it could be argued that interview-based 
findings are difficult to replicate as the whole interview process is subjective rather than 
objective. Following feminist and constructivist understandings, however, this is 
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inevitable, even desirable,256 and unavoidably makes findings difficult to replicate. 
Subjectivity is balanced by a theory-led interpretation of research findings. These are 
generalisable to a certain extent as they are compared with, and linked to, other 
researchers’ work or other cases.257  
 
 
 
3.7 Synthesis of research findings 
 The methods used to synthesise research findings were based on the approaches 
used in primary research. In a way, research findings were analysed and synthesised in a 
pragmatic and eclectic way as bricolage;258 generating meaning through ad hoc techniques. 
Research findings were analysed and synthesised thematically as well as theoretically. The 
themes employed for the thematic synthesis related to the research questions and 
hypotheses. Examples are ‘the role of NGOs’ or ‘the relevance of national norms and 
rules’. Feminist and constructivist theories formed the base of the theoretical synthesis of 
research findings. The risk of noticing only those aspects that can be seen through these 
theoretical lenses was countered by staying open to alternative interpretations.259 Research 
findings were summarised both under thematic and theoretical headings. This allowed for 
the identification of prominent sub-themes as well as comparing and contrasting research 
findings and establishing connections between them. This way, it was determined how 
research findings from different sources of information related to each other. Narratives 
which went beyond individual accounts were identified and used to produce new 
interpretations of the process of defining war rape and forced marriage under the ICC.260 
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3.8 In place of a conclusion: Lessons learned 
 In place of a conclusion stands a reflection on lessons learned from employing the 
research methods outlined in this chapter. A focus lies on interviews as they have largely 
been a new experience for the present researcher.  
 Throughout the process of conducting interviews, the researcher was concerned not 
to ask leading questions. This prevented her from asking more direct questions which 
could have led to more direct answers. After having conducted a small number of 
interviews, the researcher changed her interview guide and noted down cues and more 
comprehensive and less detailed questions in preparation for the interviews. Increasingly, 
she found herself having to rely less on the interview guide. She became more confident in 
asking instinctive follow-up questions. After getting a feeling for how many questions 
could be asked in one interview, she also established a list of priorities beforehand to know 
which questions to ask when time was limited. In relation to the interview preparation in 
general, the researcher developed a feeling for what kind of, and how much, preparation 
was necessary. One feature that remained a challenge throughout was to completely 
change the topic of a conversation. Often, the desire for consistency and a well-flowing 
discussion took priority. Even though this prevented a discussion of a broader range of 
topics, it often led to in-depth conversations about specific aspects of the ICC negotiations. 
Different topics were then raised in the follow-up emails. 
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4 The pre-ICC legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 After Chapters 2 and 3 set out the theoretical and methods framework for this 
thesis, Chapters 4 and 5 provide the thematic context for the analysis of the ICC 
negotiations of the definitions of war rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict. 
Chapters 4 and 5 situate the ICC negotiations within the broader context of legal 
discussions and developments regarding war rape and forced marriage and retrace the 
legislative histories of the two crimes. They discuss the background against which the 
actors in the ICC negotiations debated the definitions of the two crimes. Chapters 4 and 5 
also form the background against which the present researcher assesses these definitions. 
The aim of Chapters 4 and 5 is also to generate a common understanding of the nature and 
definitions as well as the causes and meanings of war rape and forced marriage in times of 
armed conflict for the purpose of this thesis.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on the pre-ICC legislative histories of war rape and forced 
marriage. It analyses and assesses the understanding of the two crimes that existed at the 
time of the ICC negotiations. It outlines the context based on which war rape and forced 
marriage were negotiated in New York and Rome. Chapter 4 addresses Research 
Questions 2 and 3 in that it studies the international and national normative structures that 
influenced the driving actors and their understanding of war rape and forced marriage in 
the ICC negotiations.  
 Chapter 5 focuses on discussions and legal developments regarding war rape and 
forced marriage that took place after the negotiations of the Rome Statute and the Elements 
of Crimes had been completed. It also discusses more theoretical considerations regarding 
the causes and meanings of the two crimes. Chapter 5 explores the current understanding 
of war rape and forced marriage. Considering the influence that the ICTY and ICTR 
jurisprudence had on the ICC negotiations in the 1990s, later cases of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal and the SCSL may have an impact on future reviews of the ICC instruments. 
Therefore it is valuable to analyse here. 
 
 Chapter 4 first focuses on the legislative history of war rape and then on that of 
forced marriage. In relation to war rape, this chapter analyses early bilateral and 
multilateral conventions, the attempt to establish an international criminal tribunal after the 
First World War, the fourth Geneva Convention, international military tribunals 
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established after the Second World War, international agreements and documents from the 
period of the mid-1970s until mid-1990s, the ICTY and ICTR and their jurisprudence prior 
to the conclusion of the ICC Elements of Crimes as well as relevant national definitions of 
rape. In the absence of a similarly extensive legislative history of forced marriage, its 
increasing recognition as a crime in the second half of the 20th century is discussed. The 
definitions of war rape and forced marriage analysed and assessed in this chapter were 
referred to in the ICC negotiations of the definitions of the two crimes. Other definitions 
were added to provide a balanced and wider overview of the legal discussions and 
developments regarding the criminalisation of war rape and forced marriage before the 
establishment of the ICC. 
 
 Chapter 4 approaches the legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage in a 
constructivist way. It refers to the main actors in this process (Research Question 1), 
paying particular attention to the role of NGOs (Hypothesis 1). Chapter 4 also considers 
what influenced the actors (Research Question 2), how they understood the crimes of war 
rape and forced marriage (Research Question 3), and how they influenced the way they 
were defined (Research Question 4). However, an in-depth analysis of the normative 
structures and actors that are mutually shaped would be too comprehensive and therefore is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
 
 
4.2 War rape 
4.2.1 Early bilateral and multilateral conventions  
Preceded by national military codes,261 early bilateral and multilateral conventions 
such as the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1785)262 frame sexual war violence against 
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women as molestation which “shall not” happen. It is put into context with the destruction 
of property like homes, goods and fields. Article 38 of the Declaration of Brussels 
(1874)263 conveys an understanding of war rape as a crime of troop discipline, an illegal 
but inevitable occurrence during armed conflict,264 as well as an honour crime. It states that 
“[f]amily honour and rights […] must be respected.” The same formulation is included in 
Article 49 of the Oxford Manual of the Laws and Customs of War (1880)265 and in Article 
46 of the fourth Hague Convention (1907).266  
 
This understanding of war rape as an honour crime established rape as particularly 
harmful and therefore necessary to be legally addressed. It highlights that war rape causes 
intense suffering of the survivor as well as the disintegration of communities. The 
understanding of rape as an honour crime reflects the purpose of war rape as targeting a 
whole community rather than ‘just’ the individual survivors. Nevertheless, survivors are 
often stigmatised and excluded from their communities. Therefore, even if the 
understanding of rape as an honour crime that inflicts collective harm is in line with the 
purpose of war rape, it is detrimental to survivors. Their individual violation is subsumed 
under the violation of the community. The understanding of war rape as an honour crime 
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denies the complex physical and psychological harm rape causes survivors and overlooks 
considerations of sexual autonomy.267 It “legitimise[s] and entrench[es] the idea that the 
rape […] harmed a wife, daughter, or sister because it impugned a husband’s, father’s, or 
brother’s honor.”268 Therefore, the understanding of war rape as an honour crime results in 
a relational view of women.269 
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4.2.2 The attempt to establish an international criminal tribunal after the First World War 
After the First World War, the German Reich and the Axis Powers were accused of 
having committed crimes of rape and abduction for the purpose of forced prostitution 
constituting violations of the laws and customs of war.270 Article 227 of the Versailles 
Treaty (1919) contains a statement of responsibility of the German Emperor for an 
“offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” which can be 
interpreted to include war rapes. The War Crimes Commission271 recommended that war 
criminals be tried before an international tribunal.272 However, this first attempt to hold 
individuals, including acting heads of state, accountable for violations of the laws and 
customs of war failed due to political considerations such as whether a political leader 
could be held individually liable for war crimes and whether national or international 
military courts would be the proper juridical forum for such a critical endeavour.273  
 
As shown above, bilateral and multilateral agreements prohibited war rape long 
before the First World War. War rapes had been prosecuted before international tribunals 
at least twice before. First, in 1474, Peter von Hagenbach was put before an international 
tribunal for the violation of the rules and customs of war during the occupation of 
Breisach, Germany. Von Hagenbach was charged with instituting a reign of terror without 
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first having declared war. He was found guilty of rape, murder and other crimes against the 
laws of nature and God committed by his troops.274 Second, after Napoleon’s escape from 
the Island of Elba, where he was exiled after his defeat in the Battle of Waterloo, the Allied 
monarchs deliberated his fate informally. After initially declaring Napoleon a threat to the 
peace and security of Europe, they folded under Prussia’s pressure and also charged 
Napoleon with atrocities committed by troops under his command against civilians during 
the wars of 1805-1815. These crimes included rape. Napoleon was sentenced to exile on 
the Island of St Helena.275 Against this background, it could be argued that already in the 
early 20th century, war rape was acknowledged as a war crime that was standard to be 
included in the War Crimes Commission’s list of appropriate crimes to be investigated 
after the First World War rather than a conscious effort to investigate acts of sexualised 
war violence. However, charging Kaiser Wilhelm II with acts of sexualised war violence 
could also be interpreted as a strong symbolic act. It could be understood as an attempt by 
the Allied leaders to morally rise above the German Emperor. Charging Kaiser Wilhelm II 
with war rape could be viewed as an indirect public condemnation of the crimes committed 
and as a statement that the Allied powers themselves treated enemy civilian women with 
respect and would not commit such acts.276 It can also be understood as an attempt to 
morally justify the Allied participation and their peoples’ suffering by showing how unfit, 
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immoral and cruel their opponent was and how desperately civilians needed to be protected 
from him. Focusing on the actors involved in the Paris Peace Conference resulting in the 
Treaty of Versailles, charging Kaiser Wilhelm II with acts of sexualised war violence 
might also have been motivated by presentations made to the leaders of the League of 
Nations Commission by the International Council of Women and the Inter-Allied 
Conference of Women Suffragists.277 However, rather than focusing on war rape, they 
sought 
 
“an agreement to suppress traffic in women, the eligibility of females for 
League employment, the right of women to vote in plebiscites on changes in 
nationality, creation of international bureaus of education and public health, 
and a statement in favor of arms control. Language reflective of some of these 
demands appeared in the Treaty of Versailles.”278 
 
The First World War resulted in 6.5 million deaths,279 leaving many women 
widowed. Building on women’s activism and advocacy, which had become increasingly 
organised in the Anglo-speaking world over the last century, single, educated, financially 
independent women in the 1920s became more outspoken and promoted non-family-based 
ways of life. This is a move away from the previously dominant understanding of women 
primarily as wives and mothers and even goes beyond considerations of a combination of 
marriage and motherhood with a career as the best way of life for women. This, however, 
stood in stark contrast to the need for women to conceal that they had a mind of their own 
and to disguise physical desires. Here it becomes apparent that the first half and middle of 
the 20th century was a time of contradicting developments in women’s history.280 
Taking the promotion of non-family-based ways of life together with an increasing 
recognition of women’s varied experiences and needs, an individualist perspective on 
women gained prevalence over a complementary individualist and relational view that had 
existed up until then. While the Second World War saw a return to women’s combined role 
as mothers and workers, individualism’s respect for Human Rights and its dismissive 
position towards sex/gender essentialism became the representative way of thinking for 
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women after the Second World War.281 This development of thought, however, was not 
reflected in the jurisprudence of the International Military Tribunal (IMT, Nuremberg 
Tribunal) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, Tokyo 
Tribunal) regarding sexualised crimes and only caught on in this field in the late 20th 
century. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 International military tribunals after the Second World War 
After the Second World War, within the framework of the IMT and IMTFE, high-
ranking military and civilian officials were individually held accountable under 
International Law for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.282 
Acts of sexualised violence were excluded from the list of crimes of the Nuremberg 
trials.283 However, in the judges’ elaboration on the acts constituting war crimes, they 
implicitly determine that disrespect for the honour and rights of the family as covered 
under Article 46 of the fourth Hague Convention was considered a war crime under Article 
6(b) of the IMT charter.284 Acts of sexualised war violence would also have been 
chargeable on the basis of Article 6(b) of the IMT charter as the war crime of ill-treatment 
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of civilians, and on the basis of Article 6(c) of the IMT charter under other inhumane acts 
constituting a crime against humanity285 if the requisite elements would have been met.286 
Evidence of rape in the form of witness testimonies, police reports, medical 
certificates and affidavits287 supporting charges of torture and of having conceived, willed, 
ordained or tolerated a systematic policy of terror and extermination of civilians288 was 
submitted by Mr Charles Dubost, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic,289 and 
Chief Counsellor of Justice LN Smirnov.290 However, especially Mr Dubost “avoid[ed] 
citing the atrocious details”291 and consequently the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to publicly 
document sexual atrocities committed during the Second World War. The judgment also 
does not specify how much weight was given to sexualised violence.292 Reflecting an 
understanding of war rapes as an unavoidable collateral damage of every war, the IMT 
failed to confirm explicitly the legal and moral importance of prosecuting sexualised war 
violence against women.293 One reason for this could be the Allies’ own culpability for 
committing acts of sexualised war violence.294  
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In contrast to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal explicitly included 
sexualised war violence in the indictment295 and judgment.296 Without further defining the 
crime, the IMTFE addressed war rape as inhumane treatment,297 mistreatment298 and 
disrespect for the rights and honour of the family,299 constituting war crimes under Article 
5(b) of the IMTFE charter.300 Evidence of acts of sexualised war violence in Borneo, 
Burma, China, French Indochina, Java and the Philippines was presented301 but 
international male observers testified in place of survivors.302 Eventually, the charges were 
only related to the rapes of Nanking.303 Establishing it as the first of many atrocities 
committed, the American delegation used the rapes committed in Nanking as a cornerstone 
for the argument that Japan conspired to commit war crimes.304 Eventually, Iwande 
Matsui305 and Koki Hirota306 were found guilty on the basis of command responsibility for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity including rape.  
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Even though seven women were members of the prosecution staff of the IMTFE,307 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals can be categorised as male for the drafters of their 
charters,308 the judges, chief prosecutors and defendant counsels were men.309 They applied 
male-centred frameworks to sexualised crimes and failed to grasp war rapes as linked to 
patriarchy. As such, they saw rapes as violations of the honour and rights of the family. 
This patriarchal view was further reinforced by the fact that in the IMTFE, international 
male observers testified about war rapes in place of the survivors themselves. Without 
going into details, evidence of war rapes was submitted in support of charges of crimes 
against peace,310 torture,311 terror312 and extermination313 rather than in support of acts of 
violence against women. Sexualised war violence against women was understood as an 
unavoidable collateral damage instead of as a weapon of war. 
 
 
 
4.2.4 The fourth Geneva Convention  
Article 27(2) of the fourth Geneva Convention314 was the first article of an 
international treaty to directly name rape. However, even though twenty-five out of 327 
delegates, experts and observers at the Geneva Conference of 1949 were women,315 none 
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of them contributed to the discussion of Article 27 on the treatment of protected persons in 
the territory of the parties to the conflict and in occupied territory.316 International 
women’s organisations, in contrast, were more involved. Without dissent,317 the proposal 
of the International Council of Women and the International Abolitionist Federation 
reading “[w]omen shall be specially protected against any attacks on their honour, in 
particular against rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”318 was 
accepted and eventually became Article 27(2) of the fourth Geneva Convention.319 
Despite the juridical progress of explicitly prohibiting war rape, a clear definition 
of the elements of the crime remained missing. The main points of focus of the relevant 
articles are male notions of honour rather than bodily integrity.320  
 
 
 
4.2.5 Mid-1970s until mid-1990s 
In the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, international agreements and 
documents framed war rape as an issue of protecting women and their fundamental rights. 
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Rape was seen as an issue of discrimination.321 Before this will be elaborated on, it shall be 
noted that this understanding is in accord with, and can be traced back to,322 demands for 
freedom from intimidation by (threat of) violence and an end to male aggression and 
domination characteristic of second wave feminism. This view is based on the 
understanding that in a patriarchal system, women and men are attributed a particular 
temperament, role and sexual status.323 As argued in Chapter 2, in relation to rape, women 
are constructed as submissive, dependent victims, as subordinates. Men, in contrast, are 
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constructed as assertive, aggressive perpetrators, as dominant. Based on this, women are 
discriminated against, preventing them from achieving complete equality with men. 
 
The wording of Article 27(2) of the fourth Geneva Convention is repeated almost 
completely in Article 76(1) of Additional Protocol I324 on the protection of women. A 
significant difference is the omission of any reference to honour. Paragraph 2 and 3 
however, show that women are still seen in relation to others, as (future) mothers and 
carers. This point of view was emphasised during the drafting process of Additional 
Protocol I by Mr Felber of Germany, proposing “that the death penalty should not be 
pronounced on mothers of infants and on women or old persons responsible for their care 
and that it should not be pronounced or carried out on pregnant women.”325 Reverend 
Father Roche of the Holy See also stressed that the aim of the prohibition of the death 
penalty for pregnant women under Paragraph 2 of Article 76 would be “to protect infants 
also.”326 Similar to the course of the discussion during the drafting phase of Article 27 of 
the fourth Geneva Convention, the discussion of Article 76 of the Additional Protocol I 
centred on the question if the pronouncement and/or the execution of the death penalty of 
pregnant women and/or mothers of infants should be prohibited, and on providing for the 
quick release of pregnant women and mothers of infants from detention327 rather than on 
the crime of war rape and its definition.  
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Partly disconnecting rape and honour, but still connecting it to shame, Article 4(e) 
of second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions328 explicitly prohibits rape as an 
outrage upon personal dignity, not a crime against a person’s integrity. Not only the rape of 
women is prohibited but that of “[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have 
ceased to take part in hostilities”.329 Therefore, Additional Protocol II introduces a gender-
neutral prohibition of rape.330 However, this broad understanding was not initially 
intended. Originally, the aim was to draft a provision granting special protection to women. 
Contrary to Canada’s proposal to draft a separate article,331 an earlier draft of Article 6 
contains Paragraph 3, stating that “women shall be the object of special respect and shall 
be protected in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, and any other form of 
indecent assault.”332 The German delegate, Mr Partsch, voiced concern about this special 
paragraph on the protection of women on the ground that it would imply that the 
provisions set out in the other paragraphs of Article 6 would only apply to men.333 
Agreeing with this, Mr de Icaza of Mexico proposed for Paragraph 3 to generally state that 
women should be the subject of special respect.334 Reinforcing the category of ‘women and 
children’, Mr de Schutter of Belgium suggested the inclusion of ‘children’ to the special 
provision to create a parallel between Article 6(3) and Article 32(1) of the draft Protocol 
II.335 The Belgian delegation submitted an amendment to this effect which was adopted by 
Committee I.336 Eventually however, Canada’s earlier proposal to create a separate article 
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on the protection of women was revived and adopted.337 Mr Hussain of Pakistan agreed to 
include ‘rape’ in Article 6(2)(e) and it was decided that Article 6(3) was now redundant.338 
The final draft of Article 6 does not mention any special provisions for women or 
children.339 
 
Pushed by reports on sexualised war violence committed in the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, the process of recognising sexualised war violence against women as 
crimes to be tried before international tribunals gained momentum. The subject matter was 
addressed in various fora in which “[t]he international women’s movement was 
instrumental in the advances made on women’s human rights”.340 General Comment No. 
19 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 1992,341 the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW, 1993),342 the 1993 
Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the Vienna Conference,343 the 1994 
Report of the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 
Conference),344 and the Platform for Action developed at the Beijing Conference (1995)345 
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frame violence against women as an issue of discrimination. It is understood as a barrier to 
the full enjoyment and recognition of fundamental rights and freedoms for women. 
Violence against women is seen as socially constructed and related to power.346 Therefore, 
rape is explicitly included as a form of gender-based rather than sexual violence that is 
linked to disrespect for women’s “integrity and dignity”.347 A link is established between 
the discrimination against, and disadvantages of, women in everyday life and the general 
vulnerability of women in wartime.348  
 
“Many sexual rights advocates point to the 1990s as a decade of significant 
successes in [UN] arenas for women’s human rights. From the 
acknowledgement in Vienna in 1993 that women’s rights are human rights and 
that violence against women is a human rights issue, to Cairo’s 1994 placing of 
women’s rights and empowerment as central to issues of population and 
development, to the 1995 Beijing conference’s overt reference to women’s 
rights to have control over their own sexuality, each major UN world 
conference seemed to offer feminist advocates new tools for holding 
governments accountable for respecting, protecting and fulfilling women’s 
rights – and their bodily integrity.”349 
 
Women’s rights advocates from all over the world “sought to bring a feminist analysis and 
women’s presence to bear on global issues of peace, security, development, environment, 
and human rights”350 through influencing the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing conferences.351 
Experiences of women’s rights advocates in the world conferences on women352 taught 
women’s rights advocates at the ICC negotiations that “women’s voices have little chance 
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of being heard at UN world conferences without deliberate and concerted efforts.”353 
Therefore, it was crucial for “the international women’s movement to build consensus and 
coalitions to bridge the ideological and material differences between women.”354 Women’s 
rights advocates also learned that “[NGOs] have to master lobbying techniques, understand 
UN conference procedures clearly and lobby effectively during the preparatory process to 
make an impact on the official debates.”355 In addition, women’s NGOs had to develop 
and/or strengthen their substantive and technical skills in the field of research and policy 
analysis, documentation and communication as well as leadership. To influence decision-
makers and official documents, women’s NGOs at the world conferences on women as 
well as in the ICC negotiations also participated in preliminary drafting work. In addition 
to lobbying, women’s groups also influenced state delegations by influencing their 
composition, publishing reports, organising briefings and working with the media. In this 
way, they bridged NGO and official debates and generated publicity that provided a focus 
on women worldwide.356 In this way too, the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing conferences 
expanded the public space in which women’s groups could work, network and learn.357  
 
 
In the mid-1990s, a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences and a Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual 
Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict were appointed by the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and by the United Nations Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights respectively.358 The appointment of the two 
Special Rapporteurs is clear evidence of the growing recognition of (sexualised war) 
violence against women as a serious issue that needs to be addressed at an international 
level. 
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The first Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy, understood her mandate to cover “all violations 
of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict, and in particular, murder, 
systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy”.359 Like General Comment No. 19, 
the DEVAW, the Vienna Conference and the Beijing Platform for Action, Coomaraswamy 
in her Preliminary Report360 framed rape in peace and wartime as an issue of 
discrimination that is linked to power. She stated that rape is a Human Rights violation that 
is perpetrated because of women’s female sexuality. It can also serve as a means of torture 
and to humiliate a group. In her 1996 report on violence in the family, Coomaraswamy 
stated that “[r]ape is broadly [and gender-neutrally] defined as non-consensual intercourse 
through the use of physical force, threats or intimidation”.361 In her 1997 report on violence 
in the community, the Special Rapporteur stressed that “[v]ictim-centred definitions […] 
should be broad enough to cover the full range of sexual violence and sensitive enough to 
capture the problems associated with the possible ‘consent’ of the victim”.362 
In her Final Report,363 Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, 
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, Gay J McDougall, 
defined rape as  
 
“the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion or duress, of any object, 
including but not limited to a penis, into a victim’s vagina or anus; or the 
insertion, under conditions of force, coercion or duress, of a penis into the 
mouth of the victim. Rape is defined in gender-neutral terms, as both men and 
women are victims of rape.”364 
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This definition reflects elaborations and applications of domestic and international law, 
including definitions of rape that have been developed by the ICTY and ICTR. 
 The definitions of rape developed within the framework of the UN between the 
mid-1970s and mid-1990s were increasingly developed by women for women and men as 
survivors of sexualised violence. While this is considered as progress, framing rape as an 
issue of protecting women and their fundamental rights and as an issue of discrimination is 
problematic. As argued in Chapter 2, framing rape as an issue of protecting women rests 
on, and perpetuates, stereotypes of women as powerless, helpless, vulnerable victims. 
Framing rape as an issue of discrimination rests on, and perpetuates, a male standard 
against which women are measured and towards which they should work. These 
limitations show that ‘adding women and stirring’ does not necessarily and automatically 
lead to more progressive definitions of sexualised crimes. Instead, it takes people with the 
right attitude, not the right sex or gender, to develop progressive law. 
 
 
 
4.2.6 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR) 
 The experience and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals established by the UN 
after the war in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda greatly influenced the 
establishment of the ICC and the negotiations of its instruments. Comparable to the 
establishment of the ICTY, sexualised war violence against women was addressed from 
the early stages of the establishment of the ICC. This, however, is contrary to the Rwanda 
Commission’s focus on the crime of genocide that was also stressed in the UN resolution 
establishing the ICTR. One possible explanation for this different emphasis is that pressure 
groups such as NGOs influenced the establishment of the court and tribunals to different 
degrees. The different degrees of influence NGOs exercised over the ICTY and ICTR also 
becomes apparent in relation to the drafting of the tribunals’ statutes. NGOs actively 
participated in the trial stage of cases before the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals by 
submitting amicus curiae briefs. However, they did not impact the definitions of rape 
developed in Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija and in the 
indictment of Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Foča case). These 
cases were key precedents in the ICC negotiations regarding the definition of war rape. 
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4.2.6.1 The tribunals’ establishment 
Responding to the widespread violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) created the 
ICTY and ICTR by resolution.365 Despite the fact that the same reason was brought 
forward for the establishment of both tribunals,366 the respective UNSC resolutions 
emphasise different aspects of the conflicts. In Resolution 827, which created the ICTY, 
the UNSC expressed its “grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia […] including reports of […] massive, organized and systematic detention and 
rape of women”.367 Resolution 955 creating the ICTR states the UNSC’s “grave concern at 
the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda”.368 In 
contrast to Resolution 827, Resolution 955 does not mention any form of sexualised war 
violence. 
This difference in emphasis in the resolutions reflects the different focal points of 
the Expert Commissions that were sent to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to 
investigate the situations. While the Yugoslavia Commission focused on sexualised war 
violence and reported its widespread and systematic use pursuant to orders,369 the Rwanda 
Commission concentrated on genocide but referred to war rape as a breach of International 
Humanitarian Law and as a crime against humanity.370  
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There are several possible explanations for the different focus of the Expert 
Commissions’ work and the UNSC’s resolutions despite the perpetration of similar crimes. 
Against the background of “historical evidence supporting the view that Western legal 
systems have not treated the rape of black women as seriously as the rape of white 
women”371 and the UNSC’s agenda for action being “dominated by the interests of 
Western powers”,372 some argue that the rape of Rwandan women may have been seen as 
legally less relevant in Western international criminal tribunals than the rape of white 
Yugoslav women.373 However, especially when taking into account that the members of 
the Rwanda Commission were from Togo, Guinea and Mali, this explanation is 
questionable. 
Another reason for the different focus of the Expert Commissions’ work and the 
UNSC’s resolutions might be that the killing in Rwanda overshadowed everything else. 
Here, the large-scale perpetration of sexualised violence only came to attention months 
later with a rise in pregnancy and birth rates. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
Commission of Experts did not know to look for sexualised violence.  
Thirdly, based on a gendered understanding of the public and private sphere, the 
role of sexualised violence in both conflicts might have been perceived differently. While 
in the former Yugoslavia, the perpetration of acts of sexualised war violence was 
understood to be intimately connected to the overall war effort, to be a crime against a 
whole community and therefore to have a public dimension, there were no reports of 
systematic rapes, rape camps or rape orders in Rwanda. Rapes might have been seen as a 
private problem there.374  
Fourthly, pressure groups influenced the tribunals to different degrees. By exerting 
pressure, NGOs played a key role in persuading the UNSC to act in light of the violence 
spreading in the former Yugoslavia. The detailed documentation and evidence of war 
crimes provided by NGOs were crucial in the establishment of the ICTY.375 Human Rights 
Watch was one of the first NGOs to call for the creation of an international criminal 
                                                          
371
 Gardam and Jarvis (n 59) 155. 
372
 ibid. 
373
 Copelon, ‘Surfacing Gender’ n (267) 245-255. 
374
 Gardam and Jarvis (n 59) 154-159. 
375
 Patrizia De Cesari, ‘NGOs and the Activities of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda’ in Alessandro Fodella and others (eds), Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance 
Bodies (TMC Asser Press 2004) 113; Ellis (n 34) 144-146; Emily Haslam, ‘Subjects and Objects: 
International Criminal Law and the Institutionalization of Civil Society’ (2011) 5 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 221. 
117 
tribunal for the region. During the conflict, it placed a permanent representative in the 
former Yugoslavia and conducted investigations and interviews with witnesses. The 
resulting report376 influenced the UNSC in its decision to establish an international 
tribunal.377 Human Rights Watch’s report also contributed to the Expert Commission’s 
findings.378 In addition, two decades of feminist work to have rape acknowledged as a 
serious crime379 resonated with the chairman of the Yugoslavia Commission, M Cherif 
Bassiouni. He was moved by the reports and challenged by the prospect of clarifying some 
of the legal questions surrounding sexualised war violence. Therefore, he diverted funds to 
the investigation of sexualised crimes. Regarding the situation in Rwanda, reports of 
sexualised violence including war rape and forced marriage mostly came from NGOs, 
especially from Human Rights Watch380 and African Rights.381 However, NGOs and 
women’s activists were less able to exercise influence over the ICTR.382  
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4.2.6.2 The tribunals’ statutes 
When drafting the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the United Nations Office of 
Legal Affairs sought comments on the drafts from governments and NGOs.383 Some NGOs 
were well situated for an international campaign to influence the drafting of the ICTY 
statute. They were aided by developments in communication technology and increased 
financial resources. NGOs built on years of organising and training, and drew on extensive 
scholarship on sexualised war violence and International Law.384 Transnational networks 
including the New York-based Women’s Coalition against Crimes against Women in the 
Former Yugoslavia385 constituted the backbone of the campaign. International women’s 
organisations and activists like the Green/Copelon Group played a key role.386 They 
promoted the explicit inclusion387 of war rape as a war crime, a genocidal act and a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions.388 The Green/Copelon Group advocated for an 
informed, gender-neutral understanding of war rape as  
 
“constitute[ing] or […] constitutive of sexual torture (and their substantive 
definitions) [to] include:  
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[…] a. Rape is any form of forced sexual intercourse. The requisite coercion 
can be shown through evidence of force, deceit, deprivation, or threats of any 
of the above, as well as promise of better treatment. 
b. Rape encompasses a range of non-consensual sexual acts or conduct 
including the introduction of the penis into the mouth, vagina or anus of the 
victim or the introduction of other parts of the body or of weapons or objects 
into the vagina or anus of the victim.  
c. Rape occurs when there is introduction (described above) to any extent. 
Proof of rape does not require penetration or the emission of semen.”389 
  
 Responding to another feminist call, the UN acknowledged the importance of 
employing female members of staff and experts in gender issues at the ICTY.390 Amongst 
others, Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba as judge,391 Louise Arbour as prosecutor392 
and Patricia Viseur Sellers as legal advisor for gender-related crimes and acting senior trial 
attorney393 were able to influence the tribunals in regard to the prosecution of sexualised 
war violence. They also influenced colleagues such as Prosecutor Richard J Goldstone and 
Appeals Chamber Judge Theodor Meron who were won over for this cause.394 Judges 
Almiro Rodrigues and Fouad Riad were also supportive.395 Incorporating gender expertise 
in the ICTY’s central operations  
 
“enhanced the ability of prosecutors to bring successful charges against 
perpetrators of sexual violence. ICTY staff members with gender expertise 
helped identify witnesses, analyze evidence, elicit testimony, and support those 
who testified. Equally significant, the inclusion of individuals (male or female) 
with gender expertise […] was crucial for building capacity throughout the 
[Office of the Prosecutor] on related issues.”396 
 
 In contrast to the influence NGOs exercised on the focus of the Yugoslavia 
Commission and their active participation in the drafting of the ICTY statute, it appears 
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that non-governmental actors were less, if at all, involved in the establishment of the ICTR 
and the drafting of its statute. This lack of involvement is striking compared to the role 
NGOs played during the trial phase of cases before the ICTR. It might have been due to 
issues of access or experience. Those charged with establishing the tribunal might not have 
supported the participation of NGOs on political grounds, or for reasons of time or 
expertise. They might not have wanted to share their power with non-state actors who 
might have wanted to discuss everything democratically with all interested parties, and 
who might have raised issues and made claims on a moral and idealistic rather than legal 
basis. Civil society groups might have operated on a local or regional rather than national 
and international level before. They also might have focused on different areas of advocacy 
and activism. They might have lacked the resources needed to influence international legal 
processes. Similar to the situation of Sierra Leone and the Special Court discussed in 
Chapter 5, Rwandan NGOs might have focused their efforts on the Gacaca courts and/or 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) rather than the tribunal. 
An indication of the success of and for women’s advocates and activists in the 
drafting process of the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes is the explicit inclusion of rape as a crime 
against humanity in the ICTY and ICTR statutes,397 framing rape as a public rather than 
private issue. In addition, the ICTR statute also explicitly mentions rape as an outrage upon 
personal dignity under Article 4(e) on violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.398  
 If the general qualifications of the categories of crimes are met, war rapes can also 
be interpreted as acts of violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being,399 
torture or inhuman treatment,400 causing unnecessary suffering,401 causing great suffering 
or serious injury to body or health,402 and as an inhumane act.403 War rapes could also be 
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interpreted as genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting 
upon the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction or 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.404 For war rape to be 
considered under these elements, it has to be taken into account that, on an individual level, 
war rapes often result in severe physical harm, ranging from bruising and bone fractures to 
fistulas, vaginal and anal infections, and infertility.405 Psychologically, the survivor may 
feel a loss of basic trust, including the sense of identity and self-respect, of security and 
control. The survivor may feel guilty, ashamed, frustrated and angry. She may not be able 
to cope with her everyday life and suffer from nightmares, flashbacks, depression, 
neuroses and post-traumatic stress disorder.406 Socially, the survivor may face 
stigmatisation, humiliation and exclusion and is often held responsible for what happened 
to her.407 Exclusion from work may make an overall difficult economic post-conflict 
situation additionally challenging for the survivor. The survivor’s family may be faced 
with excessive demands, separation and violence.408 On the community level, feelings of 
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mistrust and betrayal may lead to the destruction of social networks and disinhibition. War 
rapes may destroy a group’s social structure by making women unmarriageable. In 
patrilineal societies, pregnancies resulting out of war rape alter the ethnic constitution of a 
country or region. This summary of potential physical, psychological, social and economic 
consequences of war rape that impact survivors, their families and their communities 
illustrates that war rapes causes harm to the physical and mental well-being of a person as 
well as to life itself, resulting in great and unnecessary suffering. War rapes are 
(purposefully) intimidating and discriminatory acts. Therefore, if the general qualifications 
of the categories of crimes are met, war rapes can be interpreted to amount to the crimes 
mentioned above. 
 
 
 
4.2.6.3 The tribunals’ jurisprudence 
 Even though the tribunals’ statutes explicitly and implicitly include war rape, the 
elements of the crime were only defined in the tribunals’ jurisprudence. In Prosecutor v 
Jean-Paul Akayesu409 and Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija,410 as well as in the indictment in 
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Foča case),411 the 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals developed different definitions of rape that were crucial 
inspiration to the ICC negotiations and therefore will be discussed below. 
 
 
 
4.2.6.3.1 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu 
Reflecting the Rwanda Commission’s and the UNSC’s lack of attention to 
sexualised war violence in Rwanda, the ICTR initially did not charge Jean-Paul Akayesu 
with acts of sexualised violence. It was only when witnesses J and H spontaneously 
testified of rapes they endured and witnessed that Judge Pillay’s awareness was raised. She 
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adjourned the proceedings to permit the prosecution to investigate the crimes raised with a 
view to amend the charges to include war rape.412 Unclear about who initiated the 
intervention, this move was supported by critical letters sent to the prosecution by an 
international NGO coalition comprised of Human Rights Watch and the International 
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.413 Furthermore, an amicus curiae 
brief414 was submitted by the Coalition on Women’s Human Rights in Conflict 
Situations.415 These interventions followed a report published by Human Rights Watch.416 
Together, these contributions substantiated charges of sexualised violence against 
Akayesu.417 Although initially the prosecution under Richard Goldstone did not plan to 
amend the indictment, it eventually did. It explained that this move was motivated by 
Witness H’s testimony which had already triggered further investigation rather than by the 
amicus brief.418 Eventually Jean-Paul Akayesu was additionally charged with, and found 
guilty of, rape and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity.419  
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“[A]s there [was] no commonly accepted definition of this term in international 
law”,420 the judges in the Akayesu case421 had to define rape. They followed traditional 
male legal reasoning processes in the sense that they defined an issue, analysed relevant 
precedents and recommended a conclusion based on logic and abstraction. However, 
feminist claims were taken into consideration as sexualised war violence against women 
was defined as an issue to be legally addressed. Precedents were analysed open-mindedly, 
making room for the new insights and perspectives generated by new contexts. As 
commented on below, the final definition is progressive as it is broad, gender-neutral, 
coercion-based and uses the term ‘invasion’. The judges agreed that “national jurisdictions 
[define rape] as non-consensual sexual intercourse”.422 However, a broader definition was 
warranted to include “variations on the act of rape […] which involve the insertion of 
objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual”.423 
Comparing the definition of rape to that of torture as stated in the Torture Convention, 
“[t]he Chamber consider[ed] that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements 
of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body 
parts.”424 Rather than cataloguing specific acts in the definition of rape, a focus should be 
placed on the conceptual frame of the violent act.425 While Prosecutor Goldstone in the 
indictment referred to “forcible sexual penetration”,426 the Trial Chamber arrived at a 
definition where rape was understood as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed 
on a person under circumstances which are coercive”.427 This broad and gender-neutral 
definition supports the understanding that no genuine consent to sexual contact is possible 
under coercive circumstances. Emphasising the element of coercion, the nature of the 
crime is understood as a crime of inequality of force, physical power, status or relationship. 
Consequently, the focus lies on power, domination and violence. The physical acts, 
surrounding contexts and the exploitation of a situation are emphasised. The relevant 
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events are framed in a social, contextual and collective way;428 social in the sense that they 
are interpersonal and related to society and its organisation, contextual in the sense that 
they relate to, or depend on, context, collective in the sense that they are facilitated by 
people acting as a group, for example society. Therefore, coercion-based definitions of 
rape highlight that rape is a crime of violence for which the survivor is not responsible. In 
addition to disconnecting rape and consent, the Akayesu definition detaches rape and 
honour by overcoming the male and perpetrator-centred notion of penetration.429 
Traditionally, the concept of penetration relates to the insertion of the man’s penis into an 
orifice of the victim’s body. Therefore, it focuses on the physical aspect of rape. However, 
it excludes other sexual assaults like forced sexual acts involving objects that are equally 
serious to penetration with the penis.430 A rape definition using the term ‘invasion’, in 
contrast, provides a gender-neutral definition that illustrates the survivor’s point of view.431 
It is more comprehensive than a rape definition using the term ‘penetration’ as it 
encompasses a wider range of acts of sexualised violence. Therefore, ‘invasion’ keeps the 
definition open so as to be inclusive.432 A rape definition using the term ‘invasion’ 
emphasises violence and subordination rather than sexual arousal.433 It indicates that war 
rape does not only cause physical, but also psychological harm. Rape is an invasion into a 
person’s autonomy, self-determination and integrity.434 Consequently, a rape definition 
using the term ‘invasion’ captures the nature of the crime more adequately. It also enables 
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survivors and witnesses to speak about rape without having to use words that may be 
culturally forbidden.435 
 
In addition to developing the first international legal definition of war rape, the 
ICTR further elaborated that “[l]ike torture, rape [can be] used for such purposes as 
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction 
of a person.”436 Utilising a somewhat patriarchal lens, the tribunal also determined that war 
rapes can destroy a group by preventing births and therefore constitute acts of genocide if 
the qualifying elements are met.437 This conveys a multidimensional view of women as 
individuals, members of a group and having a reproductive role.438 
 
 
 
4.2.6.3.2 Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija 
Disregarding the Akayesu case, the ICTY judges Florence Ndepele Mwachande 
Mumba, Antonio Cassese and Richard May in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija stated that 
“[n]o definition of rape can be found in international law”.439 The Trial Chamber noted the 
unchallenged submission of the prosecution team of Brenda Hollis, Patricia Viseur Sellers 
and Michael Blaxill that  
 
“rape is a forcible act[,] […] accomplished by force or threats of force against 
the victim or a third person[.] […] This act is the penetration of the vagina, the 
anus or mouth by the penis, or of the vagina or anus by other object. In this 
context, it includes penetration, however slight, of the vulva, anus or oral 
cavity, by the penis and sexual penetration of the vulva or anus is not limited to 
the penis.”440 
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However, the Trial Chamber decided to “look for principles of criminal law common to the 
major legal systems of the world”,441 for the “common denominators”442 derived from 
national laws. As a reason it stated that “no elements other than those emphasised [in 
Article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention, Article 76(1) of Additional Protocol I and 
Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II as well as in the Akayesu case] may be drawn from 
international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general principles of international 
criminal law or to general principles of international law of any avail.”443 Like in the 
Akayesu case, the judges in the Furundžija case followed male legal reasoning processes. 
However, they seemingly were more cautious in their analysis of precedents and in their 
recommended conclusion. The Trial Chamber 
 
“found that although the laws of many countries specify that rape can only be 
committed against a woman, others provide that rape can be committed against 
a victim of either sex. The laws of several jurisdictions state that the actus reus 
of rape consists of the penetration, however slight, of the female sexual organ 
by the male sexual organ. There are also jurisdictions which interpret the actus 
reus of rape broadly. […] Furthermore, all jurisdictions surveyed by the Trial 
Chamber require an element of force, coercion, threat, or acting without the 
consent of the victim: force is given a broad interpretation and includes 
rendering the victim helpless. Some jurisdictions indicate that the force or 
intimidation can be directed at a third person.”444 
 
Faced with a lack of uniformity regarding the criminalisation of forced oral penetration,445 
the Trial Chamber held that it “constitutes a most humiliating and degrading attack upon 
human dignity”.446 Charging it as rape rather than sexual assault would be in conformity 
with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege since forcible oral sex is a crime.447 Based on 
these elaborations, the Trial Chamber arrived at a more specific, mechanical and male 
definition of the objective elements of rape that is very similar to the definition proposed 
by the prosecution. The Furundžija definition of rape describes the crime as 
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“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.”448  
 
The ICTY noted that, 
 
“[i]n stating that the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute rape only 
if accompanied by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a 
third person, the Furundžija definition does not refer to other factors which 
would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on 
the part of the victim”.449 
 
Furthermore, the Furundžija definition does not consider situations where a person is “put 
in a state of being unable to resist, […] particularly vulnerable or incapable of resisting 
because of physical or mental incapacity, or […] induced into the act by surprise or 
misrepresentation.”450 Therefore, in this respect, the Furundžija definition is “more 
narrowly stated than is required by international law.”451 This outcome is interesting 
considering Judge Mumba’s and Prosecutor Viseur Sellers’ expertise in gender crimes and 
advocacy for women’s Human Rights,452 and the availability of the Green/Copelon and 
Akayesu definition.  
 
 
 
4.2.6.3.3 The indictment in Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran 
Vuković (Foča case) 
 The Foča case was the first ICTY trial to exclusively deal with charges of 
sexualised violence. The core of the Foča team consisted of Prosecutor Hildegard Uertz-
Retzlaff, Lawyer Peggy Kuo and Crime Analyst Tejshree Thapa. They were later joined by 
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Prosecutor Dirk Ryneveld and Lawyer Daryl Mundis. The Foča team was supported by 
Patricia Viseur Sellers, Prosecutor Nancy Paterson and the ICTY Victims and Witness 
Unit.453 Demonstrating sensitivity for issues of gender and culture, the Foča team worked 
to build trusting and confidential relationships with the witnesses from the beginning. They 
portrayed an informed understanding of war violence against women as being 
interdependent with issues of gender, power and fear. Nevertheless, they aimed to build a 
thematic case that reflected the organised way in which war rape was used as a method of 
ethnic cleansing rather than trying single individuals for isolated rapes.454 Following this 
approach, the accused were charged with individual and/or command responsibility for 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity of rape, torture, enslavement and 
other violations of personal dignity.455 Similar to the Furundžija definition, the Foča 
indictment defines rape as  
 
“acts of forcible sexual penetration of а person, or forcing а person to sexually 
penetrate another […]. Sexual penetration includes penetration, however slight, 
of the vagina, anus or oral cavity, by the penis. Sexual penetration of the vulva 
or anus is not limited to the penis. Such acts can constitute an element of а 
crime against humanity, (enslavement under Article 5(с), torture under Article 
5(f), rape under Article 5(g)), violations of the laws and customs of war, 
(torture under Article 3 and Article 3(1)(а) of the Geneva Conventions) and а 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, (torture under Article 2 (b)).”456 
 
 While the indictment indicates that the sexualised crimes dealt with in the case 
were committed under coercive circumstances,457 the third amended indictment makes it 
explicit. It states that 
 
“[i]n all counts charging sexual assault, the victim was subjected to or 
threatened with or had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or 
psychological oppression, or reasonably believed that if she did not submit, 
another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.”458 
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 In addition to demonstrating that rape was used as a form of torture, the Foča 
indictment also establishes a link between rape, enslavement and outrages upon personal 
dignity. The accused were charged with detaining women in houses where the women 
were treated as their captors’ personal property and forced to sexually serve their captors as 
well as to perform household tasks.459 The women “were also beaten, threatened, 
psychologically oppressed, and kept in constant fear.”460 This highlights the coercive 
circumstances the women experienced. In the eyes of the prosecution, the fact that the 
women “were not guarded or locked inside the house”461 did not make a difference as they 
“could not escape. They had no-where to go as they were surrounded by Serbs”.462 In the 
third amended indictment, this conduct was charged as the war crime and crime against 
humanity of rape, the crime against humanity of enslavement and the war crime of 
committing outrages upon personal dignity.463 In the first indictment, however, the accused 
are not charged with rape as a war crime, but it included for one instance an additional 
charge of inhuman treatment constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.464 
 
 
 
4.2.7 Relevant national definitions of rape 
 In addition to international legal definitions of rape, certain national definitions 
were of relevance to the ICC negotiations. 
 The Arab block’s national rape definitions demonstrate a divergent understanding 
of rape. Some states define rape progressively as a form of sexual assault and recognise 
coercion as an element. Other states in contrast understand rape as an honour crime, define 
it using the term ‘penetration’ and stress the absence of consent of the survivor. However, 
the individual states constituting the Arab block do not clearly advance a more progressive 
or more conservative understanding of rape. Their national rape definitions combine 
progressive and conservative elements. Iraq, for example, defines rape as sexual 
intercourse without consent but also advances an element of force while still generally 
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framing rape as an honour crime. Sudan advances a definition of rape as intercourse 
without consent. Similarly, Bahrain understands rape as sexual assault without consent.465 
 Other national legislation such as the 2000 Colombian Penal Code includes the 
crime of violent carnal access466 which includes rape. Even though the Colombian Penal 
Code does not define rape itself, rape is understood as penetration by the penis,467 ignoring 
the use of other body parts and objects. 
 Similarly, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of rape that was in 
use during the ICC negotiations reads: “The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and 
against her will.”468 Like some of the national rape definitions advanced by states 
constituting the Arab block, the United States defined rape in terms of coercion and 
absence of consent here. Moreover, it focused on the rape of women and ignored offenses 
involving oral or anal invasion, the use of objects and rapes of men. A previous US 
definition that remains a point of reference in discussions on how to define war rape can be 
found in the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Order No. 100 (Lieber Code).469 Article 44 explicitly prohibits war rape as an act 
of wanton − not systematic − violence punishable as a capital crime. It places war rapes in 
context with the destruction and unlawful taking of property, as well as with other acts of 
violence like “wounding, maiming, or killing”.  
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4.3 Forced marriage 
 Whereas international agreements mentioned war rape from the early 20th century 
on, forced marriage in general only began to be referred to in the late 1940s. An increased 
respect for Human Rights after the Second World War, together with the rise of second 
wave feminism in the late 1960s, may have contributed to the inclusion of marriage rights 
in international Human Rights instruments. The slogan ‘the personal is political’ referred 
to the fact that every part of a woman’s private life, for example marriage, is affected by, 
and at the same time can affect, the political situation, for example domestic norms and 
rules regarding marriage. 
 
International agreements like the UDHR,470 the Convention on Consent to 
Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages,471 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),472 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)473 and CEDAW474 highlight that consent 
of both intending spouses is crucial for a marriage. Article 10(1) of the ICESCR 
furthermore states that “the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to 
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its 
establishment”.475 Following this understanding of family as the basis of a social order, 
even the more patriarchal international community should have an interest in criminalising 
forced marriage. If the basis of a social order, the family, is established by force, these 
coercive circumstances may have destabilising effects on a whole social order.  
 
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 condemns slavery-like practices, 
including bride sale and wife inheritance which include elements of coercion.476 It calls on 
states to abolish  
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“[a]ny institution or practice whereby:  
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on 
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family 
or any other person or group; or  
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer 
her to another person for value received or otherwise; or  
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another 
person”. 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy, referred to forced marriages in her reports from 
1995 onwards. In the context of outlining the nature of abuse that refugees and displaced 
women face, she commented in a footnote that “[t]he existing bank of jurisprudence on the 
meaning of persecution includes rape but does not include, for example, […] forced 
marriage”.477 The Special Rapporteur also mentioned forced marriage in the context of 
outlining the international legal framework governing trafficking and forced prostitution478 
as well as in relation to cases of war violence against women from Rwanda,479 Algeria,480 
Kashmir481 and East Timor.482 However, she did not go into any detailed discussion.483 
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In her Final Report, Gay J McDougall, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, 
recognised forced marriage as “situations where women and girls are forced into 
‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual 
activity, including rape by their captors.”484 Despite this recognition and awareness of both 
the sexual and non-sexual elements of forced marriage, however, the Special Rapporteur 
defined forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery.485 
 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 Chapter 4 situated the ICC negotiations within the broader context of legal 
discussions and developments regarding war rape and forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict. It retraced the pre-ICC legislative histories of the two crimes respectively, 
establishing the background against which the ICC negotiations of the definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage took place. 
 Outlining the international legal developments regarding the crime of war rape 
demonstrates that bilateral and multilateral conventions concluded in the 18th, 19th and 
early 20th century were early attempts at the criminalisation of war rape. They saw it as an 
honour crime. International agreements of the early and mid-20th century as well as the 
international military tribunals established after the Second World War retained this 
understanding. The IMT and IMTFE also categorised war rape as inhuman treatment and 
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mistreatment. In the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, international agreements 
and documents moved away from an honour-based view of rape and towards an 
understanding that it is a gender-based violation of women’s integrity. A link was 
established between everyday discrimination against, and disadvantages of, women, and 
the general vulnerability of women in wartime. War rape was framed as an issue of 
protecting women and their fundamental rights as well as an issue of discrimination. This 
constitutes the context in which the negotiations for the establishment of an international 
criminal court began. At a time when the Rome Statute had been passed and the discussion 
of the Elements of Crimes was underway, the statutes of the ICTR and ICTY explicitly 
included war rape as a crime against humanity. In addition, the ICTR statute explicitly 
mentioned rape as an outrage upon personal dignity, constituting a violation of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The tribunals’ 
jurisprudence defined war rape as a crime against humanity, a war crime, as constituting 
torture, an act of genocide and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Examining the 
definitions of rape as such, the ICTR’s and ICTY’s jurisprudence reveals different 
perspectives on the element of invasion/penetration. While the Akayesu definition uses the 
term ‘invasion’, ‘penetration’ is used in the Furundžija case and the Foča indictment. The 
latter reflect most national rape definitions. Oddly, the ICC uses both the term ‘invasion’ 
and ‘penetration’.  
 
While the ICC negotiations could draw on a fairly extensive legislative history in 
defining war rape, forced marriage in times of armed conflict was less well-theorised and 
well-established at that time. Bilateral and multilateral conventions form early attempts at 
the criminalisation of war rape. However, similar steps were not taken regarding forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict. While international agreements mentioned war rape 
from the early 20th century on, forced marriage in general only began to be referred to in 
the late 1940s. From the mid-1960s on, international Human Rights instruments highlight 
that consent of both intending spouses is crucial for a marriage. From 1995 onwards, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences directly 
addressed forced marriage in the context of persecution, trafficking and forced prostitution 
as well as in the context of armed conflict. However, a detailed discussion and definition 
remained missing. Similar to the developments of a definition of war rape, the first 
definition of forced marriage in times of armed conflict was put forward at a time when the 
Rome Statute had been passed and the discussion of the Elements of Crimes had begun. 
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The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict found the constituting elements of forced 
marriage to include being forced into a conjugal relationship, forced labour and acts of 
sexualised violence. 
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5 The post-ICC legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 After Chapter 4 focused on the pre-ICC legislative histories of war rape and forced 
marriage, analysing and assessing the understanding of the two crimes that existed at the 
time of the ICC negotiations, Chapter 5 focuses on legal discussions and developments that 
took place after the negotiations of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes were 
completed. It also discusses theoretical considerations regarding the causes and meanings 
of war rape and forced marriage. Even though the case reports and theories discussed in 
Chapter 5 had no bearing on the ICC negotiations in the 1990s, their analysis is crucial for 
a broader contextualisation of the crimes of war rape and forced marriage. Case reports and 
theories discussed in Chapter 5 include some of the key discussions regarding the two 
crimes and inform their current understanding. They form the background against which 
the present researcher assesses their definitions. Especially the crime of forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict cannot be understood and analysed without taking into 
consideration cases dealt with by the SCSL from 2003 onwards as they were the first cases 
to discuss forced marriage as a crime. They addressed realities of conflicts that were 
ongoing while the ICC instruments were negotiated486 and would likely be considered by 
the court.487 Considering the influence the ICTY and ICTR precedents had on the ICC 
negotiations in the 1990s, later jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the SCSL 
may have an impact on future reviews of the ICC instruments. Therefore it is a valuable 
consideration to further the comprehensive nature of this research. 
 
Chapter 5 is divided into two parts. The first one focuses on war rape, the second 
one on forced marriage. The part on war rape first discusses theoretical considerations 
regarding the causes and meanings of the crime. Arguments are considered that explain the 
perpetration of war rapes as an expression of natural male aggressiveness, power, 
patriarchy and social interactions in the military. Furthermore, interpretations of war rape 
as a weapon of war and a propaganda tool are examined. After these theoretical 
considerations, the Foča judgment is discussed as it introduces an element of consent into 
the definition of war rape. This is contrary to the coercion-based rape definition set out in 
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the Foča indictment discussed in Chapter 4. The Foča case is also instrumental in the 
second part of this chapter dealing with forced marriage as it served as a precedent for 
cases involving forced marriage considered by the SCSL. In the Foča case, the ICTY 
developed a broad, gender-neutral definition of enslavement and listed factors to be taken 
into consideration in determining whether or not powers attaching to the right of ownership 
were exercised. As such, the Foča judgment guided judges in the SCSL in determining 
whether acts of forced marriage can be interpreted as an exercise of powers attaching to the 
right of ownership. If so, forced marriage can be understood as an act of sexual slavery. 
Indeed, in Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor 
Kanu (AFRC case), Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
(RUF case) and Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, the SCSL categorised forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery and also as an inhumane act. Evidence of forced marriage was also 
heard in relation to charges of acts of terror and outrages upon personal dignity. Reflecting 
these different categorisations, the Special Court referred to the crime as ‘forced marriage’ 
and ‘conjugal slavery’. By elaborating on its understanding of forced marriage, the SCSL 
contributed to the theorisation of the crime, its causes and meanings. In Chapter 5, the 
SCSL’s elaborations on the causes and meanings of forced marriage are supplemented with 
more theoretical considerations, many of which draw on examples from Uganda. They 
explain that forced marriages are formed in times of armed conflict to create dependency 
structures in fighting groups as well as to destroy traditional interpersonal bonds. Tim 
Allen and Mareike Schomerus488 as well as Sophie Kramer489 furthermore argued that 
forced marriage, like war rape, is based on accepted peacetime marriage practices that are 
pushed into the context of conflict. In addition, Khatidja Chantler490 as well as Catherine 
Dauvergne and Jenni Millbank491 argued that forced marriage is a means to exercise 
control over someone’s sexuality. It is understood as a reward and a status symbol. Chapter 
5 also advances a new understanding of forced marriage based on the theory of hegemonic 
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masculinity. Following this, forced marriage in times of armed conflict can be understood 
as a way to fulfil a certain norm of masculinity that cannot be achieved otherwise. Based 
on this understanding, other explanations of the causes and meanings of forced marriage as 
well as the understanding of it being a form of sexual slavery are critiqued. The conclusion 
of Chapter 5 draws together the understanding of war rape and forced marriage for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
 
 Like Chapter 4, Chapter 5 offers a constructivist approach to the legislative 
histories of war rape and forced marriage. It refers to the main actors in this process 
(Research Question 1), paying particular attention to the role of NGOs (Hypothesis 1). 
Chapter 5 also takes into consideration what influenced the actors (Research Question 2), 
how they understood the crimes of war rape and forced marriage (Research Question 3), 
and how they influenced their definitions (Research Question 4). However, an in-depth 
analysis of the mutually shaped normative structures and actors is beyond the scope of this 
chapter as it would be too comprehensive. 
 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical considerations regarding the causes and meanings of war rape 
 The following paragraphs consider arguments explaining the perpetration of acts of 
war rapes as expressions of natural male aggressiveness, power, patriarchy and social 
interactions in the military. Furthermore, interpretations of war rape as a weapon of war 
and a propaganda tool are examined.  
 When discussing the causes and meanings of war rape, it needs to be kept in mind 
that they are perpetrated in the context of other acts of war violence committed by soldiers 
and civilians against civilians.492 Moreover, it is important to stress that the causes and 
meanings of war rape are context-dependent,493 complex and interconnected. No single 
cause determines acts of war rape. The following paragraphs outline individual, 
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interpersonal, institutional and structural causes, framing war rape as a form of 
interpersonal, social, political and economic violence.494  
 
Historically, the perpetration of sexualised violence against women495 in peace and 
wartime was ascribed to individual causes in the form of a natural male aggression, the 
physical superiority of men to women and an uncontrollable male sexual desire. This 
argument is connected to the assumption that war rapes are an unavoidable part, a by-
product of every war, granted to the victor as a reward.496 Consequently, it abets impunity 
and neutralises the conduct.497 This indicates that structural causes such as policies of 
impunity may explain the perpetration of war rapes. 
 Contrasting these supposedly natural male dispositions with constructivist 
arguments, rape can be explained to have interpersonal and structural causes. Therefore, it 
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can be understood as a form of interpersonal violence as “one person uses power and 
control over another through physical, sexual, or emotional threats or actions, […] or other 
kinds of coercive behavior.”498 In the case of male to female rape, rape can also be 
understood as an act of social violence as it targets a woman because of her membership in 
the social category of ‘women’.499 Rape is used as a means to regulate unequal power 
relationships between men and women in peace and wartime. Men are seen as holding an 
active power to violate, while women are viewed to be passive and open to violations.500 
This construction of aggressive sexuality normalises, neutralises and legitimises a 
prevailing system of misogynist norms.501 In times of crisis, this underlying hostility is 
actualised as the threshold for direct acts of sexualised violence is lower than in times of 
peace.502 This ‘continuum thesis’ can explain opportunistic sexualised violence in 
wartime.503 However, it assumes that the same norms of patriarchy are shared throughout a 
national community, disregarding possible variations in sub-groups. Moreover, it is argued 
that patriarchal culture cannot account for conflicts where sexualised violence is 
strategically promoted by some but not all parties to the conflict.504 It is further argued that 
 
“the continuum thesis does not explain the innovations in sexual brutality that 
we observe on the part of some armed organizations (rape with guns, sexual 
mutilation, etc.), innovations that would appear to have little precedent during 
peacetime. Moreover, when armed organizations engage in high levels of rape 
during conflict, the very high fraction of rapes that are carried out by multiple 
perpetrators contrasts sharply to the fraction observed during peacetime. Nor 
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does the thesis account for high levels of sexual violence against boys and men 
during conflict on the part of some armed organizations.”505 
 
 Focusing on times of war, a different but connected line of argument emphasises 
that sexualised war violence as an act of interpersonal and social violence can be the 
product of social interactions in fighting groups. This indicates interpersonal as well as 
institutional causes of the perpetration of war rapes. Superiors may tolerate acts of 
sexualised war violence because intervention “may lessen the respect of subordinates for 
their superiors (in a unit dominated by those who see nothing wrong in rape of civilians, 
the commander who would attempt to prohibit it may be seen as weak) and thereby 
undermine vertical cohesion.”506 Combatants may have a desire to conform to the 
behaviour of others in the unit and perpetrate acts of sexualised war violence because 
others do.507 Pointing towards structural causes, the perpetration of war rapes is also 
ascribed to military masculinity into which fighters are indoctrinated by superiors and/or 
socialised through peer pressure. Military masculinity is linked to the construction and 
exercise of a monopoly of power and heterosexuality, the suppression of feelings of 
insecurity, gentleness and other ‘feminine’ characteristics. This builds on and reaffirms 
more general norms of masculinity as well as patriarchal hierarchies between men and 
women. It may also make it easier for men to commit acts of sexualised war violence. The 
strategic purpose of the use of sexualised violence is to manifest the militaristic masculine 
identity of the male perpetrator.508 In addition, individual causes are highlighted when war 
rapes are seen as necessary for effective combat performance of soldiers. In the dangers of 
war, aggression including sexualised violence is regarded as the only way to survive 
psychologically. Soldiers view sexual relations as countering battle anxiety. Stressing the 
relevance of interpersonal causes of war rape, fears to be overpowered by female fighters, 
who are believed to be fiercer than men, make male soldiers anxious. They do not want to 
be embarrassed.509 Consequently, in wars in which women fought, “manliness demanded 
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particular vigilant policing.”510 “For soldiers, rape is a way to take out their suffering on 
women […]. For others, rape is a way for them to have sex when the situation affords them 
no opportunity for a regular family life or chance to date a woman.”511  
 
“However, the argument [linking the perpetration of war rapes to social 
interactions within fighting groups] does not explain the absence of sexual 
violence on the part of some very effective insurgent and State armies. 
Similarly, increased opportunity to rape during war cannot account for armed 
organizations with ample access to civilians that engage in little rape. Nor does 
the ‘substitution’ argument (that rape ‘substitutes’ for sex with prostitutes, 
camp followers, female combatants or willing civilians) account for the 
targeting of particular groups of women, the often extreme violence that 
frequently accompanies conflict-related rape, the occurrence of sexual torture, 
or rape by forces with ample access to prostitutes.”512 
 
 This can be explained by the understanding of war rape as a tool and weapon of 
war. Here, interpersonal and structural causes are offered to explain the perpetration of war 
rapes. War rapes are often orchestrated and perpetrated systematically as an integral rather 
than incidental part of war. The rape of women is essential to military strategy.513 It 
furthers “militaristic, masculinist and/or nationalist goals”.514 Therefore, in addition to 
being a form of interpersonal and social violence as explained above, war rapes are a form 
of political violence. They are a political form of aggression and consequently a public 
rather than private issue.515 “Placing rape at the centre of the conflict − as a constituent 
element of the violence − is an important manoeuvre allowing for the recognition that 
violence is gendered.”516 The public nature of war rapes is further highlighted by the fact 
that they are often perpetrated in public.517 Strategic war rapes can be understood as an 
attack against women as women, as well as part of an attack against the enemy. Male 
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members of the more powerful group do not only hold a protective power position over 
women in their own group, but also a controlling power position over women of their 
opponent’s group. In ‘nationalist’ conflicts, women become a symbol of the nation. They 
are targeted because of their cultural position and importance in family structure. War 
rapes are perpetrated to destroy communities by targeting women’s life-giving capacities, 
their political and economic assets. In patriarchal systems that value women’s virginity and 
define women as men’s possessions, survivors are viewed as damaged goods, threatening 
reproduction. This highlights that war rapes are a form of economic violence, targeting 
economically disadvantaged individuals or groups. In addition to threatening reproduction, 
war rapes also destroy communities by blaming, stigmatising and excluding survivors. 
They traumatise people and psychologically damage the opponent group. War rapes are a 
means of communication between male members of opposing fighting groups. According 
to this view, war rapes are symbolic expressions of the humiliation of male opponents. 
They are a means of demonstrating that these men were unable to perform their protective 
duties. In this context, it becomes clear that sexualised war violence, in contrast to 
sexualised violence committed in peacetime, is not directed against a woman as an 
individual person, but against her as a symbol for a whole group. The effect on men is the 
key point. War rapes crush men’s morale, will, and desire for battle. They humiliate and 
instil fear and terror into the opponent group.518 Additionally, war rapes are used as a 
means of reprisal and retaliation.519 
 Addressing one’s own group, war rapes committed by opponents as a form of 
political violence are also used as a means of propaganda, charging patriotism and arousing 
hate against the enemy. Here, structural causes in the sense of propaganda policies are 
offered to explain the perpetration of war rapes. Using war rapes for propaganda purposes 
also heightens visibility of sexualised violence against women in some contexts, and 
relative invisibility in others. International courts and tribunals, international organisations 
and civil society recognise that women were raped in large numbers as part of many wars. 
However, rape in peacetime as well as the rape of individual women in wartime has often 
been absent especially from the record of courts and tribunals. It also remains largely 
invisible as a matter of political urgency. Stories of rape have been listened to when they 
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supported constructions of national identity and prominent post-war constructions of the 
enemy, but not when told to support survivors’ demands for remedies such as health care 
and reparations.520 
 
 The above discussion shows that theoretical considerations regarding the causes 
and meanings of war rape focus on male to female rape. They understand rape as an act of 
aggression and force, perpetrated under coercive circumstances. Different explanations of 
the causes and meanings of war rape advance different views on whether war rape is an act 
of violence between two individuals, or a form of social violence targeting a particular 
group of people. Consequently, different theories locate the causes of war rape in the 
psyche of the perpetrator and in unequal power structures respectively.  
 
 The judgment in the Foča case dealt with by the ICTY reflects various theoretical 
considerations of the causes and meanings of war rape. Instead of focusing on male to 
female rape, it advances a rape definition that recognises men and women as potential 
perpetrators and survivors of rape. The Foča definition521 acknowledges the importance of 
the context in which an act of rape is perpetrated. However, it also introduces an element 
of consent. This sets it apart from definitions developed by the ICTR in the Akayesu case522 
and by the ICTY in the Furundžija case523 and Foča indictment.524 A consent-based rape 
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definition connotes an understanding of rape as an act between two individuals and the 
causes of rape as located in the psyche of the perpetrator and victim. This is further 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
5.3 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Foča case) 
Employing conventional methods of law, the Trial Chamber in the Foča case 
disagreed with the findings in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija that “the basic underlying 
principle common to [the major national jurisdictions is] that sexual penetration will 
constitute rape if it is not truly voluntary or consensual on the part of the victim.”525 Rather 
than force, threat of force or coercion, the Trial Chamber understood “the true common 
denominator which unifies the various systems [to] be a wider or more basic principle of 
penalising violations of sexual autonomy”,526 a point that the Trial Chamber in the 
Furundžija case indicated. Reconsidering the legal systems surveyed in the Furundžija 
judgment and conducting another survey of the relevant provisions of a number of other 
jurisdictions, the Trial Chamber in the Foča case found the factors classifying the relevant 
sexual acts as the crime of rape to fall within three broad categories 
 
“(i) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or threat of force to the victim 
or a third party; 
(ii) the sexual activity is accompanied by force or a variety of other specified 
circumstances which made the victim particularly vulnerable or negated her 
ability to make an informed refusal; or 
(iii) the sexual activity occurs without the consent of the victim.”527 
 
Based on these considerations, the Trial Chamber understood  
 
“the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law [to be] constituted by: 
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such 
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sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this 
purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, 
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.” 528 
 
In developing a mechanical, consent-based rape definition, the ICTY in the Foča case 
advanced a definition of rape that is the opposite of the conceptual, coercion-based 
definition set out by the ICTR in the Akayesu case.529 Paragraph a and b of the Foča 
definition, however, are similar to the rape definition developed by the ICTY in the 
Furundžija case.530 As the Akayesu definition, however, the Furundžija definition is 
coercion-based rather than consent-based. The Trial Chamber in the Foča case, in contrast, 
viewed lack of consent and the knowledge thereof as an element of rape while also 
acknowledging that coercion, force or threat of force could establish a lack of consent.531 
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The Trial Chamber highlighted that rape is seen as an act of “gender discrimination”532 and 
a “serious [violation] of sexual autonomy [which is] violated wherever the person 
subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary 
participant”.533 Contrary to the understanding of coercion as being the central element of 
the crime of rape, in a consent-based definition the nature of the crime of rape is 
understood along the lines of deprivation of sexual freedom and self-determination.534 The 
focus lies on “passion gone wrong”.535 An emphasis is placed on the psyche of the victim 
and perpetrator. The relevant events are framed as individuals engaged in single 
interactions.536 It can be argued that a consent-based rape definition is victim-centred and 
stresses the survivor’s agency. This establishes rape survivors as active subjects, 
empowering them. Consequently, a consent-based definition would serve rape survivors. 
However, it would be detrimental for them if their lack of consent would need to be proven 
as this can be very problematic and may lead to unsuccessful claims. Prosecutors look for 
evidence such as struggle, injury or distress to help them prove that the survivor did not 
consent. Frequently, however, there is no such corroborating evidence for example because 
survivors of war rape did not see a doctor immediately after having been raped. In the 
absence of any other evidence to help prove the survivor did not consent, cases may fail to 
meet the evidential requirements of courts or tribunals and consequently may be 
unsuccessful. Therefore, the ICTY Trial Chamber’s acknowledgement that coercion or 
(threat of) force establish lack of consent is crucial.  
 
 
In addition to developing a mechanical, consent-based rape definition that also 
acknowledges the importance of the context in which an act of rape is perpetrated, the 
judges Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba, David Hunt and Fausto Pocar also 
elaborated on the crime of enslavement. This later helped judges at the SCSL in 
determining whether acts of forced marriage could be interpreted as an exercise of powers 
attaching to the right of ownership, and consequently if forced marriage could be 
understood as an act of sexual slavery. The judges in the Foča case held that the detention 
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of Bosnian Muslim women in various centres, private apartments and houses where they 
had to cook and clean for, and (sexually) serve, the Bosnian Serb soldiers living there537 
falls under the crime of enslavement.538 Considering and reviewing the relevant provisions 
on enslavement under a number of International Humanitarian Law and international 
Human Rights instruments as well as case law of the US Military Tribunal, the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the 1976 Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,539 the ICTY defined enslavement in a broad, gender-
neutral way as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over a person”.540 Therefore, it could include contemporary forms of slavery that are 
impossible to exhaustively list.541 Here, the judges demonstrated contextualised thinking. 
By defining enslavement gender-neutrally, they challenged power structures as well as 
assumptions and stereotypes about the kinds of enslavement women and men are subjected 
to. The tribunal determined that the factors taken into consideration in determining whether 
or not the crime of enslavement was committed include  
 
“control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat 
of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel 
treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.”542 
 
Moreover, the ICTY stressed that enslavement includes situations where, even if 
the survivor would attempt to flee, she has nowhere to go and is aware of the risks 
involved if recaptured.543 As explained below, this definition could implicitly include 
forced marriage.544 
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A few months after the Foča judgment was passed, the ICTY explicitly recognised 
forced marriage during armed conflict as a prosecutable crime. In the context of discussing 
constituent elements of the crime of rape, the judgment in Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka et 
al states that “[s]exual violence would also include such crimes as […] forced 
marriage”.545 While this explicit recognition of forced marriage as a crime serves 
survivors,546 it overemphasises the sexual elements of forced marriage, neglecting the non-
sexual but gendered ones. Consequently, it acknowledges only a part of survivors’ 
realities. This is discussed further below in the context of the SCSL’s jurisprudence that 
elaborated on the crime of forced marriage and contributed towards its definition and 
understanding. 
 
 
The increased attention of international tribunals devoted to forced marriage from 
the early 2000s on might have been fuelled by reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences as well as by the Final Report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict which explicitly discuss forced marriage. 
The previous lack of attention may also stem from the emphasis placed on rape at the 
expense of other acts of war violence committed against women. However, the previous 
lack of attention may also be due to the fact that forced marriages in times of armed 
conflict actually may have been perpetrated on a smaller scale. Another possible 
explanation may be that the interpretation of forced marriages is based on socio-culturally 
accepted conventions that international courts and tribunals were hesitant to interfere with. 
 
 
 
5.4 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
 After the ICTY had elaborated on the crime of enslavement and explicitly 
mentioned forced marriage as a sexual violence crime, the SCSL build on the tribunal’s 
work in the AFRC, RUF and Taylor cases. While it established forced marriage as a form 
of sexual slavery and an inhumane act respectively, the discussion of the Special Court’s 
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statute below demonstrates that forced marriage also includes other acts of sexualised 
violence covered under Article 2(g). Forced marriage could also amount to enslavement,547 
torture,548 outrages upon personal dignity,549 “[v]iolence to life, health and physical or 
mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as 
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment”550 and/or taking hostages,551 
intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population,552 conscripting or enlisting 
children553 and/or offences relating to the abuse of girls.554 Elements of the below account 
of forced marriage that illustrate how the conduct matches these different categorisations 
reoccur in the analysis of the Special Court’s jurisprudence as well as in the discussion of 
theoretical considerations regarding the causes and meanings of forced marriage. In these 
contexts, the recurring account of elements of forced marriage is part of the understanding 
of the crime advanced by actors involved in the SCSL cases and of scholars respectively. 
Therefore, it is necessary to repeat them. 
 
 
 
5.4.1 The Special Court’s establishment 
In response to new outbreaks of violence in Freetown in May 2000, the Sierra 
Leonean government called for UN assistance to establish an international tribunal to try 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters involved. The hybrid SCSL was created as a 
result.555  
The international NGO No Peace without Justice developed a programme 
supporting the UN and the Sierra Leonean government556 in their plans to “try those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
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Sierra Leonean law”.557 The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its 
Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk, briefed members of the UNSC on violence 
against women in Sierra Leone and “highlighted the need to investigate, prosecute and 
punish those responsible for rape and other forms of gender-based violence”.558 However, 
No Peace without Justice and the Special Rapporteur appear to be an exception within the 
Human Rights community active in Sierra Leone. Institutionally, the role of civil society 
groups in the Special Court’s establishment was almost non-existent.559 Instead, the 
majority of Human Rights organisations, including the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee and the National Committee for Democracy and Human Rights focused on the 
release of abductees, humanitarian access to territory under the control of fighting groups 
and the establishment of a TRC.560 Similarly, Mary Robinson, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, drew attention to the need for justice and 
accountability for the Human Rights violations committed in the conflict and guaranteed 
her support for a TRC.561 After the government’s request to establish the Special Court, the 
Sierra Leonean Human Rights community held meetings to develop a common position. It 
advocated for the court to exist side by side with the TRC, for a broader jurisdiction that 
would go beyond the crimes committed only by the RUF during the conflict and for a 
purely international criminal tribunal rather than a hybrid court that would involve Sierra 
Leonean law and judges.562 Their first two points found favour with the United Nations 
Secretary-General who proposed the details relating to the establishment of the Special 
Court to the UNSC for its subsequent consideration.563 
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5.4.2 The Special Court’s statute 
International NGOs were involved in drafting the SCSL’s statute. Due to the 
particular role played by children in the conflict, however, they focused mainly on 
children’s rights and childcare rehabilitation.564 Together with the United Nations 
Development Programme, the International Centre for Transitional Justice contributed to 
the gender-related aspects of the SCSL statute. It funded two initiatives to provide 
technical assistance to the court, one of which was supporting a local group of female 
activists who drafted a new gender equality law.565 This focus on children and gender 
equality might have resulted in the apparent lack of involvement of NGOs in issues of 
sexualised war violence against women when the SCSL’s statute was drafted. Together 
with the above-mentioned primary interest of the majority of the Sierra Leonean Human 
Rights community in the TRC rather than the Special Court, this could also explain the 
lack of engagement of NGOs in the SCSL cases discussed below. Another possible 
explanation for the lack of NGO engagement in SCSL cases is the Special Court’s 
rejection of spontaneous applications for amicus curiae status at the trial stage.566 
 
Despite the apparent lack of involvement of NGOs in issues of sexualised war 
violence against women at the drafting stage of the SCSL’s statute, Article 2(g) of the 
SCSL statute explicitly mentions “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence” as crimes against humanity when 
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population”.567 Forced marriage includes acts of rape, forced pregnancy and other forms of 
sexual violence and it was understood to be a form of sexual slavery. Therefore, if it met 
the qualification of a crime against humanity, it could be charged under Article 2(g).  
Taking the Foča case568 as precedent, forced marriage could also be charged as 
enslavement.569 In a situation of forced marriage, a woman is abducted and taken to the 
fighters’ camp where she is forced or coerced to stay. Even though she has to leave the 
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house and even the camp to fulfil her duties, her physical environment is controlled by her 
forced husband570 and the fighting group. In addition to her movements and work, the 
forced husband also controls her sexuality in the sense that he dictates the modalities of the 
couple’s physical relationship. As mentioned before, forced wives are subjected to various 
acts of sexualised violence and expected to have an exclusive relationship with their forced 
husband. Children born from these unions as well as socio-economic considerations coerce 
forced wives into staying with their forced husband sometimes even after the conflict has 
ended. Therefore, forced marriages are highly valued in fighting groups as they establish 
bonds and dependency structures which deter escape of forced wives. In addition to social 
bonds that compel forced wives to stay with the fighting group, they often have nowhere 
else to go due to the stigmatisation they face by their families, communities and by society 
as a whole. Consequently, they mostly do not attempt to escape and make a choiceless 
decision to remain with the fighting group. Escape is further deterred by severe punishment 
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of those who attempt escape but are caught. Means of punishment range from corporal 
punishment, rape and torture, to death.571 
 This account demonstrates that constituting elements of forced marriage often 
include torture572 and other inhumane acts573 as they are discriminatory acts that inflict 
severe physical or mental injury, pain or suffering upon a forced wife to intimidate her. As 
forced husbands humiliate, degrade or otherwise violate the dignity of forced wives, forced 
marriage could also be charged under Article 3(e) of the SCSL’s statute as “[o]utrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced 
prostitution and any form of indecent assault”, constituting serious violations of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.574 Furthermore, it 
becomes apparent in the above description of situations of forced marriage that they 
include acts of “[v]iolence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular […] cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal 
punishment”,575 and taking of hostages.576 
Article 4 of the SCSL statute lists other serious violations of International 
Humanitarian Law. Here, forced marriage could fall under intentionally directing attacks 
against the civilian population.577 Civilian women are intentionally targeted for forced 
marriage to demoralise and disable the opponent by dissolving traditional bonds between 
families and within society. Considering that many women who are abducted are underage 
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and that, in addition to having to serve their forced husband sexually and otherwise, they 
are also forced to participate in combat, forced marriage could also be charged as 
conscripting or enlisting children.578  
Article 5 of the SCSL statute covers the tribunal’s jurisdiction based on Sierra 
Leonean law. Reflecting and reinforcing gender stereotypes of women and girls as victims 
of mainly sexualised war violence, Article 5(a) states that the Special Court has the power 
to prosecute persons who have committed  
 
“[o]ffences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31): i. Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary 
to section 6; ii. Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to 
section 7; iii. Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 
12.”579 
 
Based on the account given, forced marriage can include all of the above violations 
covered by of the Special Court’s statute. 
 
 
 
5.4.3 The Special Court’s jurisprudence 
 Forced marriage in times of armed conflict was less well-theorised and less well-
defined prior to the Special Court cases than war rape prior to the establishment of the 
ICTY and ICTR. This impacted on how the court approached and addressed it, 
contributing to developing a comprehensive understanding of the crime.  
The following sections analyse the AFRC, RUF and Taylor cases. In these cases, 
forced marriage was defined as a form of sexual slavery and as an inhumane act. Evidence 
of forced marriage was also heard in relation to charges of acts of terror and outrages upon 
personal dignity. Moreover, the Special Court developed different ways of referring to the 
crime: forced marriage and conjugal slavery. Both names and their connotations are 
commented on below. Regardless of the label, however, there is a risk that forced marriage 
is defined based on the context-dependent and highly gendered roles wives and husbands 
perform in a forced marriage. It is crucial to keep the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ or 
‘conjugality’ flexible and wide so as to adapt to the context and to capture different 
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scenarios. In doing so, courts would also address concerns regarding the female 
victim/male perpetrator focus that shapes current understandings of the crime of forced 
marriage.580 This understanding neglects situations where both spouses are forced into the 
marriage,581 where a man is forced into marriage by a woman582 and forced same-sex 
marriage. In addition to interpreting forced marriage as gender-neutral, this broader view 
of the identity of a survivor of forced marriage would contribute to the growing recognition 
of sexualised war violence perpetrated against men.583 In addition to keeping the meaning 
of the term ‘marriage’ or ‘conjugality’ flexible and broad so as to capture different 
victim/perpetrator constellations, context-sensitivity is crucial regarding the roles wives 
and husbands perform in a forced marriage as they may vary in different contexts.584 Care 
should also be taken that “patriarchal gender stereotypes of a wife’s role, such as 
household cooking and cleaning, are not inadvertently incorporated into jurisprudence that 
[…] seeks to make gains for women.”585 The inclusion of such gender stereotypes would 
constitute a step backwards rather than a success for the feminist project of gender-
sensitive recognition of crimes.586 If the terms ‘marriage’ or ‘conjugality’ prevail in the 
criminalisation of this conduct, it would be crucial for courts to explicitly state that 
“recognition of highly gendered conjugal duties in any given forced marriage scenario does 
not in any way imply acceptance of those duties as legitimate”587 to counter the 
incorporation of patriarchal gender stereotypes into International Law. 
 
 
 
5.4.3.1 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu 
(AFRC case) 
 After amending the initial indictment to include charges of other inhumane acts 
particularised as forced marriage, the accused in the AFRC case were charged amongst 
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others with rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence as well as other 
inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, and with outrages upon personal dignity as a 
violation of Common Article 3.588 These four counts were supported with identical 
allegations that 
 
“[a]n unknown number of women and girls were abducted from various 
locations within [six districts] and used as sex slaves and/or forced into 
‘marriage’ and/or subjected to other forms of sexual violence. The ‘wives’ 
were forced to perform a number of conjugal duties under coercion by their 
‘husbands’.”589 
 
This broad and imprecise indictment590 indicates that Chief Prosecutor David Crane was 
unsure about how the Trial Chamber591 would consider sexual slavery and forced marriage 
in the light of a lack of previous jurisprudence on the crimes.592 “Forced marriage as an 
inhumane act […] [was] a novel legal charge. [The prosecution was of the opinion that] 
[t]he complexity and sensitivity of the issue [rendered] an expert opinion both material and 
relevant.”593 Expert witness Zainab H Bangura was chosen to conduct research into forced 
marriage in Sierra Leone because the prosecution was convinced that  
 
“the best evidence […]  [would] come from a Sierra Leonean expert […], given 
its distinct social and cultural consequences and uniqueness to the Sierra Leone 
conflict. According to the Prosecution, the Sierra Leonean expert would be able 
to inform the Trial Chamber of the long-term social, cultural, physical and 
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psychological meanings and consequences of forced marriage within the Sierra 
Leonean context.”594 
 
Bangura’s experience as a women’s advocate and activist in the national and international 
arena further qualified her for the task. As a member of the Sierra Leonean Campaign for 
Good Governance, she became involved in the provision of medical and legal services for 
(ex-)forced wives and worked towards their rehabilitation and reintegration. As a 
community empowerment consultant for the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Sierra Leone, Bangura interviewed internally displaced 
women and returnee women, including (ex-)forced wives. Therefore, her report benefitted 
from first-hand witness testimonies.  
 In her report, Bangura highlighted that the  
 
“conflict […] affected women directly in diverse ways. […] However, the most 
devastating effect on women […] was the phenomenon called ‘bush wife’ […]. 
This was a phenomenon adopted by rebels whereby young girls or women were 
captured or abducted and forcibly taken as ‘wives’.”595 
 
Bangura elaborated that no official marriage ceremony took place and neither the woman’s 
nor her parents’ consent was sought.596 As a forced wife, a woman had to be sexually 
available to her forced husband, cook, wash his clothes and carry his possessions when 
they moved.597 Forced husbands did not show their forced wives respect and the forced 
husband always had the final say. Forced wives had to endure continuous physical and 
psychological abuse without having a way to address the brutality of their forced husbands. 
A forced wife was at the mercy of her forced husband. Forced wives had no security. 
Forced husbands could abandon them whenever they wanted to. Forced wives were led to 
believe that their forced husbands had the right to kill them without fear of any 
repercussions.598 The “[u]se of the words ‘wife’ by the perpetrators was deliberate and 
strategic. The word ‘wife’ demonstrated a rebel’s control over a woman; his psychological 
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manipulations of her feelings rendered her unable to deny his wishes.”599 It showed that a 
forced wife belonged to her forced husband and was expected to have an exclusive 
relationship with him. This also meant that forced wives were spared from acts of 
sexualised violence perpetrated by other men. A breach of the exclusive relationship was 
severely punished.600 After the conflict, many forced wives continue to have no livelihood 
and stay with their forced husband. This impacts on the psychological trauma they suffered 
as forced wives. Children born from forced marriage further impede (ex-)forced wives’ 
opportunities for a fresh start, including a new marriage. Fear of discrimination and 
stigmatisation as rebels often prevents (ex-)forced wives from returning to their families 
and communities. This results in the breakdown of family ties.601 
Influenced by Bangura’s report, the SCSL’s prosecution under Stephen Rapp 
defined the crime of forced marriage gender-neutrally as a fairly clear-cut act that 
 
“consists of words or other conduct intended to confer a status of marriage by 
force or threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against the 
victim, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, with the intention of 
conferring the status of marriage.”602  
 
The prosecution argued that forced marriage usually involves sex but, in comparison to 
sexual slavery, it has its own distinctive feature: a person is forced by threat or coercion 
into what appears to be a marriage. The prosecution further stated the view that 
 
“sexual slavery does not necessarily amount to forced marriage, in that a sexual 
slave is not necessarily obliged to pretend that she is the wife of the perpetrator. 
Similarly, a victim of sexual violence is not necessarily obliged to perform all 
the tasks attached to a marriage. ”603  
 
Therefore, the prosecution understood forced marriage to be of similar gravity as the other 
crimes against humanity under the Special Court’s jurisdiction and sufficiently serious to 
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qualify as an inhumane act.604 The Kanu defence disagreed with this assessment.605 
Already in its decision on the prosecution’s request for leave to amend the indictment, the 
Trial Chamber conveyed an understanding of forced marriage as a sexual or gender crime 
akin to rape, sexual slavery or sexual violence.606 Making this even clearer, Judge 
Sebutinde in her Separate Concurring Opinion on the Trial Chamber’s Decision on 
Defence Motions for Judgement of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 observed that sexual 
elements of a forced marriage dominate over non-sexual ones.607 Retaining the focus on 
sexual elements, the Trial Chamber eventually found that even though at first glance there 
was evidence that a forced marriage also consists of non-sexual elements, it was “not 
satisfied that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution was capable of establishing [these] 
elements […] of ‘forced marriage’ independent of the crime of sexual slavery under 
Article 2(g) of the Statute.”608 Like slavery for the purpose of physical labour, it 
understood slavery for the purpose of sexual abuse to be a specific form of the jus cogens 
prohibition of slavery.609 Drawing on the Foča case, the Trial Chamber defined a situation 
as sexual slavery when  
 
“(1) [t]he perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or 
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar 
deprivation of liberty [and when] 
(2) [t]he perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature”.610 
 
The Trial Chamber found that the use of the term ‘wife’ was one element of a forced 
marital relationship that was one of ownership and one-sided exclusivity where the forced 
husband exercised control over the forced wife’s sexuality, movements and labour. 
Therefore, the majority of the Trial Chamber found that the evidence presented by the 
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prosecution was completely covered by the crime of sexual slavery and that there was no 
gap in the law which would require the creation of a separate crime of forced marriage as 
an inhumane act.611 Influenced by Mrs Bangura’s report, Judge Teresa Doherty reached a 
different conclusion. Like the prosecution, she was of the opinion that forced marriage 
constituted a crime separate from that of sexual slavery. Judge Doherty stressed that there 
was evidence of situations where women were raped by various men but were not 
stigmatised as rebel wives.612 She understood the label ‘wife’ to be “indicative of [a] 
forced marital status which had lasting and serious impacts on the victims. [T]he label of 
‘wife’ to a rebel caused mental trauma, stigmatised the victims and negatively impacted 
their ability to reintegrate into their communities.”613 In contrast to the Trial Chamber’s 
focus on sexualised and physical violence, Judge Doherty therefore emphasised the 
psychological suffering of the victim caused by the imposition of a forced conjugal 
association.614 She concluded that “the act of forced marriage is of similar gravity and 
nature to the other enumerated crimes against humanity […]. Accordingly, […] forced 
marriage constitutes a crime against humanity.”615 Contrary to the categorisations of forced 
marriage suggested by the Trial Chamber and by Judge Doherty, forced marriage was 
ultimately considered to be evidence of sexual slavery under outrages upon personal 
dignity. This was due to the Trial Chamber’s earlier dismissal of the count charging sexual 
slavery because of defective pleading.616 Even though forced marriage severely harms the 
personal dignity of survivors, the category of outrages upon personal dignity does not 
satisfactorily match and adequately acknowledge the crime. Therefore, it is not necessarily 
in the interest of survivors.  
 
 
Before the Appeals Chamber, the prosecution617 challenged the Trial Chamber’s 
conclusion that forced marriage is a form of sexual slavery rather than an inhumane act.618 
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The Appeals Chamber judges619 noted that the prosecution might have misled the Trial 
Chamber by listing the charge of forced marriage as an inhumane act under the indictment 
heading ‘Sexual Violence’. However, the evidence it submitted did not support this 
understanding.620 Following Bangura’s report, the Appeals Chamber found that 
 
“[w]hile forced marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as 
non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing 
factors. First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by 
force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those 
associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with a another person 
resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of 
the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a 
relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, which could lead 
to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. These 
distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime.”621 
 
Expanding on the harm suffered by forced wives as a result of the crimes committed within 
the forced marriage rather than as a result of being compelled into a forced conjugal 
association,622 the Appeals Chamber stated that  
 
“victims of forced marriage endured physical injury by being subjected to 
repeated acts of rape and sexual violence, forced labour, corporal punishment, 
and deprivation of liberty. Many were psychologically traumatised by being 
forced to watch the killing or mutilation of close family members, before 
becoming ‘wives’ to those who committed these atrocities and from being 
labelled rebel ‘wives’ which resulted in them being ostracised from their 
communities. In cases where they became pregnant from the forced marriage, 
both they and their children suffered long-term social stigmatisation.”623 
 
Here it becomes clear that, in contrast to the prosecution in the trial phase, the Appeals 
Chamber acknowledged that forced marriage is a complex and diffuse process rather than a 
distinct act.624 It also recognised that by being forced into a conjugal association with 
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another person a forced wife is intrinsically as well as extrinsically bound by the forced 
husband through being forced or coerced into staying with him as well as through the shift 
in her legal, social and religious status and rights.625 Both, the Trial and the Appeals 
Chamber emphasised that the relative benefits that forced wives received from their forced 
husbands neither indicate consent to the forced marriage, “nor does it vitiate the criminal 
nature of the perpetrator’s conduct given the environment of violence and coercion in 
which these events took place.”626  
Like Judge Doherty, the Appeals Chamber concluded that forced marriage is of 
similar gravity to the crimes against humanity listed under the SCSL’s statute and to be 
sufficiently serious to qualify as an inhumane act.627 Even though the Appeals Chamber 
declined to enter a further conviction,628 the categorisation of forced marriage as an 
inhumane act is viewed to adequately reflect the conduct’s distinctive and multifaceted 
nature. It also avoids a too narrow categorisation that misrepresents the nature of the 
offence. Forced marriage is understood as including sexual and non-sexual elements. 
Therefore, charging forced marriage as an inhumane act can be seen as a success for the 
feminist goal to challenge gender stereotypes.629 It is recognition that, in times of armed 
conflict, women are not only affected by sexual, but also by other forms of violence. For 
these reasons, the understanding of forced marriage as an inhumane act serves survivors. 
However, classifying forced marriage as an inhumane act arguably conceals the serious 
violations it encompasses.630 Despite this downside, naming ‘forced marriage’ as a crime is 
recognition of the reality of women during and after armed conflicts as they experience and 
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understand it. It legitimises women’s experiences and consequently empowers them.631 By 
naming ‘forced marriage’ as a crime, it was “publicly and authoritatively transformed from 
a legally unacknowledged harmful experience into an acknowledged wrong requiring legal 
redress”.632 The term ‘forced marriage’ makes it easier to identify and stress the distinctive 
harms associated with it. It recognises an “interrelated, whole conduct which might 
otherwise be only viewed in parts.”633 ‘Forced marriage’ “provid[es] a single name for the 
larger overarching harm associated with a particular collection of offences and therefore 
captur[es], in one definition, harm that other international criminal law terms do not 
adequately or fully capture.”634 This conveys an understanding of forced marriage as more 
than the sum of its parts. The totality makes it a distinct crime that cannot be adequately 
captured in a collection of separate charges. However, when following this approach, it is 
crucial to determine the constituent crimes of a forced marriage on a case-by-case basis so 
as to cover different forms of forced marriage.635 In contrast to these advantages of naming 
the conduct ‘forced marriage’, it can be argued, that the use of the noun ‘marriage’ hides 
the degree of violence, coercion and control as well as the exploitation of gender roles that 
is characteristic of a forced marriage. Since mutual consent is seen as crucial to a marriage, 
the use of the noun ‘marriage’ suggests a degree of voluntarism, stigmatising the woman 
and downplaying the responsibility of the perpetrator. It suggests that the services a forced 
wife renders to her forced husband are offered as part of a marriage arrangement rather 
than forced. However, as discussed below in relation to Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, the 
adjective ‘forced’ can be interpreted to show that the noun ‘marriage’ is a perversion of 
what marriage really means.  
 
 
 
5.4.3.2 Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (RUF case) 
Following the Appeals Chamber’s definition of forced marriage in the AFRC case, 
the indictment against Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (RUF case) 
was amended to include charges of forced marriage as an inhumane act constituting a 
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crime against humanity under Article 2(i) of the Special Court’s statute. In addition, other 
sexual violence charges included rape and sexual slavery and any other forms of sexual 
violence as crimes against humanity under Article 2(g) of the SCSL statute and outrages 
upon personal dignity as a violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and 
of Additional Protocol II.636 
The Trial Chamber judges637 in the RUF case confirmed the prosecution’s 
statement638 and the Appeals Chamber’s finding in the AFRC case that “‘forced marriage’ 
is not subsumed by sexual slavery.”639 The Trial Chamber took a gender-neutral approach 
and determined the objective element of forced marriage to be the “imposition of a forced 
conjugal association”.640 This imposition of a forced conjugal status was understood as a 
distinct act including being married against the woman’s will and forced to engage in 
sexual intercourse and to perform domestic tasks,641 rather than the diffuse process that 
was indicated by the AFRC Appeals Chamber in its judgment. Contrary to these clear 
statements, however, the prosecution under Stephen Rapp confirmed Bangura’s opinion 
that “the use of the term ‘wife’ by the rebels was deliberate and strategic, with the aim of 
enslaving and psychologically manipulating the women and with the purpose of treating 
them like possessions.”642 Here, an inconsistent understanding of forced marriage becomes 
evident. On the one hand, the prosecution stressed the psychological element of the crime, 
which supports an understanding of forced marriage as an inhumane act. On the other 
hand, it also reaffirmed the purpose of forced marriage as imposing a relationship of 
ownership on the forced wife, supporting an understanding of forced marriage as a form of 
sexual slavery.  
The Trial Chamber in the RUF case also agreed with the Appeals Chamber in the 
AFRC case and found that serious physical and psychological injuries are inflicted upon 
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forced wives that lead to great suffering.643 Therefore, it was “satisfied that AFRC/RUF 
rebels forced an unknown number of women into marriages […], which […] constitute 
inhumane acts”.644 Evidence of forced marriage was heard to establish the crime of 
outrages upon personal dignity but the defendants were not prosecuted on it.645 The Trial 
Chamber also used evidence of forced marriage to prove acts of terror, constituting a war 
crime.646 
 
 
 
5.4.3.3 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor 
In the Taylor judgment, the Trial Chamber647 noted that, contrary to the AFRC and 
RUF cases, “‘forced marriage’ [as an inhumane act was] not charged” here.648 In contrast, 
Charles Taylor was charged with,649 and later convicted of, planning, aiding and abetting 
crimes against humanity of rape and sexual slavery as well as the war crime of committing 
outrages upon personal dignity committed by rebel forces in Sierra Leone.650 Evidence 
related to forced marriage was considered with regard to these charges and with regard to 
relevant jurisprudence of the SCSL.651 Following the definition of sexual slavery 
developed in the AFRC case,652 the judgment assisted in solidifying the international legal 
definition of sexual slavery and helped define its contours.653 Confirming the list of indicia 
for enslavement developed by the ICTY in the Foča case, the Trial Chamber determined 
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that “[t]here is no requirement that there be any payment or exchange in order to establish 
the exercise of ownership.”654 Thus, it helped settle an issue which arose in the ICC 
negotiations.655 Following the Foča case further, the Trial Chamber also acknowledged 
that the expression ‘similar deprivation of liberty’ covers  
 
“[extracting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as 
well as] situations in which the victims may not have been physically confined, 
but were otherwise unable to leave the perpetrator’s custody as they would 
have nowhere else to go and feared for their lives.”656  
 
Illustrating that the context of ownership may differ not only between, but also 
within, situations, the Trial Chamber observed that the sexual slavery system in Sierra 
Leone had a hierarchy of ownership.657 Further following Bangura’s report, the Trial 
Chamber also stressed that sexual slavery is a continuing crime that includes a number of 
actions that can stretch over a long period of time in many different locations, rather than a 
discrete event.658 These clarifications show that sexual slavery is understood broadly as a 
process. It could encompass forced marriage in times of armed conflict where women are 
abducted rather than exchanged for money. Forced wives are subjected to forced labour 
and have to serve their husbands sexually and otherwise. To carry out their tasks, they have 
to leave the house or camp. Therefore, they are not physically confined but still unable to 
leave and with no place to go due to coercion and stigmatisation. This is also true for 
forced wives of commanders who are accorded higher status and special treatment. Due to 
coercion, fear and/or socio-economic considerations, forced wives stay with their forced 
husbands for long periods of time; sometimes even after the conflict has ended.  
The Trial Chamber found that the evidence related to forced marriage heard in the 
Taylor case satisfied the elements of sexual slavery.659 Fighters exercised rights of 
ownership over their forced wives by depriving them of their liberty, forcing them to work 
for the fighters’ and group’s benefit. Additionally, forced wives were subjected to various 
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acts of sexualised violence.660 However, the Trial Chamber also expressed the view that 
acts constituting forced marriage were not limited to sexual forms of slavery. Therefore, it 
suggested that the term “conjugal slavery best describes these acts, and while they may 
constitute more than sexual slavery, they nevertheless satisfy the elements of sexual 
slavery.”661 
Here it becomes apparent that the judgment raised important questions about what 
the SCSL had previously termed ‘forced marriage’. The Trial Chamber stressed that the 
term ‘forced marriage’ is a misnomer because there is no actual marriage.662  
 
“What happened to the girls and women abducted in Sierra Leone and forced 
into this conjugal association was not marriage in the universally understood 
sense of a consensual and sacrosanct union, and should rather, in the Trial 
Chamber’s view, be considered a conjugal form of enslavement.”663 
 
This view serves patriarchal structures as marriage is considered too important and 
fundamental to be interfered with, preserving men’s traditional power position in the 
private sphere. The Trial Chamber went on to explain that conjugal slavery 
 
“has two main intertwined aspects [, a dual purpose]: sexual slavery and forced 
labour in the form of domestic work [para. 424-425]. Thus, what has been referred to 
as ‘forced marriage’ is actually two different forms of enslavement imposed through 
forced conjugal association”.664 
 
The Appeals Chamber continued to elaborate that conjugal slavery also includes the 
perpetrator labelling a victim his wife and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over 
her.665 Therefore, conjugal slavery encompasses  
 
“two kinds of harm: first, the harm caused by the non-consensual conferral of 
the status of ‘marriage’ on the victim and the resulting personal damage 
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(especially societal stigmatization); and second, the physical and psychological 
harms associated with the rape, forced pregnancy, forced labor, and other 
duties associated with being a ‘wife’.”666 
 
The Trial Chamber emphasised that conjugal slavery is not meant to be a new crime with 
additional elements.667 Blurring the line between the intertwined sexual and non-sexual 
aspects integrated in conjugal slavery,668 the Trial Chamber viewed the crime as a 
 
“distinctive form of the crime of sexual slavery with the additional component 
described by the Appeals Chamber [in the AFRC case]. However, the Trial 
Chamber [was] of the view that this additional component, which relates to 
forced conjugal labour, is simply a descriptive component of a distinctive form 
of sexual slavery. It is not a definitional element of a new crime, in the same 
way that gang rape is a distinctive form of rape, yet nevertheless falls within 
the scope of the crime of rape.”669 
 
 The categorisation of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery serves 
conservative forces within International Law that prefer relying on legal precedents to 
potentially developing new law. It neglects that forced marriage is not (only) an exercise of 
powers attaching to the right of ownership.670 The categorisation of forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery also perpetuates stereotypes that women primarily experience war 
as victims of sexual violence. It creates the false impression that forced marriage would 
predominantly be a sexualised crime. The categorisation of forced marriage as a form of 
sexual slavery ignores the gendered elements of forced marriage. Women are targeted 
because of their ascribed social roles as domestic workers, caretakers and sexual beings.671 
The categorisation of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery does not capture the 
forced exclusivity and intimacy of a forced marriage. It disregards the psychological force 
of acts of violence being disguised within the legitimate situation of marriage. Forced 
marriages cause different forms of suffering than sexual slavery and cause survivors to be 
discriminated against in unique ways. The woman is forced into marriage with a person 
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who often committed terrible atrocities against her family. They are forced into exclusivity 
and intimacy while at the same time they experience on-going abuse from the same person. 
The label ‘marriage’ attached to this relationship manipulates forced wives into loyalty 
towards their forced husbands. It renders them unable to deny their forced husband’s 
wishes and makes them feel saved from more abuse by other fighters. Children born into 
forced marriages make forced wives dependent on their forced husbands even after the 
conflict has ended. This is aggravated by the social stigmatisation and exclusion the 
women experience from their families and communities as they are seen as collaborators, 
rebels and killers. This perception is based on the fact that forced wives often participated 
in direct combat. They are victims, witnesses and perpetrators of war violence. 
Consequently, forced marriage could rather be understood as ‘sexual slavery plus’.  
The Taylor judgment makes clear that the Trial Chamber analysed the evidence of 
forced marriage under two categories. The evidence of sexual violence including rape was 
considered under the charge of sexual slavery. The evidence of forced labour, in contrast, 
was considered under the enslavement charge.672 This approach better reflects the acts 
intended to be captured by the term ‘forced marriage’. The construction of the constituting 
elements of forced marriage as two forms of enslavement highlights that the crime consists 
of sexual and non-sexual aspects. It confirms the acts of violence perpetrated against 
forced wives as serious crimes while avoiding the drawbacks of classifying forced 
marriage as a form of sexual slavery. A disadvantage, however, would be that enslavement 
does not immediately highlight the gendered dimension of the crime. Moreover, the 
experiences of forced wives would be fragmented into different forms of enslavement. 
Additionally, (ex-)forced wives are unlikely to self-identify with the label of 
enslavement.673 
 
 
 The SCSL cases discussed above indicate that forced marriages are formed in times 
of armed conflict because women are needed to perform women’s work such as cooking 
and cleaning. Forced marriages also are a means to exercise control over women beyond 
their household duties. Moreover, forced marriages create dependency structures within a 
fighting group while at the same time destroying traditional family and community ties. 
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Part 5.5 below shows that these explanations for the causes and meanings of forced 
marriage also reflect theoretical considerations regarding the causes and meanings of the 
crime. 
 
 
 
5.5 Theoretical considerations regarding the causes and meanings of forced marriage  
 The following sections explore different theoretical explanations for the causes and 
meanings of the crime of forced marriage such as the wish to control someone’s sexuality, 
peacetime marriage conventions being pushed into the context of conflict, the aim to 
demoralise and disable the opponent, the need for women to perform women’s work, the 
creation of bonds within the fighting group, the lack of material wealth of fighting groups, 
and the importance of social status. Section 5.5.2 advances a new explanation of the causes 
and meanings of forced marriage based on hegemonic masculinity theory and examples 
from Uganda.  
 When discussing the causes and meanings of forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict, parallels can be drawn to explanations of the causes and meanings of war rape. 
The perpetration of forced marriages and war rapes can be ascribed to essentialist 
understandings of men as aggressive hunters and women as submissive gatherers 
(individual causes). Forced marriages and war rapes are seen as forms of compensation or 
reward for successful fighters. The perpetration of both crimes can be ascribed to unequal 
power relationships where men are seen as powerful and women as powerless 
(interpersonal and structural causes). These exist in peacetime and are exacerbated in times 
of war, indicating a continuum of sexualised violence perpetrated against women in peace 
and war. Forced marriages and war rapes target women because of their membership in a 
particular social category as well as for economic reasons (structural causes). Forced 
marriages and war rapes are also a form of political violence, aiming at the destruction of 
the opponent. Within one’s own group, peer pressure can explain the perpetration of war 
rapes and forced marriage. The perpetration of both crimes can also be ascribed to different 
ideals of masculinity (structural causes). A notable difference is found in the fact that 
forced marriages, in contrast to war rapes, are perpetrated to create lasting interpersonal 
bonds. 
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5.5.1 Various perspectives of the causes and meanings of forced marriage in times of 
armed conflict 
 Following the SCSL, the wish to gain control over someone’s sexuality is 
established as a key personal motive for the perpetration of forced marriage in peace and 
wartime.674 In times of armed conflict, this argument works in two ways. On the one hand, 
male fighters aim to control women’s sexuality to strengthen their power positions. On the 
other hand, male fighters’ sexuality has to be controlled to refrain from the rape of female 
civilians. Indicating institutional and structural causes of the perpetration of forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict as a form of political violence, the leadership of the 
Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),675 for example, aims to create a new Acholi676 
nation and a new social order. As adultery is prohibited in this new social order, forced 
marriage was a means to give birth to the new Acholi nation. Severe punishment for breach 
of rules deters rapes of civilian women.677 Comparably to the LRA, rape was officially 
prohibited to control male fighters and the domestic realm in the RUF. Rape was seen as a 
counter-revolutionary threat to the group’s cohesion and efficacy. Forced marriage, in 
contrast, was tolerated and even encouraged. It offered stability and domesticity. Sexual 
intercourse in marriage had social and moral legitimacy, which made marital rape 
normatively impossible.678 This indicates that men exercise control over women’s 
sexuality. In forced marriages, it is the forced husband who unilaterally decides the terms 
and conditions of the couple’s sex life. While it is acceptable and even desirable for the 
forced husband to have more than one wife as it increases his status in the fighting group, 
exclusivity is expected of forced wives. A breach of this partly exclusive arrangement by 
forced wives is severely punished.679  
 Another structural explanation links the perpetration of forced marriages in times of 
armed conflict to the peacetime convention of marriage by capture (interpersonal 
violence). It is argued that these peacetime conventions are simply pushed into the context 
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of conflict.680 However, the way forced wives are treated upon return to their families and 
communities is contrary to the understanding of forced marriage in times of armed conflict 
as based on peacetime marriage practices. Survivors of forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict are shunned, forced to abandon their children and to participate in traditional 
cleansing ceremonies to wash away their guilt and experiences of sexualised violence. 
These reactions make it very clear that forced marriage in times of armed conflict cannot 
be understood as an extension of culturally accepted peacetime practices of marriage.681 
On the contrary, forced marriage in the LRA  
 
“purposefully violates Acholi sociality. Without the consent of the woman and 
man, and without the formal processes cementing the relationships of their 
lineages, women are not only coerced into marriage, but have no rights or 
recourse within it. The practice can therefore only be understood as a violation 
of customary practices regarding marriage”.682 
 
Moreover, it can be seen to be motivated by the aim to demoralise and disable the 
opponent by dissolving traditional and cultural bonds between families and within 
society.683 This establishes forced marriage as a form of social and political violence, 
targeting women who belong to a particular social group to reach the political goal of 
demoralising and disabling this group. 
 Focusing on women and their traditional roles, it is argued that forced marriages are 
coerced because fighting forces need women to perform women’s work as sexual partners, 
mothers to the children born from forced marriages, domestics, cooks, porters, water 
collectors, and food producers and gatherers (interpersonal cause of forced marriage). 
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However, women also break traditional gender roles – and are expected to do so – when 
they participate in direct combat and perform military support tasks.684 Contrary to the 
effect forced marriages have on traditional and cultural interpersonal bonds, they also are 
of vital importance to the group as they create families and consequently bonds within, and 
dependency on, the fighting group. Forced wives depend on their forced husband for 
protection from assaults by other fighters. Forced pregnancies and children born into these 
unions further reinforce women’s dependency on their forced husband and the fighting 
group. This becomes very clear when considering that in Sierra Leone and Uganda, 
fighters’ widows were allowed to remain single but opted for a new marriage with another 
fighter in hope for socio-economic support for themselves and their children. In fighting 
groups in both countries, families were also established by adopting young female 
abductees who became domestic slaves and subsequently, when reaching puberty, forced 
wives to commanders. Since these structures of dependency minimise the likelihood of 
escape of abductees and forced wives and strengthen unit cohesion, forced marriages were 
highly valued in fighting groups.685 
 Since women also serve as a means of compensation and reward for fighters’ 
bravery and upon military success, forced marriage also has to be seen in the context of a 
fighting group’s economic situation. Against the background of a lack of material wealth, 
women serve as a substitute, low-cost payment system that simultaneously boosts fighters’ 
morale.686 This argument highlights that forced marriage has structural causes in the sense 
that it is connected to a fighting group’s economic structure and in the sense that it is a 
form of economic violence. 
 Another attempt to explain the motivation for the perpetration of the crime of 
forced marriage in times of armed conflict centres on men’s self-perception and the 
establishment and maintenance of their power positions (personal, interpersonal and 
structural causes of forced marriage). Especially older fighters in higher ranks maintain a 
decadent lifestyle in which they have authority, easy access to resources and a choice of 
wives. As mentioned above, like in peacetime, the number of forced wives is understood as 
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a status symbol.687 Joseph Kony serves as an example. As the leader of the LRA, Kony 
holds a level of power and influence he would not enjoy otherwise. However, the personal 
benefits he derives from the accumulation of about forty handpicked wives ‒ in contrast to 
the commanders’ five and the low-level fighters’ one or two wives ‒ cannot explain the 
engagement in forced marriages throughout the LRA. It has to be questioned why he 
would give any wives to his fighters instead of taking all women for himself if his personal 
benefit was the only driving force behind the perpetration of forced marriage.688 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Hegemonic masculinity and forced marriage 
 The above-mentioned understanding that forced marriages are formed in times of 
armed conflict because women are needed to perform women’s work as well as the 
understanding of forced marriage as based on peacetime norms of marriage and 
masculinity can be developed further when applying RW Connell’s theory of hegemonic 
masculinity689 to Uganda. This also highlights personal, interpersonal and structural causes 
of the perpetration of forced marriage in times of armed conflict. Based on hegemonic 
masculinity theory, forced marriage can be understood as a way for men to ‘have it all’. It 
is a way for men to strive to fulfil the masculine ideal of financial independence, marriage 
and parenthood and to be the provider for, and protector of, wives and children. Men in 
fighting groups do not only need women to perform women’s work, but to fulfil their 
gender roles so that men can fulfil theirs. Rather than explaining forced marriage in times 
of armed conflict as peacetime marriage practices being pushed into the context of conflict, 
it is gender norms that are pushed into the context of conflict. While forced wives are a 
status symbol for fighters, demonstrating their power position, they also mark their status 
as adults and men. Explaining why forced marriages are formed in times of armed conflict 
based on hegemonic masculinity theory adds to the existing explanations, contributing to a 
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more comprehensive understanding of the causes and meanings of the crime. An analysis 
of the crime through the lens of hegemonic masculinity also offers an explanation as to 
why the crime of forced marriage is only perpetrated in certain regions of the world. Rather 
than being an extension of a highly patriarchal society in general where men hold a power 
position and exercise control over women, forced marriage in times of armed conflict is an 
expression of a thwarted hegemonic masculinity based on men’s roles as husbands, fathers, 
providers and protectors. In regions where masculinity is based on different norms, the 
crime would be meaningless. Consequently, it is unlikely to be committed. 
 
 The following paragraphs outline the theory of hegemonic masculinity and analyse 
hegemonic masculinity in Uganda. Based on this, a new explanation for the causes and 
meanings of forced marriage in times of armed conflict is advanced. In addition to 
providing a new explanation, inconsistencies in existing ones are highlighted before 
limitations of hegemonic masculinity theory are considered. 
 
 
 
5.5.2.1 Hegemonic masculinity in theory 
 Hegemonic690 masculinity is the context-dependent ideal of a man that is enacted 
only by a minority of men.691 Hegemonic masculinity maintains and reinforces the link 
between men and power as it provides a pattern of practice for the continuing 
subordination of women and marginalises other versions of masculinity. Therefore 
hegemonic masculinity is relational. It may incorporate elements of marginalised 
masculinities if they are of use, and requires all other men to position themselves in 
relation to it. Recognising a plurality and hierarchy of masculinities, those men who 
benefit from patriarchy without enacting its hegemonic version show a complicit 
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masculinity. They sustain, honour, desire and support the hegemonic version of 
masculinity.692  
 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Hegemonic masculinity in practice: Northern Uganda 
 Any analysis of hegemonic masculinity in practice must take into account the 
plurality of masculinities in any country. Versions of masculinity are “socially constructed, 
fluid over time and in different settings, and plural”.693 Since there are as many exceptions 
as there are assumptions about proper gender roles in Uganda as anywhere else in the 
world, it is difficult to present a unified and generalised picture of the normative version of 
masculinity in Northern Uganda. In any case, it is necessary to distinguish between men’s 
lived experiences and expectations of masculinity. Taking marriage and fatherhood as an 
example, “not all men wish to or are able to enter into it (lived experiences), but they are 
all expected to become married at some point (lived expectations).”694 Breaking out of 
these expectations is not considered an option. In Uganda’s patrilocal, patrilineal society, a 
man pays a bride price for the woman he wishes to marry. After marriage, the wife is 
considered subordinate to, and property of, her husband. Seen as unfit for formal 
education, women are regarded as there to help, to perform domestic work and to produce 
children. They are seen as exploitable bodies and tools, and their voices are often ignored. 
Violence against women is an internalised norm. For some men, it is a means to get a 
woman to love him. In a relationship, violence against women is considered a sign that the 
man emotionally invests into the connection. On a different note, violence against women 
is also viewed as a socially sanctioned extension of male authority; a way to achieve and 
maintain power and authority over women. As a means of discipline, it is socially 
acceptable to beat a woman if she does not show respect to men or because of actual or 
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suspected infidelity, allegedly evidenced, for example, by the refusal to engage in sexual 
activities with their partner.695 This indicates that men hold a power position in regard to 
their and their partner’s sexuality. Sexualised violence and coercion as well as more 
general aggressiveness in regard to sexuality are common. Being sexually active 
demonstrates masculine prowess, competence and achievement rather than intimacy. It is a 
way for men to gain respect and social status.696  
 Men, in contrast to women, take priority. They are more educated, richer and own 
other assets in addition to their wives.697 “To be recognised as an ‘adult’ and a ‘man’ [, 
however,] men are expected to become husbands and fathers […] and to exercise 
considerable control over wife and children.”698 Financial independence and subsequently 
marriage and fatherhood are preconditions to be socially and politically accepted; they are 
preconditions to be taken seriously and to be listened to, to be perceived as responsible and 
able to participate in political life. Adult men have access to important resources like 
information, contacts and solidarity.699 Unmarried young men, in contrast, are viewed with 
suspicion and seen as idle troublemakers, as “irresponsible, disrespectful, impatient, 
extravagant, arrogant, fun lovers who are ineffective at work.”700 To increase their status as 
adult men, some men have multiple wives and many children. They use their wealth in 
people for material and political advancement. In addition to marriage and fatherhood, 
being able to provide for the material needs of wife and children as well as to physically 
protect a family are two more key markers of Northern Ugandan hegemonic masculinity. 
This indicates that the achievement of manhood and masculinity is judged by other men 
and women rather than by the individual man himself.701  
 However, the context of ongoing conflict, heavy militarisation and internal 
displacement make it very difficult or even impossible for the majority of men to fulfil 
these expectations and to become a husband and father, and then the provider and protector 
of their family. In the absence of cattle or cash as the basis for bride-wealth payments, 
many men cannot get married and therefore not fulfil their roles as husbands and fathers. 
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Continuing rebel and military activities compromise men’s roles as protectors. 
Consequently, men experience an inability to take up, or sustain, roles and positions 
defined as the masculine norm. This leads to a crisis of identity and/or social presentation. 
Their fear of being seen as less than a man leads to and/or strengthens feelings of 
humiliation, intimidation, resentment, oppression, frustration and anger that are expressed 
in violent acts justified in terms of self-preservation and revenge. Men actively join the war 
to achieve what they feel they have been denied and to avail themselves of economic 
opportunities the conflict offers.702 The use of violence is seen as a “potential means to 
achieve an end, namely masculinity, rather than an integral component of that 
masculinity.”703 
 
 
 
5.5.2.3 Towards a new explanation of forced marriage based on hegemonic masculinity 
theory 
 Explaining the causes and meanings of forced marriage on the basis of hegemonic 
masculinity theory is a novel approach that contributes to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the crime by adding to existing explanations. Applying the theory of 
hegemonic masculinity to Uganda also highlights that forced marriages are not perpetrated 
in times of armed conflict simply because men have the power to do it. Forced marriages 
are perpetrated in times of armed conflict because men cannot otherwise fulfil a certain 
masculine ideal which would leave them socially disadvantaged. 
 
 
 As outlined above, the precarious economic situation in Uganda makes it difficult 
for men to become financially independent. Therefore, their chances to pay bride-wealth to 
get married and consequently to start a family are diminished. This thwarts their pursuit of 
hegemonic masculinity. Men’s economic responsibilities and diminished chances to fulfil 
these motivate them to join the war.704 However, even though becoming a fighter could put 
men into an economic position to get married and to start a family and therefore to meet 
key elements of Northern Ugandan hegemonic masculinity, forced marriage in times of 
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armed conflict offers them the same opportunity without having to pay a bride price. 
Fighters abduct women, take them to their camp (patrilocality) and label them their wives. 
Subsequently, the women are subjected to rape and forced pregnancy.705 They reproduce 
their traditional feminine roles as wives and mothers, enabling their forced husband to 
fulfil his role as husband and father. Patrilineal norms are reproduced if a couple splits up 
after the conflict. If the woman returns to her community, she is often not allowed to keep 
her children as they are understood to belong to their father’s clan.706 In addition to playing 
on culturally accepted peacetime gender norms, this indicates the subordination of forced 
wives by their forced husbands. In a highly patriarchal, misogynist environment, forced 
wives are seen as exploitable bodies and tools. In addition to rape and forced pregnancy, 
they are subjected to enslavement, torture, forced labour, and forced participation in direct 
combat.707 Forced husbands exercise control over their sexuality, movements and work.708 
This is supported by the internalised norm that violence against women is an extension of 
men’s authority and power over women. Members of fighting groups also use violence 
against women as a means of discipline for disobedience, resistance, not conceiving, 
talking together unsupervised, having blank expressions on their faces, looking miserable, 
allegedly planning an escape, or breaking rules or taboos of the fighting group. The means 
of punishment range from severe beating to rape, torture or death.709 Women are also 
punished for actual or suspected infidelity, based on the expectation that forced wives 
should have an exclusive relationship only with their forced husband. Forced husbands, in 
contrast, often have more than one wife. This again is supported by cultural norms. A 
fighter’s status in the group depends on his wealth in people (wives and dependants).710 He 
supports them materially and protects them from acts of violence perpetrated by other 
men.711 Therefore, forced husbands fulfil their role as providers and protectors. As a result, 
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he keeps his forced wives in a situation of dependency upon him, coercing them into 
staying with him.712 While forced husbands can rid themselves of forced wives by 
abandoning or killing them, forced wives have to escape the fighting group if they want to 
leave their forced husband. Escape, however, is almost impossible.713 It becomes clear that 
forced marriage provides fighters with access to different internal and external resources 
like a ‘proper’ household, support, wealth in people, status and respect as well as solidarity 
and social participation in terms of bonding with other members of the fighting group. The 
reverse example of the exclusion and punishment of fighters who do not conform and 
engage in forced marriages714 suggests that forced husbands gain the acceptance of the 
group for choosing forced marriage as a way of achieving hegemonic masculinity.  
 To be accepted into the fighting group, men who actually reject forced marriage are 
forced or coerced into complicit masculinity. They have to honour, desire, support and 
sustain forced marriage. In addition to complicit men, forced wives themselves support and 
sustain the perpetration of forced marriage. Older wives turn on younger women who are 
considered a shame to the household in which they live. For this reason, older wives 
influence their forced husbands to marry younger women.715  
 Unmarried young men and lower level fighters who are given fewer wives than 
higher ranks and commanders constitute the group of marginalised men in fighting 
groups.716 This indicates that hegemonic masculinity in fighting groups in Northern 
Uganda is established through differentiation from marginalised men rather than through 
incorporation of certain elements of their version of masculinity. Like men who meet the 
norms of hegemonic masculinity, marginalised men benefit from the domestic and support 
work forced wives perform. Forced wives also provide the advantage of additional 
combatants. The fighting group as a whole benefits from the bonds and dependency 
structures forced wives create.717  
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 The existence of marginalised but complicit masculinities constitutes a continuous 
test for, and increases the need to, demonstrate one’s masculinity. This creates an 
environment of vulnerability and potential failure, resulting in constant competition 
between the fighters. Increased by the atmosphere of violent conflict, this environment of 
humiliation, intimidation, frustration and anger as well as personal uncertainty, insecurity 
and fear of failure creates a desire to be in control. Associated with sexuality, the fear to 
lose control is implied by intimacy in the sense that physical intimacy involves giving up 
control and letting go. For a person who is afraid to lose control, this can be an uneasy 
situation. Against this background, in addition to a strategy of bonding, forced marriage, 
which includes a very violent form of sexuality, can be interpreted as a means to disguise 
feelings of inadequacy and weakness, and as a means for empowerment. (Sexual) 
aggressiveness can also be seen as a way to negotiate the latent tensions and 
aggressiveness between the fighters. If these tensions are based on the aforementioned 
competition between male fighters, killing another man’s forced wives can be understood 
as a way to subordinate him. Violence in war, as in peace, becomes a means of self-
preservation as a man as well as of revenge for not being able to achieve manhood and 
masculinity otherwise.718 
 
 
 
5.5.2.4 Hegemonic masculinity and existing explanations of forced marriage 
 In addition to providing a new explanation of the causes and meanings of forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict, analysing the crime based on the theory of hegemonic 
masculinity also highlights inconsistencies of some of the existing explanations outlined 
above. When thinking about forced marriage through a hegemonic masculinity lens, the 
substitution argument that forced marriages were engaged in to reduce the number of war 
rapes of civilians appears to be based on the false assumption that both crimes would serve 
the same purpose. While forced marriage provides fighters with the opportunity to become 
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husbands, fathers, and providers for, and protectors of, a family, war rapes do not. War 
rapes confirm a different kind of hegemonic masculinity which includes, for example, 
sexual prowess. While forced marriages provide fighting groups with additional and 
necessary manpower, war rapes do not. In most cases, women who were raped by male 
fighters do not become part of a fighting group to support its operation.  
 The understanding of forced wives as status symbols especially for fighting group 
leaders like Joseph Kony is another explanation that can be developed further on the basis 
of an understanding of forced marriage informed by the theory of hegemonic masculinity. 
The interpretation advanced above that Kony’s personal benefit could not explain the 
perpetration of forced marriages throughout the LRA is only partly correct. The 
perpetration of forced marriages does not only benefit a fighter personally as in achieving 
hegemonic masculinity. It also confirms the fighter’s man- and adulthood and makes him a 
full member of society. Therefore, for the benefit of the whole fighting group, its 
effectiveness and efficiency, Kony has to give women to his fighters to make them men.  
 Seeing forced marriage through a hegemonic masculinity lens also offers an 
opportunity to adapt the argument that forced marriages in times of armed conflict are 
based on socio-culturally accepted peacetime marriage practices that are simply pushed 
into wartime. The analysis of hegemonic masculinity in Uganda and the parallels that can 
be drawn to forced marriages in times of armed conflict indicate that it is not a socio-
culturally accepted peacetime marriage practice that is pushed into wartime, but rather 
socio-culturally accepted peacetime gender norms. Men strive to be financially 
independent, husbands, fathers, providers and protectors, and in the context of Uganda’s 
precarious economic situation and the conflict, they see forced marriage as a way to fulfil 
this socially accepted ideal. However, while forced marriage in times of armed conflict 
may be based on socio-culturally accepted masculine ideals and men may use it as an 
opportunity to fulfil these, forced marriage violates women’s gender norms. While 
marriage and motherhood are expected of women and achieved through forced marriage, 
forced wives transgress women’s gender roles by participating in combat. This resonates 
with their stigmatisation as collaborators, rebels and killers.  
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5.5.2.5 Limitations of hegemonic masculinity theory 
 Even though the theory of hegemonic masculinity holds great explanatory power in 
regard to forced marriage in times of armed conflict, its shortcomings have to be 
mentioned too. Since the theory is based on essentialist concepts of gender, it negates the 
prospect of ascribing women with masculine characteristics. It negates the prospect of 
women forcing men into forced marriage.719 If we applied the Ugandan ideal of 
masculinity to women, we would, for example, be able to interpret forced wives’ improved 
access to food and looted goods through engaging in combat roles as a means to gain 
economic, and consequently more general, independence from their forced husbands and 
the fighting group.  
 A focus on hegemonic masculinity also easily overlooks how men who meet the 
ideal of masculinity simultaneously can be seen as deviating from it. Taking the example 
of fighters, they meet the masculine requirement of physical strength, toughness, 
activeness and capacity for violence. However, at the same time they are required to be 
obedient, to submit to authority and to endure humiliation, which are generally seen as 
feminine traits.720 
 Since hegemonic masculinity theory assumes that all men aspire to conform to a 
certain ideal of masculinity or benefit from it, it cannot explain why some male fighters 
never marry.721  
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Taking together the elaborations on war rape in Chapters 4 and 5, for the purpose of 
this thesis, war rape is understood as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature”,722 a sexual 
expression of violence and aggression. It is an act of force that exploits power inequalities. 
Power inequalities include gender inequality, inequalities between men, inequalities 
between women, inequalities of socio-economic resources, and inequalities based on 
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nationality, race, culture, class, age, education, profession and sexual orientation. 
Consequently, war rapes are committed under (possibly especially created) coercive 
circumstances expressed through, for example, threats or deceit, rendering the victim 
incapable of giving genuine consent. However, it has to be stressed that not all sexual 
interactions in times of armed conflict are rapes. Moreover, women’s agency has to be 
emphasised. Therefore, an element of lack of consent remains important in defining war 
rape. However, consent has to be interpreted as genuine agreement. Silence or the lack of 
resistance does not necessarily amount to consent. Moreover, an element of absence of 
consent has to be included in a definition of rape in a way that it can be established by 
proving coercive circumstances without having to introduce evidence of the survivor’s lack 
of consent. Downsides of a (partly) consent-based definition such as a focus on the 
behaviour of the survivor have to be considered. War rapes are an extreme continuation of 
structural peacetime violence. They target a person’s dignity, autonomy, self-
determination, bodily integrity and identity. War rapes cause physical, psychological and 
social harm. They humiliate, shame, stigmatise, intimidate, degrade, punish, control and 
destroy the individual survivor as well as their families, communities and society as a 
whole. War rape is a crime in and of itself and it can also constitute, for example, an act of 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and torture.  
 
Forced marriage in times of armed conflict means that, in the coercive context of 
armed conflict, the status of marriage is conferred on someone by words or deeds.723 
Forced marriage includes acts of physical and psychological violence such as abduction, 
manipulation, enslavement, deprivation of liberty, sexualised violence, forced pregnancy, 
forced labour, corporal punishment and forced recruitment. Nevertheless, some see it as a 
way to survive; to protect themselves from what they consider worse acts of violence and 
to gain economic benefits. Forced marriages are formed in times of armed conflict to 
exercise control over someone, targeting a person’s self-determination. Forced wives also 
are a reward and status symbol. Forced marriages create dependency structures in fighting 
groups and destroy traditional interpersonal bonds because forced wives are stigmatised 
by, and excluded from, their families and communities. Forced marriage is a way to fulfil a 
certain masculine ideal that cannot be achieved otherwise. This indicates that forced 
marriage is a form of structural gender-based violence that is a continuation from 
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peacetime norms and practices. Legally, forced marriage has been categorised as form of 
sexual slavery, which highlights the seriousness of the crime. However, it overemphasises 
the sexual elements of forced marriages. An inhumane act of forced marriage instead 
reflects the conduct’s distinctive and multifaceted nature, although it arguably conceals the 
seriousness of the crime. In addition to these different categorisations, different terms for 
the conduct have been developed: forced marriage and conjugal slavery. The SCSL argued 
that since no actual marriage takes place between the spouses, ‘forced marriage’ is a 
misnomer for what would better be called ‘conjugal slavery’. As mentioned above, even 
though the label ‘slavery’ highlights the seriousness of the conduct, it creates a 
fragmentation of the elements of forced marriage into different forms of slavery. 
Moreover, (ex-)forced wives are unlikely to self-identify with that label. The term ‘forced 
marriage’ has the advantage that it recognises an “interrelated, whole conduct”.724 Naming 
forced marriage “provid[es] a single name for the larger overarching harm associated with 
a particular collection of offences and therefore capturing, in one definition, harm that 
other international criminal law terms do not adequately or fully capture.”725 Therefore, the 
term ‘forced marriage’ is used throughout the thesis.  
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6 The ICC negotiations in general: Actors’ identities, influences and methods 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 provided the broader thematic context for the assessment of the 
ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict, and the 
analysis of how these definitions came about. Building on this, Chapters 6 – 9 analyse how 
the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage came about, and address the research 
questions and hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the identity of actors involved in the ICC negotiations in 
general (Research Question 1). Following feminist and constructivist theories, it is 
important to critically examine not only contexts, agendas and assumptions but also actors 
and their identities that shape their interests and actions. As explained in Chapter 2, actors’ 
identities, in turn, are shaped by normative structures. For the purpose of this thesis, 
normative structures are personal, national and international values, norms and rules. Since 
actors and structures mutually influence each other (constructivist circle), they have to be 
analysed together.  
In the context of treaty negotiations, individuals are mainly viewed as 
representatives of different constituencies. They are rarely seen as individuals who can 
have an impact on negotiation dynamics, courses and outcomes. The second part of the 
chapter portrays state delegates at the ICC negotiations as individual experts who have to 
follow their governments’ instructions. However, their instructions leave space for 
personal and international values, norms and rules to come into play. Therefore, in this 
context, an emphasis is placed on normative structures shaping actors. However, the 
examples given also show that actors shape normative structures, for example by 
influencing the content and interpretation of their instructions, which impacts on the 
making of international rules. In addition to these two inter-connected lenses, the third part 
of this chapter outlines the formation of state coalitions based on shared national norms. 
This way, the (power) dynamics of the ICC negotiations are highlighted. The fourth part of 
Chapter 6 moves away from a state-centric view on the ICC negotiations and analyses 
NGOs as a group that also played a crucial role. A focus is placed on the CICC, its 
founding, composition, motivation, general interests, sources of funding, ways of 
participation in, and influencing, the ICC negotiations, and its relationship with state 
delegations. The Women’s Caucus is singled out as a specific group within the NGO 
Coalition. The Caucus is of great relevance for this thesis as it was the main actor driving 
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the negotiations of sexualised crimes. Especially the last two sections of this chapter 
explore the methods the CICC and the Women’s Caucus used to influence states’ positions 
(Research Question 4). 
 
 
 
6.2 State delegates as individuals  
As may be expected, government delegations at the ICC negotiations were 
constituted mainly of career diplomats and senior civil servants, to a lesser extend of public 
and private experts including legal specialists mainly of International Law and domestic 
criminal law, and a few politicians. Delegates were not subject specialists.726 To a certain 
extent, they negotiated in a vacuum.727 Many “lacked experience in […] [International 
Criminal Law], comparative criminal law, or comparative criminal procedure. Most 
delegates had no criminal practice experience of any kind.”728 They also seldom had 
experience of war and military conduct.729 
Delegates had to secure their national interests as laid out in instructions they 
received from their governments. These instructions included negotiation objectives; 
information on what a state aimed for, what it was prepared to accept and what it could not 
compromise on.730 The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (UK), Elizabeth Wilmshurst, stands as an example. Before a change of 
government in 1997, the UK was sceptical about the establishment of an international 
criminal court. When the Labour Party took over from the Conservatives, however, the 
UK’s position changed. Wilmshurst represented the country before and after the 1997 
elections and argued for the position of each respective government.731 
At first glance, the relevance of governmental instructions seems to put personal 
and international values and norms in the backseat. When considering, however, that 
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instructions from national governments were “mostly not very specific”,732 contradictory 
and/or inadequate,733 it becomes clear that they did leave room for both, personal and 
international normative structures to come into play. In these situations, delegates had to 
take into account their own professional experience as negotiators, regular progress 
evaluations and their perception of the overall interest of the international community. 
Delegates can and often did have an impact on the content of their instructions through 
reports to, and influence on, their ministries.734 Moreover, committed, creative and 
enthusiastic delegates would approach others to show them that certain proposals or 
positions, including those on gender and sexualised violence, were not contrary to the 
instructions they received from their governments.735 This way, individual delegates 
influenced international normative structures. Here, personal contacts were of vital 
importance.736 The example of a speech made by a member of the Colombian delegation in 
relation to the crime of forced pregnancy in which he voiced an opinion contrary to the 
previously negotiated compromise definition, however, was rebuked. This demonstrates 
that international norms in the wake of becoming rules trumped personal values.737 The 
example of the Canadian delegation further indicates that international, national and 
personal values and norms mattered in the ICC negotiations. At the time the ICC 
negotiations took place, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs championed the Human 
Security Agenda. This included the view that human security could not exist as long as 
gender inequality persists and violence against women is perpetrated. This motivated the 
minister and his delegation to work towards ensuring that an international criminal court 
would learn from past mistakes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as the ICTY 
and ICTR in not paying enough attention to gender crimes and their appropriate 
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investigation.738 These points of view were supported by Australia and New Zealand.739 
For New Zealand, this was in line with its support for gender equality and non-
discrimination at UN level.740 A similar interplay between international, national and 
personal values, norms and rules can be seen from the example of the Bosnian delegation. 
Influenced by his country’s experience of the war in the 1990s, the Bosnian ambassador 
was keen to have sexualised violence included in the list of war crimes and had “the moral 
authority to do so”.741 Therefore he actively supported instructions received from the 
Bosnian government to make sure that the instruments and jurisprudence742 of the ad hoc 
tribunals would be considered in drafting the ICC instruments.743  
 
 
 
6.3 State delegations as groups 
As the paragraphs above indicated, the ICC negotiations can be characterised as 
political rather than technical,744 “an exercise in international relations” that constructed its 
own reality.745 Coalitions formed by state delegations contributed to the creation of this 
distinct reality. Initially, state coalitions formed along geographic lines. Increasingly, 
however, they were based on states’ positions on an international criminal court.746 
Therefore, some of these coalitions transcended traditional divides. However, they did not 
completely remove boundaries as traditional power dynamics remained in place at least 
partly. The support for the Rome Statute of the permanent members of the UNSC, for 
example, was still seen as crucial.747  
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 The coalition approach facilitated equality between the global North and South. 
However, a low level of awareness of civil society, parliamentarians and government 
leaders regarding the ICC negotiations until August 1998,748 as well as a lack of funding,749 
resulted in a low level of participation of state and NGO delegations from the global South 
in the first PrepCom sessions. For example, the initial absence or low level of involvement 
of Arab states in the ICC negotiations was put down to practical rather than normative 
reasons. It was argued that they lacked training in legal reform processes and therefore did 
not fully participate. However, their behaviour and the attitude that others will take care of 
everything were also brought forward as possible explanations.750 Also invoking national 
and regional norms, it was said that Arab states did not engage because of the perceived 
inherent unfairness of the court as a Western institution, and concerns that it would 
interfere in domestic matters.751 Practical and strategic reasons were also brought forward 
in trying to explain the initial low level of engagement of other states in the ICC 
negotiations. It was argued that “third world countries did not take [the process of 
establishing the ICC] seriously […] because they thought it was too expensive [and only 
participated to be seen as civilised]”.752 The latter explanation resonates with the 
motivation of other states, for which participation meant legitimation for their national 
governments.753 However, these arguments raise the question whether states from the 
global South did not see the advantages of having a permanent international criminal court 
independent of the UNSC and specific situations like many others did.754 A low level of 
engagement from certain states can also be understood as resistance towards the external 
imposition of a legal reform process that should have been initiated by the domestic 
government. This imposition can be understood as a form of social engineering if main 
donor countries are also the main sponsors of a new international treaty that may require 
national implementation and therefore national law reform. Donor countries could then 
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make continuing financial support for some states dependent upon them participating in 
negotiations and signing the treaty. And vice versa, if donor countries like the US are 
opposed to a new treaty, continuing support, for example for some African states, could be 
made dependent upon them not signing the treaty.755 Making governments appear helpless, 
pushed about and out of control, this could give rise to low-level participation in 
international law-making processes or opposition to the outcomes.756 
 As the negotiations continued, the initial North-South divide decreased. Countering 
arguments that “third world countries did not take [the process of establishing the ICC] 
seriously”,757 African delegations from all parts of the continent participated actively from 
the sixth PrepCom session in March/April 1998 on. They cooperated closely on many 
issues on the basis of principles adopted by members of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in September 1997, and the Dakar Declaration adopted by 
government and NGO representatives at a conference in Senegal in February 1998.758 At 
Rome and since, African diplomats took a lead in pushing for an international criminal 
court with a significant degree of independence from the UNSC and European powers. 
Due to the size of the group – fifty-three African states were involved in the negotiations – 
they were able to steer the debate forcefully.759 “Since many of the countries involved 
[had] only recently ended colonial rule […] or set up ‘truth commissions’ […], many also 
[had] the moral authority to push for the Court to be an effective one.”760 The assignment 
of this authority can be seen as another example of national and international normative 
structures shaping actors’ identities. National experiences of colonialism and conflict 
highlight that norms and rules related to independence, self-determination, peace and 
justice were held high at national level. These national normative structures coincided with 
international ones. African actors were seen as allies in the struggle to end impunity for 
acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This shapes the identities of 
these actors in the international fora of the ICC negotiations. The example above also 
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indicates that experiences of war and Human Rights abuses motivated African state 
delegations to participate in the ICC negotiations.761  
 Contributing to this heightened level of participation of actors from all over the 
world in the ICC negotiations, the CICC used the funding it received from various 
foundations, individuals, states and other institutions, including the European Union and 
some of its member states, the Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation, to support 
NGOs and state delegations from developing countries.762 It assisted state delegations by 
providing representatives, legal experts and interns to serve (on) smaller delegations.763 
The delegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Samoa, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Trinidad and Tobago are examples of state delegations that included 
NGO representatives.764 On the one hand, this enabled state delegations as well as 
members of civil society to participate more actively and directly in the ICC negotiations. 
With more people on a state delegation, more meetings could be covered. Being present in 
a meeting meant knowing what was discussed and being able to participate in ongoing 
(informal) work. For the state delegation, this cooperation helped to develop its legal 
arguments.765 For members of the civil society, serving on a state delegation meant access 
to, and speaking rights in, all meetings. This way, a civil society member of a state 
delegation was, for example, able to influence the provision covering forced pregnancy.766 
It enabled members of the civil society to continue to argue their original points in a 
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different forum. They stayed true to their own and their organisations’ views and still 
argued for, and on the basis of, the same views when they became members of state 
delegations.767 In these situations, national norms had a low impact. In addition to 
providing civil society members to support small state delegations, some state delegations 
like Canada also included two civil society members not only to benefit from their 
expertise amongst others on gender issues, but also to have NGO’s points of view reflected 
in the delegation.768 On the other hand however, CICC funding made NGOs and 
government delegations especially from the global South dependent on support from the 
global North.769 Donors could have exploited this power imbalance to push state or NGO 
delegations to take on certain issues or points in return for support, manipulating 
discussions and outcomes.770  
 
Even though the previous paragraphs show that the coalition approach facilitated 
equality between state delegations, inequalities based on language existed and restricted 
opportunities for actors to influence international normative structures. Those who actively 
participated in the ICC negotiations were largely English-speaking.771 How crucial English 
language skills were becomes apparent when considering that much of the information that 
was circulated was in English. Moreover, the decisive working group and informal 
meetings took place in English only without translation (and record). Those who wanted to 
speak or discuss a proposal had to do so in English.772 This led to a situation where a 
delegation’s advisor was sent to negotiate in these meetings because he was the only 
English speaker.773 It also resulted in some states having an advantage regarding the 
submission of proposals and therefore, they became key actors in the negotiations. This 
indicates that states that contributed written proposals gained more visibility than those that 
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participated mainly verbally. This is due to the fact that if a written proposal was 
submitted, it had to be dealt with seriously. It could not be ignored.774 In situations where 
sceptics submitted a proposal that, if adopted, would have made the court acceptable to 
them, disregarding their proposal would have created the risk that these sceptics might 
have withdrawn their support for the court completely. Conversely, written proposals also 
could not be ignored as to do so might have risked alienating the court’s allies.775 Too 
much attention paid to sceptical proposals and the potential result of a watered down 
institution and instruments might have frustrated the court’s allies, resulting in withdrawal 
of support. 
The number of key actors in the ICC negotiations was further limited by the fact 
that consensus was needed. The more actors discussed a proposal, the more difficult it 
became to agree on it. Therefore, the informal or working group meetings, in which a 
lower number of delegations participated already, were further downsized into smaller 
groups or blocks who worked on a proposal together. Once they drafted a proposal, it was 
fed back into the larger groups, step by step.776 The compromise they delivered was often 
“so delicate that not even a single word [could] be changed. It was nearly impossible to 
undo those texts.”777 The negotiations of the elements of genocide in the first session of the 
PrepCom2 stand as an example here. Disagreement about the contextual element was 
overcome in informal discussions between the US and Canada, supported by the UK, 
Germany, Australia and others. A compromise was worked out which was then put before 
an informal meeting chaired by Herman von Hebel, the coordinator of the working group 
on the elements of crimes, before it was incorporated into a rolling text.778 A degree of 
secrecy was upheld about the block meetings, their participants and about what was 
discussed. Especially small states were seldom invited or able to participate. This indicates 
that the size of delegations mattered. Bigger delegations had an advantage because they 
could send members to simultaneous meetings.779 
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Much of the dynamism of the ICC negotiations was driven by the Like-Minded 
Group (LMG)780 which was formed with encouragement of the CICC in the second 
PrepCom session. The LMG was first chaired by Canada, then by Australia. At the 
beginning of the Rome Conference, its members also included Austria, Argentina, 
Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa, 
Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago (representing twelve 
Caribbean states), Uruguay, and Venezuela.781 Based on shared goals, it developed a 
strong, but sometimes uneasy partnership with the CICC and other experts.782 Like the 
CICC, the LMG advocated 
 
“the independence of the international criminal court from the [UNSC], the 
independence of the prosecutor, the extension of the inherent jurisdiction of the 
international criminal court to cover all core crimes, the full cooperation of 
states with the international criminal court, a successful diplomatic conference, 
the prompt creation of an independent and effective court, and the power of the 
international criminal court to finally decide on the unavailability or 
unwillingness of national systems to proceed with a case.”783 
 
Like the LMG, the NAM made up of China, India, Israel, Pakistan, a group of Arab 
states and others also advocated the independence of the court from the UNSC. In general, 
however, they favoured a much weaker institution. The members of the Arab block, for 
example, spoke out for war crimes provisions covering only international armed conflicts, 
for the exclusion of the term ‘gender’ and related provisions, for a change in the provisions 
covering child soldiers to exclude the Palestinian intifada, and the inclusion of the death 
penalty.784 The NAM also focused on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It saw nuclear 
weapons as the weapons of developed countries while chemical and biological weapons 
were those of developing states. Therefore, if the former would not be included in the list 
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of prohibited weapons under the war crimes provision, neither should the latter.785  The 
Movement’s influence on the ICC negotiations, however, was weakened due to historical 
enmities between the members of the group, preventing it from growing together. NAM’s 
cohesion soon faded and the Movement broke apart. Its members either joined the LMG or 
reformed into regional groups like SADC.786 It can be assumed that their decision which 
group to join was based on assessments of compatibility of a delegation’s national norms 
and rules with those of the groups they could join. 
Led by South Africa, SADC stood as a counterweight to Europe that was eventually 
integrated into the LMG.787 Again, this change of identity could be based on an evaluation 
resulting in the perception that SADC’s and the LMG’s values and norms were compatible. 
Constructivist theory suggests for both situations, the inclusion of former NAM members 
into SADC and the LMG as well as the eventual incorporation of SADC into the LMG, 
that the change in SADC’s and the LMG’s composition had an effect on their identities 
and consequently their interests and actions. 
Many Caribbean states also joined forces, advocating the inclusion of drug related 
crimes in the jurisdiction of an international criminal court and the court’s power to impose 
the death penalty.788 
In contrast to the LMG and NAM, the five permanent members of the UNSC aimed 
at keeping the court under UNSC control, modelling it after the ad hoc tribunals.789 As 
noted above, in 1997 however, the UK changed its position after a change of government, 
and joined the LMG.790 It worked towards the Western objective to succeed in establishing 
a permanent international criminal court and to have the maximum number of states 
involved.791 Following a pragmatic approach, for the UK, as for many Western states, an 
international criminal court was a foreign policy issue, intended to close a gap in states’ 
foreign policy armoury. It was envisaged as a permanent juridical process to assist peace 
after conflict by initiating prosecutions straight away rather than having to create a new 
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institution on an ad hoc basis first. Invoking issues of national sovereignty, it was 
important that the court was not to (be seen to) damage Western governments who were 
worried that the institution might prosecute their own people. It can be argued that their 
concerns were unnecessary because the ICC needs states’ support to be effective. 
Furthermore, Western armed forces enjoy a working military discipline where breaches 
thereof are dealt with appropriately within the military system.792 They may have had a 
reason to worry, however, when considering that UN peacekeepers, including Western 
military personnel, have been involved in crimes like trafficking in human beings and 
forced prostitution.793 Therefore, Western states could be pressured to launch 
investigations against their own people to avoid involvement of an international criminal 
court, which would be “poison”794 for every government. As mentioned above in relation 
to the UK, the example of the French delegation also shows that it was a change in national 
power dynamics and consequently national normative structures that led to a change in 
France’s identity in the ICC negotiations. Initially, when the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court still seemed unlikely, France was very supportive of the 
project. When the court began to take shape, however, France took a more cautious 
position. France shared the UK’s concerns regarding the protection of its own people. Like 
the UK, after a change of government in 1997, the French policy changed again and 
became more constructive. This was supported by the Minister of Justice, indicating once 
more that in addition to national norms, personal values mattered in the ICC negotiations. 
The French delegation did not go as far as joining the LMG however. Rather, the French 
were approached by the LMG, wishing to secure the ratification of the Rome Statute by 
some of the permanent members of the UNSC. The importance ascribed to the support of 
this group of states indicates that, contrary to what is argued by some, traditional power 
dynamics were at least partly reinforced.795  
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6.4 NGOs as groups 
 Traditional state-centric models are still important in forming our understanding of 
the international system. Traditional constructions of International Law are deeply 
engrained and continue to restrict opportunities for NGOs to get involved in international 
law-making and court procedures. The existing structures and processes of international 
law-making are struggling to accommodate NGOs’ diversity and fluidity.796 However, this 
only tells part of the story of how structures shape actors in international law-making. As is 
discussed further below, NGOs can contribute to international law-making processes in a 
number of ways. Through their participation, they can facilitate a development away from 
the traditional state-centric power dynamics of international relations and towards the 
active participation of a wider range of actors.  
The ICC negotiations can be understood as evidence of new diplomacy, where 
large and small states, international organisations, and NGOs worked together in 
partnership in which all sides were interested.797 Cooperation between governments, 
international organisations and civil society organisations is not a new phenomenon.798 
Especially at the UN, NGOs have played a considerable role since the drafting of its 
charter. A  
 
“parallel NGO conference with a separate agenda, the NGO forum, has been a 
feature of most UN conferences and their preparatory meetings since the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Environment. Supplementing the business of the 
forum is an extracurricular festival of NGO exhibitions and activities. In all 
these ways, NGOs seek to influence the governmental agenda, exploit news 
coverage of the event, and carry on business among themselves.”799 
 
In the ICC negotiations, however, no parallel NGO forum was organised. Instead, NGOs 
participated in all stages of the actual negotiation process. As discussed in detail below, 
while states still made the final decisions, NGOs became their strategic partners800 that 
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influenced states’ decisions in various ways. The direct participation of NGOs in the ICC 
negotiations can be understood as a result of the positive relationship between states and 
NGOs that has developed during the last century. The extent and depth of cooperation and 
the scale of the targets that the partnership between large and small states, international 
organisations, and NGOs had set for itself and that it eventually achieved, establishes the 
ICC process as a “vanguard approach to international diplomacy and the development of 
international laws and institutions”.801  
 
 Within the analysis of NGOs as important actors in the ICC negotiations, the 
following sections focus on the CICC as a particular group of NGOs, and the Women’s 
Caucus as a particular group within the CICC. An emphasis is placed on both groups’ 
founding, composition, motivations, general interests, funding, methods and relationships 
with state delegations  
 
 
 
6.4.1 The NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC)802 
Exemplifying new diplomacy and permeating the boundaries of state-centric 
models of international relations and law-making, a group of particularly strong, mainly 
European and US American Human Rights organisations participated in the establishment 
of an international criminal court from the early 1990s onwards. The organisations were 
led by the World Federalist Movement, represented by William R Pace.803 The CICC’s 
founding members also included Amnesty International, represented by Christopher Keith 
Hall; Human Rights Watch, represented by Richard Dicker; the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Human Rights, represented by Jelena Pejic; No Peace Without Justice/Transnational 
Radical Party, represented by Emma Bonino; and Parliamentarians for Global Action.804 
                                                          
801
 Pace and Schense, ‘Coalition for the International Criminal Court at the Preparatory Commission’ (n 34) 
706. 
802
 See Annex 2 for an organigram of the CICC. 
803
 Benedetti and Washburn (n 34) 8-9; Benedetti, Bonneau and Washburn (n 28) 70, 76-77: William R 
Pace’s interests and actions in the ICC negotiations were shaped by his career as a professional official of 
NGOs dedicated to world peace and the development of international organisations. Pace recognised the 
importance of the solidarity between members of the CICC, which he preserved and used as needed. 
Together with his personal strengths, he influenced the ICC discussions this way.  
804
 For more information on these actors see Benedetti, Bonneau and Washburn (n 28) 68-73; Mariacarmen 
Colini, ‘The Experience of No Peace Without Justice’ in Alessandro Fodella and others (eds), Civil Society, 
International Courts and Compliance Bodies (TMC Asser Press 2004). 
202 
Some of these NGOs later became members of the self-appointed CICC Steering 
Committee which provided policy and programme coherence for the Coalition’s efforts 
and activities.805  
The organisations that founded the CICC maintained long-standing relationships 
with diplomats, scholars and the United Nations Secretariat. They participated in the work 
of the ILC on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court from 1994 
onwards.806 When the ILC submitted its draft statute for a permanent international criminal 
court in 1994, the group was disappointed by the UNGA’s decision not to convene an 
international conference and shocked about the willingness of friendly states to 
compromise on key issues. This motivated them to found the CICC.807  
 
The founding of the CICC arguably stands as an example of a “fortunate 
coincidence”808 where people with coinciding values came together; where structures 
shaped actors. Initially, the CICC encouraged diplomats to call for a preparatory process 
and a diplomatic conference for the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court.809 In cooperation with the LMG, the Coalition later pushed to realise the idea of a 
fair, free and independent international criminal court. It was perceived to be necessary to 
create a permanent institution that, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, was independent of the 
UNSC on the one hand, and specific cases and situations on the other. Like many Western 
governments, the CICC envisaged a fair, free and independent international criminal court 
to fill an impunity gap.810  
 
The coalition approach facilitated equality between large and small NGOs.811 
However, it has to be noted that the NGOs that are experienced in dealing with core global 
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governance issues are big international organisations mostly from the global North. They 
are well-connected to other, mainly Northern, NGOs, developing a clear core-periphery 
structure and, therefore, a hierarchy.812 However, even though the CICC itself was founded 
by exactly those international Western organisations, its membership broadened to include 
Latin American and African NGOs but only a few civil society groups from North Africa, 
Asia and the Middle East. Latin American and African NGOs were motivated to 
participate in the ICC negotiations by their experiences of war and Human Rights 
abuses.813 The example of individuals like the Senegalese Lawyer Abdul Koroma, M 
Cherif Bassiouni814 and Richard Goldstone as well as the establishment of the ICTR and 
TRCs, further motivated African civil society groups to become involved.815 The low 
number of North African, Asian and Middle Eastern NGOs that participated in the ICC 
negotiations might have been related to the weakness in the development of International 
Law, in particular of Human Rights, in these regions.816  
 
“A glance at the ratification record of existing human rights treaties − for 
instance, the [ICCPR] or the Convention Against Torture − shows that, 
regardless of their official ideology, states in North Africa and the Middle East 
and Asia are least likely to become parties. Many Asian human rights groups 
have tried unsuccessfully for years to set up an Asian human rights system. It is 
not surprising, then, that their enthusiasm for setting up an even more forceful 
human rights implementation mechanism, one that their governments would be 
even less likely to participate in, was lukewarm. The situation in the Middle 
East and North Africa is even bleaker. In many of the countries in this region, 
there is not enough political space for human rights groups to operate freely, let 
alone to campaign for a Court that might have the authority to bring leaders of 
their governments to justice for human rights abuses.”817 
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This confirms the idea that “global civil society and the international rule of law are 
interdependent and need each other to be able to develop further.”818  
At the request of other Coalition members, the CICC established an International 
Secretariat. Continuously, the International Secretariat worked towards maintaining 
momentum. To this end, it successfully mobilised and coordinated different NGO groups, 
legal experts and private organisations such as parliamentary, religious, humanitarian, and 
women’s associations that represented every part of the world. The CICC International 
Secretariat supported the development of a common strategy and provided information 
services.819 This way, the Secretariat contributed towards a high degree of transparency, 
resulting in inclusivity. It remained neutral in the negotiations so as to maintain the CICC’s 
cohesiveness. Not taking a position enabled the International Secretariat to identify and 
expand areas of commonality between CICC members in the face of a plurality of ideas 
and objectives that existed in the negotiations. This was utilised to uphold relationships 
with a large number of actors and to contribute the NGOs’ wide range of expertise to all 
parts of the negotiations. It was possible for the International Secretariat to maintain a 
neutral position in the ICC negotiations because it was hosted by the World Federalist 
Movement, whose broad and general mandate allowed the Secretariat to remain neutral on 
many specific issues.820 Here, the World Federalist Movement performed its role as 
convenor, offering a platform for discussion and amplifying voices from the ground 
through inter-governmental processes.821 This is not to say that the World Federalist 
Movement did not engage in substantive work during the ICC negotiations. It was 
interested in the creation of an international criminal court as it would “entrench certain 
rights and responsibilities, […] putting into place a proper panoply of power and 
relationships where states can be held accountable”.822 This indicates that the Coalition 
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members followed their own mandate if compatible with the overall CICC goal to create a 
free, fair and independent court.823 
 
The members of the CICC met in groups such as regional and thematic caucuses. 
Members of regional caucuses lobbied state delegations from their own region. Thematic 
caucuses were based on shared values and norms to develop their positions and to employ 
concerted efforts. They were created around issues of children, faith, gender justice, peace 
and victims.824 
 
 
 
6.4.1.1 The Women’s Caucus 
Of particular relevance for this thesis is the thematic caucus on gender justice, the 
Women’s Caucus, as it was the main actor that played a vital role in ensuring that gender 
crimes were appropriately addressed as separate crimes as well as constituting other crimes 
such as torture.825 Although this was the Caucus’ main goal, its areas of interest were 
broader and in line with the overall goal of the CICC.826 
 
 
Before 1997, the efforts of women’s rights advocates and activists were employed 
at the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing conferences.827 Therefore, they did not pay much attention 
to the ICC negotiations. When the PrepCom began, William Pace communicated with 
Rhonda Copelon828 about the need to include women’s organisations in the CICC as they 
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represented an important constituency among international NGOs and had a considerable 
capacity for outreach. Although women’s rights groups including Equality Now829 first 
participated in the third PrepCom meeting in February 1997, it was only after this session 
that they decided to form a formal caucus.830  
 
“[The] women realized that without an organized caucus, women’s concerns 
would not be appropriately defended and promoted. Building on the work of 
previous caucuses formed around the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing Conferences, 
and due to the success of [the] ad hoc caucus in [the February 1997 PrepCom] 
[…], these women decided to form a permanent caucus which would be part of 
the CICC but autonomous in its function.”831 
 
“This decision was helped along by a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, which in turn 
wanted a caucus structure that could receive and use the gift in an organized way.”832  
 Additional staff − scholars, lawyers and activists specialised in Human Rights and 
women’s rights, most of them with previous experience in international justice work − was 
recruited.833 This indicates that expertise of violence against women prevailed over 
experience of violence. Amongst the Caucus’ members of staff were Donna Axel,834 Alda 
Facio835 and Betty Murungi.836 Another member of the Women’s Caucus was María 
                                                                                                                                                                                
professor of law and director of the International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University 
of New York School of Law. Working with her students, she filed amicus briefs in cases before the ICTY 
and ICTR. This way, she contributed to the recognition of rape as potentially constituting acts of genocide 
and torture under International Law. 
The International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York School of Law 
functioned as the Women’s Caucus’ Legal Secretariat. 
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Eugenia Solís.837 At the time of the Rome Conference, the Women’s Caucus had more than 
300 women’s organisations and 500 individual members. Twelve to fifteen people were 
present at Rome at any time during the conference.838  
 
The Caucus received funding839 from a foundation headquartered in the US to bring 
survivors and women working on the ground with survivors in various countries to New 
York and Rome. Survivors of sexualised war violence who participated in the ICC 
negotiations were at the same time activists. They were members of the Caucus’ delegation 
and had direct input into its positions. Additionally, emails were sent out, outlining 
positions the Women’s Caucus thought about adopting and asking for feedback. Contacts 
in different countries would then reach out to local women and organisations to collect 
their views and feed those back to the Caucus who would take them into account when 
drafting its final positions.840  
In general, however, only a few survivors were involved in the ICC negotiations 
and had the opportunity to shape international rules. Amongst them were Barnes de 
Carlotto, Abuela, Rachel Edralin-Tigalo and Robert Green. An advert for a press 
conference in the second issue of Terra Viva, the conferences’ daily newspaper, indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                                
jurist and writer with decades of experience in both grassroots movements and more formal legal and UN 
contexts. She has carried out hundreds of trainings on women’s Human Rights with an emphasis on CEDAW 
for judges, the police and judicial officials throughout Latin America as well as for women’s and civil society 
organisations throughout the world. 
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that parents of victims were given the opportunity to speak about their experiences.841 
However, Hebe de Bonafini and Evel Pertini, two members of Madres de Plaza de Mayo, 
were forcibly led away after disrupting a speech by Argentinian Justice Minister Raul 
Enrique Castillo as they were not accredited participants of the Rome Conference. Security 
guards further prevented them from presenting their case to the press.842  
 
The Women’s Caucus guided the work of its members. This was necessary because 
of the geographic scope of its members and the wide range of activities undertaken.843 The 
Caucus provided orientation sessions before PrepCom sessions for new members, some of 
whom still had to be persuaded about the Women’s Caucus’ positions so that they could 
lobby governments accordingly.844 In regard to the Women’s Caucus’ drafting work and 
lobbying, at the ICC negotiations, in Vienna, Cairo and Beijing,845 the members of the 
Caucus discussed the language they wanted to introduce in a democratic and cooperative 
fashion.846 At this stage, only women were involved.847 The initiative often came from 
Copelon.848 This indicates that the Caucus’ members as individual actors shaped the 
Caucus’ values and norms. Its positions were informed by thorough research on relevant 
existing treaties and case law, and based on (survivors’) experiences of the Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals.849 This indicates that personal and international 
values, norms and rules mattered in the Women’s Caucus’ discussions. Different members 
then approached delegates from different states, suggesting that normative structures 
influenced actors. Who they approached depended on evaluations of who might be 
empathetic towards their concerns and requests based on the general orientation of the 
respective state’s government.850 The Women’s Caucus had good relations amongst others 
with “Australia, Bosnia, Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Netherlands, European countries 
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generally, South Africa for ten Southern African countries and Sweden”.851 Moreover, 
contacts were established based on shared nationality as well as through personal 
commonalities, trust and understanding. Here, the importance of informal contacts and 
personal values becomes apparent.852 Even though many men did not see gender issues as 
international crimes, members of the Women’s Caucus found that most friendly delegates 
were men. This is to be expected, considering that most delegates at the ICC negotiations 
were men.853 The impact of personal values can also be seen in the different styles of 
lobbying that different members of the Women’s Caucus applied. In conversations with 
state delegates, some Caucus members went on to the next point after agreement had been 
reached on a certain issue. Others continued to bring forward arguments supporting a 
particular point the Women’s Caucus raised even after agreement had been reached with a 
delegate.854 This supports the opinion voiced that NGOs provided alternative or additional 
lines of reasoning to a proposal rather than drafting one themselves.855 Some members of 
the Women’s Caucus were very attached to their language, very definite about it and 
disappointed when it was changed. Others acknowledged that compromises were 
necessary.856 This raises the question whether it was more important to achieve a 
satisfactory overall outcome than to include certain wordings in the ICC instruments.857 It 
raises the question whether the words that are used in a definition is only interesting from a 
theoretical point of view but less so in practice. After all, in practice, it has to be kept in 
mind that meanings of terms may change from one language to the other and distinctions 
exist in one but not the other.858 After having reached agreements or compromises on the 
Caucus’ proposals, delegates would officially propose them. It has to be stressed that this 
did not happen out of pure empathy towards the Women’s Caucus. Rather, state 
delegations that presented the Caucus’ proposals did so based on evaluations of their own 
experiences and of how the Women’s Caucus’ positions fitted with those of the state 
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delegation in question.859 Here again, personal and national values, norms and rules 
influenced actors. 
 
Although the Women’s Caucus’ advocacy strategy was effective, it was also 
exclusive. It disregarded state delegations that were perceived to have contrary opinions or 
shared no common ground with the Caucus. These delegations in turn were not aware of 
women’s rights at stake and saw other issues like the inclusion of non-core crimes and the 
relationship between the UNSC and the court as dominating the discussions. They 
perceived the negotiations to have taken place without a strong women’s lobby.860 This 
illustrates the significance of penetrating an environment that is not very gender-sensitive 
by networking delegates.861 
 
In pursuing the objective of ensuring that gender crimes were appropriately 
addressed, the Women’s Caucus enjoyed the cooperation and support of many of CICC’s 
members who endorsed papers the Caucus had drafted, sharing its views. This was crucial 
for the Caucus’ overall success.862 However, the Women’s Caucus also encountered 
opposition from a small number of government delegations who perceived it to be in 
“pursuit of a purely [feminist] political agenda rather than the contribution of legal 
expertise based on the real-life experience of war-affected women and survivors of sexual 
violence”.863 Voicing male norms, 
 
“delegates considered attention to the prerequisites of gender justice to be 
unnecessary, since, in their perception, ‘neutral rules would take care of it.’ For 
many, it was the first time they had to deal with a women’s rights agenda and 
with its advocates as an organized force. Many had ‘advice’ or criticism for the 
Caucus: ‘Don’t be so pushy;’ ‘You’re not dressed properly’; ‘Don’t worry, 
we’ll take care of your concerns.’”864  
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While some governments were hostile, others were unsupportive. A member of the 
German delegation, for example, voiced male norms and indicated that NGOs’ active 
participation in the negotiations was acceptable as long as it was in line with states’ 
positions.865 It was said that the German delegation 
 
“was not concerned with women. It was not a crucial question for [the German 
delegates and they had no stakes in the matter]. [They] took it for granted that 
the ICTY had moved significantly ahead. [The delegates] realised that 
[International Humanitarian Law] in particular but also crimes against 
humanity have to take into consideration issues of women, [the protection] of 
women [and their sexual identity and sexual liberty] […] [and that] attacks 
against women should not be perceived as […] collateral damage […]. [The 
German delegation] did not have a problem with the women’s NGOs […] 
running the show as long as they […] did not create significant problems for 
the overall compromise [like they did in relation to the crime of enforced 
pregnancy]. [After all,] this [was] not the Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights”.866 
 
The French delegation adopted a similar point of view. The exact definitions of the crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery and, by extension, forced marriage were no “big deal”867 for 
them and the concept of gender was viewed “not [to] translate very well into French”.868 It 
was “not [seen as] very French”869 but rather as an Anglo-Saxon or American movement. 
Indicating that personal values mattered, their female chief of delegation still was close to 
the Women’s Caucus. She gave her team instructions to support the group, especially in its 
struggle against the Holy See. The delegation “would have [supported the Caucus] with or 
without the instructions [though] because actually [they] believed in […] the things the 
Women’s Caucus was saying.”870 However, as any delegation, the French had hard and 
soft points in the negotiations. Disagreement arose, for example, over the element of 
coercion in relation to rape. While the Women’s Caucus was understood to have argued 
that coercive circumstances automatically negate any consent, the French delegation drew 
on the state’s experience of the Second World War. It was argued that many French 
women had genuine relationships with German soldiers. Therefore, not all sexual 
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encounters between people of any background in war could be classified as rape.871 This 
illustrates that the Caucus was perceived to only “focus on one thing and ignore the rest”872 
and therefore to simplify things.873  
In addition to hostile and unsupportive governments, the Women’s Caucus also 
encountered opposition from different NGOs. In the early phase of the Women’s Caucus’ 
involvement in the ICC negotiations, some NGOs “felt that the […] Caucus’ objectives 
would dilute the key messages as well as human rights definitions and concepts.”874 Some 
NGOs saw the Caucus’ “sectoral interest to be at odds with what they considered to be the 
more central issues, such as jurisdiction or trigger mechanisms. In these cases, the 
Women’s Caucus was often portrayed as rigid, intrusive, and uncompromising.”875 Other 
NGOs considered the Caucus not to be very important, did not want to be associated with 
it and consequently did not support its proposals. Other NGOs like Redress shared the 
views of the Women’s Caucus and agreed that the issues the Caucus addressed were of 
relevance. However, Redress had to follow its own mandate that required the organisation 
to focus on different concerns.876 Other NGOs opposed the Women’s Caucus because of 
values and norms grounded in religious objections to the gender provisions in the Rome 
Statute, especially the provisions relating to forced pregnancy in Article 7. Prompted by 
concerns raised by the Holy See in regard to the term ‘gender’, North American 
conservative Christian NGOs got more involved in the negotiations.877 Particularly 
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noticeable for their destructive, highly emotive, intimidating and harassing behaviour 
during the Rome Conference, ‘pro-family’ groups caused difficulties with other NGOs, 
especially the Women’s Caucus.878 The Caucus, in response, became more careful and 
secretive when discussing issues in public, falling silent when strangers joined their 
group.879  
Similarly to NGOs prioritising other questions, it was argued that individuals also 
corrupted the debate about gender issues and sexualised violence by continuously 
advancing strong opinions, for example about the relationship between sexualised violence 
and pornography. Acting strategically and knowing how to organise enabled them to make 
their voices heard.880 
 
 
 
6.4.2 Forms of participation 
As mentioned above, the Women’s Caucus shared some objectives and advocacy 
strategies with the CICC in general. In the PrepCom and at Rome, NGOs were highly 
visible. They closely monitored and distributed information on the status of the 
negotiations, co-sponsored news conferences, expert meetings, public debates, seminars, 
symposia and workshops, and co-ordinated parallel activities conducted by NGOs. In 
addition to very directed and sometimes aggressive lobbying, NGOs facilitated exchange, 
discussion and participation amongst others through meetings and communicating with UN 
officials and members of state delegations.881 Aiming at moderating and neutralising 
states’ positions, these meetings were conducted to give states the opportunity to discuss 
controversial issues on a technical rather than political basis. Here, the CICC would state 
the facts regarding a certain issue and aim to provide a way out for disagreeing 
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delegations.882 The larger groups within the CICC were the intellectual leaders of the 
Coalition. Amongst them were Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 
International Service for Human Rights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the 
International Commission for Jurists. They produced, circulated and promoted new 
research and expert documents including journal articles and reports, aiming to inform and 
influence “a specialist public of NGOs, academics, and state representatives on specific 
sub-themes, promoting certain alternatives over others with reference to precedent, legal 
argument, or political realities”.883 This way, they provided the context for the decisions 
that were to be made by states. These forms of NGO participation in law-making 
negotiations were taken as a sign of NGOs’ growing professionalism.884 Smaller groups 
were often more effective at disseminating information, networking and building 
coalitions.885 In addition to lobbying, producing expert documents, trying to influence the 
negotiating bodies’ reports to the UNGA, disseminating information to the wider public 
and convening conferences, Amnesty International, No Peace Without Justice and others 
also staged street actions in the form of demonstrations, signature lists, human carpets and 
vigils.886 
In recognition of the CICC’s role in the proceedings to establish an international 
criminal court, the CICC’s International Secretariat was asked by the UN to organise the 
accreditation of NGOs to the Rome Conference. This was a unique form of self-regulation 
that had not been attempted before at international conferences.887 
Through regional and national networks and initiatives, CICC members raised 
awareness of the establishment of an international criminal court and developed important 
personal contacts at a local level. They circulated position papers and supported and 
coordinated inter-sessional meetings, contributing to national policy-making and therefore 
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influencing normative structures.888 This way, CICC members contributed to the capacity-
building and mobilised policy advocacy of local NGOs to pressure their governments at 
home.889 During the PrepCom2 negotiations, the CICC joined the LMG in insisting that the 
PrepCom2 should protect the integrity of the Rome Statute. They wanted to avoid that the 
statute would be reopened for discussion and its spirit would be changed.890 However, the 
CICC decided to focus its efforts on influencing structures by addressing shortcomings of 
the statute at the national level through promoting the adoption of strong national 
implementing legislation. The Coalition gathered information about national ratification 
processes, discussed with delegates the obligations which would come with ratifying the 
Rome Statute, briefed them and NGOs on progress towards entry into force, and planned 
activities at national and regional level.891 Therefore, NGOs had a mediating role between 
the international and national level.  
 
 
 
6.5 The relationship between the CICC and state delegations 
As mentioned before, the CICC worked in cooperation with state delegations. 
Especially through consultative roles with a growing number of governments, particularly 
from the LMG, the CICC developed into a strategic partner in the whole course of the 
negotiations.892 The growing acceptance of NGOs was facilitated by their acceptance of 
the culture and style of international treaty conferences as well as of the fact that national 
policy positions are better addressed through dialogue than by condemnation. NGOs knew 
that they had to win fights through their arguments, and they did. Early and open 
discussions prevented confrontations with written (counter-)proposals.893 NGOs were 
realistic about the kind of involvement they sought. They knew and accepted that states 
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made the final decisions.894 At Rome, NGOs did not seek speaking rights or access to 
crucial informal meetings as it was important to keep government delegations satisfied. 
NGOs recognised the importance of the ICC negotiations being largely a state-based 
process for the ultimate success of the court. Therefore, NGOs promoted and galvanised 
broad state support.895 However, “[m]any ‘like-minded’ countries would agree with the 
assessment…that without the NGOs there would never have been an agreement on a 
court”.896 As indicated above however, the partnership between states and NGOs was not 
always an easy one due to different organisational structures, presuppositions and interests 
influencing government delegations’ and NGOs’ short-term and long-term goals and 
working methods. CICC members, for example, were concerned about the focus of the 
LMG on unanimity and the disproportionate power this granted to uncompromising 
delegations, causing tensions.897 States’ willingness to engage with NGOs was issue-
dependent.898 Generally, a positive synergy existed between Canadian NGOs and the 
state’s delegation. The actors had a common outlook and were supportive towards the 
Canada’s Human Security Agenda. When minds did not meet, however, relationships 
worsened. This was the case in relation to the conservative Christian organisations 
mentioned above and the crime of forced pregnancy.899 Similarly, when NGOs touched 
political raw nerves like the protection of states’ soldiers, cooperation lessened.900 
However, governments did not want to oppose NGOs publicly. Therefore, before the 
negotiations began, members of NGOs were sometimes taken aside by state representatives 
and told they would not get what they wanted, and how the negotiations were going to 
go.901 Like the Canadian example above, this indicates that NGOs had to dance to states’ 
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tunes. Relationships between NGOs and state delegations were generally constructive until 
NGOs disagreed with states’ positions. In such cases, cooperation lessened. State 
delegations also did not want NGOs around when they were trying to reach a compromise, 
wanting to avoid the NGOs’ moral voice and being held morally responsible. The 
discussion about the inclusion or exclusion of nuclear and chemical weapons stands as an 
example here. As mentioned above, the NAM, especially Syria, argued for either both 
kinds of weapons to be included in, or excluded from, the Rome Statute. Since member 
states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not have ratified the statute if it 
would have explicitly prohibited the use of nuclear weapons, a compromise was reached to 
exclude any reference to chemical and nuclear weapons.902 In contrast, state delegations 
decided not to waste negotiation capital on something that they subjectively considered 
harmless or a waste of time. The inclusion of crimes against UN personnel in the war 
crimes provision of the Rome Statute stands as an example here. This way, states 
accumulated negotiation capital that they used in regard to issues they could not 
compromise on. Consequently, the most sensitive issues could be the least controversial 
ones.903  
 
 
 
6.6 Logics of interaction 
 The above paragraph demonstrated that actors mutually influenced each other in 
the ICC negotiations. Chapter 6 also showed that actors’ identities, interests and actions 
were influenced by normative structures through the logic of consequences 
(instrumentalism), appropriateness (morality and ethics), practicality (practice), arguing 
(rational oppositional discourse), purposive role playing and habit (unreflected action).904 
The British and French concerns regarding the protection of their own people from 
potential prosecution before the ICC can be interpreted to have been driven by the logic of 
consequences. The potential prosecution of their own citizens would have been against 
their interests and a high price to pay for closing a gap in British and French foreign policy 
armour. As the participation of African states in the ICC negotiation was motivated by 
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experiences of war and Human Rights abuses, their involvement can be interpreted to have 
been driven by the logic of appropriateness. They acted on the basis of what social norms 
deem right; the prompt prosecution of those responsible. The Women’s Caucus’ lobbying 
can be interpreted to have been driven by the logic of practicality and arguing. Its members 
approached state delegates they thought might be empathetic towards their concerns as 
well as state delegates with whom they had something in common. Women’s Caucus’ 
members presented a series of statements and/or reasons to persuade members of state 
delegations of the Caucus’ views so that members of state delegations would eventually 
officially introduce them. State delegations would then consider the Caucus’ proposals 
based on their own positions. NGOs’ general identity and actions in the ICC negotiations 
can be interpreted to have been based on the logic of purposive role playing. NGOs 
accepted the culture and style of international treaty negotiations and consequently were 
accepted by, and seen as partners of, state delegations. Potentially following the logic of 
habit in the sense of unreflected action, state delegations who opposed the Women’s 
Caucus “considered attention to the prerequisites of gender justice to be unnecessary, 
since, in their perception, ‘neutral rules would take care of it’.”905  
 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that actors and normative structures mutually influenced 
each other in the ICC negotiations, confirming the constructivist circle. In regard to actors, 
it was demonstrated that individuals, states and NGOs played an important role in the 
negotiations (Research Question 1). This confirmed Hypothesis 1906 and Martha 
Finnemore’s theory that NGOs matter in international relations and law-making. In regard 
to structures, it was highlighted that personal, national and international values, norms and 
rules mattered (Research Question 2).907 This supported the theories of both Finnemore 
and Peter Katzenstein that international and national normative structures influence 
international relations. The example of the Bosnian delegation referred to above draws 
most of these factors together. Influenced by his country’s experiences (national) in the 
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war in the 1990s, the Bosnian ambassador (personal) was keen to have sexualised violence 
included in the ICC list of war crimes (international). Therefore, he actively supported 
(personal) instructions received from the Bosnian government (national) to make sure that 
the instruments and jurisprudence of the ICTY (international) would be considered in 
drafting the ICC instruments (international). This example also shows how normative 
structures (values and norms based on national experiences) shape actors (the Bosnian 
ambassador) who again shaped normative structures (the ICC instruments). When adding 
to this the Women’s Caucus, which was the main actor advocating the inclusion of various 
sexualised crimes in the Rome Statute, the crucial role NGOs played in the negotiations 
becomes apparent. 
 Normative structures can be interpreted to have influenced the identities, interests 
and actions of actors in the ICC negotiations through the logic of consequences 
(instrumentalism), appropriateness (morality and ethics), practicality (practice), arguing 
(rational oppositional discourse), purposive role playing and habit (unreflected action). 
This confirmed the first part of the constructivist circle: normative structures shape actors 
(Research Question 2).908 
 Exploring state delegations as groups showed that states formed coalitions partly 
based on shared values, norms and rules, partly changing traditional dynamics of 
international negotiations. This already indicates that national norms can explain 
fundamental changes in states’ identities as international actors. This was confirmed, using 
the examples of the UK and France where changes in national power dynamics, and 
consequently national norms, led to changes in the states’ identities in the ICC 
negotiations. However, civil society members who became members of state delegations 
and maintained and argued for their original points serve as an example of a situation in 
which national norms and rules had no impact on the negotiations, refuting Katzenstein. 
The discussion of the level of engagement of actors from the global North and South also 
showed that in addition to normative reasons, actors’ (in-)actions were motivated by 
practical and strategic considerations. Financial issues, the lack of awareness and 
competence, considerations related to a state’s international image and nationalist 
arguments were brought up in this context. Nevertheless, the example of African states as 
actors in the ICC negotiations confirms the constructivist circle and refutes Hypothesis 
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4.909 Experience assigned African states the moral authority to push for an effective court 
because of their history of colonisation and establishment of TRCs. Their identity in the 
ICC negotiations was determined by national and international norms and rules. African 
states as actors also influenced international rules by signing the Rome Statute. In addition 
to social engineering potentially limiting the opportunities for certain actors to shape 
international rules, the same result was achieved by prioritising English over other 
languages, especially in informal meetings, as well as by insisting on consensus in 
decision-making.  
Part four of this chapter engaged with Hypothesis 1910 and Martha Finnemore’s 
claim that NGOs matter in international relations and international law-making processes 
because they teach their views to states. It moved away from a state-centric view on the 
ICC negotiations and analysed NGOs as a group that played a crucial role as well. NGOs 
directly and indirectly influenced the process and substance of the negotiations. The 
Women’s Caucus played a vital role in ensuring that gender crimes were appropriately 
addressed as crimes in and of themselves as well as forms of other listed crimes such as 
torture. The Caucus also advocated the creation of an independent and fair court that would 
be associated with peace. While more specific views of NGOs, especially on sexualised 
crimes, are discussed in the following chapters, this chapter already highlighted that the 
Women’s Caucus formed its views based on the input of survivors of sexualised violence 
and women working with survivors, refuting Hypothesis 4.911 The Women’s Caucus also 
formed its views based on its members’ personal backgrounds as well as on their research 
into existing values, norms and rules, especially those of the ad hoc tribunals and the Final 
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery 
and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict. When combining Chapter 6 with 
Chapter 4, it becomes apparent that the Women’s Caucus’ composition and strategy was 
based on experiences of previous international conferences (Research Question 2).912 At 
Vienna, Cairo, Beijing and Rome, women’s organisations incorporated members from all 
over the world. Therefore, it was crucial to build consensus through discussion. Women’s 
                                                          
909
 Hypothesis 4 reads: Survivors of war rape and forced marriage and actors from the global South were not 
involved. 
910
 Hypothesis 1 reads: NGOs in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in the 
development of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage. 
911
 Hypothesis 4 reads: Survivors of war rape and forced marriage and actors from the global South were not 
involved. 
912
 Research Question 2 reads: What influenced the driving actors? 
221 
organisations were active at local, national, regional and international level at all stages of 
the negotiation processes. To influence the negotiations effectively, they had to understand 
how international law-making conferences work. Women’s organisations had to be well 
prepared, conduct research and policy analysis, document acts of violence against women, 
produce and distribute reports, organise briefings and lobby state delegations. Through 
cooperation with the media, they generated publicity for their agendas. In addition to 
building bridges between different women’s NGOs and activists as well as between 
women’s organisations and the media, women’s organisations bridged NGOs and state 
delegations by influencing the latter’s composition (Research Question 4).913 
Chapter 6 explored some more general views held by the CICC and how it came to 
hold them (Research Question 2).914 The CICC supported the establishment of a free, fair 
and independent permanent international criminal court because it was necessary to act 
upon lessons learned from challenges encountered in relation to the ICTY and ICTR, as 
well as to fill an impunity gap. At Rome, the NGO Coalition was concerned about the 
focus on unanimity because it ascribed disproportionate power to dissenting voices and 
consequently could cause tensions. After Rome, the CICC was of the opinion that strong 
national legislation implementing the Rome Statute was needed due to the shortcomings of 
the instrument. Throughout the whole negotiation process, the Coalition’s International 
Secretariat remained neutral so as to maintain the CICC’s cohesiveness, to identify and 
expand areas of commonality between CICC members, to uphold relationships with a large 
number of actors and to contribute the NGOs’ wide range of expertise to all parts of the 
negotiations. Therefore, it was a strategic decision made possible by the World Federalist 
Movement’s broad mandate. The World Federalist Movement itself supported the creation 
of an international criminal court because it would “entrench certain rights and 
responsibilities, […] putting into place a proper panoply of power and relationships where 
states can be held accountable”.915 
 While this chapter did not go into detail demonstrating that NGOs in the ICC 
negotiations taught their views to states, it addressed various ways how NGOs influenced 
states (Research Question 4).916 Central to this was the high visibility of NGOs during the 
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ICC negotiations. Furthermore, networking and cooperation between NGOs at multiple 
levels, as well as between NGOs and states, was crucial. NGOs monitored the negotiations, 
furthering transparency. They distributed information, shared their research and expertise, 
held regular meetings and briefings and organised news conferences and parallel activities. 
They facilitated participation, provided a platform for discussion and exchange, mediated 
between different actors, facilitated compromises and participated in preliminary drafting 
work. Maintaining momentum, they continuously raised awareness, engaged in capacity 
building, provided orientation and guidance and mobilised NGO engagement and 
participation. A common strategy, concerted efforts and the work in caucuses was made 
possible by, and contributed to, the cohesiveness of the group of NGOs involved. A very 
effective structure and organisation was extremely necessary due to the large number and 
diversity of the actors involved, as well as the wide range of activities undertaken. NGOs 
based their work on personal, national and international values, norms and rules talked 
about in democratic discussions. They amplified voices from the ground; voices of 
survivors of sexualised violence and those working with them. In their lobbying, they 
addressed supposedly friendly state delegations and delegations with which they expected 
to have common ground. Especially the latter highlights the importance of personal and 
informal contacts, creating trust and understanding. State delegations in turn evaluated 
NGOs’ proposals in a similar fashion, based on experiences and the compatibility with the 
respective state’s positions. Overall, NGOs provided the context for decisions that were to 
be made. They shaped the space and substance of the negotiations. What was noticed by 
state delegations as the growing professionalism of NGOs – their acceptance of the culture 
of international treaty-making negotiations, their realistic assessment of the kinds of 
involvement they sought and their recognition of the crucial role of states as final decision-
makers – made it possible for NGOs to influence state actors’ identities and actions.917 
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In addition to demonstrating that NGOs played an important role in the ICC 
negotiations (confirming Hypothesis 1)918 and succeeded in influencing the identities and 
actions of state actors, this chapter also refuted Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 states that it 
was expected to find that survivors of sexualised war violence as well as actors from the 
global South were not involved in the ICC negotiations of the definitions of war rape and 
forced marriage. This chapter mentioned that the Women’s Caucus included, and worked 
with, survivors of sexualised violence. Therefore, survivors directly influenced and shaped 
the outcomes of the ICC negotiations. However, it has to be noted that, overall, the 
participation of survivors was an exception. In contrast, the direct involvement of actors 
from the global South was facilitated throughout NGO and state coalitions by providing 
various necessary resources like financial support, personnel and information. Civil society 
actors from all regions of the world were represented and actively engaged in the ICC 
negotiations as members of the CICC. 
 
However, a word of caution seems necessary here. According to Adriaan Bos, the 
chair of the ICC negotiations until Rome, civil society actors “[fill] in gaps arising from a 
democratic deficit in the international decision-making process.”919 As Marlies Glasius 
summarised, they can foster deliberation, develop alternative proposals, promote access 
and give a voice to those unheard, increase transparency for, and accountability to, the 
wider public, and diminish power distortions among states.920 This chapter showed that 
NGOs in the ICC negotiations indeed developed alternative proposals and promoted 
access. NGOs also made the official state debates more deliberative and less focused on 
narrow interests.  
 
“Numerous conferences and seminars, the Sicilian retreats, academic articles, 
and NGO position papers contributed to a global, albeit specialist, debate on 
the merits of the international criminal court, which informed and influenced 
the ultimate decision-making by state delegates.”921 
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When it comes to internal deliberation and transparency, however, it has to be 
noted that no thorough debate and no formal collective decision-making took place within 
the CICC.922  
 
“Partly this was for practical reasons, because of the number of NGOs, the 
cumbersome internal decision-making procedures of some NGOs, and the 
onslaught of events, and partly because it was deemed too divisive to get into 
controversial matters. Partly, too, the NGO Coalition lacked the kind of culture 
of consensus reflecting commitments to social transformation, non-violence, 
and representation of popular demands.”923 
 
The Coalition emphasised pluralism rather than internal democracy.924 As mentioned in 
this chapter, big international NGOs are the most experienced and best connected. 
Therefore, their impact on international negotiations and their outcomes are more 
significant than those of smaller, less experienced and less well-connected organisations, 
creating inequalities and hierarchies. Even though the CICC included and represented civil 
society actors from all over the world, those actors found themselves under the guidance 
and leadership of international Human Rights groups.925 When it comes to giving a voice 
to those unheard, it has to be noted that even though the Women’s Caucus included 
survivors of sexualised violence and women working with them on the ground, many civil 
society representatives were “well-heeled, university-educated cosmopolitans with little 
direct experience of violence”.926 The presence of grass-roots representatives like the 
members of Madres de Plaza de Mayo appears to have served a symbolic purpose rather 
than actually involving them in the negotiations. This emphasises expertise rather than 
experience.927 
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7 The ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage: Actors’ identities, 
influences and understandings 
 
7.1 Introduction 
After Chapter 6 focused on the identities of actors involved in the ICC negotiations 
(Research Question 1) and on what influenced them in general (Research Question 2) as 
well as on ways how NGOs influenced states (Research Question 4), the aim of Chapter 7 
is to analyse who the key actors were that drove the negotiations of the definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict specifically (Research Question 1). It 
also examines why these driving actors got involved in the ICC negotiations of these two 
crimes and which international, national or personal values, norms or rules influenced them 
and their positions (Research Question 2).928 The main goal of Chapter 7 is to examine 
how these actors interpreted the crimes of war rape and forced marriage (Research 
Question 3).  
Chapter 6 showed that international NGOs, in particular the Women’s Caucus, 
played a role in the development of International Criminal Law regarding sexualised 
crimes in general, how it came to hold its views and how it influenced states. Chapter 7 
presents a more detailed snapshot of two specific sexualised crimes, war rape and forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict. Addressing Research Question 1,929 Chapter 7 
demonstrates that the Women’s Caucus was a driving actor regarding the criminalisation of 
war rape and forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. It is emphasised that NGOs 
actually did teach their views to states. Regarding the Women’s Caucus’ opposition, it is 
shown that the Arab block raised concerns regarding the criminalisation of war rape and 
sexual slavery, based on their national laws, religious principles and cultural norms 
(Research Question 1930 and 2,931 confirming Hypothesis 2).932 This highlights the tension 
that existed in the negotiations between issues of national sovereignty and the extent of the 
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ICC’s jurisdiction. It also confirms Hypothesis 3933 and Peter Katzenstein’s theory that 
national normative structures matter in international relations by indicating that domestic 
norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of war rape and forced 
marriage in International Criminal Law. Consequently, the crimes were at least partially 
interpreted as questions of honour, confirming Hypothesis 5.934 However, the reference to 
cultural norms also indicates an understanding of rape as a form of structural violence. 
This was also the approach taken by the Women’s Caucus in regard to both war rape and 
forced marriage (Research Question 3),935 speaking against Hypothesis 6.936 As in the 
previous chapter, actors are portrayed as shaping normative structures and vice versa. As 
this is considered obvious in the following discussion, it will not be explicitly noted 
throughout the chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 is divided into two parts. First, it focuses on the crime of rape, then on 
forced marriage. For both, developments in the PrepCom, Rome Conference and 
PrepCom2 are analysed in turn. Regarding the crime of rape, the discussions and outcomes 
of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Zutphen inter-sessional meeting937 are also mentioned. 
Before concluding, both parts discuss the logics of interaction that influenced actors’ 
identities, interests and actions in the ICC negotiations of the definitions of war rape and 
forced marriage. 
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7.2 Rape 
7.2.1 The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
 The Ad Hoc Committee was formed by the UNGA in 1995 to “review the major 
substantive and administrative issues arising out of the [ILC] draft statute [for an 
international criminal court] […] and, in the light of that review, to consider arrangements 
for the convening of an international conference of plenipotentiaries.”938 To this purpose, 
the Ad Hoc Committee met twice and submitted its report to the UNGA in 1995.939 
 The following paragraphs discuss the ILC draft statute and the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the subject of war rape. They analyse the identities (Research Question 1) 
and understandings (Research Question 3) of actors involved in the discussion of the crime 
of war rape at the early stages of the ICC negotiations. 
 
 
The ILC’s draft statute940 lists the categories of crimes the ICC was to have 
jurisdiction over without elaborating on their content. The annex lists the fourth Geneva 
Convention and Additional Protocol I which explicitly include the crime of rape. In its 
commentary to Article 20, the ILC referenced Article 5 of the ICTY statute which also 
includes rape as a crime against humanity. Rape could therefore be considered to be 
included in the ILC draft statute by reference. 
Based on this, some delegations at the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee identified 
sexualised war violence as an issue and called for the inclusion of rape and other similar 
offences as war crimes and crimes against humanity in the statute of a permanent 
international criminal court.941 At this early stage in the negotiation process, two 
international NGOs supported this. Amnesty International and the International 
Commission of Jurists, however, did not advocate the inclusion of rape as a crime in and of 
itself that could constitute a war crime or a crime against humanity if the general 
qualifications are met. Instead, Amnesty International spoke out for the inclusion of rape as 
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an act potentially constituting torture.942 The International Commission of Jurists 
advocated the inclusion of “outrageous assaults on personal dignity, such as sexual assault 
and enforced prostitution, (in both cases when used as a political weapon)”943 as a crime 
against humanity. The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes includes rape as a crime against 
humanity944 as well as “outrages upon personal dignity in violation of international 
humanitarian law, in particular […] rape”.945 
 
Delegates were aware946 that rape as an outrage upon personal dignity invokes outdated, 
victim-centred notions of honour instead of stressing that rape is a violation of a person’s 
integrity and (sexual) autonomy. Instead of codifying unacceptable conduct, including rape 
as an outrage upon personal dignity in the draft statute legitimised the view of war rape as 
an honour crime. Arguably, however, categorising war rape in this way can also be 
interpreted to have been recognition that some societies see rape as an honour crime. A 
compromise would have been a view of rape as a violation of honour being an aggravating 
factor rather than an element of the crime.947 
 
 
 
7.2.2 The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(PrepCom) 
 Following the Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendations, the UNGA created the 
PrepCom to “combine further discussions [of issues] with the drafting of texts, with a view 
to preparing a consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal court as a 
next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries.”948 Between March 
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1996 and April 1998, the PrepCom met six times at the UN headquarters in New York. In 
January 1998, the inter-sessional meeting in Zutphen, the Netherlands, took place to 
technically consolidate and restructure the draft articles into a draft statute.949 
 The following sections analyse the PrepCom negotiations of the crime of war rape. 
They cover the first, third, fifth and sixths PrepCom session as well as the Zutphen inter-
sessional meeting because war rape was explicitly discussed in these sessions. Therefore, 
they shed light on the key actors in the negotiations of war rape (Research Question 1), 
what influenced them (Research Question 2), and how they understood the crime 
(Research Question 3). 
 
 
 
7.2.2.1 First session, March/April 1996 
 Following on from the Ad Hoc Committee’s work, consensus existed in the first 
PrepCom session held in March/April 1996 that definitions of crimes need to be included 
in the ICC statute to make it more specific and meet the requirement of legality. 
International rules in the form of international conventions and statutes, as well as the ad 
hoc tribunals’ definitions of crimes against humanity, were considered as precedents. 
However, they were seen as not clear enough and in need of further elaboration.950 On war 
crimes, state delegations spoke out for the inclusion of, amongst others, the 1907 Hague 
rules, the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 and 
relevant provisions of Additional Protocol I and II as well as the ICTY and ICTR 
instruments in the statute of an international criminal court.951  
 
The PrepCom’s report on its proceedings during its first session can be interpreted 
as male, creating a hierarchy of crimes by stating that crimes like murder, extermination 
and enslavement, but not rape, need clarification. Therefore, the PrepCom Chairman 
Adriaan Bos952 and the delegations of Japan,953 the Netherlands,954 New Zealand955 and the 
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UK956 submitted proposals to add crimes of sexualised violence, either in the text or in 
footnotes, without elaborating on the acts. The proposals include rape committed on 
national or religious grounds,957 as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing958 and as an 
outrage upon personal dignity.959 Resonating with Amnesty International’s proposal 
mentioned above and Article 3 of the ICTR statute, it was also suggested in the first 
PrepCom session to refer to “[cruel treatment including] torture [, rape and other serious 
assaults of a sexual nature]”.960 In an informal text, the chairman also proposed to include 
“rape [or other serious assaults of a sexual nature]” as a crime against humanity.961 The 
potential inclusion of a reference to other serious assaults of a sexual nature, however, 
creates and perpetuates a hierarchy of acts of sexualised violence, assuming that acts 
falling short of a physical invasion are less serious than acts of rape. This, however, may 
be contrary to the experiences of survivors.962 
The Chairman’s Revised Informal Text on war crimes includes rape in square 
brackets963 as “violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular […] [rape] [and sexual violence]”.964 Comparable to the proposals of Austria,965 
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Egypt966 and New Zealand,967 but contrary to the Chairman’s Informal Text No. 4,968 the 
crime was also listed under “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”969 in 
international and non-international conflicts. Creating a link between rape and indecent 
assault as well as humiliating and degrading treatment respectively has a similar effect as 
categorising rape as an outrage upon personal dignity and an honour crime discussed 
above.970 
 
 Contrary to the majority of proposals that advocated adding crimes of 
sexualised violence but did not elaborate on the acts, the US suggested three definitions of 
rape. Initially, it defined the elements of the crime against humanity of rape to be “(1) 
[t]hat the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse or forcible sodomy with a person; 
(2) [t]hat the act of sexual intercourse or forcible sodomy was done unlawfully by force 
and without consent”.971 ‘Sexual intercourse’ was understood as “the penetration, however 
slight, of any orifice of the body, by any part of another’s body or by an object.”972 
‘Forcible’ was determined to include “the use of force or threat of force against the victim 
or a third person.”973 Disconnecting rape and “forcible sodomy” but establishing a 
connection between rape and enforced prostitution, the US developed a second definition 
of “[r]ape or enforced prostitution, meaning causing a person to engage in [or submit to] a 
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sexual act by force or threat of force.”974 A third definition that was also included in the 
PrepCom’s report on its proceedings during its first session defines the crime against 
humanity of rape as “causing a person to engage in or to submit to a sexual act by force or 
threat of force”.975 The US definitions of rape show a move away from an initial coercion- 
and consent-based definition to a purely coercion-based understanding. The definitions 
also show a move away from the use of the term ‘penetration’ to a broader and more 
neutral definition of rape as a forced sexual act. While the first definition explicitly 
includes sexual acts committed with objects, it appears to be implied in the second and 
third definition. The second and third definition are gender-neutral. They define rape as a 
forced sexual act without unnecessarily specifying the assailant, their sex/gender or the 
specifics of the sexual act. Mentioning force or threat of force, the US definitions can also 
be interpreted to be broad enough to include non-physical coercion.976 
 
 
 
7.2.2.2 Third session, February 1997 
The USA’s advocacy for gender-neutral rape definitions was in line with 
awareness-raising efforts launched by women’s organisations in the course of the third 
PrepCom session in February 1997.977 In addition to advocating broad and gender-neutral 
definitions of rape, the number of state proposals indicating an honour-based, and therefore 
victim-centred, understanding of the crime made it crucial for women’s organisations to 
place a focus on the crime of the perpetrator, not on the victim. It had to be stressed that 
the victim is not responsible for what happened to her. 
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Based on research by the ICRC,978 New Zealand and Switzerland979 submitted a 
proposal understanding rape as constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions by 
wilfully causing great suffering. This indicates that non-state actors taught their views on 
sexualised crimes as breaches of International Humanitarian Law to states. In the first 
PrepCom session, New Zealand spoke out for the inclusion of rape as an outrage upon 
personal dignity. As mentioned above, this view is victim-centred. Rape as wilfully 
causing great suffering, in contrast, focuses on the acts of the perpetrator. Even though this 
can be interpreted as progress, it still misrepresents the character of sexualised violence as 
its purpose goes beyond harming the victim.980  
To understand the advancement of including rape as a grave breach, an 
understanding of the particular time in the ICC negotiation process is important. 
Throughout the negotiations, but especially in the early stages, actors did not want to risk 
losing support for the court by pushing the war crimes provisions too far or by including 
new crimes. Their fall-back position was to copy the grave breaches provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and to adopt them one-to-one as war crimes under the jurisdiction of 
an international criminal court. This way, the ICC grave breaches provisions would save 
existing provisions and war crimes would at least be included in the new statute. They 
could always be amended in a review. In addition, actors “wanted to exemplify in the 
grave breaches provisions the sort of crimes that they would not want [itemised] but 
actually were [indicated] in there”.981 Due to International Law’s gender-blind past where 
rape was treated as collateral damage to every war,982 rape had to be exemplified, for 
example, as an act whereby the perpetrator wilfully causes great suffering to the victim 
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which constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. This way, even if actors 
would have fallen back on the narrow list of war crimes, only including grave breaches, 
rape would have been included in the ICC statute.983 In contrast to this position advocating 
the one-to-one adoption of the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the 
ICRC proposed not to cut and paste from these instruments but to include as much as 
possible. Since an international criminal court should have jurisdiction over the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community, it should cover customary law 
and serious violations of widely accepted treaties.984 This position could be perceived as 
conservative as a focus is placed on clarifying existing law but not on developing new 
crimes. However, it was in line with the ICRC’s role as the guardian of International 
Humanitarian Law. The outcome of this discussion was the exclusion of any direct 
references to rape in the grave breaches and Common Article 3 provisions of the draft 
statute. However, based on the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, and 
especially based on Additional Protocol II and the Lieber Code, rape was discussed as 
being illustrative of an outrage upon personal dignity and a violation to life and health, 
rather than a substantive addition to the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions.985 
“[O]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape, enforced prostitution and 
other sexual violence of comparable gravity”986 was listed as other serious violations of the 
laws and customs of war. In cases of internal conflict, different options regarding outrages 
upon personal dignity and wilfully causing great suffering to body or mind were proposed 
as violations of Common Article 3. Comparable to a working paper submitted by New 
Zealand and Switzerland,987 the different options included “[outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment [rape and enforced 
prostitution]]”, “[outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape, enforced prostitution 
and other sexual violence of comparable gravity]”, and “[wilfully causing great suffering, 
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serious injury to body or health, including rape, enforced prostitution and other sexual 
violence of comparable gravity]”.988 These different suggestions illustrate the attempt to 
crystallise what was recognised by states as reflecting customary International Law rather 
than to develop new crimes.989 This includes the discussion regarding the relationship 
between the crime of rape and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, Additional 
Protocol I and II, Common Article 3, and the Lieber Code respectively. Here, it becomes 
apparent that international rules matter in international relations and law-making.  
While existing international rules strongly influenced actors, 
 
“[m]any [state and non-state] delegations felt that [a] separate listing [of acts of 
sexualised violence] was warranted, as they were concerned that listing sexual 
violence crimes as ‘outrages on personal dignity’ would represent a step 
backward, and send the outdated and potentially harmful message that these 
violent, physical crimes were to be evaluated based on the harm done to the 
victim’s honour, modesty or chastity”.990  
 
Following feminist calls for the separate mention of sexualised crimes, it was suggested to 
list rape and other sexualised crimes in a separate category distinct from other crimes.991 
“[R]ape or other sexual abuse [of comparable gravity,] or enforced prostitution”992 was 
included in the draft statute as a crime against humanity. This was supported by Amnesty 
International and the ICRC, which also understood rape to potentially constitute torture 
and inhumane treatment.993 However, as the brackets indicate, the qualification ‘of 
comparable gravity’ could potentially be limiting and exclude sexualised abuses falling 
short of a physical invasion. Thus, it also creates and perpetuates a hierarchy of sexualised 
crimes. Based on male points of view, it constructs crimes falling short of physical 
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invasion as lesser crimes than rape. The risk of the qualification ‘of comparable gravity’ 
limiting the acts that could be covered by this provision was aggravated by the fact that 
rape, unlike other listed crimes against humanity, was not defined in the third PrepCom 
session.  
 
 
 
7.2.2.3 Fifth session, December 1997 
The fifth PrepCom session in December 1997 saw steps forward and backward 
regarding the criminalisation of acts of sexualised war violence. The February 1997 
progress of introducing an alternative definition of grave breaches including rape in an 
international criminal court’s statute was not followed up so as to reflect the exact grave 
breaches language of the Geneva Conventions.994 However, a reference to grave breaches 
was included in Article 20(B)(p bis) on “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict”995 related to sexualised crimes. The acceptance 
of this wording was facilitated by the understanding that the reference to grave breaches in 
Article 20(B)(p bis) would introduce a specific threshold, rather than be an element 
requiring acts of sexualised violence also to amount to one of the crimes mentioned in the 
grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, or indicating that sexualised crimes 
could already be prosecuted as grave breaches.996 Article 20(D)(e bis) covering “other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character” links the same list of crimes to “serious violation of Article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions”.997 Both Article 20(B)(p bis) and (D)(e bis) 
again confirm that international rules, in the form of the Geneva Conventions, matter in 
international relations and law-making. They are upheld and used as points of reference. 
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Against opposition based on the male perception that acts of sexualised violence 
would already be recognised as other crimes like torture and genocide,998 a proposal to 
further delineate the list of these crimes to include “rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, enforced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence”999 as war crimes in international and internal conflicts and as crimes against 
humanity was widely supported.1000 This demonstrates the “[c]oncerted effort […] made, 
not least by [the UK], to reflect the concerns of the women’s groups”.1001 It is a successful 
example of the Women’s Caucus “educating”1002 states, even though the names of crimes 
that were eventually accepted differed from the ones initially proposed.1003 To some extent, 
the establishment of this list of sexualised war crimes and especially the drafting of their 
elements was a creative legislative exercise as these forms of violence had not constituted 
war crimes in their own right before the adoption of the Rome Statute and related 
International Humanitarian Law rules had not been very precise.1004 Only rape and forced 
prostitution were explicitly mentioned in the previous PrepCom negotiations. Therefore, 
the achievement to explicitly include this list of sexualised crimes in the Rome Statute 
shows that international relations and law-making are not always restricted by existing 
international normative structures. The extent of this achievement becomes apparent when 
considering the repeated mantra of the ICC negotiations being a conservative exercise, 
crystallising existing law but not creating new crimes. Therefore, it was not enough to 
argue that a form of conduct is wrong and/or a breach of international (customary) law. It 
had to be recognised as a crime under international (customary) law, resulting in hunts for 
the slightest hints to substantiate arguments.1005 
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In the view of the Women’s Caucus, the crimes mentioned in the list of sexualised 
crimes are forms of gender violence. Gender violence was understood as  
 
“the most extreme form of gender discrimination. [It is] violence or violations 
which target or affect women exclusively or disproportionately because they 
are women. Gender violence also includes violence or violations which are 
based on or perpetuate socially constructed or stereotyped gender roles, or the 
power differential between men and women.”1006  
 
Therefore, gender violence is structural violence as social structures such as gender roles or 
power inequalities between men and women systematically harm or otherwise 
disadvantage women.1007  
 
“Sexual violence, whether directed to women or men, is usually a form of 
gender violence, since it is an attack on one’s gender identity, whether 
masculine or feminine. That is, women are raped, for example, to control and 
destroy them as women and to signal male ownership over them as property; 
men are raped to humiliate them through forcing them in the position of 
women and, thereby, rendering them, according to the prevailing stereotypes, 
weak and inferior.”1008 
 
Here, the Women’s Caucus demonstrated an understanding of rape as sexual violence as a 
form of gender violence and therefore, a form of structural violence. The Women’s 
Caucus’ elaborations on gender violence as structural violence stress that “socially 
constructed or stereotyped gender roles, or the power differential between men and 
women”1009 underlie the perpetration of rape. 
 
 
 
7.2.2.4 The inter-sessional meeting in Zutphen, January 1998 
The same list of sexualised crimes as put forwards in the fifth PrepCom session was 
included in the Zutphen draft. It states that “committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
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prostitution, enforced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international 
and internal armed conflict.1010 The draft also lists “rape or other sexual abuse [of 
comparable gravity,] or enforced prostitution” as crimes against humanity.1011 It becomes 
apparent that the list of sexualised crimes included under the war crimes provisions is 
broader than the sexualised crimes recognised as potentially amounting to crimes against 
humanity. It includes not only rape, forced prostitution and other forms of sexualised 
violence (of comparable gravity), but also sexual slavery, enforced pregnancy and enforced 
sterilization. This disparity in the development of sexualised crimes as war crimes and as 
crimes against humanity continued throughout the PrepCom2 negotiations and the 
conclusion of the Elements of Crimes.  
 
 
 
7.2.2.5 Sixth session, March/April 1998 
In the run-up to the Rome Conference, the US developed a fourth definition of rape 
that brings together the definitions the delegation developed in the first PrepCom session. 
In a Reference Paper, the US defined rape broadly as “attack[ing] a person […] through 
acts of a sexual nature”.1012 In a comment, however, it specified that “[r]ape is the forcible 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of another by the accused’s sexual 
organ, or forcible penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by 
any object.”1013 Focusing on body parts, the reference to the “accused’s sexual organ” 
suggests a male perpetrator even though the general wording is gender-neutral, as pushed 
for by the Women’s Caucus. However, the definition also indicates a more informed 
understanding of the crime of rape as including oral sex and the use of objects in addition 
to vaginal and anal invasion. Even though oral sex is not explicitly mentioned, this 
recognises that women can also be perpetrators and men victims of rape. 
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7.2.3 The United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Rome Conference) 
Based on the PrepCom’s draft, the UNGA convened the United Nations 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Rome Conference) from 15 June to 17 July 1998 in Rome, Italy. The purpose of the Rome 
Conference was to finalise and adopt a convention on the establishment of an international 
criminal court.1014 The following paragraphs analyse by whom and how war rape was 
discussed at Rome.  
At the Rome Conference, the contents of the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity provisions, but not their definitions, were extensively discussed primarily in 
informal sessions. The official records of plenary meetings1015 show that many state 
delegates1016 favoured the general inclusion of crimes of sexualised war violence in the 
ICC’s jurisdiction as a preventive measure.1017 Mr Abdullah M Mohammed Ibrahim Al 
Sheikh of Saudi Arabia, for example, indicated that the inclusion of the crime of rape 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC was uncontroversial.1018 State delegates were supported in 
their position regarding the inclusion of sexualised crimes in the Rome Statute by 
international organisations and international and regional NGOs like Amnesty 
International, the Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights and the United Nations 
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Children’s Fund.1019 However, despite extensive discussions, the delegates did not come to 
an agreement on Paragraph “(p bis) committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
enforced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”1020 as “other serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established 
framework of international law”.1021 Regarding crimes against humanity, eventually, a 
compromise text that explicitly included the crime of rape received wide support. This 
compromise text created the only way out of repeating, though not resolving, arguments 
regarding specifications and definitions already put forward in the PrepCom.1022 It was the 
only way to reach a solution in the extremely limited time period of six weeks that the 
Rome Conference lasted.1023  
 
Participants in the Rome Conference did not succeed in defining the elements of 
crimes. Then again, a large group of delegations considered a binding list of elements 
unnecessary.1024 At the insistence of the US delegation, however, Article 9 was inserted 
into the Rome Statute, stating that the elements of crimes would be defined and the 
definitions would be included at a later date. The USA and a small group of other 
delegations would have preferred it if binding elements would have been negotiated before 
the Rome Statute entered into force.1025 The US was “particularly concerned that those war 
crimes which were based on international provisions imposing obligations on states should 
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be properly defined as regards individual criminal responsibility”.1026 How important the 
development of elements of crimes before the Rome Conference was to the delegation is 
indicated by the fact that it had drafted a full set of elements of crimes against humanity 
already at PrepCom stage.1027 However, the US showed flexibility in the negotiations of 
their paper in the PrepCom2.1028  
 
 
 
7.2.4 The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (PrepCom2) 
 After the Rome Conference, the PrepCom2 was charged with negotiating 
complementary documents to the Rome Statute, setting out the ICC’s structure, jurisdiction 
and functions. This would complete the establishment and contribute to the smooth 
functioning of the court. The following paragraphs analyse the ICC Elements of Crimes 
which were negotiated between February 1999 and July 2000.1029 The Elements of Crimes 
are of particular relevance to this thesis as they include the definition of war rape which 
assists the ICC in the interpretation and application of Article 7(1)(g)1030 covering rape as a 
crime against humanity, and of Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)1031 and Article 8(2)(e)(vi)1032 covering 
rape as a war crime.1033 The Elements of Crimes differ from the (draft) instruments 
negotiated previously as the (draft) instruments listed rape as a crime in and of itself as 
well as constituting other crimes but did not define it. The rape definitions discussed above 
were proposed by state delegations but not included in the (draft) instruments. The 
PrepCom2 met ten times between February 1999 and July 2002. The sections below, 
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however, only cover the first five PrepCom2 sessions as the negotiations of the Elements 
of Crimes were completed in the fifth session. 
 
 
 
7.2.4.1 First session, February 1999 
Before the PrepCom2’s first session in February 1999, the USA drafted two crucial 
proposals, one on the elements of crimes against humanity and another on the elements of 
war crimes. Comparable to wordings suggested previously by the US,1034 rape was defined 
as a situation where  
 
“[t]he accused intended to attack one or more persons through acts of a sexual 
nature. The accused penetrated any part of the body of another person with the 
accused’s sexual organ, or penetrated the anal or genital opening of another 
person with any object or other part of the accused’s body. The penetration was 
committed by force”.1035 
 
Linking rape to sexual slavery, ‘sexual nature’ was understood as “intentional 
touching of the sexual organs with the intent to arouse either the accused, or the victim or a 
third party if applicable ([for example], sexual slavery).”1036 ‘Committed by force’ meant 
that the sexual act was accomplished by direct or indirect coercion, force or threat of force 
against the victim or a third person, resulting in the victim fearing that she or a third person 
would be subjected to physical or psychological violence if the victim would not comply. 
It was also understood to include situations where the accused would take advantage of an 
inherently coercive environment. However, “[e]vidence of consent may negate the 
necessary force element.”1037 In addition to defining rape itself, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)(1) of 
the USA’s proposal is followed by a comment, stating that “the existence of specific 
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crimes of sexual violence in Articles 8.2(b)(xxii) and 8.2(e)(vi) does not undermine the 
fact that those same acts might constitute the essential elements of some other offenses 
under the Statute.”1038 This resonates with a proposition made by the Women’s Caucus. 
The Caucus argued that it is necessary to understand acts of sexualised war violence both 
as crimes in and of themselves as well as potentially constituting other crimes to avert the 
danger of marginalising those crimes by not including them when the charges of torture 
and other general violations are drawn up. This view was supported by a wealth of 
customary International Law and examples from the ICTY and ICTR, demonstrating that 
international norms and rules mattered in the ICC negotiations. Furthermore, the 
prohibition against gender discrimination in the application and interpretation of law 
requires taking acts of sexualised war violence into account when considering charging and 
prosecuting other crimes.1039 Since the US did not include this understanding in its 
previous draft elements, it can be assumed that the Women’s Caucus taught its views to the 
US delegation.  
Similarly to the view of the US, rape was explicitly included in the suggested 
comments relating to the crime of genocide in the draft elements of crimes. Following the 
Women’s Caucus’ view, it is stated that  
 
“the term ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ in Article 6(b) may include, but is 
not necessarily restricted to, acts of […] rape [or] sexual violence […]. It is 
recognized that rape and sexual violence may constitute genocide in the same 
way as any other act, provided that the criteria of the crime of genocide are 
met.” 1040 
 
 
The Women’s Caucus saw that state delegations were divided about how to define 
rape and became more open to a wording similar to how the crime was eventually 
defined.1041 Contrary to the US definition of rape, the Caucus1042 and Costa Rica1043 put 
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forward a definition emphasising invasion – including but not limited to penetration – and 
coercion rather than penetration and force.1044 This definition is in accordance with the 
Caucus’ underlying working assumption that the definition of rape should not focus on 
body parts.1045 Taking into consideration national and international rules, the definition 
proposed by the Women’s Caucus and Costa Rica goes beyond national and customary 
definitions1046 and melds the principles that underlay the decisions in Prosecutor v Jean-
Paul Akayesu and Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija.1047 This way, it could have been aimed at 
mediating between actors who did not agree with the ad hoc tribunals’ findings.1048 
Regarding the element of force or coercion, the Women’s Caucus argued that the 
term ‘coercion’ is preferable to that of ‘force’ because it expresses less direct but no less 
threatening situations. Referring to international norms in the form of approaches taken by 
the ICTY and ICTR, the Caucus reasoned that this terminology recognises that in conflict 
situations, a perpetrator may accomplish rape without directly coercing or threatening the 
person. In addition to acts or threats of force and situations where the victim is disabled, 
the description of coercive circumstances should also include, for example, “threats to 
deny or promises to provide the means of survival”1049. This addition is critical “if 
situations are to be included where women ‘choose’ to trade sexual service in order to 
survive, such as forced temporary marriage and other slave-like conditions”.1050 In regard 
to the element of consent brought up by the USA in its explanation of ‘committed by 
force’, the Women’s Caucus disagreed, stating that 
 
“[o]nce coercive circumstances or conditions have been shown, any discussion 
of the presence or lack of overt physical resistance or nonconsent on the part of 
the victim becomes an absurdity. […] The traditional requirement in domestic 
rape laws that in addition to a showing of force, the prosecution had to show 
resistance or non-consent (or the treatment of these as essential to the proof of 
force) is both inappropriate to the situations before the ICC and based on the 
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outrageous and now-repudiated sex-stereotyped attitudes about women and 
sex. […] The resistance and non-consent standards played a big role in both 
allowing impunity for rape and other sexual violence committed against 
women as well as deterring women from participation in the legal system to 
vindicate themselves. Such standards served to shift the focus from the acts or 
conduct of the perpetrator to the ascribed failings of the victim”.1051 
 
 
 
7.2.4.2 Second session, July/August 1999 
As indicated by the different proposals submitted by the US,1052 Costa Rica1053 and 
the Women’s Caucus1054 in the first PrepCom2 session, one of the most contentious issues 
during the second PrepCom2 session in July/August 1999 was the definition of crimes of 
sexualised violence, especially of rape and the meaning of ‘penetration’.1055  
The discussion was based on the very detailed text prepared by the ICRC on Article 
8(2)(b), 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the ICC statute. The text was introduced at the request of the 
governments of Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, Korea, South Africa and 
Switzerland,1056 demonstrating that the ICRC, like the Women’s Caucus, succeeded in 
teaching its views to states. The document contains research on, and an analysis of, 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights instruments and relevant national and 
international case law.1057 Drawing on international rules identified in the Akayesu and 
Furundžija cases and the Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, the 
material element of rape is defined as: 
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“(1) The perpetrator committed an act of sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(2) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.”1058 
 
The same wording is brought forward in a proposal by Costa Rica, Hungary and 
Switzerland.1059 This was to be expected as this proposal is also based on ICRC 
research.1060 As the suggested wording was not gender-neutral, a majority of delegations 
was not satisfied with it. A proposal by Colombia commenting on the proposal by Costa 
Rica, Hungary and Switzerland reflects this concern by replacing the term ‘penetration’ 
with having “sexual access to the victim”, intended to lower the threshold for 
protection.1061 The background to this proposal highlights that delegates and lawyers relied 
on what they knew best and consequently the importance of national rules as well as the 
temporal and local contexts. However, delegates were also constantly reminded by the 
chair of the PrepCom2 not to simply reinstate their national positions but to define the 
crime for the purpose of the ICC statute.1062 The Colombian proposal was informed by 
Colombia’s national criminal law at that time and the crime of carnal access which 
included, amongst others, rape. Even though there was no definition, rape was understood 
as penetration by the penis.1063 Colombia’s proposal also contributed to the discussion of 
the element of force/coercion by stating that “[t]he agent commits the act through violence 
or the use of coercion or force or intimidation or the threat of force against the victim or a 
third person.”1064 Eventually, the discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator of the 
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Working Group on Elements of Crimes, Herman von Hebel, defines rape as a war crime in 
international conflict that violates a person’s autonomy1065 as 
 
“[t]he accused invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim 
with any object or any other part of the body.”1066 
 
A footnote indicates that the “concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to be broad enough to be 
gender-neutral.”1067 This can also be inferred from the second part of this element. In 
stating that “the anal or genital opening of the victim” would have to be invaded by any 
object or body part, it illustrates that men and women are recognised as victims and 
perpetrators of rape. Therefore, in addition to reflecting different national legislations and 
international jurisprudence,1068 this definition merges proposals made by state and non-
state delegations. It includes the notion of ‘penetration’ as advanced by Colombia1069 and 
the US,1070 as well as Belgium and others,1071 and Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland1072 
on behalf of the ICRC.1073 It also includes ‘invasion’ as advocated for by Costa Rica1074 
and the Women’s Caucus.1075 Also following the Women’s Caucus view,1076 the definition 
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of rape proposed in the coordinator’s discussion paper is less dependent on body parts than 
the definition previously suggested by the ICRC.1077 It takes the Akayesu language and 
tries to fit it into the discussion of legality.1078 
The coordinator’s discussion paper continued to specify that 
 
“[t]he invasion was committee by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression 
or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent”.1079 
 
The intention of the drafters to stress that coercive circumstances are not restricted to the 
use of physical force becomes clear.1080 
Focusing on the first element of the definition of rape, as indicated above, the 
expression of ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ reflects the importance of international as 
well as national rules. Drawing on the Akayesu definition of rape, a majority of delegations 
supported the concept of invasion which, even though it was seen as somewhat vague, was 
perceived to be broader than ‘penetration’ and intended to be gender-neutral.1081 Most 
national definitions, in contrast, define rape using the concept of penetration. Highlighting 
the relevance of both international and national rules, the wording is a compromise reached 
between defining rape as an act of invasion or penetration.1082 This compromise shows that 
while the ICC negotiations heavily relied on precedents and therefore could be 
characterised as male, precedents were chosen and interpreted in the light of new contexts, 
reflecting female reasoning. International and national “rules [left] room for the new 
insights and perspectives generated by new contexts”.1083 The definition of rape as an 
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‘invasion resulting in penetration’ reflects the smallest common denominator between 
sometimes extremely diverging views.1084 It reflects the delegates’ desire to ensure a high 
level of ratifications.1085 The long and relatively complicated wording resulted out of the 
PrepCom2’s intention to draft a gender-neutral and inclusive definition.1086 It is argued that 
the ICC formulation is one of the most progressive and broad definitions of rape under 
international and national law. Moving beyond international precedents, it aimed and 
succeeded at including many acts such as rape with objects which no judgment had yet 
been passed on by the ad hoc tribunals. Therefore, the ICC rape definition was negotiated 
for the future. It sets new standards, creating a normative force that promotes women’s 
rights in international but also domestic contexts through the need for implementation.1087  
Even though this shows that the ICC definition of rape can be seen as a positive 
development and progress in International Criminal Law, it is not faultless. It 
simultaneously indicates progress and regression. It is argued that this definition is 
generic.1088 However, it still includes body parts. It is still based on, and reproduces, 
outdated notions of honour1089 by including the concept of penetration, making it a 
conservative1090 definition. Therefore, it is not an entirely satisfactory compromise from a 
feminist point of view. In addition to its long and relatively complicated1091 wording, the 
formulation ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ is somewhat awkward.1092 A point could be 
made that this wording did not only result out of the drafters’ intention to create a gender-
neutral definition, but also out of fear of misunderstandings of terms which necessitated a 
high degree of specification,1093 or out of fear of alienating support by being too radical by 
developing a fundamentally new rape definition. Furthermore, it can be argued that a 
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gender-neutral definition could also have been included by adopting the definition 
developed by the ICTR in the Akayesu case, a definition only mentioning invasion. Even 
though it was argued that the formulation ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ broadens the 
ICC definition of rape, it could also be said, as mentioned above, that the Akayesu 
definition is even broader. 
 
 
 
7.2.4.3 Third session, November/December 1999 
Based on a joint proposal by Canada and Germany1094 that aimed at reflecting the 
most thoughtful approaches taken by the ad hoc tribunals,1095 rape as a crime against 
humanity1096 and as a war crime in international1097 and internal armed conflict1098 was 
defined in the same words used in the discussion paper proposed by the coordinator in the 
second PrepCom2 session.1099  
Highlighting the controversy around the role of consent,1100 the Arab block 
submitted a proposal stating that “[n]othing in [the elements of the crime against humanity 
of rape] shall affect natural and legal marital sexual relations in accordance with religious 
principles or cultural norms in different national laws.”1101 If accepted, this would have 
made marital sexual intercourse consensual by definition. In contrast to national laws 
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which at least partly view rape as an honour crime, the reference to cultural norms 
indicates an understanding of rape as a form of structural violence. The Arab block’s wish 
to protect cultural norms that might allow marital rape makes clear that self-same norms 
underlie the perpetration of rape. The reference to national laws makes it clear that national 
norms and rules matter in international relations. Although this proposal was not 
supported, the Arab block’s opposition resulted in Footnote 13 in the ICC Elements of 
Crimes, linking the elements of rape to the debate about an alternative wording for the 
introductory text to crimes against humanity.1102 This underscores the fragile compromises 
repeatedly brokered by the Coordinator of the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes, 
Herman von Hebel, and Sub-Coordinator Prince Zeid Al-Hussein, as well as the German, 
Swiss, British and US delegations on the standards and definitions of sexualised crimes, 
potentially affecting the interpretation and application of these provisions.1103 
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While the Arab block primarily relied on its national laws as a basic position in the 
ICC negotiations, Colombia was taught by NGOs and eventually diverted from its national 
laws in the ICC discussions. In a comment on Rolling Text No. 6 proposed by the 
coordinator during the second PrepCom2 session, it recalled its previous proposal on the 
wording of the elements of the crime of rape and again suggested replacing the term 
‘invasion (resulting in penetration)’ with ‘having access to’. The proposal’s reasoning was 
informed by discussions regarding a broadening of Colombia’s national definition of rape 
with national and international NGOs like the Colombian Commission of Jurists and the 
ICRC that had more access than the Colombian delegation to international doctrines and 
materials of the ad hoc tribunals.1104 This highlights the importance of international norms 
and rules as well as the key role of NGOs in law-making processes. Colombia considered 
the definition worked out in the previous round of discussions to be “[extensive and] 
confusing and […] not [to reflect] the protection which must exist in relation to the legally 
protected right of sexual freedom or freedom to exercise control over one’s body.”1105 
Drawing on the Furundžija case, it understood the proposed changes as gender-neutral and 
open, specifying the violent means used in a general way rather than referring to any body 
parts. Furthermore, using the main verb ‘access’ would make it possible to differentiate 
rape from sexual violence, the difference being that in the latter, the conduct would consist 
of the violent sexual act falling short of carnal access.1106 This “would permit a better use 
of evidence and a significant development of jurisprudence”.1107 Colombia spoke out 
against the use of ‘invasion’ because of its indefinite character and difficulties from an 
evidentiary point of view resulting out of this.1108  
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7.2.4.4 Fourth session, March 2000 
In further discussions, NGOs explained to the Colombian delegation their 
understanding of ‘penetration’ as the use of any tool.1109 Based on this, Colombia reverted 
from its previous suggestions and stated that the main verb ‘to have access to’ could be 
replaced by ‘to penetrate’ in order to facilitate agreement on the elements of rape as a 
crime against humanity and a war crime in (non-)international armed conflicts.1110 
 
 
 
7.2.4.5 Fifth session, June 2000 
In the fifth PrepCom2 session, however, the delegations of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador and Spain submitted a proposal suggesting anew to replace the verb 
‘invasion’ with ‘to have access to’.1111 
Eventually, however, the delegations wanted to ensure consistency between the 
elements of rape as a crime against humanity and the largely completed elements of rape as 
a war crime.1112 Therefore, the definition of war rape remained as developed in the second 
PrepCom2 session1113 and was adopted as such.1114 
 
 
 
7.2.5 Logics of interactions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, actors’ identities, interests and actions are influenced by 
normative structures through different logics of interaction. In the ICC negotiations of the 
crime of war rape, actors’ identities, interests and actions were influenced mainly through 
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the logic of consequences (instrumentalism), appropriateness (morality and ethics), 
practicality (practice), arguing (rational oppositional discourse) and purposive role 
playing.1115 The Arab block submitted a proposal which, if accepted, would have made 
marital sexual intercourse consensual by definition. This can be interpreted to have been 
driven by the logic of consequences. It was in the Arab block’s interest to protect their 
national laws, cultural norms and religious principles as well as members’ sovereignty. The 
fact that many delegations felt that a separate listing of acts of sexualised violence was 
warranted rather than listing them as outrages upon personal dignity can be interpreted to 
have been driven by the logic of appropriateness as it was what social norms deemed right. 
In addition to listing sexualised crimes separately, they were also understood as potentially 
constituting, for example, acts of torture. This can be interpreted to have been driven by the 
logic of practicality. After acts of sexualised violence have been recognised as such in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, delegates followed common sense and recognised 
that acts of sexualised violence could potentially constitute other crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Driven by the logic of arguing, the ICC rape definition is a 
compromise reached between defining rape as an invasion or penetration. The ICRC’s 
proposal to include as much as possible from the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions can be interpreted as having been driven by purposive role playing. As the 
guardian of International Humanitarian Law, it is the ICRC’s task to protect it. In 
summary, the process and outcome of the ICC negotiations of the crime of war rape can be 
explained by actors upholding national normative structures as well as their concerns 
regarding national sovereignty, norms that were deemed right, common sense, reasonable 
arguments and the roles actors played in treaty negotiations. 
 
 
 
7.2.6 Conclusion on war rape 
 Retracing who the key actors were in the ICC negotiations of rape (Research 
Question 1), it became apparent that the ICRC as well as the Women’s Caucus were two 
international non-governmental delegations that drove the discussions of the crime of war 
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rape, supporting Hypothesis 1.1116 Regarding state delegations, the Arab block, Colombia 
and the US made relevant contributions.  
The ICRC papers constituted the historical background for the definition of rape. It 
outlined the state of law at the time of the ICC negotiations. Procedurally, the ICRC could 
not introduce its papers as formal proposals due to its observer status. For this to happen, 
the papers needed to be taken up by state delegations. Here the ICRC’s identity as the 
guardian and expert of International Humanitarian Law, and the respect of state 
delegations that the organisation enjoyed because of its successful influence in the 
emergence and evolution of International Humanitarian Law, was crucial. The ICRC 
looked for a number of states from different regions that would submit its texts.1117 Of 
relevance to the discussion of the definition of rape are the ICRC papers that were taken up 
and submitted by Belgium and others1118 as well as by Costa Rica, Hungary and 
Switzerland.1119 The organisation also taught the Colombian delegation to broaden its 
national definition of rape that so far had guided Colombia’s position on war rape in the 
ICC negotiations. Based on non-state actors’ teaching of international doctrines and the ad 
hoc tribunals’ judgments (Research Question 2),1120 Colombia advanced a different 
reasoning for its proposed wording of the definition of rape.1121 A proposal by New 
Zealand and Switzerland1122 that was based on ICRC research1123 was of relevance to the 
general inclusion of the crime in the ICC statute. Due to time constraints, the relationship 
between the ICRC and Switzerland was helpful. The Swiss government is the ICRC’s main 
funder and until the 1970s, the committee controlling the organisation was closely linked 
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to the Swiss government.1124 “Observers have alleged that the cultural, intellectual and 
political ‘symbiosis’ between the Swiss government and the ICRC leaders has influenced 
the ICRC’s positions and decisions.”1125 Switzerland’s default policy in regard to the ICRC 
was to support the organisation if it could. New Zealand saw itself as gaining strength from 
being a good international actor. Thus, if a delegation looked for support, the state’s 
default position was to give support if the proposal made sense on a principled basis.1126 
Considering that the ICRC drew on existing national and international law as well as the 
Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual 
Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, Belgium and others, Colombia, 
and Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland proposed definitions of rape that used the term 
‘penetration’ (Research Question 3).1127 
In addition to the ICRC, the Women’s Caucus played a role in the development of 
the ICC definition of war rape. In contrast to the ICRC, however, the Caucus pushed for 
progress in the form of gender-neutral, perpetrator-orientated, invasion- and coercion-
based understandings of rape as a crime in and of itself as well as potentially amounting to 
other crimes (Research Question 3).1128 Like the ICRC, the Caucus’ positions were 
influenced by precedents from national and international laws (Research Question 2)1129. 
However, the Women’s Caucus was not bound by a role as guardian of International 
Humanitarian Law like the ICRC, but was guided by its mandate to advance women’s 
rights. Therefore it developed a different focus and advanced different conclusions. Its 
positions were (partly) taken up by the US1130 and Costa Rica,1131 confirming Hypothesis 
1.1132 Addressing Research Question 3,1133 the US moved away from its initial consent-
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based definition and advanced a broad understanding of the element of coercion. In 
addition, it developed gender-neutral definitions. However, in line with its national 
laws,1134 it still used the term ‘penetration’ instead of ‘invasion’. In contrast to the 
proposals it submitted together with Hungary and Switzerland, Costa Rica on its own 
advanced a definition of rape using the term ‘invasion’. Considering that before the 
Women’s Caucus got involved in the ICC negotiations, state delegations mainly discussed 
the crime of rape in a victim-centred, honour-based way as constituting other crimes, for 
example an outrage upon personal dignity, and that initial definitions only used the term 
‘penetration’ and included an element of consent as well as force, it can be argued that the 
Women’s Caucus taught its views to states.  
Opposing these developments, the Arab block submitted a proposal1135 that retains 
the definition of rape as ‘invasion resulting in penetration’. This went beyond its national 
laws which mainly use the term ‘penetration’. Falling back on national laws as well as 
religious principles and cultural norms, however, the Arab block aimed to include an 
exception that, if accepted, would have made sexual intercourse in marriage automatically 
consensual. The Arab block’s recourse to conservative national laws as well as religious 
principles and cultural norms to oppose progressive developments regarding the definition 
of rape confirming Hypothesis 2 that states with strong patriarchal structures, where 
religion plays a leading role in legal and social matters, opposed the development of a 
more progressive definition. It also shows that domestic norms explain the resistance 
towards progressive definitions of rape. This speaks in favour of Hypothesis 3.1136 
 
In addition to outlining who the driving actors were in the ICC negotiations of war 
rape as a specific sexualised crime listed in the Rome Statute, what influenced them in the 
discussion of the crime and how they defined it, the above discussion also argued that rape 
was understood as an honour crime as well as a form of structural violence. This confirms 
Hypothesis 51137 and speaks against Hypothesis 6.1138 Initially, rape was included in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1133
 Research Question 3 reads: What was the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
1134
 Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network, ‘The Laws in Your State’ <https://www.rainn.org/public-
policy/laws-in-your-state> accessed 21 November 2014. 
1135
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates Concerning the 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity (09 December 1999)’ (n 66). 
1136
 Hypothesis 3 reads: Domestic norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage. 
1137
 Hypothesis 5 reads: War rape and forced marriage were interpreted as honour crimes. 
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ILC draft statute as an outrage upon personal dignity. As this was perceived to be linked to 
notions of honour, rape was initially interpreted as an honour crime. This is also true for 
the Arab block’s national understanding of rape that influenced its positions in the ICC 
negotiations. The Women’s Caucus, in contrast, advocated an understanding of rape as a 
form of structural violence that has its roots in patriarchy. 
 
 
 
7.3 Forced marriage 
After the second part of this chapter focused on war rape, the third part focuses on 
forced marriage in times of armed conflict. As part 7.2 on war rape, part 7.3 analyses 
which key actors drove the ICC negotiations of forced marriage specifically (Research 
Question 1), why they got involved in the discussion of this crime and what influenced 
their positions (Research Question 2) and how the driving actors interpreted forced 
marriage (Research Question 3). Seeing that forced marriage was only mentioned as a form 
of sexual slavery and not discussed as a crime in and of itself, it is of interest and relevance 
to trace the ICC negotiations of the crime of sexual slavery. It is necessary to understand 
how actors interpreted the crime of sexual slavery to learn why they categorised forced 
marriage as such, rather than as a separate crime.1139 
As part 7.2 on war rape, part 7.3 on forced marriage analyses the relevant 
negotiations in the PrepCom, Rome Conference and PrepCom2.  
 
 
 
7.3.1 The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(PrepCom) 
 In the context of the PrepCom negotiations, forced marriage was only mentioned in 
the fifth session. Therefore, this is the only PrepCom session analysed below.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1138
 Hypothesis 6 reads: Structural causes of the perpetration of war rape and forced marriage were not 
addressed. 
1139
 This will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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7.3.1.1 Fifth session, December 1997 
Based on the Nuremberg charter,1140 Control Council Law No. 10,1141 the Tokyo 
charter,1142 the statutes of the ICTY1143 and ICTR,1144 and the ILC Draft Code of 
Crimes,1145 there was general agreement that the crimes against humanity provisions of the 
Rome Statute should include the crime of enslavement.1146 This highlights the importance 
of international rules in the making of the ICC instruments. However, already in the Ad 
Hoc Committee, state delegations “recognized the need to reconcile differences in [the 
definition] and to further elaborate the specific content of […] enslavement”.1147 
Encompassing not only slavery but also servitude and forced labour, enslavement can be 
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 London Agreement (n 283) art 6(c). 
1141
 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (n 282) art II(1)(c). 
1142
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (n 300) art 5. 
1143
 UNSC Resolution 827 (n 11) art 5(c). 
1144
 UNSC Resolution 955 (n 11) art 3(c). 
1145
 International Law Commission ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (n 
944) art 18(d). 
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 PrepCom ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session from 11 to 21 February 1997’ (n 
979); PrepCom ‘Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from 1 to 12 December 
1997’ (n 995); PrepCom ‘Draft Consolidated Text: War Crimes’ (n 979); PrepCom ‘Preliminary Text: War 
Crimes’ (n 979); PrepCom ‘Redraft of the ILC Article 20 on ICC Jurisdiction With Proposed Elements 
(Delegation of the United States)’ (n 971); PrepCom ‘Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 
January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands’ (n 1010) art 20(D)(l) Option II; Amnesty International, ‘Making 
the Right Choices’ (n 993) 29, 44; Hall, ‘Article 7 Crimes against Humanity para. 1 (c) Enslavement’ (n 
541); Human Rights Watch, Justice in Balance (n 1000). 
1147
 Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (n 29) para 78. 
PrepCom ‘For Annex to Statute: Elements Related to Article on Crimes against Humanity (Delegation of the 
United States)’ (n 974); PrepCom ‘Proposal by the United States of America on Elements of Offenses for the 
International Criminal Court’ (02 April 1998) UN Doc A/AC.249/1998/DP.11; PrepCom ‘Redraft of the ILC 
Article 20 on ICC Jurisdiction With Proposed Elements (Delegation of the United States)’ (n 971); PrepCom 
‘Reference Paper Elements of Offenses for the International Criminal Court (Delegation of the United 
States)’ (n 1012): In a redraft of Article 20 of the ILC draft statute, the USA first defined the elements of 
enslavement as “the accused [holding] a person against that person’s will and for the purpose of performing 
labor”. In its draft elements of crimes of March 27, 1996, the US developed a definition of enslavement as 
“intentionally placing or maintaining a person in a condition in which any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised over him”. In a reference paper dated March 27, 1998, the USA defined 
the elements of enslavement as “(1) […] the accused intended to own or cause to be owned one or more 
persons and the fruits of their labor; (2) […] one or more persons was forced to do labor without any 
compensation; (3) […] the accused exerted ownership rights over one or more persons so as to deprive them 
of all individual rights”. The second wording was based on the 1926 Slavery Convention, demonstrating that 
international rules mattered in the ICC negotiations. It can be argued that the third definition developed by 
the US moves away from traditional understandings of slavery for the purpose of forced labour towards a 
broader definition, focusing on the acts of the perpetrator rather than on the purpose for which someone is 
enslaved. A similar focus is reintroduced in the USA’s fourth definition of enslavement put forward in 
another reference paper dated April 02, 1998. As outlined above, forced marriage in times of armed conflict 
includes elements of enslavement, slavery, serfdom and forced labour. Therefore, it can be understood as 
being indirectly included in the USA’s and other state delegations’ proposals. However, the prominence of 
traditional notions such as enslavement, slavery, serfdom and forced labour raises doubts as to whether actors 
involved in the ICC negotiations were aware of, and considered, the gendered elements of these crimes. 
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understood to be broad enough to include slavery-like practices such as “compulsory 
betrothal of women […] where the victims are not merely economically exploited, but 
totally dependent on others”.1148  
As outlined in section 7.2.2.3 of this chapter, in the fifth PrepCom session in 
December 1997, the Women’s Caucus proposed the inclusion of “rape, sexual slavery, 
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and other sexual and gender 
violence”1149 in a sub-paragraph of the war crimes and crimes against humanity 
provisions.1150 This makes the Rome Statute the first international legal instrument to 
specify sexual slavery as a war crime and a crime against humanity.1151 The crime was 
explicitly included in the ICC statute without much debate. As the explicit inclusion of 
sexual slavery as a war crime and crime against humanity under the ICC instruments was 
based on Women’s Caucus’ advocacy, it is an example of an NGO teaching its views to 
states. Even though slavery was one of the earliest Human Rights violations to be 
recognised as a crime under International Law, it was only first regulated by treaty in 1926 
when the Slavery Convention1152 was adopted. Based on the Slavery Convention, the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery1153 was adopted in 1956. International rules evolved to 
address new forms of slavery including servitude and forced labour in the UDHR,1154 the 
European Convention on Human Rights,1155 the ICCPR,1156 the American Convention on 
Human Rights1157 and the African Charter.1158 The explicit inclusion of sexual slavery in 
the Rome Statute was further facilitated by international norms related to the crime as 
discussed previously at the Vienna and Beijing conferences and also in reports of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like 
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 Hall, ‘Article 7 Crimes against Humanity para. 1 (c) Enslavement’ (n 541). 
1149
 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 
PrepCom’ (n 50). 
1150
 Additionally, an informal working paper of 12 December 1997 included “slavery and the slave trade in 
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 La Haye (n 49) 190. 
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 UDHR (n 128) art 4. 
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 ECHR (n 128) art 4(1). 
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Practices during Armed Conflict and the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences.1159 Reflecting customary law, the explicit inclusion 
of sexual slavery in the Rome Statute represents the codification of a specific kind of 
slavery that is increasingly recognised as a major problem worldwide. Its codification 
shows that the ICC negotiations could be characterised as male as they heavily relied on 
precedents. However, precedents were chosen and interpreted taking new contexts into 
consideration.1160 This reflects female reasoning processes. Clearly linking the crime of 
sexual slavery to the well-recognised crime of enslavement, the inclusion of sexual slavery 
in the ICC instruments marks a shift away from an understanding of sexualised violence as 
an honour crime and refocused attention on the actions of the perpetrator.1161  
The Women’s Caucus understood sexual slavery to be a form of gender violence, 
which is structural violence.1162 It gave “the enslavement of women through forced 
marriage or otherwise for domestic as well as sexual service”1163 as one example. 
Irrespective of an initial agreement or some kind of exchange, 
 
“[s]lavery and enslavement are the exercise of control over another person as 
chattel. Kidnapping, deceiving or coercing a woman, under threat of death, 
bodily injury, starvation to herself or others, to submit to serial rape as 
‘comfort women’ or to be ‘temporary wives,’ providing both sexual and 
domestic services is, in the terms of article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery 
Convention, placing her in ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any 
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.’ It may 
also qualify as a condition of ‘serfdom’ under article 1(b) of the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery.”1164 
 
Referring to international rules,1165 this elaboration gives examples of how a woman might 
enter into slavery as well as of possible forms of coercion, of how powers attaching to the 
right of ownership might be exercised over her. Contrary to the Women’s Caucus’ later 
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 Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court’ (n 50) 615. 
1160
 Bartlett (n 120) 852-853. 
1161
 Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court’ (n 50) 608-609; Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 PrepCom’ (n 50). 
1162
 See Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 
PrepCom’ (n 50). 
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 ibid. 
1164
 ibid. 
1165
 Brunnée and Toope (n 138): The Women’s Caucus’ reliance on international rules to define slavery and 
enslavement can be interpreted to have been driven by the logic of practicality. The Caucus followed 
common sense in defining the crimes in accordance with existing definitions. 
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view that the term ‘coercion’ is preferable to ‘force’ as it more clearly includes less direct 
or threatening situations,1166 the elaboration only lists physical forms of coercion, most of 
them directed at the victim.  
 The Women’s Caucus’ elaboration on enslavement and slavery explicitly include 
forced marriage in times of armed conflict where women are abducted and made fighters’ 
wives. Under threat of death and bodily injury they are forced to provide sexual and 
domestic services to their forced husbands. According to the Caucus, this way, rights of 
ownership are exercised over forced wives. As forced wives are bound to live and work on 
land that belongs to their forced husbands or the fighting group, forced to serve their 
husband sexually and otherwise and are not free to change their situation, forced marriage 
could also qualify as a condition of serfdom.1167  
The Women’s Caucus proposed to include “all forms of enslavement, including 
sexual or domestic enslavement and forced marriage, by sale, deception, coercion or 
threat”1168 in the war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute that cover grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions. In contrast to the above elaboration on sexual slavery, this 
definition is gender-neutral. It simultaneously broadens and limits ways a person can be 
obtained by leaving out any reference to kidnapping but including sale and threat. 
Regarding the criminalisation of forced marriage under the ICC instruments, this change is 
rather unfortunate as most forced wives are abducted into forced marriage. Therefore, a 
direct reference to kidnapping in the definition of enslavement would have made the link 
between the crimes clearer. However, this is ensured by the direct inclusion of forced 
marriage into the definition of enslavement.  
 
Contrary to these efforts led by the Women’s Caucus, the Holy See1169 submitted a 
proposal deleting the reference to sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and enforced 
pregnancy from the list of sexualised crimes. It was replaced with a separate subsection 
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 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Priority Concerns Related to the Elements Annex’ (n 430). 
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 Rothschild (n 34): The Holy See exercised considerable influence in international negotiations like the 
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listing “enslavement or any other kind of involuntary servitude that emerges from the 
theatre of war or armed conflict”1170 as a war crime in international and internal conflicts. 
Eventually, the proposal was not adopted.1171 Nevertheless, it sparked a heated debate 
between delegates of the Holy See and Bosnia and Herzegovina1172 about the crime of 
forced pregnancy. The proposal also sparked questions regarding the difference between 
enslavement and sexual slavery. If sexual slavery would be a form of enslavement, the 
Holy See’s proposal would have reduced overlap.1173  
 
“[A]rguments in favour of retaining the separate listings of the crimes of 
enslavement and sexual slavery [stressed] that sexual slavery is a prevalent 
contemporary crime warranting express recognition, that the prohibition was 
sufficiently established in existing law, that listing the crime increases the 
gender-sensitivity of the Rome Statute, and that sexual slavery is conceptually 
distinct from certain other forms of enslavement or slavery-like practices”.1174 
 
Even though it becomes clear that the Holy See’s proposal was aimed at the crime 
of enforced pregnancy, at first glance, it could be viewed as being directed at the crime of 
sexual slavery. The retention of references to enslavement and involuntary servitude in the 
Holy See’s proposal, however, indicates that the proposal did not target sexual slavery and, 
by extension, forced marriage. This also becomes apparent when considering that medieval 
canonists already stressed the importance of mutual free consent to marriage for it to be 
valid. Based on this as well as on the Holy See’s role as a “[respected] international moral 
voice”,1175 it would have had an interest in criminalising forced marriage. Since the 
emphasis on free consent to marriage is based on an understanding that it is related to a 
person’s dignity, the Holy See might understand forced marriage to be a violation of 
someone’s dignity1176 and, by extension, an honour crime. In contrast to the critique voiced 
above in regard to the categorisation of rape as an outrage upon personal dignity, however, 
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the Holy See understood physical integrity, autonomy and self-determination to be based 
on someone’s dignity.1177 Following this, forced marriage as a violation of someone’s 
dignity would also be a violation of a person’s integrity and (sexual) autonomy. Focusing 
on the language of the Holy See’s proposal, it suggests a broader wording than the list of 
sexualised crimes which would still include forced marriage. In contrast to an 
understanding of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery, it does not focus on the 
crime’s sexual elements. However, by subsuming it under enslavement and involuntary 
servitude, exactly these sexual elements would be eclipsed. Just as it is misleading to 
emphasise the sexual elements of forced marriage, it is misleading to downplay them. 
Consequently, the Holy See’s proposal would not have contributed to a more informed 
understanding of the crime. 
 
Outlining the discussions regarding the crime of sexual slavery in the fifth 
PrepCom session shows that the Women’s Caucus explicitly mentioned forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict as a form of sexual slavery.1178 Therefore, forced marriage can be 
interpreted to be indirectly included in the Rome Statute. However, it was not discussed in 
any depth. The Caucus also did not consider forced marriage as a specific act of sexualised 
violence independent of sexual slavery.1179 Other questions such as the distinction 
between, and respective definition of, sexual slavery, enslavement, forced prostitution and 
human trafficking took priority over considerations of forced marriage and whether it 
indeed constitutes a form of sexual slavery.1180 
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7.3.2 The United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Rome Conference) 
 During plenary discussions in Rome, forced marriage was not mentioned. An 
article published in the fifth issue of Terra Viva, however, cites Conse A, who was 
abducted by the LRA, saying that “girls were forcefully married off to men who were 
cruel”.1181  
The crime of sexual slavery was introduced by the United Nations Children’s Fund 
and Ugandan delegate Mr Kirabokyamaria in relation to children. Regarding the conflicts 
in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, both actors referred to 
children facing “abduction, rape, enslavement”,1182 “mutilation, forced pregnancy [and] 
sexual slavery”,1183 all potential elements of a forced marriage in wartime. In an interview 
with Terra Viva, Eva Boenders, representative of the Children’s Caucus, emphasised that 
“child recruits may also be sexually abused and forced to live as sexual slaves to 
soldiers”.1184 During the discussions in the Committee of the Whole, Mr von Hebel of the 
Netherlands mentioned that a compromise text of crimes against humanity explicitly 
including sexual slavery received wide support.1185  
The official records of the Rome Conference show that the crime against humanity 
of enslavement was defined based on a proposal submitted by Italy1186 as “the exercise of 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
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children”.1187 In addition to being based on Article 1(1) of the Slavery Convention, this 
definition reflects the PrepCom debate regarding the overlapping circle of crimes and if it 
should be completed, linking the crimes of sexual slavery, enslavement and trafficking in 
persons.1188  
Some delegations at the Rome Conference were aware of academic proposals for 
the elements of sexual slavery.1189 M Cherif Bassiouni, for example, proposed the 
following elements for the crime of sexual bondage: “an institution or practice whereby a 
person is forcibly transferred or held for the purpose of performing any sexual conduct 
whatsoever, whether for reward or not.”1190 Even though Kelly Dawn Askin did not 
include the crime of sexual slavery in her proposed definitions of sexualised crimes, her 
definition of forced prostitution was considered helpful in the discussions of the crime of 
sexual slavery. Askin proposed the following elements for the crime of enforced 
prostitution: “(a) […] the accused unlawfully forced or coerced a certain named or 
described person to engage in sexual acts; and (b) As a result of the force or coercion, the 
person’s reproductive capacity was affected.”1191 
 
 
 
7.3.3 The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (PrepCom2) 
 Just as the PrepCom2 negotiations are crucial for an analysis of the process of 
defining war rape under the ICC instruments, they are of great importance when analysing 
the process of defining forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery as the PrepCom2 
negotiations dealt with the question of how to define crimes. This sets them apart from 
previous discussions in the PrepCom and Rome Conference that focused on the 
categorisation of crimes as acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. As 
in the second part of this chapter, the sections below cover the first five PrepCom2 sessions 
as the negotiations of the ICC Elements of Crime were completed in the fifth session. 
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7.3.3.1 First session, February 1999 
After the Rome Conference, the elements of the crime of sexual slavery, including 
some of the questions raised in the December 1997 PrepCom, were discussed at every 
session of the PrepCom2. 
 
The USA proposed the elements of the crime against humanity and war crime of 
sexual slavery to be 
 
“[t]hat the accused intended to attack one or more persons by causing them to 
engage in acts of a sexual nature. That the accused deprived one or more 
persons of their liberty. That the accused, through force or threat, caused the 
person or persons to engage in acts of a sexual nature”.1192 
 
A comment to the article states that ‘deprivation of liberty’ is to be understood broadly to 
include physical detention and confinement as well as severe deprivations of autonomy and 
freedom of movement.1193 This understanding resonates with the Women’s Caucus view 
regarding the element of force to include non-physical coercion.1194 The USA’s definition 
of sexual slavery could include forced marriage in times of armed conflict as in most cases 
women are forced to engage in sexual acts. While some forced wives are confined, 
deprivation of autonomy and freedom of movement are characteristics of their everyday 
life.  
Drawing on international normative structures in the form of statements of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like 
Practices during Armed Conflict and the indictment in the Foča case as precedents, the 
Women’s Caucus brought forward a different definition comparable to that of the crime of 
enslavement. Describing the act of enslavement rather than the status or condition of the 
victim,1195 the Caucus defined sexual slavery as “[t]he exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership or control when such exercise involves obtaining or 
                                                          
1192
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by the United States of America: Draft Elements of Crimes: Addendum’ 
(Crimes against Humanity) (n 1035) art 7(1)(g)(2)(1), art 7(1)(g)(2)(3); PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by 
the United States of America: Draft Elements of Crimes: Addendum’ (War Crimes) (n 1035) art 
8(2)(b)(xxii)(2), art 8(2)(e)(vi)(1)(2), art 8(2)(e)(vi)(1)(2)(3), art 8(2)(e)(vi)(1)(2)(4). 
1193
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by the United States of America: Draft Elements of Crimes: Addendum’ 
(Crimes against Humanity) (n 1035). 
1194
 Spees, ‘Women’s Advocacy in the Creation of the International Criminal Court’ (n 792) 1241. 
1195
 Hall, ‘Article 7 Crimes against Humanity para. 1 (c) Enslavement’ (n 541). 
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imposing sexual service and/or access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”1196 
Explicitly mentioning forced marriage, the Women’s Caucus elaborated that  
 
“[s]exual slavery can be institutionalized as with the ‘comfort women’ 
organized by the Japanese Army during World War II or the rape camps in the 
former Yugoslavia; or it can be carried out on a more individualized basis. 
Thus, forced temporary marriage has been recognized as a form of sexual 
slavery. Sexual slavery embraces situations, such as in Rwanda, where women 
may be kidnapped or may choose this condition as a means of survival; where 
women may be physically confined to the home, or ‘free’ to leave the situation 
albeit at the risk of being killed because she leaves the protected ‘marriage’ 
status. The same is true of situations where the military occupies a town and 
demands sexual service from women in their own home.”1197 
 
 
 
7.3.3.2 Second session, July/August 1999 
In the second PrepCom2 session, Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland1198 proposed 
a different set of elements for the war crime of sexual slavery that was based on ICRC 
research.1199 It was drafted to avoid the problem raised by the US proposal in regard to the 
term ‘attack’. Some delegations were concerned  
 
“that this word was inappropriate and could set an unnecessarily high 
threshold for the Prosecutor to meet. Delegates also had problems with the 
US’s comment on ‘deprived’ and ‘deprivation’, which, by using the term 
‘universally recognized as impermissible under international law’, could also 
wrongly set an unduly high threshold − one not normally seen (indeed, one 
expressly avoided) in international instruments.”1200 
 
Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland defined sexual slavery as “[t]he perpetrator treat[ing] 
a person as chattel by exercising any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence”.1201 
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The last subordinate clause is comparable to the definition of sexual slavery suggested by 
the Women’s Caucus in the previous PrepCom2 session. As illustrated before, forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict could come under this definition. Drawing on the 
international rules of the 1926 Slavery Convention and the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed 
Conflict, the same wording can also be found in the request from the governments of 
Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, Korea, South Africa and Switzerland regarding 
the text prepared by the ICRC on Article 8(2)(b), (c) and (e).1202 The ICRC explicitly 
quoted the Special Rapporteur, who understood “situations where women and girls are 
forced into ‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves 
forced sexual activity, including rape by their captors”1203 as examples of sexual slavery. 
Generally, the ICRC’s proposal introduced by Belgium and others is closer to the Rome 
Statute’s definition of enslavement.1204 The first element set out the concept of slavery 
while the second element described the sexual aspect of slavery.1205 However, many 
delegations felt that the reference to chattel was outdated, inappropriate and vague, linking 
the concept of sexual slavery to the ownership of saleable property and classic concepts of 
chattel slavery.1206 To overcome these criticisms, Colombia proposed to define sexual 
slavery as “[t]he agent exercises any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership of a person in order to carry out sexual acts of any kind.”1207 In contrast to the 
proposal by the Women’s Caucus1208 and the delegations of Costa Rica, Hungary and 
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Switzerland, the reference to “rape or other forms of sexual violence”1209 is eliminated 
here. This “makes it possible to include […] acts [of rape and other forms of sexualised 
violence as well as acts] […] in which there is alleged or apparent consent of the victim 
when faced with intimidation or resignation resulting from his or her condition of 
slavery.”1210 Mediating between state delegations, the Women’s Caucus developed a 
definition of sexual slavery that includes elements of the Costa Rican, Hungarian and 
Swiss definition as well as the definition proposed by Colombia. It covers situations where 
“[t]he perpetrator […] [exercised] any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”1211 
This way, it is consistent with the ICC’s definition of enslavement which emphasises the 
element of ownership. As illustrated in Chapter 5 and in the discussion above, all of the 
definitions referred to in this paragraph could include forced marriage in wartime. 
Resonating with a previous elaboration on the crime of slavery and enslavement by 
the Women’s Caucus,1212 the US suggested including an illustrative list of actions that 
qualify as the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership in the elements of the 
crime of sexual slavery. Similar to the USA’s insistence on attaching a document outlining 
the elements of crimes to the Rome Statute, this was motivated by the opinion that more 
precision was needed.1213 Establishing a direct link between the accused and the purchase 
or sale and including a reference to labour without compensation, the USA’s proposal was 
criticised for potentially excluding indirect perpetrators and situations of slavery with 
compensation.1214 Forced marriage in times of armed conflict, for example, is a crime 
where multiple perpetrators can play different roles including bringing, exposing and 
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accepting a woman for the purpose of forced marriage. The material support a forced wife 
receives from her forced husband could arguably be understood as a form of compensation. 
The outcome of the discussions of the elements of the crime of sexual slavery was a 
rolling text that eliminated the reference to chattel, kept the ICC’s definition of 
enslavement, included an open list of examples of how the right of ownership might be 
exercised and established a specific connection to the sexual aspect of slavery.1215 It states 
that 
 
“[t]he accused exercised a power attaching to the right of ownership over one 
or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty 
[and] [t]he accused caused such a person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature”.1216 
 
Other examples such as recruiting or abducting that would have been particularly relevant 
for the crime of forced marriage were not included because they were understood to define 
the means of obtaining a person and not to describe directly an exercise of ownership.1217 
Nevertheless, forced marriage in wartime could fall within this definition if ‘a similar 
deprivation of liberty’ is interpreted so as to include abduction, a forced exclusive sexual 
and non-sexual relationship, forced pregnancy, forced childbearing and upbringing, and 
forced labour. 
 The wording of the definition of sexual slavery included in the rolling text is very 
different from the various proposals previously submitted. The first subordinate clause was 
taken from the 1926 Slavery Convention. The second subordinate clause reflects the 
USA’s concerns regarding an illustrative list of how powers attaching to the right of 
ownership could be exercised. Of this list, only selling overlaps with a previous definition 
suggested by the Women’s Caucus.1218 Similarly to the Caucus’ definition, the one 
included in the rolling text includes pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary elements. The 
Women’s Caucus’ definition, however, focused on ways of obtaining a person while the 
definition in the rolling text gives examples of the exercise of powers attaching to the right 
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of ownership after a person has been obtained. The term ‘similar deprivation of liberty’ on 
the one hand resonates with the Foča indictment and the Women’s Caucus’ proposal to 
include physical and psychological forms of confinement.1219 On the other hand, it can be 
limiting as the discussion of the fourth PrepCom2 session below shows. The whole first 
element of the definition in the rolling text is the same as that of the crime of enslavement 
as defined in the ICC Elements of Crimes.1220 
 
 
 
7.3.3.3 Third session, November/December 1999 
The discussions of the November/December 1999 PrepCom2 session reviewed 
questions regarding the illustrative list of ways in which rights of ownership might be 
exercised; its inclusion, exclusion, scope and (commercial) focus.1221 Colombia, 
Switzerland, the US and the Women’s Caucus participated in these discussions and 
considered the Supplementary Slavery Convention and the Foča indictment.1222 
Eventually, this debate on the elements of the crime of sexual slavery was overtaken by the 
wider discussions on an overall compromise package on the elements of crimes against 
humanity1223 and the August 1999 rolling text remained unchanged.1224 
 Early in the December 1999 negotiations, the Arab block proposed that the 
elements of sexual slavery should stipulate that “[p]owers attaching to the right of 
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ownership do not include rights, duties and obligations incident to marriage between a man 
and a woman”.1225 The Arab block prioritised the protection of religious or cultural 
practices and traditions. As mentioned above, the reference to (patriarchal) cultural norms 
indicates an understanding of sexual slavery as a form of structural violence. The Arab 
block “feared that the law on crimes against humanity was too ambiguous and might be 
used by activist judges not simply to deal with atrocities but as a tool of ‘social 
engineering’”.1226 The Arab block was concerned that the elements might be drafted so 
wide as to criminalise certain domestic practices as crimes against humanity.1227 However, 
as crimes against humanity are intended to be universal and fall within Human Rights and 
International Criminal Law, most delegations could not accept such culturally specific 
exemptions and were concerned about setting a precedent that could have an adverse 
impact in the Human Rights field.1228 The inclusion of culturally specific exceptions, for 
example, might have led to the (discussion about the) inclusion of penalties recognised 
under Shari’a law such as the death penalty.1229 Since it would have also conflicted with 
values and norms regarding the separation of Church and State, a point was made by 
dissenting delegations that religious values should not shape the law.1230 Moreover, the 
inclusion of these exceptions might have appeared to be an international endorsement of 
such situations. Accepting the Arab block’s proposal would have resulted in approving acts 
that violate values and norms most delegations at the ICC negotiations shared. These 
delegations would not allow the Arab states’ proposal as it would permit people to do 
something immoral. Moreover, as a practical matter, the exceptions requested were hardly 
necessary. Although far from acceptable for some delegations, they would hardly qualify 
as a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. In a situation of 
widespread violence amounting to crimes against humanity, however, the blanket 
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exclusion of all family matters would result in impunity for crimes committed against 
family members.1231 The Women’s Caucus stressed that the proposal’s content 
discriminates against women by trying to exclude crimes which affect women 
disproportionately from the ICC’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the adoption of the Arab block’s 
proposal would violate International Law.1232 The Caucus drew on international norms in 
the form of the statements of the CEDAW and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, and referred to Article 4 of the DEVAW which affirms that “[s]tates should 
condemn violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination”.1233 Consequently, 
the Arab block’s proposal was dismissed. 
 
 
 
7.3.3.4 Fourth session, March 2000 
 The fourth PrepCom2 session continued to discuss questions regarding the 
illustrative list of ways in which rights of ownership might be exercised. Colombia 
proposed to explicitly include “transferring […] [and] trafficking” and to recognise the 
multiplicity of powers attaching to the right of ownership.1234 As mentioned above, the 
latter would be of relevance to the criminalisation of forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict. Human Rights Watch, in contrast, suggested to either delete the illustrative list 
completely or to expand it to include modern day slave-like practices like debt bondage 
and forced labour. Without mentioning forced marriage even though it had been 
recognised as a form of sexual slavery before,1235 the international NGO argued that the 
current list would work to limit the scope of the Rome Statute due to the terminology ‘such 
as’, generally interpreted as limiting the scope of the definition to conduct of a similar 
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nature to that specified in the list. In regard to the elements of sexual slavery, Human 
Rights Watch argued that deprivations of liberty would be restricted to deprivations of a 
similar nature to those set out in the list. Consequently, the common element to all of the 
examples would be a commercial exchange. Any further elaboration on the definition 
should be along the lines of powers of ownership that limit a person’s (sexual) 
autonomy.1236 In an article published in the ICC Monitor, the journal of the CICC, Fanny 
Fontaine, Jean Carmalt and Bruce Broomhall followed a Canadian proposal and suggested 
to clarify the issues arising around the list by adding to sexual slavery the same footnote as 
to enslavement. This clarified that forced labour, servile status and trafficking in persons 
fall within the scope of sexual slavery.1237 The footnote reads:  
 
“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, 
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile 
status. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes 
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.”1238 
 
Therefore, it would have also covered situations where “a tenant who is by law, custom or 
agreement bound to live and labour on land belonging to another person and to render 
some determinate service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to 
change his status”.1239 Forced labour is an element of most forced marriages in wartime 
and forced wives are reduced to a servile status, forced to live with their forced husbands, 
work for them and see to their forced husbands’ needs and wishes. However, the delegates 
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remained reluctant to change the current language of the elements of the crime of sexual 
slavery as a war crime.1240 
 
 
 
7.3.3.5 Fifth session, July 2000 
Contrary to the renewed advice of Human Rights Watch,1241 the final compromise 
for the elements of the crime of sexual slavery worked out in the fifth session of the 
PrepCom2 in July 2000 did not alter the list of examples. As suggested by Canada and the 
Women’s Caucus, a clarifying footnote was added which reads:  
 
“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, 
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile 
status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is 
also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking 
in persons, in particular women and children.”1242 
 
Agreement on this language was facilitated by referring to international rules in the form of 
the Supplementary Slavery Convention, by describing the limits of ‘servile status’ and by 
repeating parts of the definition of enslavement.1243 This “helped to ensure that the crime 
[…] include[s] slavery-like conditions such as […] forced marriage […] which do not 
require purchase or sale, etc”1244 and “would [also] amount to other inhumane treatment 
within the Court’s jurisdiction under paragraph 1(k) when [it] ‘intentionally cause[s] great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical health’, which would often occur 
in such cases”.1245 The Women’s Caucus’ suggestion to include the words “with or without 
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pecuniary benefit”1246 was not taken up. The Caucus also raised the point that the inclusion 
of a reference to trafficking would “not remedy the problematic restriction of slavery to 
commercial examples since trafficking involves a complex web of commercial 
transactions”.1247 A second footnote was added to the elements of sexual slavery, 
recognising that, “[g]iven the complex nature of this crime”, its commission “could involve 
more than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose”.1248 Attempts to 
illustrate variations, however, were rejected. It was argued that this result would be 
achieved by applying Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, covering different forms of 
participation in the commission of a crime as well as the commission of a crime jointly 
with or through another person.1249 As the finalised draft text of the Elements of Crimes 
shows, the definition of sexual slavery remained as agreed in the second PrepCom2 
session.1250 
 
 In summary, the final text of the elements of crimes of sexual slavery reflects three 
main areas of debate. First, rejecting references to attack or chattel, the exercise of any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership was adopted as a test for determining 
slavery. Second, as a compromise, an open, illustrative list of examples of the exercise of 
powers attaching to the right of ownership was adopted. Third, a footnote was added to 
expand the illustrative list. This resulted out of the concerns of many delegations that the 
wording in the illustrative list would lead to an interpretation that the exercise of powers 
attaching to the right of ownership required a commercial or pecuniary aspect. The 
footnote makes it clear that the illustrative list is to be read broadly and in line with 
International Law instruments such as the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention. It 
confirms that commercial or pecuniary exchange or advantage is not necessary to 
demonstrate that a person exercised powers attaching to the right of ownership.1251  
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7.3.4 Logics of interactions 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, actors’ identities, interests and actions are influenced by 
normative structures through different logics of interaction. In the ICC negotiations of 
forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery, actors’ identities, interests and actions were 
influenced mainly through the logic of consequences (instrumentalism), appropriateness 
(morality and ethics), practicality (practice), arguing (rational oppositional discourse) and 
purposive role playing.1252 Like in the negotiations of the ICC rape definition, the Arab 
block intervened in the discussions of the crime of sexual slavery, aiming to disconnect it 
from “rights, duties and obligations incident to marriage”.1253 This can be interpreted to 
have been driven by the logic of consequences. It was in the Arab block’s interest to 
protect their national laws, cultural norms and religious principles as well as its members’ 
sovereignty. The codification of sexual slavery in the Rome Statute can be interpreted to 
have been based on the logic of appropriateness, practicality and purposive role playing. It 
was stressed that “sexual slavery is a prevalent contemporary crime warranting express 
recognition, that the prohibition was sufficiently established in existing law [and] that 
listing the crime increases the gender-sensitivity of the Rome Statute”.1254 Therefore, the 
codification of sexual slavery was what social norms deemed right. In addition, delegates 
followed common sense and included sexual slavery in the Rome Statute based on its 
recognition under customary International Law. The Women’s Caucus was very outspoken 
on the issue, playing its role in ensuring that gender crimes were appropriately addressed. 
The different drafts of definitions of sexual slavery can be interpreted to have been based 
on the logic of arguing. After the Rome Conference, the elements of the crime of sexual 
slavery were discussed at every session of the PrepCom2. Especially questions regarding 
the illustrative list of ways in which the right of ownership might be exercised. Eventually, 
as a compromise, an open, illustrative list of examples of the exercise of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership was adopted. In short, the process and outcome of the 
ICC negotiations of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery can be explained by actors 
upholding national normative structures and their concerns regarding national sovereignty, 
                                                          
1252
 Brunnée and Toope (n 138) 7. 
1253
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates Concerning the 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity (09 December 1999)’ (n 66). 
1254
 Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court’ (n 50) 622-623. 
280 
norms that were deemed right, common sense, the roles actors played in treaty 
negotiations, and reasonable arguments. 
 
 
 
7.3.5 Conclusion on forced marriage 
 Retracing who the key actors were in the ICC negotiations of forced marriage 
(Research Question 1) showed that the ICRC as well as the Women’s Caucus were two 
international non-governmental delegations that drove the discussions. This confirms 
Hypothesis 1.1255 Regarding state delegations, the Arab block, Canada, Colombia, the Holy 
See and the US made relevant contributions. 
 Based on the Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict 
(Research Question 2),1256 the ICRC,1257 but first and foremost the Women’s Caucus,1258 
were the only delegations directly mentioning forced marriage. They understood it as a 
form of structural violence in the form of sexual slavery (Research Question 3).1259 This 
contradicts Hypothesis 6.1260 
 Taught by the Women’s Caucus, states included sexual slavery in the list of 
sexualised crimes as a crime against humanity and a war crime. This was a creative 
legislative exercise because sexual slavery had not constituted an international crime in its 
own right before the adoption of the Rome Statute and related international rules were not 
very precise. The Holy See1261 opposed the explicit inclusion of sexual slavery in the ICC 
statute but retained a reference to enslavement and involuntary servitude which would still 
have covered forced marriage in times of armed conflict. The Holy See’s understanding of 
the requirement for mutual free consent to marriage for a marriage to be valid further 
indicates that it would not oppose the criminalisation of forced marriage. Since the 
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 Hypothesis 1 reads: NGOs in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in the 
development of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage. 
1256
 Research Question 2 reads: What influenced the driving actors? 
1257
 PrepCom2 ‘Request from the Governments’ (n 1056). 
1258
 For example Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 
1997 PrepCom’ (n 50). 
1259
 Research Question 3 reads: What was the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
1260
 Hypothesis 6 reads: Structural causes of the perpetration of war rape and forced marriage were not 
addressed. 
1261
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by the Holy See’ (n 1170). 
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emphasis on free consent to marriage is based on an understanding that it is related to a 
person’s dignity, the Holy See might understand forced marriage to be a violation of 
someone’s dignity1262 and, by extension, an honour crime. This confirms Hypothesis 5.1263 
 Regarding the definition of sexual slavery (Research Question 3),1264 the Women’s 
Caucus proposed a wording based on Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention1265 
(Research Question 2),1266 sexual slavery was defined in terms of exercising powers 
attaching to the right of ownership. To distinguish sexual slavery from slavery, the 
definition also includes the performance of sexual acts. A similar wording was proposed by 
Belgium and others1267 as well as by Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland.1268 Like their 
definition of rape, their definition of sexual slavery was influenced by ICRC research on 
the state of the law on (sexual) slavery (Research Question 2).1269 Colombia proposed a 
similar definition.1270 The definitions referred to here only differed in the words used to 
describe the sexual elements of the crime. In addition, the Women’s Caucus initially 
introduced the explicit inclusion of ‘control’ in the definition. Costa Rica, Hungary and 
Switzerland added a reference to chattel. Neither wording was eventually adopted. The 
USA’s reference to deprivation of liberty was adopted1271 and so was its suggestion to 
include an illustrative list of actions that qualify as the exercise of rights attaching to the 
powers of ownership was taken up. In contrast to the USA’s focus on direct perpetrators, 
however, a footnote now stresses that the commission of sexual slavery could involve more 
than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose.1272 The inclusion and 
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wording of this as well as of footnote 181273 in the definition of sexual slavery was 
supported by the Women’s Caucus and Canada. This way, Colombia’s proposal1274 to 
include an explicit reference to trafficking was respected. 
 Opposing these developments, the Arab block submitted a proposal1275 that 
excludes marriage rights, duties and obligations from powers attaching to the right of 
ownership. As with rape, the Arab block founded its opposition on national laws, religious 
principles and cultural norms. Furthermore, the Arab block was motivated by fear that 
some of their traditional cultural and family norms could fall within the reach of crimes 
against humanity, as well as fear of social engineering (Research Question 2).1276 This 
speaks in favour of Hypotheses 21277 and 3.1278 
 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Building on the analysis of the ICC negotiations in general that was advanced in 
Chapter 6, Chapter 7 focused specifically on the negotiations of war rape and forced 
marriage in times of violent conflict. The aim of Chapter 7 was to analyse who the key 
actors were that drove the negotiations of the definitions of war rape and forced marriage 
(Research Question 1) and why they got involved in the ICC negotiations of these two 
crimes and what influenced their positions (Research Question 2). Another goal was to 
examine how these actors interpreted the crimes of war rape and forced marriage 
(Research Question 3).  
                                                          
1273
 Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 36) art 7(1)(g)(2): 
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Addressing Research Question 1,1279 the ICRC and especially the Women’s Caucus 
as non-state actors (confirming Hypothesis 1),1280 as well as the Arab block, Colombia and 
the US as state actors drove the ICC negotiations of the crimes of war rape and forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict.  
 
Regarding Research Question 2,1281 Chapter 7 confirmed Martha Finnemore’s and 
Peter Katzenstein’s theories that international as well as national norms and rules matter in 
international relations and law-making. The Arab block’s, Columbia’s and the US’ 
national normative structures had an impact on the ICC negotiations. Amongst the 
international normative structures that influenced the negotiations were the 1907 Hague 
and 1949 Geneva conventions, Protocol I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, the 
1926 Slavery Convention, and the ICTY and ICTR instruments and judgments in the 
Akayesu and Furundžija cases. In addition, the Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during 
Armed Conflict as well as the Vienna and Beijing conferences and Platforms for Action 
were referred to. However, due to the actors’ different mandates, common sources of 
information were interpreted and used differently.  
 
Addressing Research Question 3,1282 in the negotiations of the definition of both 
war rape and forced marriage, the Women’s Caucus taught its views to states. As a non-
state and therefore outside actor in international law-making, it presented problems and 
solutions to states. Rather than sticking to their initial proposals and including rape as 
constituting other crimes like an outrage upon personal dignity, states followed the Caucus 
and listed sexualised crimes in the Rome Statute as separate offenses as well as possibly 
constituting other crimes. This understanding avoids marginalising sexualised crimes and 
is in line with the prohibition of gender-based discrimination. The Women’s Caucus was 
also partly successful in teaching states to construct a definition of rape using the term 
‘invasion’ rather than ‘penetration’ as that would create a broader, more inclusive, gender-
neutral definition that highlights rape as an assault on a person’s integrity and autonomy 
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 Hypothesis 1 reads: NGOs in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in the 
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rather than honour and dignity. A rape definition using ‘invasion’ emphasises that rape is 
an act of violence and domination. Following the Women’s Caucus, Costa Rica advocated 
a rape definition using the term ‘invasion’. The ICRC was another crucial non-
governmental actor that influenced the definition of war rape. However, as the guardian of 
International Humanitarian Law, it had to take a more conservative stance. Based on ICRC 
research, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, Korea, South Africa and 
Switzerland suggested definitions using the term ‘penetration’. This was also advanced by 
the US. Considering the importance of consensus in the ICC negotiations, the final 
wording of the definition of rape was a compromise that included suggestions from both 
sides. Another example of a situation in which the Women’s Caucus taught its views to 
states is the move away from the initial understanding of rape as an outrage upon personal 
dignity and therefore a victim-centred honour crime, towards a focus on the perpetrator and 
an interpretation of rape as a form of structural violence that is rooted in patriarchy. A 
focus on the perpetrator is also achieved by constructing a broad coercion-based rather 
than consent-based definition. These views were adopted by the US.  
Regarding forced marriage, only the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC explicitly 
mentioned the crime in their discussions. Both understood it as a form of sexual slavery 
that was defined based on the 1926 Slavery Convention definition of slavery with an added 
sexual element. Here, again, Belgium and others, Colombia, Costa Rica together with 
Hungary and Switzerland, and the US submitted relevant proposals and Canada was also 
involved in the discussions. However, since the Caucus was the first actor to introduce the 
issue in the ICC negotiations, it can be said that it taught its views to states. 
The Women’s Caucus, however, did not always succeed in teaching its views to 
states. As the expression of ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ shows, its call not to 
construct a rape definition with cumbersome and unnecessarily specific wording was not 
followed. Indicating that the Caucus did not always follow its own advice, it suggested to 
include the words “with or without pecuniary benefit”1283 in the definition of sexual 
slavery. This, however, was not taken up. In general, the analysis of the development of the 
definition of rape and sexual slavery indicated that the Women’s Caucus succeeded more 
in teaching its views on rape than its views on sexual slavery to states. In the negotiations 
of the definition of sexual slavery, the (Supplementary) Slavery Convention, the report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
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 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary to the Elements Annex and 
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Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, and the Foča indictment appeared to have 
been more influential than the Caucus. Since the mere direct inclusion of sexual slavery 
already constituted a creative law-making exercise, delegates supposedly wanted to err on 
the side of caution in defining the crime so as not to jeopardise their gains and potentially 
even the whole ICC project. They had to keep in mind that every proposition that 
encountered significant opposition might have been the straw to break the camel’s 
back.1284 Therefore, they stayed away from more progressive definitions that could have 
explicitly included forced marriage in times of armed conflict and relied on established 
international rules like the (Supplementary) Slavery Convention in defining sexual slavery. 
A similar theory can be developed when taking into account that forced marriage was 
mentioned more often and directly in relation to the crime of enslavement and slavery, two 
established offenses. This solid ground offered scope for progressive elaborations and 
definitions that included forced marriage in times of armed conflict. 
 
Colombia, the ICRC, the US and the Women’s Caucus faced opposition from the 
Arab block. Falling back on national laws, religious principles and cultural norms 
(Research Question 2),1285 it introduced a proposal that would have made marital sexual 
intercourse consensual by definition. It also would have excluded marriage rights, duties 
and obligations from powers attaching to the right of ownership. The Arab block’s 
proposal arose out of concern that some of its traditional family and cultural norms could 
fall within the reach of crimes against humanity as well as out of concern about social 
engineering. This confirms Hypotheses 21286 and 3.1287 It also speaks in favour of Peter 
Katzenstein’s theory that national norms and rules matter in international relations. 
In addition to analysing who the main actors were in the ICC negotiations of war 
rape and forced marriage in times of armed conflict, what influenced them and how they 
defined the crimes, Hypotheses 51288 and 61289 focus on a broader view of rape and forced 
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marriage. The initial inclusion of war rape as an outrage upon personal dignity in the ILC 
draft statute as well as the Arab block’s national understanding of the crime that influenced 
its position in the ICC negotiations demonstrate that war rape was at least partly 
understood as an honour crime. This confirms Hypothesis 5. However, refuting Hypothesis 
6, the Women’s Caucus saw rape as a form of structural violence that is rooted in 
patriarchy. It advanced the same general understanding to sexual slavery and, by extension, 
forced marriage. The Holy See, in contrast, might have interpreted forced marriage as an 
honour crime as it is a violation of someone’s dignity. 
 
 
Comparing the process of defining war rape and forced marriage under the ICC 
instruments highlights that largely the same actors were involved in the negotiations of 
both crimes. Non-state actors, especially the Women’s Caucus, played a role in both the 
discussions of war rape and of forced marriage. Actors from states with strong patriarchal 
structures, where religion plays a leading role in legal and social matters, opposed 
development of progressive definitions of war rape and forced marriage. This indicates that 
actors in the ICC negotiations of both crimes were shaping, and being shaped by, national 
and international norms and rules. The compromise definition of war rape that all actors 
could agree on defines the crime as an ‘invasion resulting in penetration’. Forced marriage 
was understood as a form of sexual slavery and not defined as a crime in and of itself. 
Therefore, the actors in the ICC negotiations did not develop elements of the crime of 
forced marriage. Both war rape and forced marriage were understood as honour crimes by 
some actors who participated in the ICC negotiations, and as a form of structural violence 
by others. 
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8 The Women’s Caucus’ understanding of forced marriage 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapters 8 and 9 present a more detailed snapshot of a specific part of the ICC 
negotiations already mentioned in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 further analyses the Women’s 
Caucus’ understanding of the crime of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery 
(Research Question 3). Based on the recommendations and comments the Caucus 
submitted at different stages of the ICC negotiations, this chapter scrutinises the 
terminology the Women’s Caucus used and the examples it gave. Chapter 8 also examines 
the sources of information the Women’s Caucus referred to. Therefore, it studies how the 
Caucus as a specific NGO came to hold its views that it then taught to states, addressing 
Research Question 2.1290 Chapter 8 considers whether the Caucus incorrectly viewed 
forced marriage as a purely sexual crime or if the sexual elements of a forced marriage 
were exaggerated, potentially explaining the group’s understanding of the crime of forced 
marriage as a form of sexual slavery.  
 
Chapter 8 consists of three parts. Part 8.2 analyses how the Women’s Caucus defined 
forced marriage. Digging deeper, parts 8.3 and 8.4 examine why the Caucus defined forced 
marriage as a form of sexual slavery. Addressing this question, part 8.3 studies the 
examples of sexual slavery the Women’s Caucus referred to in written comments and 
recommendations to the ICC negotiations. These examples give information about how the 
Caucus understood sexual slavery, and forced marriage as a specific form of sexual 
slavery. They also indicate that the group’s understanding of these crimes was influenced 
by the Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, 
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict. This is elaborated on in 
part 8.4 of this chapter. 
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8.2 Forced marriage as a form of gender violence 
Echoed by Amnesty International,1291 the Women’s Caucus was the driving actor in 
raising questions regarding forced marriage in the PrepCom and PrepCom2 discussions. In 
the context of a discussion about the incorporation of the principle of non-discrimination, it 
defined forced marriage as a form of gender violence.1292  
The Caucus explicitly stated that gender violence includes acts of sexual and non-
sexual violence. Linking it to the crime of slavery, it noted that sexual gender violence 
serves “to signal male ownership over [women] as property”.1293 Both the definition of 
gender violence and sexual gender violence can be classified as male as they create and 
perpetuate an understanding of women as victims and men as perpetrators. Even though a 
clear reference was made to the non-sexual and sexual elements of the crime, “the 
enslavement of women through forced marriage or otherwise for domestic as well as 
sexual service”1294 was given as an example of a non-sexual act of gender violence.1295 
Forced marriage was listed together with acts of psychological and physical violence of a 
non-sexual nature as well as violent acts that are linked to a women’s sexuality, such as 
forced pregnancy and forced sterilisation. 
 
It becomes apparent that, in addition to bringing forward male definitions, the 
Women’s Caucus did not establish a sharp distinction between sexual and non-sexual 
gender violence. Nevertheless, it clearly recognised both elements of the crime of forced 
marriage which it defined as a form of enslavement and slavery. It becomes obvious that 
the Women’s Caucus did not misunderstand forced marriage as a purely sexual crime and 
categorised forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery as a result of this 
misunderstanding. The next part of this chapter analyses whether an overemphasis on the 
sexual elements could explain why the Caucus viewed forced marriage this way. 
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8.3 Examples of sexual slavery 
The following paragraphs analyse the examples of sexual slavery the Women’s 
Caucus gave in written comments and recommendations to the ICC negotiations. They 
illustrate the Caucus’ understanding of sexual slavery, and of forced marriage as a specific 
form of sexual slavery. As the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, 
Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict referred to the same 
examples in her Final Report, it can be assumed that the Women’s Caucus’ understanding 
of sexual slavery and forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery was influenced by the 
Final Report. The examples below discuss experiences of women in World War Two 
Japan, Yugoslav rape camps, the Rwandan genocide and the conflicts in Myanmar 
(Burma), Liberia and Uganda. Comparisons to forced marriage as it is understood for the 
purpose of this thesis are established.1296 Furthermore, the focus of the Women’s Caucus’ 
inquiry is scrutinised. It becomes apparent that the Caucus recognised the sexual and non-
sexual elements of forced marriage but emphasised the former. This could explain the 
groups’ understanding of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. 
 
 
In the context of recommending the mainstreaming of issues of sexualised violence, 
the Women’s Caucus developed a definition of slavery and enslavement1297 that clearly 
recognises the sexual and non-sexual elements of the crime as well as of forced marriage. 
Nevertheless, enslavement is understood as gendered because it exploits women’s and 
men’s traditional gender roles.1298 This can also be seen from the examples the Women’s 
Caucus gave of situations of sexual slavery. They establish women as victims, perpetuating 
male stereotypes. 
 
Quoting the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences and also referring to international norms in the form of the Final Report of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, the Women’s Caucus defined the situation 
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of the comfort women as institutionalised sexual slavery.1299 During the Second World 
War, comfort women were forced to provide sexual services for members of the Japanese 
armed forces. This way, the Japanese Army wanted to reduce the number of rapes that 
occurred in occupied communities, aiming not to antagonise the local population even 
more. The enslavement of women also intended to decrease threats of espionage and 
potential leaks about military tactics and operations. Additionally, institutional scrutiny and 
outrage, as occurred after the fall of Nanking, was to be avoided. Built into this motivation 
was the male understanding that soldiers need to have sex to keep fighting. Their 
continuing ability to fight was also to be ensured by minimising sexually transmitted 
diseases amongst the troops through providing the opportunity to have intercourse with 
comfort women who underwent medical checks rather than with local women who did 
not.1300 In addition to the recruitment of ‘willing’ women who already worked as 
prostitutes, women were recruited by means of deception, purchase, force, coercion and/or 
abduction.1301 At first glance, rules and regulations for comfort women and their users 
seem to show concern for the women’s correct treatment.  
 
“The prohibition of alcohol and swords, the regulation of hours of service, 
reasonable payment and other attempts to impose what would appear to be a 
sense of decorum or fair treatment [, however,] are in stark contrast with the 
brutality and cruelty of the practice. This only serves to highlight the 
extraordinary inhumanity of a system of military sexual slavery”.1302 
 
Comfort women had to endure sexual subjugation and mutilation, forced sterilisation, 
multiple rapes, severe physical abuse and acts of torture as well as malnutrition and poor 
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living conditions. In addition to often being exposed to front-line threats, comfort women 
lived under constant fear of further abuse, of being killed, catching sexually transmitted 
diseases and becoming pregnant. Some were never allowed to leave the camp, others were 
allowed to take walks at set times and others again were allowed to go on trips. Either way, 
however, their freedom of movement as well as their personal freedom was restricted.1303  
Parallels can be drawn between the situation of the comfort women and forced 
wives and the kinds of abuses both groups were subjected to. Both had to endure sexual 
subjugation, rapes, physical abuse and torture. Both lived in constant fear. Some comfort 
women were allowed to leave the camp. Forced wives were allowed to move freely to 
complete their tasks. A difference between the situation of the comfort women and forced 
wives is that the reality of forced wives – as the Women’s Caucus recognised – included 
providing sexual and domestic services exclusively to their forced husbands. Comfort 
women, in contrast, had to sexually serve many men but had no domestic tasks.1304 
Therefore, by referring to these examples of different kinds of sexual and non-sexual 
gender violence in conjunction, the Women’s Caucus created the impression that the crime 
of forced marriage would predominately be a sexual crime. This could explain why the 
Caucus understood forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. 
 
Making this misleading emphasis on the sexual elements of gender violence even 
more obvious, the Women’s Caucus gave the rape camps in the former Yugoslavia as 
another example of institutionalised sexual slavery.1305 During the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the creation of rape camps was one hallmark of the terror against 
the civilian population aimed at humiliating them and instilling fear. In the rape camps, 
women were detained, tortured and brutalised repeatedly by many different assailants over 
long periods of time. Sometimes women were forcefully taken from a larger rape camp 
such as Partizan Sports Hall, brought to a particular soldier’s home and brutalised there, 
only to be returned to the camp to suffer more sexualised violence. A survivor, Mirsada, 
remembered sexual as well as non-sexual elements of the crimes committed against her 
that can be compared to the tasks of a forced wife.  
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“The White Eagles would come to get us every night. They would bring us 
back in the morning. There were nights when more than 20 of them came. That 
seemed to be some kind of honor. They did all kinds of things to us. It cannot 
be described, and I don’t want to remember. We had to cook for them, and 
serve them, naked. They raped and slaughtered some girls right in front of us. 
Those who resisted had their breasts cut.”1306 
 
However again the focus clearly lies on the sexual elements and even non-sexual 
components like cooking and serving her captors are sexualised through the fact that 
Mirsada had to carry out these tasks naked.1307  
 
In addition to establishing a link between the crime of forced marriage in times of 
armed conflict, the situation of the comfort women, and the rape camps established during 
the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Women’s Caucus also linked forced marriage to 
women’s experiences of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Explicitly using the language of 
marriage, the Women’s Caucus categorised “the practice of taking women as ‘temporary 
wives’ or […] forced ‘temporary marriage’”1308 as sexual and gendered enslavement,1309 
but also as individualised sexual slavery.1310  
The emphasis on the temporary nature of forced marriage stands in contrast to 
African Rights’ definition of the crime. The non-governmental organisation distinguished 
forced marriage from sexual slavery based on the period of time intended to spend together 
rather than on the dominance of sexual or non-sexual elements. African Rights stressed 
that “the behaviour of these men [made clear that] they […] intended to keep the women 
indefinitely.”1311 This understanding was supported by stories forced wives told about their 
forced husbands who obtained Hutu identification cards for them and made preparations to 
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flee together.1312 Human Rights Watch also found that in some cases, forced wives stayed 
with their forced husbands for socio-economic reasons after the genocide.1313  
Comparable to the findings of African Rights1314 and Human Rights Watch1315 as 
well as the understanding of forced marriage in times of armed conflict advanced in this 
thesis, the Women’s Caucus described experiences of Rwandan women who were 
separated from their families, kidnapped, bought and sold, allocated, or chose to become a 
concubine or to submit themselves to conditions of sexual slavery and forced marriage as a 
means of survival.1316 Connected to looting sprees, women were seen as spoils of genocide 
that beautifully completed men’s victory. In contrast, forcing women into marriage with 
undesired men served as a means of humiliation. Some forced wives were physically 
confined to the home. Some were free to leave only at the risk of being killed because they 
left the protected marriage status, emphasising their complete dependency on their forced 
husbands.1317 Vestine, a survivor, remembered that she had “limited freedom to move 
around, to pick food, cook for [herself] and even to work in the fields.”1318 Here, in 
addition to the dominant account of the sexual elements, the non-sexual elements of the 
crime of forced marriage become apparent.  
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Emphasising the sexual elements of forced marriage, in the Rwandan context, the 
notion of marriage was clearly linked to the crime of rape. Human Rights Watch’s report 
focuses on the rape of women during the Rwandan genocide. In this framework, it 
discusses forced marriage as a form of individualised sexual slavery.1319 In women’s 
testimonies collected by African Rights, the terms ‘being taken’ and ‘being married’ both 
appear to refer to rape. Survivor Catherine told the story of how she was discovered when 
hiding in a field. One of her captors, Patrice, announced that he would “take [her]”. The 
other men became angry and argued that she “should […] be enjoyed by all of them”. 
Patrice replied that she “would be killed by being ‘married’ to all of them”.1320 During the 
Rwandan genocide, promises of marriage were also used as a justification for rapes. Two 
other survivors, Thérèse and Christine, told how two brothers who offered to hide them in 
their homes took advantage of the situation and “raped [them], saying that they would 
marry [them] when the fighting finished.”1321 Awareness existed that these forced 
marriages were not ‘real’ marriages. Most women quoted in the report referred to their 
forced husband as their “abductor[s]”1322 rather than their husbands. Vestine was the only 
woman quoted, stating that she and her forced husband “began living as man and wife” and 
who referred to herself as the “wife” and to the man as her “husband”.1323 Reflecting the 
ethnic component of the Rwandan genocide, it has to be noted that amongst the Hutu 
community, forced inter-marriages were not accepted. While forced wives were a status 
symbol for male fighters in Sierra Leone and Uganda, Hutu men had to bribe others into 
silence about their relationships and were seen as Tutsi accomplices. They were ordered to 
hand over their Tutsi wives to be killed. However, when men kept women as sex slaves 
without marrying them, they also had to face criticism and the stigma of being impotent 
because they did not marry the women.1324  
 
The Women’s Caucus’ comments and recommendations in the ICC negotiations 
also refer to the experience of women in Burma, which are very different from that of 
forced wives in, for example, Rwanda but also from the experiences of women in Sierra 
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Leone and Uganda. In Burma, sexualised violence is used by the military regime to quell 
opposition and to maintain its power.1325 Blurring the line between rape and forced 
marriage as in Rwanda, some evidence indicates that “soldiers use rape to coerce women 
into marriage and to impregnate them so they will bear ‘Burman’ babies, known as a 
campaign of ‘Burmanization.’”1326 Burmese soldiers, married or unmarried, are promised 
certain rewards if they married women from certain ethnic groups. They are encouraged to 
leave their “blood […] in the village”.1327 Similar to the situation in Uganda, many acts of 
sexualised violence occur in conjunction with other Human Rights abuses such as forced 
relocation, forced labour, slavery and torture. Comparable to the fate of the comfort 
women in Japan, women in Burma are forcibly conscripted by the military into situations 
of sexual slavery.1328 Even though the sexual elements of gender violence are stressed 
again, a Burmese survivor recalled sexual and non-sexual violations she was subjected to 
when she was kept as a porter:  
 
“I was kept as a porter in October. They said it would only be for four days, but 
they kept me for one month and four days. … At night I couldn’t sleep because 
I often saw guards come and take the youngest girls away. … Two times I had 
to carry separately from the rest of the group, and ended up alone in the forest 
with the soldiers at night. Both times the soldiers came to me and beat me, 
showed me their guns to keep me quiet, and then raped me.”1329 
 
 
Similarly, during the civil war in Liberia, women were abducted, raped, forced into 
survival sex or exploited as sex slaves.1330 Comparable to accounts of forced marriage from 
Burma, the Women’s Caucus in its comments and recommendations in the ICC 
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negotiations stated that Liberian militias forced women into forced labour, including 
washing, cooking and looting as well as into sexual slavery and forced marriage as a way 
of rewarding soldiers.1331  
 
In addition to the situation of the comfort women, the rape camps in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwandan, Burmese and Liberian women’s experiences of forced marriage, 
the Women’s Caucus also referred to the situation in Uganda where “rebels […] abduct 
children and use them as forced labourers, child soldiers and sexual slaves [and] [g]irls 
[…] are given to commanders as ‘wives’”.1332 In addition to indicating that a forced 
marriage consists of sexual and non-sexual elements, here the Women’s Caucus recognised 
the interconnection with the recruitment of child soldiers, potentially breaking with 
traditional understandings of women’s gender roles as wives, housewives and mothers.  
 
This account of Liberian and Ugandan women’s experiences is very similar to the 
understanding of forced marriage advanced in this thesis. The Women’s Caucus’ examples 
of Liberia and Uganda highlight that forced marriage includes acts of sexual and non-
sexual gender violence. This contradicts the Caucus’ understanding of forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery as it places a focus on the sexual elements of the crime. 
 
 
As mentioned above, the Women’s Caucus’ examples of the Japanese comfort 
women and the rape camps in the former Yugoslavia place a misleading, male emphasis on 
the sexual elements of gender violence. In contrast, the examples the Caucus gave of 
Rwandan, Burmese, Liberian and Ugandan women’s experiences of forced marriage show 
that the crime consists of sexual and non-sexual elements. Nonetheless, the Women’s 
Caucus placed an emphasis on the former. This could explain why the group saw forced 
marriage as a form of sexual slavery. However, the question arises whether the Women’s 
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Caucus was not taken aback by the incompatibility of the non-sexual elements of forced 
marriage with the crime of sexual slavery. 
 
 
According to an affiliate of the Women’s Caucus and members of the CICC, it was 
not. Instead, the Women’s Caucus discussed forced marriage only in the context of sexual 
violence, as a form of sexual slavery, as this was the way forced marriage was understood 
by the international community at the time of the ICC negotiations.1333 Therefore, the 
crime was not discussed in depth and other issues like the relationship between the crimes 
of trafficking and sexual slavery as well as between sexual slavery, enslavement and forced 
prostitution took precedence.1334 The Caucus “simply believed that, in fact, forced 
marriage is sexual slavery [and] what matters as a crime [are] sexual aspects that make it 
the crime of sexual slavery”.1335 This, however, neglects the non-sexual elements of a 
forced marriage that are not captured in the categorisation of the conduct as a form of 
sexual slavery. Based on the view quoted above, both the crime of sexual slavery and 
forced marriage were “strengthened”;1336 sexual slavery by including forced marriage, and 
forced marriage by being “clearly”1337 included in sexual slavery because through this, it 
was identified as a serious crime.1338 
Contrary to this, another member of the CICC stated that women’s advocates 
would have liked forced marriage to be listed as a separate crime in the ICC instruments. 
However, if the sacredness of the institution of marriage is stressed and if forced marriage 
is constructed as a social issue, subsuming forced marriage under sexual slavery arguably 
constituted a compromise that satisfied concerns of more conservative states.1339 
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8.4 Sources of information 
In contrast to the limited discussions of forced marriage in the ICC negotiations, the 
sources of information referred to, the terms used and examples cited in the writings of the 
Women’s Caucus1340 paint a more complex picture of the conduct. The Caucus’ awareness 
of the crime of forced marriage appears to have been based especially on the Final Report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, Gay J McDougall, conveying international 
norms.1341  
Since McDougall’s Final Report precedes the relevant recommendations and 
comments raised by the Women’s Caucus in the ICC negotiations, it can be supposed that 
the latter adopted the terminology used by the former in regard to “forced, temporary 
marriage”.1342  
The Special Rapporteur’s Final Report explicitly states that “[o]ne significant 
impetus for the […] decision to commission this study was the increasing international 
recognition of the true scope and character of the harms perpetrated against the [comfort 
women in Japan] during the Second World War.”1343 In addition, like the documents 
prepared by the Women’s Caucus, the Final Report refers to the rape camps established in 
the 1990s during the war in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the situation of women who 
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were subjected to sexualised war violence, including forced marriage, in Rwanda, Burma, 
Liberia and Uganda.1344 By listing them together, the report connects sexual slavery, the 
establishment of rape camps, (gang) rape, forced marriage, forced labour, sexual mutilation 
and torture.1345 Supported by the statement that “[s]exual slavery also encompasses 
situations where women and girls are forced into ‘marriage’, domestic servitude or other 
forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual activity”,1346 the connections 
established indicate that McDougall recognised the sexual as well as non-sexual elements 
of the crime of forced marriage. She even went so far as to state that “[t]he link between 
rape and slavery […] is not accidental; many cases of sexual violence committed during 
armed conflict are most appropriately prosecutable as slavery.”1347 She stressed that 
(sexual) slavery constitutes a crime regardless of whether it was committed by public or 
private actors and that, furthermore, a pecuniary element is not necessary. Either way, the 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership leads to limitations on autonomy, 
freedom of movement and sexual self-determination. Following the understanding brought 
forward in the indictment in the Foča case discussed in Chapters 4, McDougall clarified 
that sexual slavery extends to situations where a woman is technically free to leave but is 
prevented from doing so by the coercive circumstances she finds herself in. McDougall 
made clear that “[t]he term ‘sexual’ is used […] as an adjective to describe a form of 
slavery, not to denote a separate crime.”1348 It “denotes the result of this particular crime 
[…]: limitations on one’s autonomy, freedom of movement and power to decide matters 
relating to one’s sexual activity.”1349 She elaborated that “[i]n all respects and in all 
circumstances, sexual slavery is slavery and its prohibition is a jus cogens norm in 
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customary International Law.”1350 To establish this, McDougall referred to the judgment of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Co., Limited1351 as precedent. Here, the ICJ stated that erga omnes 
“obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, […] from the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination.” Erga omnes obligations “[pertain] to the legal 
implications arising out of a certain crime’s characterization as jus cogens.”1352 
Consequently, by stating that the protection from slavery gives rise to erga omnes 
obligations, the ICJ determined that slavery is a jus cogens crime. As such, the prohibition 
of slavery represents the top of the international legal hierarchy. It protects the most 
essential interests of the international community as a whole.1353 As a jus cogens norm, the 
prohibition of slavery does not allow for any derogation.1354 States have a duty to prosecute 
and extradite. These obligations apply universally and states have universal jurisdiction. 
Statutes of limitations, immunities and the defence of superior orders are not applicable.1355  
 McDougall stressed that 
 
“modern prohibitions against slavery allow for pure universal jurisdiction over 
any State or non-State actor in any case involving slavery or the slave trade. 
This status may be particularly useful in prosecuting individual cases of sexual 
slavery committed during armed conflict, as the prosecution in such a case need 
not establish the existence of State involvement or acquiescence, [the extent to 
which the laws or practices of any State may have sanctioned the act,] the 
existence of a widespread or systematic pattern of abuse, or any nexus between 
the crime and an armed conflict.”1356 
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Therefore, “[t]he international crime of slavery, including sexual slavery, is a particularly 
important and useful basis for addressing egregious acts of violence committed against 
women in armed conflict”.1357 
 
Against this background, it can be argued that, in addition to founding their 
awareness of the crime of forced marriage on the Final Report and in addition to adopting 
its examples and terminology, the Women’s Caucus might also have adopted the strategy 
suggested by McDougall regarding the criminalisation of forced marriage. Rather than 
being founded on a misunderstanding of the crime or a misevaluation of the dominance of 
its sexual or non-sexual elements, the understanding of forced marriage as a form of 
(sexual) slavery appears to have been a strategic decision. Comparable to discussions about 
the criminalisation of rape as torture,1358 defining forced marriage as the jus cogens crime 
of slavery emphasises the seriousness of the conduct, increases the chances of prosecution 
and supersedes the principle of national sovereignty.1359 The latter would be of particular 
relevance considering the Arab block’s concerns regarding the criminalisation and 
definition of sexualised crimes. 
Therefore, based on the writings of the Women’s Caucus rather than on accounts of 
the ICC negotiations, the Caucus’ understanding of the crime of forced marriage as a form 
of sexual slavery can be understood as an attempt to keep slavery alive as a subject by 
adapting the name and definition to make room for new insights and perspectives 
generated by new contexts. Making use of the historical background of the struggle for the 
abolition of slavery, it then becomes a well-established label that signifies something that 
everybody opposes and no one would openly defend; something that is obviously wrong. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, this labelling, however, cannot be considered a fair and 
objective description of the situation in which victims of forced marriage find themselves. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 introduced the Women’s Caucus’ understanding of forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery. Based on this, Chapter 8 analysed the examples, terminology and 
sources of information the Caucus used in relation to forced marriage. Through this 
analysis, a deeper understanding of the Women’s Caucus’ interpretation of the conduct 
was gained. 
 
The categorisation of sexual slavery and, by extension, forced marriage as a form 
of gender violence that can include acts of sexual and non-sexual violence demonstrates 
that the Caucus did not see forced marriage as a purely sexual crime. However, the 
examples used in relation to forced marriage show that the Caucus overemphasised the 
sexual elements of the crime. Like the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, the Women’s Caucus mentioned forced marriage in 
the same breath as the situation of the comfort women during the Second World War in 
Japan. Even though parallels can be drawn between the two, the crucial difference is that 
forced wives have to provide sexual and domestic services exclusively to their forced 
husbands while comfort women had to sexually serve many men. The situation of the 
comfort women was mentioned as an example of institutionalised sexual slavery, and so 
were the rape camps established during the war in the former Yugoslavia. Here, the 
misleading emphasis on the sexual elements of gender violence becomes even more 
obvious as even non-sexual components such as cooking and serving the captors were 
sexualised through the fact that they had to be carried out naked. In addition to the comfort 
women and the rape camps in the former Yugoslavia, the Women’s Caucus also referred to 
Rwandan, Burmese, Liberian and Ugandan women’s experiences of forced marriage. 
These examples show that forced marriage consists of sexual and non-sexual elements. 
However, especially with the Rwandan and Burmese example, an emphasis was placed on 
the sexual ones. During the Rwandan genocide and in Burma, ‘marriage’ was used as a 
euphemism for rape. In Rwanda, promises of marriage were used as a justification for rape. 
In Burma, rape is used to coerce women into marriage. The examples of forced marriage in 
Liberia and Uganda, in contrast, balance the relevance of the sexual and non-sexual 
elements of forced marriage. 
In addition to the examples referred to, the Women’s Caucus’ terminology of 
‘forced temporary marriage’ is comparable to that brought forward in the Final Report of 
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the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict. 
Since the examples and terminology used by the Women’s Caucus’ appear to be 
largely based on the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, it could be assumed that the 
Caucus also might have adopted the strategy for the criminalisation of forced marriage 
suggested by the Special Rapporteur. As such, the categorisation of forced marriage as a 
particular form of the jus cogens norm of slavery appears to have been a strategic decision 
that highlights the seriousness of the crime and facilitates prosecution. 
This, however, stands in contrast to how the international community saw forced 
marriage at the time of the ICC negotiations. Forced marriage was simply seen as a sexual 
crime and what mattered were its sexual elements that made it the crime of sexual slavery. 
Participants of the ICC negotiations claimed that the Women’s Caucus adopted this view.  
Against the background of the international community’s stand, few better 
alternatives than subsuming forced marriage under sexual slavery would have been likely 
to have emerged from the ICC negotiations. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the mandate 
of the conference which restricted the creation of new crimes as well as the dynamics of 
the negotiations did not make a bigger step possible. The inclusion of the crime of sexual 
slavery in the ICC instruments is an important codification of a crime previously 
recognised under customary law but not yet mentioned in an international legal 
instrument.1360 Forced marriage, in contrast, was less visible as a crime under International 
Law and therefore was not recognised as a crime in its own right. Additionally, the drafters 
wanted to avoid repetition and undue overlap.1361 Since the difference between forced 
marriage and sexual slavery was not highly theorised, the former could have fallen victim 
to the resulting process of specification. Therefore, increased theorisation of forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict is important to ensure sensitive interpretations of the 
crime by the ICC.1362 It also can be argued that the drafters resorted to the use of 
constructive ambiguity by defining forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. This way, 
they left open opportunities for a positive and precedent-setting approach as taken by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
 
                                                          
1360
 Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court’ (n 50) 623. 
1361
 Interview 19 (n 483); Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court’ (n 50) 623. 
1362
 Valerie Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?’[2005] Harvard Human Rights Journal 55, 58. 
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9 The Arab block’s proposal 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9 presents another, more detailed, snapshot of a specific part of the ICC 
negotiations already mentioned in Chapter 7. It explores the Arab block’s1363 concerns 
regarding the definitions of rape and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity. From its 
proposals discussed in Chapter 7 it becomes clear that it aimed to protect religious 
principles, cultural norms and national laws.1364 Chapter 9 addresses Research Questions 
21365 and 31366 by exploring which religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national 
laws exactly the Arab block might have wanted to protect.  
After establishing that marital rape is not criminalised under the Arab block’s 
national laws, the chapter analyses the ideal of obedient wives and the understanding of 
rape as an honour crime as two possible reasons for this. Linked to religious principles, 
socio-cultural norms and national laws related to the ideal of obedient wives are 
discussions about societal structure and cohesion, social engineering, external impositions 
of legal reform processes and negotiations of women’s rights and sexualised violence as 
proxy debates for governments’ broader geopolitical and economic concerns. Linked to 
religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws related to the understanding of 
rape as an honour crime are discussions about mediation and Shari’a courts as ways to 
address sexualised violence, social engineering, external impositions of legal reform 
processes and rape-marriage policies. After focusing on the crime of rape, Chapter 9 then 
turns to the Arab block’s concerns regarding the ICC definition of sexual slavery. It argues 
that the Arab block was aware that certain marriage rights, duties and obligations might be 
interpreted to be an exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership and therefore the 
Arab block sought to exclude them from the ICC definition of sexual slavery. Marriage 
rights, duties and obligations that are explored in this context are the accepted language of 
                                                          
1363
 Interview 1 (n 730); Interview 14 (n 750): According to other states’ delegates, the Arab block was led by 
Syria and Qatar. As mainly oil producing states, the states constituting the Arab block had the means to 
invest in the ICC negotiations. Therefore, they were more organised than other states that might have held 
opinions contrary to that of the majority of delegations at the ICC negotiations. Consequently, the Arab block 
could make its voice heard. 
1364
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates Concerning the 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity (09 December 1999)’ (n 66). 
1365
 Research Question 2 reads: What influenced the driving actors? 
1366
 Research Question 3 reads: What was the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
305 
a marriage offer, understandings of dowry and maintenance, irregular and temporary 
marriages and the ideal of obedient wives. Comparisons between these and forced 
marriages in times of armed conflict are established. As it becomes apparent that the Arab 
block’s proposal did not target the indirect criminalisation of forced marriage as a form of 
sexual slavery under the ICC instruments, part 9.3 also analyses religious principles, socio-
cultural norms and national laws that supported this step. Before concluding, Chapter 9 
historically contextualises the Arab block’s opposition in the ICC negotiations by drawing 
parallels to the Beijing Conference. 
 
 
 
9.2 “Nothing in [the elements of the crime of rape] shall affect natural and legal marital 
sexual relations in accordance with religious principles or cultural norms in different 
national laws.”1367 
Even though the Arab block criminalised rape in general, only Article 279 of the 
Qatari Penal Code explicitly recognises “the relative, the guardian, the caretaker or the 
servant” as perpetrators of rape, and imposes a harsher sentence on them than on other 
rapists.1368 In Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United 
Arab Emirates, in contrast, there is no law covering marital rape. In fact, only marital 
sexual intercourse is considered lawful.1369 The non-criminalisation of marital rape could 
explain why the Arab block submitted a proposal to the same effect under International 
Criminal Law.1370  
                                                          
1367
 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates Concerning the 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity (09 December 1999)’ (n 66) art 7(1)(g)(1)(4). 
1368
 Qatari Penal Code (n 20). 
1369
 Bahrain Penal Code (n 20) art 339, art 344-348; The Criminal Act of 1991 (Sudan) (n 20) art 149(2); 
Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 (n 20); The Libyan Penal Code (n 20); Omani Penal Code (n 20); Khalaf (n 20) 6; 
Freedom House, ‘Syria’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010) 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Syria.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014; Wael B 
Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 133; U.S. Department of 
State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: Saudi Arabia’ (n 20); 
U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: 
United Arab Emirates’ (2010) <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136082.htm> accessed 01 April 
2014. 
1370
 Interview 12 (n 743). 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences and/or practicality. Based on their national laws, it might have been in its interest to make 
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9.2.1 Obedient wives 
The non-criminalisation of marital rape under the Arab block’s national laws is in 
line with the ideal that “a woman must always be obedient [and sexually available] to her 
husband, an Islamic legal principle”1371 “initially taken from a 19th century European 
model”.1372 Accordingly, “the husband […] has more extensive rights [in regards to marital 
sexual relations] than his wife”.1373 Husbands’ more extensive rights, authority and power 
on the one hand can be understood as legal discrimination against wives supported by 
religious and socio-cultural values and norms. The result is wives’ subordination which 
can include being obedient and in a servile status to their husbands. On the other hand, it is 
argued that hierarchies are a necessary element of any group structure to ensure cohesion 
rather than an indicator of men’s superiority. The need for clearly identified and 
differentiated gender roles is justified by the wish to enhance the success, growth, strength 
and stability of the family1374 and, by extension, of society, for “a family is [the nucleus of 
Islamic society,1375] the prototype of the nation”.1376  
Attempts to alter the distinct gender roles within the family structure that are 
required by religious and socio-cultural values and norms could therefore be perceived not 
only as legal reform, but as social engineering and coercion to alter religious practices and 
beliefs on which Islamic identity is based.1377  
                                                                                                                                                                                
marital sexual intercourse consensual by definition. The Arab block might also have acted based on what it 
perceived to be common sense grounded in its national laws. 
1371
 Doumato (n 75) 12. 
1372
 Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (n 1369) 121. 
1373
 Wael B Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge University Press 2009) 278-279; 
See also Ahmed Shukri, Muhammedan Law of Marriage and Divorce (Colombia University Press 1917) 21. 
1374
 Mashood A Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 90; 
John E Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse University Press 1982) 15; Jamal J Nasir, The 
Status of Women Under Islamic Law and Under Modern Islamic Legislation (Graham and Trotman 1990) 3. 
1375
 Abdur Rahman I Doi, Women in Shari’ah (Islamic Law) (2nd edn, Ta-Ha Publishers 1989) 32; See also 
ICESCR (n 99) art 10(1) which states that “the family […] is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society”. 
1376
 Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (n 1369) 120. 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences in protecting the ideal of obedient wives. Protecting unequal gender relations might have been 
in the Arab block’s interest as it arguably enhances the success, growth, strength and stability of the family 
and society. 
1377
 Baderin (n 1374) 133-138. 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences in protecting unequal gender relations within the family. It might have been in its interest to 
protect its collective identity. 
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 The Arab block’s dissent from developments in International Criminal Law 
regarding sexualised crimes can also be understood as resistance towards the external 
imposition of a legal reform process that should have been initiated by national 
governments, limiting the ways through which states can exercise power in the domestic 
sphere. Making governments appear out of control, this could give rise to opposition.1378 
This indicates that negotiations of women’s rights or sexualised violence are rarely 
solely about sexuality, sexual agency and gender but  
 
“serve as proxy debates for governments’ broader geopolitical and economic 
concerns. In many instances, strong language related to gender and women’s 
experience is negotiated and traded off as a result of bilateral and multilateral 
security and terrorism alliances, foreign aid relations, global debt imbalances, 
and the legacies of colonialism, war, conflict and political/economic transition. 
Governments may support or oppose sexuality-related positions because they 
are being pressured by donor countries, because of regional and political 
allegiances or aspirations, or, in fact, to demonstrate that they can operate free 
of these political pressures.”1379  
 
This also affects the space for advocacy and how organisations set their priorities, 
measure their goals and develop ideas to counter political realities and risks.1380 
Nevertheless, many women’s rights advocates see the articulation of women’s rights 
within the international sphere “not only as a goal in itself, but as potentially affecting 
national level policies in ways that support their political agendas.”1381 Therefore, their aim 
is social engineering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1378
 Interview 3 (n 726); Interview 18 (n 5). 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences in opposing a more progressive rape definition as this would have imposed a legal reform 
process on the Arab block that should have been initiated by national governments. It might have been in the 
Arab block’s interest to prevent governments to appear pushed about to avoid opposition. 
1379
 Rothschild (n 34) 107. 
1380
 Rothschild (n 34) 16. 
1381
 Rothschild (n 34) 108. 
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9.2.2 Honour 
The non-criminalisation of marital rape is also in line with the Arab block’s 
patriarchal understanding of rape as an honour crime.1382 Article 21(1)(f) of the Iraqi Penal 
Code, for example, establishes rape as a “dishonourable offence”.1383 The Omani Penal 
Code mentions rape under “Crimes Prejudicial to Honour and Public Morals”.1384 
Similarly, the Libyan Penal Code lists rape under “Offences against Freedom, Honour and 
Morals”.1385 The Qatari Penal Code includes rape in “Chapter 4 Adultery and Crimes of 
Honour”.1386 Both the non-criminalisation of marital rape and the understanding of rape as 
an honour crime reflect and reinforce the trivialisation of rape which could explain how it 
is addressed legally. 
 Like other honour crimes, sexualised violence is considered a private matter often 
dealt with through mediation between the people concerned and interested, such as the 
perpetrator and survivor, as well as their families, rather than in court.1387 Therefore 
dispute resolution depends on decisions made by the family, or by religious or tribal 
authorities often resulting in judgments detrimental to women.1388 A similar outcome is to 
                                                          
1382
 Bahrain Penal Code (n 20) art 344, art 346; The Criminal Act of 1991 (Sudan) (n 20) art 149(1); Iraqi 
Penal Code No. 111 (n 20) art 21(1)(f), art 393(1); The Libyan Penal Code (n 20) art 407; Omani Penal Code 
(n 20) art 218(1); Qatari Penal Code (n 20) art 279; Centre on Law and Globalization (n 428); Khalaf (n 20) 
6; United Nations Commission on Human Rights ‘Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict’ (n 3) para 24; U.S. 
Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: Saudi 
Arabia’ (n 20); U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human 
Rights Report: Syria’ (n 20). 
For a more nuanced discussion of the Arab block’s national rape definitions see section 4.2.7. For further 
elaboration on the understanding of rape as an honour crime see section 4.2.1. 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
appropriateness. It might have followed what social norms deemed right, in this example the understanding 
of rape as an honour crime. 
1383
 Iraqi Penal Code No 111 (n 20) chapter three, section 1. 
1384
 Omani Penal Code (n 20) title v. 
1385
 The Libyan Penal Code (n 20) book III, title III. 
1386
 Qatari Penal Code (n 20). 
1387
 Bahrain Penal Code (n 20) art 339, art 344-348; The Criminal Act of 1991 (Sudan) (n 20) art 149(2); 
Iraqi Penal Code No 111 (n 20); The Libyan Penal Code (n 20); Omani Penal Code (n 20); Freedom House, 
‘Syria’ (n 1369) 2; Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (n 1369) 133; Khalaf (n 20) 6; U.S. Department of 
State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: Saudi Arabia’ (n 20); 
U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2009 Human Rights Report: 
United Arab Emirates’ (n 1369). 
1388
 Dunya Ahmed Abdulla Ahmed, ‘Bahrain’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), Women’s Rights in the 
Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2010) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Bahrain.pdf> accessed 17 March 
2014; Huda Ahmed, ‘Iraq’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), Women’s Rights in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010) 6, 12, 14 
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be expected when cases of sexualised violence are dealt with in Shari’a courts.1389 These 
patriarchal all-male religious courts arbitrarily decide related matters on a case-by-case 
basis. Drawing on Islamic sources, judges who are often conservative religious scholars 
with little or no formal legal training use their own discretion to interpret Islamic legal 
texts.1390 They accord to the law’s effects a character of sanctity.1391 Consequently, even if 
a dispute comes before a court, the court has to apply the law which, in the examples of the 
Arab block, is based on patriarchal religious principles1392 which translate themselves into 
patriarchal court systems and socio-cultural norms that, again, feed back into law-making 
processes.  
Since sexualised violence is often dealt with outside domestic courts, the Arab 
block supposedly would not want them to come before an international court. This would 
drag sexualised violence from the private into the public sphere. As a public matter, 
sexualised violence would be addressed by different actors. These may recognise 
                                                                                                                                                                                
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Iraq.pdf> accessed 18 March 2014; 
Doumato (n 75). 
1389
 Ahmed, ‘Bahrain’ (n 1388) 2, 4, 8; Bahrain Center for Human Rights, ‘Family Law in Bahrain’ (10 
February 2014) 7 
<http://www.bahrainrights.org/sites/default/files/BCHR%20Report%20on%20Family%20Law%20in%20Ba
hrain.pdf> accessed 17 March 2014. 
1390
 Ahmed, ‘Bahrain’ (n 1388); See also Doumato (n 75): Civil, commercial and criminal matters as well as 
family-related matters of non-Muslims are dealt with by civil law courts. 
1391
 Ahmed, ‘Bahrain’ (n 1388) 2, 4, 8; Bahrain Center for Human Rights (n 1389) 7. 
1392
 Constitution of the State of Bahrain (26 May 1973) 
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Bahrain.pdf> accessed 17 March 2014; Khalaf (n 20) 4; See also 
The Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (1998) art 4 
<http://www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%
20THE%20SUDAN%201998.pdf> accessed 28 March2014; Constitution of Saudi Arabia (1992) art 1 
<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sa00000_.html> accessed 28 March 2014; The Constitution of the State of 
Kuwait (1962) art 2 <http://www.crsk.edu.kw/Photo/dastor.pdf> accessed 21 March 2014; Constitution of 
Syria (1964) art 3(2) 
<http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/syrianarabrep/syria_constitution.htm> accessed 28 
March 2014; Constitution of the United Arab Emirates (1996) art 7 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48eca8132.pdf> accessed 28 March 2014; Iraqi Constitution (2005) art 2 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/iq/iq004en.pdf> accessed 18 March 2014; Oman’s Constitution 
of 1996 with Amendments through 2011 art 2 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011.pdf> accessed 21 March 2014; Permanent 
Constitution of the State of Qatar (2003) art 1 
<http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/asw/quatar/qatar_constitution.doc> accessed 21 March 
2014: In the Arab block, religious principles are the basis for national laws including personal status laws 
which include marriage laws. This becomes clear when considering that in most of these states’ consititutions 
– with Lebanon being an exception – “Islamic Sharia (Islamic Law) [is recognised as] ‘a main source’ of 
legislation”. In Lebanon, international treaties take precedence over national laws. 
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sexualised violence as a wrong, resulting in law reform that could be perceived again as a 
form of social engineering and unwanted interference in national matters.1393 
One outcome of the mediation that follows instances of extra-marital sexual 
violence is the marriage between the rapist and the rape survivor. According to Bahraini, 
Iraqi, Lebanese, Libyan, Sudanese and Syrian law1394 as well as socio-cultural norms, the 
rapist would save the survivor’s honour through marrying her as a social redress.1395 In 
Bahrain, the husband may later divorce his wife and consequently not only avoid 
punishment for rape but also his conjugal responsibilities such as financially supporting his 
wife and providing housing for her.1396 Effectively sentencing the rape survivor to at least 
three years of marriage to her rapist, Article 398 of the Iraqi Penal Code establishes that  
 
“[l]egal proceedings will resume or the sentence will be reinstated, according 
to the circumstances if such marriage ends in divorce brought about by the 
husband without legal justification or in a divorce ordered by the court for 
wrongs committed by the husband or for his bad behavior within 3 years 
following the cessation of the proceedings. The public prosecutor, the accused, 
the victim or any person who has an interest in the proceedings may, according 
to the circumstances, make application for the proceedings, investigation, 
procedures or execution of the sentence to be stopped or for their resumption or 
for the reinstatement of the sentence.”1397 
 
 Rape-marriage policies highlight a male, victim-centred and collective 
understanding of rape. It is the survivor’s honour – and by extension the honour of her 
family – that needs to be saved rather than the perpetrator’s breach of the law that needs to 
be prosecuted.  
 
                                                          
1393
 Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences. It might have been in its interest not to address sexualised violence in international courts as 
this would have resulted in domestic law reform. 
1394
 Bahrain Penal Code (n 20) art 353; Interview 14 (n 750); Iraqi Penal Code No 111 (n 20) art; Khalaf (n 
20) 6; Freedom House, ‘Syria’ (n 1369) 12; Alison Pargeter, ‘Libya’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), 
Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers 2010) 13 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Libya.pdf> 
accessed 21 March 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Social Institutions and 
Gender Index: Sudan’ (2012) <http://genderindex.org/country/sudan> accessed 28 March 2014. 
Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
practicality and appropriateness. It might have followed what it considered to be common sense grounded in 
national laws and/or what social norms deemed right.  
1395
 Pargeter (n 1394) 13. 
1396
 Bahrain Center for Human Rights (n 1389).  
1397
 Iraqi Penal Code No 111 (n 20). 
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 The discussion in part 9.2 showed that marital rape is not criminalised under 
national laws in the states constituting the Arab block. This could explain the group’s 
proposal to make marital sexual intercourse consensual by definition in the ICC 
instruments. Digging deeper, it became apparent that the national non-criminalisation of 
marital rape is connected to religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws 
related to the ideal of obedient wives and understandings of rape as an honour crime. The 
ideal of obedient wives creates distinct gender roles. Attempts to alter these could be seen 
as social engineering and an imposition of a legal reform process. Therefore, these 
attempts could be quashed. Furthermore, they are quashed by geopolitical and economic 
concerns. Questions of honour are considered private and therefore are rarely dealt with in 
court. A court case would increase publicity and convey importance to an issue. This might 
lead to demand for reform which might again be perceived as attempts of social 
engineering and unwelcome interference in national matters. Rape-marriage policies, 
instead, are an easy and quiet solution to re-establish a woman’s honour and that of her 
family. 
 
 
 
9.3 “Powers attaching to the right of ownership do not include rights, duties and 
obligations incident to marriage between a man and a woman”1398 
 The following paragraphs address the Arab block’s concerns regarding the ICC 
definition of sexual slavery. They first analyse the accepted language of a marriage offer as 
well as understandings of payments of dowry and maintenance before they examine 
irregular and temporary marriages as marriage rights, duties and obligations that might be 
interpreted to be an exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership and therefore 
amount to sexual slavery. In a third step, the ideal of obedient wives recurs, this time in the 
context of the Arab block’s concerns regarding the ICC definition of sexual slavery rather 
than rape. Comparisons are established to forced marriages in times of armed conflict. 
While the first three sections of part 9.3 explore marriage rights, duties and obligations in 
the states constituting the Arab block that bear resemblance to situations of sexual slavery 
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 PrepCom2 ‘Proposal Submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates Concerning the 
Elements of Crimes against Humanity (09 December 1999)’ (n 66). 
312 
and forced marriage in times of armed conflict,1399 section 9.3.4 discusses religious 
principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws of the Arab block that support the 
indirect criminalisation of forced marriage under the ICC instruments. 
 
 
 
9.3.1 The language of marriage offers, and understandings of dowry and maintenance 
payments 
The language of a marriage offer and understandings of payments of dowry and 
maintenance are rights, duties and obligations related to marriage that might be comparable 
to forced marriage and/or interpreted to be an exercise of powers attaching to the right of 
ownership and therefore amounting to sexual slavery.  
The payment of dower by the groom to the bride rather than her marriage guardian 
can be understood as an action making her a party to the marriage contract. Based on this, 
the marriage contract cannot be considered a sale.1400 In contrast, the language of the offer 
of marriage shows that marriage is conceived at least by some schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence as a property transaction. Terms such as ‘gifting’, ‘selling’ and ‘surrendering 
ownership’ are accepted, invoking concepts of ownership and slavery.1401 The definition of 
dower as “an exchange for the vulva”1402 makes this even more graphic. It is this 
ownership by the husband of the wife’s vulva that makes sexual intercourse lawful. 
Following on from this, the payment of maintenance ensures the husband’s exclusive use 
of his wife’s vulva.1403 The use of the wife’s vulva with or without the wife’s consent 
could explain the Arab block’s proposal to disconnect marital sexual intercourse from the 
crime of rape. The payment of maintenance can also be understood as an exchange or 
compensation for the husband’s right to confine his wife to the house for his sexual 
gratification. This understanding verges closely on what constitutes the crime of sexual 
slavery. Moreover, it can be compared to situations of forced marriage in times of armed 
                                                          
1399
 Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
appropriateness in the sense that it did what social norms deemed rights. 
1400
 Esposito (n 1374) 24. 
1401
 Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (n 1373) 273-274; Shukri (n 1373) 43-44: Others 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence adopt a more literal and formal approach and argue that marriage is an act 
through which two people are brought, fitted and paired together based on mutual suitability. 
1402
 Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh University Press 1997) 174 
1403
 Imber (n 1402) 183. 
313 
conflict where attaching the label ‘wife’ to a woman indicates her belonging to her forced 
husband and assures his exclusive sexual access for which he in turn supports the woman 
materially.  
 
 
 
9.3.2 Irregular and temporary marriages 
 To prevent extra-marital sexual relations, irregular marriages1404 are recognised as 
situations of quasi-ownership of the vulva.1405 Here, the wife has the right to payments of 
dower, but not to maintenance. Therefore, even though the husband owns her vulva, he has 
no right to exclusive use. The same holds true in temporary marriages.1406 In both 
situations, but especially in temporary marriages, it can be asked whether the payment of 
dower is more of a purchase price rather than a gift made by a man to his bride. Also, it 
could be argued that, without receiving maintenance, without mutual rights of inheritance, 
without rights to support if the wife becomes pregnant and without any divorce rights, the 
wife is in a vulnerable position that can easily be exploited by her husband.  
 A forced marriage in times of armed conflict can be understood as irregular due to 
the lack of involvement of a marriage guardian, official witnesses and proper offer and 
acceptance. In regard to the dissolution of irregular and forced marriages, in neither 
situation does the woman have extensive protection. Since forced marriages are formed 
informally, there are no formal divorce proceedings. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind 
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 Doi, Women in Shari’ah (Islamic Law) (n 1375) 46-53; Esposito (n 1374) 13-19; Hallaq, An Introduction 
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and even afterwards, the rights of the spouses are limited. The wife has the right to payments of dower, but 
not of maintenance. There are no mutual rights of inheritance. To dissolve the marriage, a single verbal 
declaration of divorce by one of the partners is sufficient. 
1405
 Imber (n 1402) 174-175, 189; Shukri (n 1373) 21. 
1406
 Ahmed, ‘Iraq’ (n 1388) 10, 12-13; Nasir (n 1374) 16-17: A temporary marriage allows an unmarried 
woman to marry a man, whether already married or not, for a certain period of time in exchange for money. 
These temporary marriages leave the woman without protection as only the man has the right to dissolve the 
marriage, unless there was a prior agreement between them. Additionally, the woman has no right to support 
if she becomes pregnant. While Shiite clerics who encourage the practice argue that it prevents adultery and 
helps widows and poor women, critics see it as a form of prostitution. Understanding the aim of marriage to 
be the founding of a family, Sunni jurists agree that a marriage contract must not include or imply any time 
limit. Therefore, they do not consider temporary marriages to be proper marriages because they do not, as 
said above, establish maintenance and inheritance rights. 
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that a split from her forced husband may be socio-economically detrimental to the forced 
wife as it is likely that she is excluded from her family and community and may have no 
other means of support. Since forced marriage in times of armed conflict can be seen as a 
form of irregular, it would be lawful according to norms of the Arab block. By 
disconnecting marriage rights, duties and obligations, including irregular marriages, from 
sexual slavery, forced marriage as a form of irregular marriage would not be criminalised 
under International Law either. It has to be noted, however, that irregular marriages differ 
from forced marriages in regard to payment of dower. While in irregular marriages, the 
woman has the right to payments of dower, but not of maintenance, it is the other way 
round in forced marriages. Women are abducted and given in marriage to a fighter in 
exchange for his services to a fighting group. The woman does not receive anything from 
the man in ‘exchange for her vulva’. In marriage, however, she is materially supported by 
the forced husband. 
Comparing forced marriage to temporary marriage, the man holds the exclusive 
power to dissolve the marriage in both situations. Highlighting differences, the label of 
marriage attached to forced marriages in situations of armed conflict and temporary 
marriages serves different purposes. In the case of the latter, in conformity with religious, 
socio-cultural and legal norms and rules, it makes sexual intercourse lawful. The fact that 
the woman does not have any rights to support if she becomes pregnant shows that these 
unions are not aimed at serving any reproductive purpose, but pure sexual gratification. In 
the case of forced marriages, the label ‘wife’ attached to an abductee manipulates the 
woman into loyalty towards her forced husband and the fighting group. As it does not only 
legitimise sexual intercourse but also implies non-sexual exploitation, it has broader 
implications than in temporary marriages. The fact that a woman’s status and her position 
within the family and the fighting group increases after she gave birth as well as the 
acknowledgement of paternity from the forced husband reveals that reproduction rather 
than pure sexual gratification which could be achieved through rape is an important 
element in forced marriages. In addition to marriage and parenthood, forced marriages 
enable forced husbands to fulfil the masculine ideal of providing for, and protecting, their 
family. 
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9.3.3 Obedient wives 
 The ideal of obedient wives discussed above in relation to the Arab block’s 
proposal on the ICC definition of rape may also have been one of the religious principles, 
socio-cultural norms and national laws the Arab block wanted to protect by disconnecting 
marriage rights, duties and obligations from the ICC definition of sexual slavery as an 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.1407 
 Contrary to the principles of Islam and the understanding that one should serve God 
alone1408 as well as to national prohibitions of slavery,1409 the ideal of obedient wives is 
linked to a view of women as men’s property, overlooking considerations of autonomy. 
This could be interpreted to result in a state of ownership or servitude. Consequently, the 
ideal of obedient wives could be considered a breach of national prohibitions of slavery.  
 The ideal of obedient wives also resonates with situations of forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict. Forced wives have to be submissive to the authority of their forced 
husbands. Forced wives have to serve their forced husbands sexually and otherwise. 
Disobedience is severely punished. 
 
 
 So far, Part 9.3 has shown that the language of marriage offers as well as 
understandings of dowry and maintenance were national normative structures that the Arab 
block might have wanted to protect by proposing to disconnect marriage rights, duties and 
obligations from the crime of sexual slavery as they can be linked to the notion of 
ownership and therefore constitute the first element of the crime of sexual slavery. The 
same holds true for irregular and temporary marriages. In both instances, the payment of 
dowry could be seen as purchasing ownership of the woman’s vulva. When considering 
that temporary marriages do not create any rights for the woman and that temporary 
                                                          
1407
 Brunnée and Toope (n 138): This indicates that the Arab block might have been driven by the logic of 
consequences. It might have been in its interest to disconnect marriage relations from powers attaching to the 
right of ownership to protect domestic marriage rights, duties and obligations. 
1408
 Ahmed, ‘Bahrain’ (n 1388) 11; Baderin (n 1374) 87. 
1409
 The Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (n 1392) art 20; Constitution of the United Arab Emirates 
(n 1392) art 34(2); Iraqi Constitution (n 1392) art 37(3); The Libyan Penal Code (n 20) art 425; Qatari Penal 
Code (n 20) art 321; Haya al-Mughni, ‘Kuwait’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), Women’s Rights in the 
Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
2010) 10 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Kuwait.pdf> accessed 21 March 
2014; Rafiah al-Talei, ‘Oman’ in Julia Breslin and Sanja Kelly (eds), Women’s Rights in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance (Freedom House/ Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2010) 8 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Oman.pdf> accessed 21 March 2014; 
Doumato (n 75) 11; Freedom House, ‘Syria’ (n 1369) 10. 
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marriages are comparable to prostitution, the link to sexual slavery becomes even more 
obvious. The ideal of obedient wives also puts women in a servile statutes to man. 
Therefore, it could be seen as amounting to sexual slavery. 
 In addition to demonstrating that irregular marriages, the ideal of obedient wives 
and understandings of maintenance can amount to an exercise of powers attaching to the 
right of ownership, a link can be established to forced marriage in times of armed conflict. 
Forced marriages are formed without any formality such as the presence of witnesses. 
Forced wives have to obey their forced husband. They are expected to have an exclusive 
relationship and receive material support.  
 
 
 
9.3.4 Religious principles, cultural norms and national laws that support the 
criminalisation of forced marriage in times of armed conflict 
 Even though the Arab block’s proposal invokes issues related to marriage and 
parallels can be drawn between certain rights, duties and obligations related to marriage in 
the states constituting the Arab block and forced marriage in times of armed conflict, the 
Arab block’s proposal did not target the indirect criminalisation of forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict under the ICC. While the meanings of the payment of maintenance, 
irregular marriages, and the male ideal of obedient wives can be interpreted to include 
elements of forced marriage and therefore may give rise to opposition towards its 
international criminalisation, other religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national 
laws also support this step.  
According to the laws of the Arab block, a woman may not be forced into marriage 
and must always agree with the final decision to bring the marriage contract into effect.1410 
Coercion constitutes a ground for seeking annulment of marriage in a court.1411  
 If a woman’s absence of consent to marriage is understood to make the marriage 
bad in its foundation, forced marriages in times of armed conflict would be void.1412 
                                                          
1410
 al-Mughni (n 1409) 8, 10. 
1411
 The Great Green Charter of Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era (1988) art 21 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/57641/65910/F702695289/LBY57641.PDF> accessed 21 
March 2014; Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (n 1373) 275. 
1412
 Doi, Women in Shari’ah (Islamic Law) (n 1375) 46-53; Esposito (n 1374) 18-19; Shukri (n 1373) 51-52: 
Void marriages are completely bad in their foundation for example because the partners are blood relatives, 
related by affinity or by fosterage as well as because of illicit sexual impropriety or religious differences. 
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However, if the spouses are unaware that their marriage is void, their sexual relationship is 
not classified as adultery. Based on socio-cultural norms, it would be considered as a 
quasi-marriage. However, since it is unrealistic to argue that a forced wife and her forced 
husband were not aware of the women’s absence of consent to marriage, forced marriage 
in times of armed conflict would not fall under the category of a quasi-marriage. 
In line with the potential understanding of forced marriages as void, Article 411 of 
the Libyan Penal Code explicitly criminalises “Abduction with Intention of Marriage”. The 
provision states that “[w]hoever abducts an unmarried woman or detains her by force, 
threats, or deceit, with the intention of marrying her, shall be punished”.1413 Broadening the 
group of potential targets and acts, Article 412 further determines that “[w]hoever abducts 
a person, or detains a person by force, threats, or deceit, for the purpose of the commission 
of indecent acts, shall be punished”.1414 A similar provision exists in the Omani Penal 
Code.1415 Article 296 of the Qatari Penal Code penalises “[b]ringing, exposing or accepting 
a male or a female in the purpose of sexual exploitation.”1416  
Even though only Article 411 of the Libyan Penal Code explicitly connects the 
crime of abduction and confinement to marriage, forced marriage as committed in armed 
conflicts could also fall under the other provisions outlined. Without a doubt, the crime 
includes sexual exploitation where different perpetrators can play different roles including 
bringing, exposing and accepting a woman for that purpose as determined in the Qatari 
Penal Code. The commission of indecent acts as referred to in the Libyan and Omani penal 
codes is more ambivalent. If forced marriage is seen as void because of the woman’s 
absence of consent and if extra-marital sex is seen as an indecent act because it violates 
religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws, the sexual elements of forced 
marriage would be an indecent act. Since women are abducted and detained for the 
purpose of forced marriage and since one of the purposes of forced marriage is sexual 
exploitation, it could be argued that forced marriage in times of armed conflict would fall 
under Article 412 of the Libyan Penal Code and Article 218(2) of the Omani Penal Code. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Void marriages do not award any rights or obligations to the spouses. They are null and void and therefore 
considered not to exist. 
1413
 The Libyan Penal Code (n 20). 
1414
 The Libyan Penal Code (n 20). 
1415
 Omani Penal Code (n 20) art 218(2). 
1416
 Qatari Penal Code (n 20). 
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9.4 Contextualising the Arab block’s opposition to the development of women’s rights 
 It has to be mentioned that the Arab block’s opposition analysed in this chapter was 
not new. Striking parallels can be drawn between Cynthia Rothschild’s analysis of the 
opposition raised at the Beijing Conference and against its Platform for Action1417 and the 
ICC negotiations. At both occasions, Arab and Sub-Saharan countries as well as a Catholic 
alliance led by the Holy See and supported by Latin American countries portrayed 
women’s rights advocacy and activism as a threat to country, community and family. 
Supporting the development of women’s rights was viewed through a national and regional 
lens as officially approving sexual perversion including extra-marital sex. In Beijing, New 
York and Rome, opponents of the development of women’s rights used rhetoric combining 
nationalism, traditionalism, moral absolutism and intolerance. National norms and rules 
were used as a defence against critique. They enabled states to position themselves as 
representing the uniting voice of the people in projecting a national (patriarchal) identity. 
Nationalism was used to defend the ideal identity of a state. In the name of divine moral 
values, local prejudices were endorsed by religion.1418 “Conservative Muslim movements 
and authorities call[ed] for Western respect for tradition, as if there is a monolithic truth to 
that tradition”.1419 Those who were constructed as threatening national identity and 
independence were simultaneously constructed as foreign,1420 as the ‘other’. The “very 
postulation of an international order, in which universal and binding promises assume 
precedence over particularity and sovereignty, [was a potential affront to] the forces of 
nationalism.”1421 On this base, opponents raised questions regarding the (im)possibility of 
translating terms like ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender’, stated their incomprehension of 
those terms and concepts, and invoked the defence of human dignity. Misinformation 
about the meaning of such terms fuelled fears raised by the development of women’s 
rights. Syria for example feared that women would stop bearing children if they had 
equality.1422 As Rothschild demonstrated in regard to the Beijing Platform for Action and 
as was shown in this chapter using the example of the discussions of the crime of sexual 
                                                          
1417
 Rothschild (n 34); See also Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’ (n 1362). 
1418
 Rothschild (n 34). 
1419
 Rothschild (n 34) 16. 
1420
 Rothschild (n 34). 
1421
 Rothschild (n 34) 44. 
1422
 Rothschild (n 34). 
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slavery in the ICC negotiations, opponents brought up domestic norms and rules as a tool 
to close down discussions of women’s rights. In trying to erase ideas, they facilitated their 
construction. Links were invoked and simultaneously, their existence was denied as if this 
would change the facts.1423 Using the ICC negotiations of the elements of sexual slavery as 
an example, the Arab block’s proposal establishes a connection between sexual slavery and 
marital rights, duties and obligation. At the same time, however, the Arab block denied this 
connection by stating that powers attaching to the right of ownership exclude marital 
rights, duties and obligation. This, however, does not change the fact that some marital 
rights, duties and obligations could amount to powers attaching to the right of ownership 
and therefore to slavery. By aiming to explicitly exclude marriage rights, duties and 
obligations from the crime of sexual slavery and therefore connecting, and at the same time 
disconnecting, domestic marriage practices and the crime of sexual slavery, women’s 
rights were rendered both a “persistently forbidden subject, and a sensational and 
omnipresent threat”.1424 The urgency with which women’s rights were circumscribed in the 
Beijing and ICC negotiations highlighted their potential power and use as a source of 
strength.1425  
 
 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 9 explored the Arab block’s concerns regarding the definitions of rape and 
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity that it voiced in a proposal submitted in the third 
PrepCom2 session in December 1999. Confirming Hypothesis 31426 and Peter 
Katzenstein’s theory that national norms and rules shape international actors, their interests 
and actions, the Arab block’s proposal makes clear that the group’s aim was to protect 
certain religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws that might be 
interpreted to amount to crimes against humanity. Chapter 9 addressed Research Questions 
                                                          
1423
 ibid. 
1424
 Rothschild (n 34) 41. 
1425
 Rothschild (n 34). 
1426
 Hypothesis 3 reads: Domestic norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage. 
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21427 and 31428 by exploring what religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national 
laws exactly the Arab block might have wanted to protect.  
In regard to the crime of rape, the chapter found that marital rape is not 
criminalised under national laws of the Arab block. This could explain the group’s 
proposal to delink marital sexual intercourse and rape under the ICC instruments. The non-
criminalisation of marital rape under the Arab block’s national laws can be explained 
based on religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws related to the ideal of 
obedient wives and understandings of rape as an honour crime. Obedient wives have to be 
sexually available to their husbands, indicating that there is no rape in marriage. The 
understanding of rape as an honour crime trivialises rape which leads to it being dealt with 
outside courts. Consequently, the Arab block would not want rape to be addressed by an 
international court which would give the issue a bigger stage. The finding that national 
understandings of rape as an honour crime shaped the ICC negotiations through the Arab 
block’s proposal confirms Hypothesis 5 expecting to find that rape was interpreted as an 
honour crime in the ICC negotiations. 
Regarding the crime of sexual slavery, Chapter 9 found that the accepted language 
of a marriage offer, understandings of payments of dowry and maintenance, irregular and 
temporary marriages, and again the ideal of obedient wives are rights, duties and 
obligations related to marriage that can be interpreted to be an exercise of powers attaching 
to the right of ownership and therefore to amount to sexual slavery. To protect these 
marriage rights, duties and obligations, the Arab block might have wished to disconnect 
them from the crime of sexual slavery.  
While the accepted language of a marriage offer, understandings of payments of 
dowry and maintenance, irregular and temporary marriages and the ideal of obedient wives 
bear resemblance to situations of sexual slavery and forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict and therefore could explain the Arab block’s wish to disconnect them, other 
religious principles, socio-cultural norms and national laws can be interpreted to support 
the criminalisation of forced marriage in times of armed conflict. National marriage laws 
stress that the woman’s consent to marriage is necessary for the marriage to be valid. An 
even stronger case can be made based on Articles 411 and 412 of the Libyan Penal Code 
and Article 296 of the Omani Penal Code. They cover abduction for the purpose of 
                                                          
1427
 Research Question 2 reads: What influenced the driving actors? 
1428
 Research Question 3 reads: What was the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
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marriage and sexual exploitation and bringing, exposing or accepting a person for the 
purpose of sexual exploitation respectively. 
 
In addition to exploring which religious principles, socio-cultural norms and 
national laws the Arab block might have wanted to protect, Chapter 9 also considered the 
Arab block’s fear of social engineering. It became apparent that externally imposed legal 
reform processes such as those triggered by the national implementation of the Rome 
Statute might have been understood as attempts of social engineering. As this can have an 
impact on international treaty-making negotiations, it needs to be considered by 
participating delegations in developing their interests and actions so as not to 
disproportionately weaken, or jeopardise the conclusion of, a treaty. 
 
Confirming Hypothesis 2,1429 the Arab block’s proposal to exclude marital sexual 
relations from the crime of rape and marriage rights, duties and obligations from sexual 
slavery makes it very clear that in the states constituting the Arab block, men hold a power 
position over women. This is supported by the husband’s more extensive rights regarding 
his marital sexual enjoyment. The husband’s more extensive rights in the context of 
marriage are linked to the religious principle that a wife has to be obedient and sexually 
available to her husband. The ideal of obedient wives raises questions of their autonomy 
and invokes notions of ownership. The accepted language of a marriage offer, including 
terms such as ‘gifting’, ‘selling’ and ‘surrendering ownership’, has the same effect. The 
payment of dowry can be interpreted as payment in exchange for the wife’s vulva. 
Following on from this, the payment of maintenance secures the husband’s exclusive 
access. The payment of maintenance can also be understood as an exchange or 
compensation for the husband’s right to confine his wife to the house for his sexual 
gratification. In irregular and temporary marriages, the wife has the right to the payments 
of dower, but not of maintenance. Therefore, even though the husband owns her vulva, he 
has no right to exclusive use. Especially in relation to temporary marriages, it can be 
questioned whether the payment of dower is more of a purchase price, rather than a gift 
made by a groom to his bride. Also, it could be argued that, without protective rights, the 
wife is in a vulnerable position that is easily exploited by her husband. The partial 
                                                          
1429
 Hypothesis 2 reads: States with strong patriarchal structures, where religion plays a leading role in legal 
and social matters, opposed the development of progressive definitions of war rape and forced marriage. 
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understanding of rape as an honour crime also indicates a view of women as men’s 
property.  
Patriarchal values, norms and rules would become contested if men could not freely 
decide on their marital relations. Therefore, patriarchal values, norms and rules would 
become contested if marital rape would be criminalised under International Law and if 
certain marriage rights, duties and obligations would amount to sexual slavery. 
Consequently, the wish to maintain existing power structures could have been the 
fundamental reason for the Arab block to dissent developments in national as well as 
international law in regard to sexualised crimes. This confirms Hypothesis 2 that states 
with strong patriarchal structures, where religion plays a leading role in legal and social 
matters, opposed progressive developments in International Criminal Law regarding 
sexualised and gender-based crimes.  
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10 Conclusion 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 The Conclusion summarises the nature and relevance of feminist and constructivist 
theories for this research project. It also recapitulates the main findings through these 
theoretical lenses. Here, the Conclusion draws together the discussion of war rape and 
forced marriage respectively, the critique of the ICC definitions of the two crimes, the 
analysis of the process of defining them, the theories behind their perpetration, and their 
legislative histories. Based on this, it is considered whether the ICC definitions of war rape 
and forced marriage could have been different. In addition, the Conclusion addresses the 
bigger question whether International Criminal Law is an appropriate framework to deal 
with war rape and forced marriage. Finally, the Conclusion outlines the thesis’ potential 
contribution, problems experienced and areas of future research. 
 
 
 
10.2 Theory 
 This thesis analysed the ICC negotiations of the definitions of war rape and forced 
marriage in times of armed conflict from a feminist and constructivist point of view.1430 
The present researcher’s understanding of the two theories as well as their relevance for 
this research project and how feminism and constructivism relate to each other are 
recapitulated below. 
 
 
 
10.2.1 The nature of feminism and constructivism and their relevance for this research 
project 
 The present researcher’s understanding of the research topic and its significance are 
informed by feminist ideas. Furthermore, the subject of the research project – the 
criminalisation of sexualised war violence against women – is a gender issue and, as will 
be explained in more detail below, feminist theories are useful to address it. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the aim of feminist theories and methods is understood to highlight 
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 For further information on feminist and constructivist theories and full references see Chapter 2. 
324 
sex/gender issues that are hidden by patriarchal structures. These patriarchal structures 
include legal rules, institutions and processes that construct realities that are different for 
women and men. Legal rules, institutions and processes are man-made and therefore reflect 
and prioritise men’s social position, concerns and customs. Feminists highlight sex/gender 
issues by probing beneath surface appearances and questioning what has been taken for 
granted. Context and process sensitivity cause them to take a critical stance of absolutes 
and generalisations. Instead of scientific objectivity, feminism advocates subjectivity. This 
includes establishing the researcher as an individual with a specific identity and concrete 
interests that lead to certain emotions and behaviour. This implies that feminist methods 
recognise the role of feminist politics in feminist research. The political goal of gender 
equality, for example, is reflected in feminist research that emphasises non-hierarchical, 
reciprocal relationships in which every actor is considered knowledgeable. In addition, 
feminist research methods stress empathy and true dialogues. This objective, however, is 
not always upheld in relationships between feminists where arrogant competition and an 
insider/outsider distinction are noticeable. This might be the result of uncalled-for and 
unrealistically high expectations feminist research faces from the ‘outside’, compelling it 
to defend and aggrandise itself while at the same time making only tentative claims about 
research findings. This might lead to the assumption of a domination/subordination 
relationship that first takes the form of m>f and then considers other factors such as 
nationality, race, culture, class, age, education, profession and sexual orientation. 
 While studying sexualised war violence against women and the legal approach to it 
is of interest and relevance from a feminist point of view, constructivism allows for a more 
detailed analysis of the process of their criminalisation. In contrast to rational International 
Relations theories that conceive actors to have predetermined interests and to make 
calculated decisions based on cost-benefit considerations, constructivism claims that 
actors’ identities and interests are socially constructed. They are shaped by normative 
structures, rather than by materialism. Actor’s identities and interests shape their actions 
which in turn shape normative structures. Therefore, normative structures can change and 
constructivists seek to explain these changes. To explain changes in normative structures, 
systemic constructivists like Martha Finnemore focus on the international sphere. 
Finnemore claims that normative structures change due to interactions between actors in 
the international system as well as the impact of international normative structures. Unit-
level constructivists like Peter Katzenstein, in contrast, stress the importance of domestic 
norms and their influence on actors’ identities, interests and actions. While Finnemore 
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emphasises the role of outside actors such as NGOs in initiating change by teaching state 
actors what their interests should be, Katzenstein understands change to come from within 
state actors. A point of critique that can be raised against constructivist theories in general 
is that they reject the rationalist claim that actors are driven by pre-determined interests and 
cost-benefit calculations and yet they themselves establish the logics of consequences, 
arguing, practicality and purposive role playing as four possible explanations for normative 
change. However, they also consider questions of appropriateness and the effect of habit 
and emotions. Moreover, the constructivist priority of normative over material structures is 
challenged when considering the reality that states disregard normative structures when it 
is in their interest. A feminist critique of constructivist theories highlights that, contrary to 
reality, constructivists assume actors to be equal. 
 
 
 
10.2.2 The relationship between feminism and constructivism 
 Comparing constructivism and feminism, both theories recognise that realities are 
socially constructed. Constructivism focuses on the fact that realities are constructed and 
the process of how a particular reality came about through the interaction of normative 
structures and actors. For feminism, in contrast, the outcome, the way realities are made to 
be, is more important than the fact that they are constructed. Feminism highlights that 
normative structures are not neutral but gendered and therefore influence actors in different 
ways. In addition, both, feminism and constructivism are interested in change. While 
constructivism focuses on the process of change, feminism focuses on substance. It adds 
politics to a constructivist analysis. By not taking a political position, however, 
constructivism establishes itself as a flexible theory that moves beyond specific sets of 
domination and subordination. The outcome of a constructivist analysis of the development 
of normative structures is more complex and less predictable than that of a feminist 
analysis that necessarily focuses on m/f and m>f.  
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10.3 How did the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage in times of armed 
conflict come about? A summary of the main findings 
 This thesis grew out of a critique of the ICC definition of war rape and forced 
marriage. Therefore, it addressed the ongoing challenge of how to define the two crimes 
adequately, reflecting women’s experiences and the nature of the crimes. The Elements of 
Crimes define the first element of rape as  
 
“[t]he accused invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the 
victim with any object or any other part of the body.”1431 
 
The awkward and regressive wording ‘invasion resulting in penetration’ is puzzling when 
taking into account that actors could have relied on the more progressive Akayesu 
precedent. Furthermore, actors in the ICC negotiations understood forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery and did not discuss it in depth. The perpetration of forced marriages 
in conflicts that were ongoing while the ICC instruments were negotiated makes this 
neglect problematic. 
Against the background of this critique, this thesis analysed how the ICC 
definitions of war rape and forced marriage came about. Based on a combined feminist and 
constructivist approach it focused on the driving actors, the normative structures that 
influenced their identities, interests and actions, their understandings of the two crimes, 
and their methods of influencing the ICC negotiations. The following paragraphs draw 
together the main findings of this research project and further comment on the points of 
critique regarding the ICC definition of war rape and forced marriage. They also further 
comment on how feminist and constructivist theories relate to each other and what has 
been gained by approaching the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage in this 
way. 
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 PrepCom2 ‘Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator: Article 8, paragraph 2(b)(xxii)’ (n 1066) art 
8(2)(b)(xxii)(1)(2); PrepCom2 ‘Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its Second Session’ (n 1066) 
art 8(2)(b)(xxii)(1)(2). 
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10.3.1 Who were the driving actors in the process of war defining rape and forced 
marriage? 
Both feminism and constructivism are interested in outside actors in the process of 
defining rape and forced marriage. A feminist analysis places a focus on women and men. 
A constructivist analysis, in contrast, focuses on state and non-state actors.  
 
 
 
10.3.1.1 The driving actors outside the ICC 
A combined approach shows that since the 18th century, a crucial development has 
taken place in international law-making regarding the identity of driving actors.1432 In 
relation to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the Declaration of Brussels, the Oxford 
Manual, the Hague Convention, Protocol I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
and the War Crimes Commission established after the First World War, it was largely male 
statesmen who took measures concerning sexualised war violence. However, they actually 
took action only in a few cases like the von Hagenbach trial and the deliberations of 
Napoleon’s fate after his defeat in the Battle of Waterloo. After the Second World War, 
this climate of state-centeredness and male exclusivity began to change. Women and 
NGOs participated in the drafting process of the Geneva Conventions. While male 
international observers testified on behalf of female survivors of sexualised war violence 
before the IMTFE, female survivors themselves told their stories to the international 
military tribunal in Nuremberg. As shown in the Akayesu and Foča cases, the personal 
testimony of survivors of sexualised war violence is crucial for the ICTR and ICTY to 
reach convictions. Today, women like Judge Navanethem Pillay of South Africa and Judge 
Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba of Zambia, Prosecutor Louise Arbour of Canada 
and Gender Advisor Patricia Viseur Sellers of the US/Belgium hold influential positions in 
both tribunals as well as in the SCSL. International and local NGOs and women’s activists 
actively influenced international law-making and the work of international legal 
institutions like the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. The international Coalition for Women’s 
Human Rights in Conflict Situations, expert witness Zainab Hawa Bangura of Sierra 
Leone, the Green/Copelon Group, Human Rights Watch, the International Centre for 
Transitional Justice, the International Abolitionist Federation, the International Council of 
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 For further information on the driving actors in the process of defining war rape and forced marriage 
outside the ICC as well as full references see Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Women, and No Peace Without Justice played a vital role in drafting provisions, 
supporting on-site investigations and writing amicus briefs, letters and petitions. Female 
members of staff and NGOs contributed towards the informed inclusion of sexualised 
crimes in the investigation, prosecution and trial phase as well as gender-sensitive policies 
and processes in international courts and tribunals.  
 
 
 
10.3.1.2 The driving actors in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage 
 In the ICC negotiations of the crimes of war rape and forced marriage, states were 
− as expected − the main actors, but NGOs also played a crucial role.1433 Confirming 
Hypothesis 1,1434 the discussion was driven especially by the Women’s Caucus but also the 
ICRC as non-state actors. Vocal state actors were the Arab block, Colombia and the US.  
 Feminist theories support the Women’s Caucus’ motivation to become active in the 
ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage. The Caucus wanted to ensure that 
sexualised crimes were appropriately addressed and that women’s concerns were 
considered. Moreover, feminist theories are helpful in scrutinising the ICRC’s and Arab 
block’s motivations to become involved. By playing its role as the guardian and expert of 
International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC preserved male norms and rules. The Arab 
block did the same by engaging in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage to 
protect national norms and rules against international interference. Outside the explanatory 
scope of feminist theories but indicating that actors’ interests and actions were constructed 
by emerging normative structures, Colombia had an interest in shaping the definitions of 
crimes as it was aware that it might become the focus of ICC investigations. Similarly, the 
USA insisted on defining the crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC as it was worried that 
the institution might prosecute its own nationals. 
 
Giving a voice to those unheard and emphasising women’s empowerment through 
participation in political processes, a feminist analysis of the ICC negotiations raises the 
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 For further information on the main actors in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage and 
their motivations to become involved as well as full references see Chapters 6 and 7. 
1434
 Hypothesis 1 states that NGOs in general and women’s organisations in particular played a role in the 
development of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage. 
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question if survivors of sexualised war violence were involved. Refuting Hypothesis 4,1435 
the Women’s Caucus included, and worked with, survivors of sexualised war violence who 
campaigned for women’s rights. As members of the Caucus’ delegation, survivors had 
direct input in its positions. Women and women’s organisations in different countries were 
informed about positions the Women’s Caucus thought about adopting and asked for their 
views. The Caucus would consider the feedback it received when drafting its final 
positions. Therefore, survivors directly and indirectly influenced and shaped the outcomes 
of the ICC negotiations. However, it has to be noted that overall the participation of 
survivors was an exception.1436  
 
 
 
10.3.1.3 Will women and NGOs change the word? 
A feminist and constructivist analysis of the main actors in the ICC negotiations 
and legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage places great hopes for progress in 
International Law in the participation of women and NGOs respectively. While this thesis 
highlighted their successes, it also demonstrated that women and NGOs in influential 
positions do not necessarily and automatically advance the law.1437 
The female members of the prosecution staff of the IMTFE do not appear to have 
pushed for a more appropriate gender policy of the tribunal which, for example, might 
have prevented male observers from testifying in the place of female survivors of 
sexualised war violence. Comparably, the women involved in the drafting process of the 
Geneva Conventions did not contribute to the discussion of Article 27 of the fourth Geneva 
Convention. It was outside actors – the International Council of Women and the 
International Abolitionist Federation – who proposed a provision specifically protecting 
women from war rape. While Judge Pillay successfully contributed to the establishment of 
a flexible and context-sensitive rape definition in the Akayesu case, Judge Mumba 
reintroduced a mechanical definition of rape in Furundžija as well as the notion of consent 
in the Foča case. In the ICC negotiations, the members of the Women’s Caucus were 
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 Hypothesis 4 reads: Survivors of war rape and forced marriage and actors from the global South were not 
involved. 
1436
 For further information on the participation of survivors of sexualised war violence in the ICC 
negotiations and full references see Chapter 6. 
1437
 For further information on the participation of women and NGOs in international law-making and legal 
processes as well as full references see Chapters 2 and 4-7. 
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largely successful in advocating a progressive understanding of sexualised crimes. 
However, they experienced opposition from women based on religious grounds. Other 
women were perceived as corrupting the debate about gender issues and sexualised 
violence by continuously advancing strong opinions, for example about the relationship 
between sexualised violence and pornography. 
Like women’s advocacy, the generally high degree of activism of local and 
international NGOs in international trials and law-making also leads to mixed results. The 
Human Rights community active in Sierra Leone proposed to establish the Special Court 
alongside a TRC and to give the court jurisdiction over crimes committed in the conflict by 
all groups involved. This was received favourably by the United Nations Secretary-
General. However, the Human Rights community’s additional call for a purely 
international institution was rejected. Women’s organisations and activists involved in the 
establishment and work of the ICTY and ICTR succeeded in having war rape explicitly 
recognised in the statutes of both tribunals as crimes against humanity. However, this is not 
the case for the war crimes provision of the ICTY and the genocide provisions of both 
tribunals. War rape is also not explicitly recognised as a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions. Furthermore, war rape is still linked to notions of dignity. The informed 
definition of war rape proposed to the ICTY by the Green/Copelon Group was not adopted 
in its entirety. The Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations actively 
influenced the Akayesu case. However, it was internal developments of spontaneous 
witness testimonies rather than pressure from outside that changed the course of the case. 
While NGOs were accepted and respected as strategic partners of states in the ICC 
negotiations and exercised considerable influence in the discussions of war rape and forced 
marriage, eventually, states had the whip hand. Relationships between NGOs and state 
delegations were generally constructive until NGOs disagreed with states’ positions. In 
such cases, cooperation lessened. State actors, for example, insisted on the inclusion of the 
term ‘penetration’ and a reference to body parts in the ICC rape definition despite the 
Women’s Caucus’ advocacy to the contrary. As the expression ‘invasion resulting in 
penetration’ shows, the Caucus’ call not to construct a rape definition with cumbersome 
and irritatingly specific wording also was not followed. In addition, the Women’s Caucus’ 
suggestion to include the words “with or without pecuniary benefit”1438 in the definition of 
sexual slavery was not taken up. 
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 Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, ‘Recommendations and Commentary to the Elements Annex and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ (n 838). 
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It becomes apparent that the success of women and NGOs in progressively 
developing International Law depends on the priorities, openness and receptiveness of 
members of the court or those in charge of establishing one. Women and NGOs still 
operate within male normative structures, circumscribing their opportunities and abilities 
to exercise influence. Dominating women, men led the negotiations of the Geneva 
Conventions and the IMTFE, and behaved in a patronising way towards female actors in 
the ICC negotiations. In addition to hampering the influence and success of women and 
women’s groups this way, war rape was not seen as a serious issue and therefore, women’s 
and/or NGOs’ concerns in this regard were perceived to be trivial. The IMTFE applied a 
gendered framework to sexualised war violence by failing to establish a link between war 
rape and patriarchy, and to understand war rape as a deliberate act of violence against 
women and a means of waging war. In addition, war rape was marginalised in the ICTY 
and ICTR statutes by uniformly recognising it only as a crime against humanity and not 
consistently listing it as a war crime, an act of genocide and a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions, crimes which are considered to be more serious than crimes against 
humanity. In the IMTFE, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC negotiations, precedents 
prevailed over adapting established rules to new contexts. This demonstrates that actors 
followed male reasoning processes. They were highly dependent on legal precedents that 
were analysed and applied using logic and abstraction. In the ICC negotiations, some 
actors considered attention to gender issues unnecessary. They relied on the progress made 
by the ad hoc tribunals and the positive effect of neutral rules. However, the ICC’s and 
SCSL’s understanding of acts of sexualised war violence against women such as forced 
marriage reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes of women as sexual beings and as 
housewives. This further limits the opportunities and abilities for women and women’s 
groups to exercise influence. They are considered out of place in the public sphere and 
therefore not taken seriously. 
 
 
 
10.3.2 What influenced the driving actors? 
 A constructivist analysis of the ICC negotiations of the process of defining war 
rape and forced marriage warrants an examination of what influenced the driving actors to 
determine how they came to hold their views that shaped normative structures. The actors 
in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage were influenced by international, 
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national and personal values, norms and rules. This confirms both Martha Finnemore’s and 
Peter Katzenstein’s theories that international as well as national normative structures 
matter in international relations and law-making. Going beyond the focus of their claims, 
the thesis also recognised the relevance of personal values.1439 While constructivists might 
be satisfied with the findings that international, national and personal normative structures 
mattered in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage, feminists turn towards 
those values, norms and rules to analyse their gendered implications.  
 
 
 
10.3.2.1 International normative structures 
Among the international normative structures that influenced the actors in 
negotiations of the definition of war rape and forced marriage were the 1907 Hague and 
1949 Geneva conventions, Protocol I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, the 
1926 Slavery Convention and the ICTR and ICTY instruments, judgments in the Akayesu 
and Furundžija cases and the Foča indictment. In addition, the Final Report of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like 
Practices during Armed Conflict as well as the Vienna and Beijing conferences and their 
outcomes were referred to.  
 
 The fourth Hague and Geneva conventions express a view of war rape as a 
violation of the honour of the family. The understanding of war rape as an honour crime 
emphasises the severity of the harm rape causes to survivors and communities. This makes 
it necessary to legally address rape. However, while the emphasis on the collective harm 
that rape causes reflects a purpose of war rape, it is detrimental to survivors. Their 
individual violation is obscured by the violation of the community. Women’s (sexual) 
autonomy is denied by advancing a relational view of women. 
 In the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, international agreements and 
instruments such as Protocol I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions and the Vienna 
and Beijing declarations and Platforms for Action framed war rape as an issue of 
protecting women and their fundamental rights. While this stresses that women are human 
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 For definitions of international, national and personal values, norms and rules see Chapter 2. For further 
information on the normative structures that influenced actors in the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced 
marriage and full references see Chapter 7. 
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beings and have human rights, it also implies that women are helpless and vulnerable and 
require special treatment. From the mid-1970s on, rape was also seen as an issue of 
discrimination. This resonates with the argument that unequal relationships between men 
and women are at the root of sexualised violence in peace and wartime.  
 In this atmosphere of strengthened women’s rights advocacy regarding the 
recognition of war rape as a crime, the ICTY and ICTR were established. The statutes of 
both ad hoc tribunals explicitly include rape as a crime against humanity. In addition, rape 
is also explicitly mentioned as a war crime in the ICTR statute. In their jurisprudence, the 
tribunals recognised rape as a crime against humanity, a war crime, a genocidal act, torture 
and as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. This highlights that war rape was seen 
as a crime in and of itself as well as potentially constituting other crimes.  
 In the Akayesu case, the ICTR developed the first definition of war rape under 
International Criminal Law; a definition that uses the term ‘invasion’ and stresses the 
element of coercion. A rape definition using the term ‘invasion’ is gender-neutral, 
inclusive and culturally sensitive. It illustrates the survivor’s point of view. A coercion-
based rape definition emphasises the inequality between the victim and the perpetrator, the 
violence of the situation and the surrounding contexts. This indicates that a coercion-based 
rape definition is based on the value of equality and the resulting norm of non-
discrimination.  
 In the Furundžija case the ICTY disregarded the Akayesu definition of war rape 
and developed a definition using the male term ‘penetration’. Both, definitions of rape 
using the term ‘penetration’ and ‘invasion’ can be understood to be founded on the norm 
‘don’t touch’. The term ‘penetration’, however, is understood to be less vague than the 
term ‘invasion’. In spite of this, a rape definition using ‘penetration’ links rape to questions 
of honour and focuses on the physical aspect of rape. In line with this, the Furundžija 
definition specifies the physical aspects of rape, making it narrower than the Akayesu 
definition. Specifying body parts may be detrimental to survivors as testifying becomes 
more challenging because survivors have to give a detailed account of the physical aspects 
of the rape which may also infringe upon cultural sensitivities. This critique also applies to 
the ICC rape definition. 
 Paragraphs a and b of the definition of war rape developed in the Foča case built on 
the Furundžija definition. In Paragraph c, however, the ICTY returned to a consent-based 
rape definition. It viewed lack of consent and the knowledge thereof as an element of rape 
while also acknowledging that coercive circumstances could establish a lack of consent. 
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Contrary to a coercion-based understanding of the crime of rape, a rape definition centred 
on the concept of consent stresses that being raped deprives the victim of her sexual self-
determination and freedom. Therefore it stresses the survivor’s agency. The value of self-
determination translates into the norm of non-interference in personal decisions. This 
indicates that a consent-based rape definition focuses on the psyche of the victim rather 
than on the acts of the perpetrator. In the Foča case, the ICTY also held that the physical 
and psychological detention of Bosnian Muslim women in various centres, private 
apartments and houses where they had to cook and clean for, and (sexually) serve, the 
Bosnian Serb soldiers living there fell under the gender-neutral crime against humanity of 
enslavement. The ICTY derived the definition of enslavement from Article 1(1) of the 
1926 Slavery Convention. 
 
Before moving on to national normative structures that influenced the ICC 
negotiations, it has to be stressed that while actors could draw on a relatively extensive 
legislative history in their discussions of a definition of war rape, forced marriage had only 
been defined in the Final Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict, Gay J 
McDougall. The Final Report is one of the first instances where forced marriage is 
established as an internationally recognised wrong that needs to be addressed because it 
violates the value of personal self-determination and the norm to be free to choose whom, 
when and how to marry. However, since the crime of forced marriage had not been well-
established in the mid-1990s, it was not recognised as a crime in and of itself and as a form 
of sexual slavery instead. The categorisation of forced marriage as a form of sexual 
slavery, however, creates the false impression that forced marriage would predominantly 
be a sexual crime and consequently perpetuates stereotypes that women primarily 
experience war as victims of sexual violence. The categorisation of forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery does not capture the forced exclusivity and disregards the 
psychological force of acts of violence being disguised within the legitimate situation of 
marriage. It neglects that forced marriages cause different forms of suffering than sexual 
slavery and cause survivors to be discriminated against in unique ways. Contrary to these 
disadvantages of categorising forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery, it has to be 
acknowledged that the use of the label ‘slavery’ emphasises the seriousness of the crime of 
forced marriage. This critique also applies to the categorisation of forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery in the ICC negotiations. 
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10.3.2.2 National normative structures 
 The relevance of national norms and rules in the ICC negotiations becomes 
apparent when considering that state delegations received instructions from their 
governments, including negotiation objectives that sometimes reflected national laws. 
Confirming Hypothesis 3,1440 domestic definitions of rape, for example of the US and 
Colombia, prevented a more progressive wording that would not use the term 
‘penetration’. The Colombian Penal Code of 2000 includes the crime of violent carnal 
access which includes rape. As rape is understood as penetration by the penis, the 
Colombian national definition of the crime ignores the use of other body parts and of 
objects. Similarly, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of rape at the time 
referred to “[t]he carnal knowledge of a female”1441 and defined rape in terms of coercion 
and lack of consent. The US definition focused on male to female rape, ignoring rapes of 
men and the use of objects. Article 44 of the Lieber Code includes a 19th century US 
American definition of rape that remains a point of reference in discussions on how to 
define the crime. Progressively, the Lieber Code directly prohibits war rape as an act of 
wanton violence that is punishable as a capital crime. It emphasises the physical harm rape 
causes by placing war rapes in context with other acts of physical violence. By placing 
rape in context with the destruction and unlawful taking of property, the Lieber Code also 
implies that women are men’s property. The Arab block’s proposals also highlight the 
relevance of national normative structures. With recourse to national laws, religious 
principles and cultural norms, the Arab block proposed changes to the definitions of rape 
and sexual slavery. Fundamental to the Arab block’s dissent towards developments in 
international law in regard to sexualised crimes was the wish to maintain existing 
patriarchal power structures. This confirms Hypotheses 21442 and 31443 as well as Peter 
Katzenstein’s theory that national norms and rules matter in international relations.  
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 Hypothesis 3 reads: Domestic norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage. 
1441
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (n 20). 
1442
 Hypothesis 2 reads: States with strong patriarchal structures, where religion plays a leading role in legal 
and social matters, opposed the development of progressive definitions of war rape and forced marriage. 
1443
 Hypothesis 3 reads: Domestic norms explain the resistance towards more progressive definitions of war 
rape and forced marriage. 
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10.3.2.3 Personal normative structures 
While constructivism does not place an emphasis on personal values, they are 
crucial to feminists. Personal values that played a role in the ICC negotiations had been 
formed through experiences of war and international justice work. The Women’s Caucus’ 
positions were informed by experiences of survivors of sexualised war violence with the 
ICTY and ICTR. Their participation in court proceedings indicates that survivors valued 
justice. The Caucus also based its identity, interests and actions on its members’ 
experiences and expertise developed in previous caucuses formed at the Vienna, Cairo and 
Beijing conferences as well as in their work as Human Rights and women’s rights scholars, 
lawyers and activists. Human Rights and women’s rights work is often very personal for 
actors who are driven by the value of equality. Civil society actors who became members 
of state delegations and maintained, and argued for, their personal views are another 
example that demonstrates the impact of personal values on the ICC negotiations. 
Moreover, when governments’ instructions to delegates were inadequate, delegates had to 
depend on their professional experience, daily progress evaluations and their perception of 
the international community’s general interests. This indicates that delegates valued 
professionalism and communality. Delegates approached others to show them that certain 
positions, including those on sexualised violence, were in fact consistent with their 
governments’ instructions. In addition, delegates shaped the content of their instructions 
through reports to their ministries. 
 
 
 
10.3.3 What was the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage? 
 While the type of norms that influence actors is central to a constructivist 
examination of the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage, it is not a major 
concern in a feminist analysis. A constructivist analysis, in contrast, is not concerned with 
actors’ particular views on a topic but this is crucial in a feminists study. Therefore, in a 
purely constructivist research project, actors’ understandings of war rape and forced 
marriage would not have been explored. From a feminist point of view, however, this is 
important because it informs actors’ understandings of what problems exist and what 
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solutions may be needed, and therefore their stance in the debate. This is what feminist 
advocates take into consideration when devising their strategy.1444 
 
 
 
10.3.3.1 The driving actors’ understandings of war rape  
 Due to actors’ different mandates, common sources of information were interpreted 
and used differently. Both the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC were influenced by existing 
national and international rape laws. However, while the ICRC was bound by its role as 
guardian of International Humanitarian Law, the Caucus was guided by its mandate to 
advance women’s rights. Therefore, the Women’s Caucus was more at liberty to develop 
different foci and advance different suggestions. An example is the Women’s Caucus’ 
emphasis on the Akayesu case based on which it advocated a coercion-based rape 
definition using the term ‘invasion’. The ICRC, in contrast, emphasised the Furundžija 
case and Foča indictment. As mentioned above, in both cases the ICTY arrived at a 
mechanical definition of rape using the term ‘penetration’. The Women’s Caucus and the 
ICRC agreed that rape should be recognised as a crime in its own right as well as 
constituting, for example, genocide and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.  
 Among the key actors in the ICC negotiations of the definition of rape, the 
Women’s Caucus was the only one that held a more elaborate view. Considering its 
mandate, this was to be expected. In addition to advocating a coercion-based rape 
definition that used the term ‘invasion’, the Caucus stressed the importance of developing a 
broad, gender-neutral and perpetrator-centred understanding of rape as a crime in and of 
itself as well as potentially amounting to other crimes. This included a definition that does 
not rely on body parts and recognises situations that are directly and indirectly threatening 
to the victim. Refuting Hypothesis 6,1445 the Women’s Caucus also highlighted that rape is 
a form of gender violence and therefore a form of structural violence that continues from 
peace into wartime. This approach is in accord with the prohibition of gender-based 
discrimination.  
 Colombia, followed by the US, was a key actor that went through a considerable 
learning process. Based on its national rules, Colombia initially proposed a rape definition 
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 For further information on the driving actors’ understanding of war rape and forced marriage and full 
references see Chapters 7-9. 
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 Hypothesis 6 states that structural causes of the perpetration of war rape were not addressed. 
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using neither the term ‘invasion’ nor ‘penetration’ but ‘to have sexual access to the victim’. 
It understood this wording to be inclusive and to better protect the right of sexual freedom 
and freedom to exercise control over one’s body. A second proposal kept this wording but 
conversations with NGOs inspired the delegation to advance a different reasoning for it. 
They now took international legal developments and discussions, for example about the 
difference between rape and sexual violence, and evidential considerations into account. 
After further exchanges with NGOs led to a better understanding of the term ‘penetration’ 
as the use of any tool, the Colombian delegation proposed a rape definition using this term. 
Eventually, however, in a joint proposal of Spain and five South and Central American 
states including Colombia, the verb ‘to have access to’ was reintroduced. 
 Like Colombia, the US initially evoked national norms and rules in proposing a 
consent-based rape definition using the term ‘penetration’ before following the Women’s 
Caucus and stressing the coercive circumstances under which war rapes are committed. 
The US also agreed with the Caucus that rape should be recognised as an independent 
crime as well as potentially constituting other offences. It consecutively established a 
connection between rape and sodomy, enforced prostitution and sexual slavery 
respectively. 
 Like Colombia and the US, the Arab block also advanced an understanding of rape 
– or rather of what it is not – based on national norms and rules. The states constituting the 
Arab block understand marriage to legitimise sexual intercourse. Consequently, marital 
rape is legally impossible. This is supported by the ideal of obedient wives according to 
which wives have to be sexually submissive to their husbands. When an unmarried woman 
is raped, the understanding of rape as an honour crime (confirming Hypothesis 51446) 
dictates that it should be dealt with in private rather than in court. Instead of a court trial, 
the rapist is encouraged to marry his victim to re-establish a woman’s honour and the 
honour of her family. The act of rape itself is understood in different ways by different 
states constituting the Arab block. Generally, however, it is mostly defined as non-
consensual, sometimes as forced, sexual intercourse.  
 
 The above demonstrates that actors’ understandings of war rape were influenced by 
international, national and personal values, norms and rules. It indicated that the Women’s 
Caucus’ understanding of war rape was also shaped by the more theoretical view of war 
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 Hypothesis 5 states that war rape was interpreted as an honour crime. 
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rape as based on the discrimination and violence committed against women in everyday 
life. Moreover, the understanding of war rape as a weapon of war appears to have been 
implied in the ICC negotiations; otherwise it would not have been recognised as a war 
crime. Actors would not have recognised rape as a crime at all would they have understood 
it as an expression of natural male aggressiveness as this implies that rape is an 
unavoidable by-product of war and legal pursuit is futile. Would actors have taken into 
consideration that war rape can be understood as an expression of social interactions in the 
military, they might have argued more strongly for it being a form of structural violence 
and focused predominantly on the actions and context of the perpetrator. While actors in 
the ICC negotiations placed a focus on individuals involved in an act of rape as well as on 
the effect war rapes have on survivors’ communities, advancing an understanding of war 
rape as a tool of propaganda would have also highlighted the effect of war rapes on 
societies as a whole.1447  
 
 
 
10.3.3.2 The driving actors’ understandings of forced marriage 
 Regarding forced marriage, only the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC explicitly 
mentioned the crime in their discussions. Refuting Hypothesis 6,1448 the Women’s Caucus 
recognised forced marriage as a form of gender violence and therefore structural violence 
that has sexual and non-sexual aspects. This understanding is supported by the examples of 
Liberian and Ugandan women’s experiences the Caucus referred to in its written 
recommendations and comments. Other examples like the situation of the Second World 
War comfort women, the rape camps that were established during the war in the 1990s in 
the former Yugoslavia and experiences of forced marriage of Burmese and Rwandan 
women, however, suggest an overemphasis on the sexual elements of forced marriage. 
This could explain why forced marriage was understood as a form of sexual slavery. The 
understanding of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery is in line with the 
international community’s view of forced marriage at the time of the ICC negotiations. The 
international community simply saw forced marriage as a sexual crime. Only its sexual 
elements that made it the crime of sexual slavery were important. Following the Women’s 
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Caucus and/or the international community’s view, the ICRC also saw forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery. 
 While the implicit categorisation of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery 
conceals the link between the two crimes, the Arab block’s understanding of sexual slavery 
– or of what it is not – draws attention to the connection by denying it. According to the 
Arab block, marital rights, duties and obligations do not constitute elements of sexual 
slavery. This, however, does not change the fact that some of them such as the accepted 
language of marriage offer and acceptance, understandings of dowry and maintenance, 
irregular and temporary marriages and the ideal of obedient wives could amount to an 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership and cause a person to be subjected to 
sexual acts. Contrary to the Arab block, the Holy See became indirectly involved in the 
negotiations of forced marriage and sexual slavery through a proposal deleting any explicit 
reference to both crimes. Even though the Holy See did not refer to forced marriage, it 
might have had an interest in criminalising it as a marriage formed without mutual free 
consent violates Christian norms. Confirming Hypothesis 5,1449 the Holy See may have 
interpreted forced marriage as an honour crime because it violates someone’s self-
determination and therefore someone’s dignity. 
 The Arab block’s general understanding of sexual slavery as an exercise of powers 
attaching to the right of ownership and causing a person to be subjected to sexual acts is in 
line with the understanding first advanced by the Women’s Caucus and taken up by the 
ICRC. The actors established a link between sexual slavery and enslavement. While both 
are understood as an exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, the difference 
between the two is the sexual element that is only present in sexual slavery. The Women’s 
Caucus highlighted direct and indirect threats through which women and men can be 
forced into slavery. A form of pecuniary exchange is possible but not necessary. Belgium 
and others as well as Costa Rica, Hungary and Switzerland convey a conflicting 
understanding of sexual slavery that is based on ICRC research. On the one hand, they also 
advanced the broad view that sexual slavery includes an exercise of powers attaching to the 
rights of ownership and recognised contemporary forms of slavery. On the other hand, 
however, they linked sexual slavery to traditional forms of chattel slavery. 
 While the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC established a link between sexual 
slavery and enslavement, Canada and Colombia also understood sexual slavery to be 
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linked to trafficking in human beings as a person can be trafficked for the purpose of 
sexual slavery. Colombia also emphasised that the sexual element in a situation of sexual 
slavery has to be understood more widely than equating it with non-consensual sexual acts. 
It can also include sexual acts to which the victim consented due to coercion or resignation. 
Moreover, Colombia stressed that the crime of sexual slavery can be committed by more 
than one perpetrator, each with a different role that does not need to constitute a direct 
threat to the victim. 
 The US agreed with the Women’s Caucus and Colombia that sexual slavery 
includes direct and indirect threats. However, it emphasised a pecuniary element in the 
exercise of powers attaching to the rights of ownership. The US further disagreed with 
Colombia and stressed the role of direct perpetrators. This narrow understanding of sexual 
slavery is contrary to the US’ initially broad view of sexual slavery that focused more 
generally on an attack against a person and the consequential deprivation of liberty.  
 
 While the Women’s Caucus and the ICRC explicitly mentioned forced marriage in 
the context of the ICC negotiations, it was not discussed in any detail. It was only in the 
early 2000s that the SCSL took up the issue and developed a legal definition of and 
approach to it, building on the Foča case as precedent. Would the actors in the ICC 
negotiations have been able to take the Foča judgment as well as the AFRC, RUF and 
Taylor cases into account, they would have been able to build their arguments on a more 
developed understanding of forced marriage as a situation where the status of marriage is 
conferred on someone by words or deeds. It could include conduct such as abduction, 
manipulation, enslavement, deprivation of liberty, sexualised violence, forced labour and 
corporal punishment. Nevertheless, some see it as a way to survive; to protect themselves 
from what they consider worse acts of violence and to gain socio-economic benefits. This 
is especially important because forced marriages destroy traditional interpersonal bonds 
between forced wives and their families and communities.1450   
 If the actors in the ICC negotiations also would have been able to take into account 
research on forced marriage published from the early 2000s on, they could have considered 
elaborations on the purpose of the perpetration of forced marriage. Forced marriage in 
times of armed conflict is a means to exercise control over fighters as well as women, to 
reward fighters and increase their status in the fighting group, to destroy traditional 
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interpersonal bonds while creating new dependency structures within fighting groups, to 
achieve a masculine ideal, and to gain additional combatants. This indicates that forced 
marriage is a form of structural gender-based violence that is a continuation of peacetime 
norms and practices. 
 Despite the developing understanding of forced marriage, actors in the ICC 
negotiations might still have seen forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. Forced 
marriage meets the factors that the Foča case introduced to be taken into consideration in 
determining whether or not a conduct amounts to an exercise of powers of ownership over 
a person. The SCSL furthermore determined that labelling a woman a fighter’s wife, 
forcing her into an exclusive marital relationship, depriving her of her liberty, and 
controlling her sexuality, movements and labour amounts to sexual slavery.  
 However, actors in the ICC negotiations might also have understood forced 
marriage as an inhumane act because it does not easily fit the category of sexual slavery. 
Sexual slavery does not necessarily include forcing someone into marriage and to perform 
conjugal tasks that include sexual as well as non-sexual duties. In contrast to forced 
marriage, sexual slavery does not necessarily demand an exclusive relationship between 
two people. Forced marriage causes distinctive harm to forced wives and results in unique 
stigmatisation. Actors in the ICC negotiations might have advocated an understanding of 
forced marriage as an inhumane act as this makes it easier to recognise the crime of forced 
marriage as an interrelated, whole conduct that causes distinctive harm. It enables courts to 
fully address the crime and its consequences. However, categorising forced marriage as an 
inhumane act arguably conceals the seriousness of the crime 
 Actors in the ICC negotiations also might have questioned whether ‘forced 
marriage’ is the best way to refer to the conduct, or if ‘conjugal slavery’ might be a more 
appropriate term to use. The advantage of explicitly naming forced marriage is that it 
legitimises women’s experiences during and after armed conflicts as they understand them. 
The disadvantage is that one could argue that the term ‘forced marriage’ hides the degree 
of coercion and exploitation that is exercised in a forced marriage. The term ‘conjugal 
slavery’ highlights that no actual marriage takes place between the spouses as well as the 
seriousness of the crime. However, it also carries the negative implications of the label 
‘slavery’ discussed above. 
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10.3.4 How did the driving actors influence the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced 
marriage? 
 Constructivists argue that one way actors shape normative structures like the Rome 
Statute is by teaching other actors what their interests and consequently their actions 
should be, influencing their identity.1451 In the ICC negotiations of the definition of war 
rape and forced marriage, actors taught other delegations by lobbying them. In their 
lobbying, NGOs addressed state delegations with which they expected to have a common 
ground. This highlights the importance of personal contacts that created shared 
understandings. States’ delegates, in turn, evaluated NGOs’ proposals in a similar way, 
based on the compatibility with their governments’ positions. To influence other 
delegations as well as the ICC negotiations as a whole, networking and working in 
coalitions and caucuses was important. It facilitated cooperation, cohesion and the 
development of common strategies to reach common goals in the face of actors’ diversity, 
and the wide range of activities undertaken and goals aspired to reach. NGOs taught other 
actors by continuously raising their awareness about issues for example through news 
conferences and parallel activities. NGOs also provided guidance for state and non-state 
actors, amongst others by distributing information such as expert documents. This was 
facilitated, for example, by holding regular meetings and briefings. In this way, NGOs 
provided the context for decisions that were to be made by states. The growing 
professionalism of NGOs, as states perceived it, enabled NGOs to shape state actors’ 
identities and actions. Based on the ICRC’s research, for example, Belgium, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, Korea, South Africa and Switzerland proposed definitions 
of rape using the term ‘penetration’. In addition to the ICRC, the Women’s Caucus as a 
non-state and therefore outside actor in international law-making also succeeded in 
teaching its views on rape as a form of structural violence rather than as an honour crime to 
the US delegation. The US also followed the Caucus’ advocacy in focusing on the 
perpetrator instead of the victim. In addition, state delegations followed the ICRC’s and 
especially the Women’s Caucus’ advocacy and included various sexualised crimes in the 
Rome Statute as separate offenses as well as constituting other crimes if the relevant 
qualifications are met. With regard to the crime of rape, the Women’s Caucus was 
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successful in inspiring Costa Rica to develop a definition using the term ‘invasion’ instead 
of ‘penetration’.  
 In general, the analysis of the negotiations of the definitions of rape and forced 
marriage suggests that the Women’s Caucus was more successful in teaching its views on 
rape than its views on forced marriage to states. The Women’s Caucus’ ability to teach its 
views on forced marriage to states might have been limited by the fact that, at the time of 
the ICC negotiations, most actors did not see forced marriage as a serious issue that needed 
to be addressed legally. No precedents existed. Little research had been carried out. This 
again indicates the prevalence of male legal structures that see sexualised violence crimes 
committed against women from a male point of view and approach it using male legal 
reasoning that emphasises the important role of normative structures in shaping actors’ 
interests. 
 
In addition to teaching other actors what their interests and subsequent actions 
should be, actors also influenced other actors in the ICC negotiations by facilitating their 
participation and giving a voice to those unheard. Actors financially supported small state 
delegations and made members of NGOs civil society members of a state delegation. 
Especially NGOs also engaged in capacity building and provided orientation and 
information such as progress reports to other actors. 
 
 Actors also influenced the ICC negotiations more directly by carrying out drafting 
work and submitting proposals. In addition to exercising this very direct influence, actors 
influenced the negotiations in more indirect ways through monitoring. NGOs also provided 
a platform for discussion and exchange. They facilitated compromises by mediating 
between different actors. In general, the high visibility of NGOs during the ICC 
negotiations was central to their ability to influence the definitions of war rape and forced 
marriage. They were active at international, regional, national and local level at all stages 
of the negotiation process.  
 
 
 
10.3.5 Preliminary conclusions  
 Summarising the main findings through the lens of feminist and constructivist 
theories, a combined approach creates the opportunity to focus on women and NGOs – 
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including survivors – as (outside) actors in the ICC negotiations. It demonstrated that both 
played a role and highlights that neither women nor NGOs alone will change the world. 
The success of both depends on the attitudes and openness of other actors towards them, 
the flexibility of (normative) structures, their resources and professionalism. Furthermore, 
a combined approach allows for an analysis of the type of normative structures that 
influenced actors in the ICC negotiations as well as to critique their substance. It 
demonstrated that international, national and personal values, norms and rules influenced 
actors in the negotiations of war rape and forced marriage. It also highlights a non-linear 
development from male towards more progressive understandings of war rape and forced 
marriage. The focus of feminist research on the substance of (normative) structures made 
an analysis of actors’ understandings of war rape and forced marriage necessary. It 
highlighted a diverse understanding of war rape as a coerced or non-consensual act of 
invasion or penetration. Rape was recognised as an honour crime by some and as a form of 
structural violence by others. Generally, rape was understood to include a variety of sexual 
acts that can be carried out by and against men and women. While understandings of war 
rape differed amongst actors in the ICC negotiations, unanimity prevailed regarding forced 
marriage. It was understood as a form of gender violence committed by men against 
women that includes sexual and non-sexual elements and is comparable to sexual slavery. 
Like rape, forced marriage was recognised as an honour crime by some and as a form of 
structural violence by others. Generally it can be confirmed that NGOs advanced 
progressive understandings of war rape and forced marriage while states with strong 
patriarchal structures where religion plays a leading role in legal and social matters 
opposed them. Their opposition was informed by national norms and rules. The 
constructivist interest in how actors came to hold their views that influenced normative 
structures necessitated an analysis of the way actors influenced the ICC negotiations. This 
thesis showed that actors influence normative structures by teaching other actors what their 
interests and consequent actions should be. Actors taught other actors through lobbying, 
coalition building, awareness raising and providing guidance. They also influenced other 
actors by facilitating participation, capacity building, and providing orientation and 
progress reports. Actors influenced normative structures more directly through their 
drafting work and more indirectly through monitoring the negotiations, and facilitating 
exchange and compromises. 
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10.4 Could the definitions have been different? 
 Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that the final ICC definitions of 
war rape and forced marriage were inevitable. Considering the actors involved, 
incompatible mandates prevented the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage 
from being different. Different mandates pulled actors in opposite directions – advancing 
the position of women versus maintaining male privileges, preserving international 
normative structures versus preserving national normative structures – which made 
compromises necessary in light of the required unanimity. The carefully negotiated 
compromise was often the only possible one.  
This was the case regarding the ICC rape definition. Based on international norms 
and rules, a majority of delegations supported a definition using the broad and gender-
neutral term ‘invasion’. A minority of delegations, however, stressed that most national 
definitions use the concept of penetration which was perceived to be more narrow but less 
vague than that of invasion. Mediating between the two sides, the Women’s Caucus and 
Costa Rica developed a definition using both terms. Their proposal went beyond national 
rape definitions like that of the US and Colombia and combined the Akayesu and 
Furundžija ones. This brief outline demonstrates that the wording of the ICC definition of 
rape is the smallest common denominator found between actors who sought to define rape 
as an act of invasion or penetration. The need for unanimity can also explain the 
categorisation of forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery. The consensus in the 
international community was that forced marriage was a form of sexual slavery, leaving no 
space for dissenting voices and consequently no space to develop a more progressive 
definition. This understanding was supported by the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during 
Armed Conflict. 
In addition to taking into account the actors themselves, the normative structures 
that influenced them, and how they understood war rape and forced marriage, the methods 
actors used to influence the ICC negotiations made a different outcome unlikely. While 
consensus was furthered by the work in coalitions and caucuses, they silenced conservative 
but also progressive minorities. While non-state actors taught state actors what their 
interests and actions should be, they were unsuccessful when an issue was not already 
well-established. When NGOs pushed for progress, they were occasionally stopped by 
states with different interests.  
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 The above discussion demonstrates that the actors’ incompatible mandates made 
different outcomes of the ICC negotiations in regard to the definition of war rape and 
forced marriage unlikely. In addition, divergent precedents between national and 
international law as well as within international law led to conflicting understandings of 
the crime of rape which made any definition but the carefully negotiated compromise 
unlikely. In the case of forced marriage, insufficient precedents led to unchallenged 
unanimous understandings of the crime as a form of sexual slavery. Regarding the methods 
actors used to influence the ICC negotiations of war rape and forced marriage, differences 
in standing between state and non-state actors, the work in coalitions and the importance of 
a sound basis for advocacy made different outcomes unlikely.  
 
 
Comparing the criminalisation of war rape and forced marriage under the ICC 
instruments demonstrates that the difference in the actors’ approach to them – clearly 
defining rape as a crime in and of itself as well as constituting other crimes and 
categorising forced marriage as form of sexual slavery without discussing the conduct any 
further – was not due to the actors involved in the discussions of both crimes. Neither can 
the different approach be attributed to the methods actors used to influence the ICC 
negotiations of war rape and forced marriage. Both the actors involved and their methods 
were largely the same. Different approaches to the criminalisation of war rape and forced 
marriage also cannot be explained by the type of normative structures that influenced 
actors’ understandings of the crimes. Actors’ understandings of war rape and forced 
marriage were influenced by relevant international, national and personal values, norms 
and rules.  
Instead, it appears that the different approach actors took to the criminalisation of 
war rape and forced marriage was influenced by the unequal standing of the two crimes in 
International Law and in the consciousness of the international community at the time of 
the ICC negotiations. The crime of rape was much better established than forced marriage 
in times of armed conflict. War rape had already been recognised as a serious issue. 
Research had been carried out about its causes, meanings and consequences and precedents 
existed on how to address and define rape legally. This influenced understandings of actors 
in the ICC negotiations of war rape as a crime that can be perpetrated by and against men 
and women, and causes them physical and psychological harm. Actors recognised the 
coercive context in which war rape takes place and its limiting impact on the possibility to 
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give free consent while also stressing the survivor’s agency. War rape in itself was 
understood as a war crime and a crime against humanity as well as potentially amounting 
to other crimes such as torture and genocide. Differences in actors’ understanding of war 
rape lay in the detail. However, it has to be stressed that before international tribunals 
established war rape as a crime in its own right, it was first categorised as a violation of the 
honour and rights of the family and then it was more broadly and adequately viewed as a 
breach of a person’s fundamental rights. Once precedents were established, discussions of 
war rape were facilitated. Consequently, it can be argued that forced marriage – a conduct 
that had not been widely researched, discussed and legally addressed when the ICC 
negotiations took place – had to be categorised as a form of sexual slavery first before it 
could be considered as another inhumane act and a crime in its own right. Categorising 
forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery established it as a serious issue that had to be 
addressed legally. It conveys an understanding of forced marriage as a state of possessing a 
woman that includes causing her to engage in sexual acts. 
 
The paragraphs above highlight that the two-pronged approach of this thesis, 
looking at both war rape and forced marriage, allowed a more thorough and comparative 
analysis of the factors that influence the process of criminalising sexualised crimes 
committed in wartime and therefore provided a more balanced answer to the central 
research question. Generally, the comparison of the legislative histories of war rape and 
forced marriage indicates that a conduct has to be established as a serious problem first and 
then discussed in the context of existing crimes before it can be criminalised in its own 
right.  
 
 
 
10.5 Is International Criminal Law an appropriate framework to deal with war rape and 
forced marriage? 
 In addition to criticising the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage and 
scrutinising the way they came about, a more general question can be asked: Is 
International Criminal Law an appropriate framework to deal with these crimes? 
 As the analysis of the legislative histories of war rape and forced marriage 
demonstrated, International Criminal Law is a way to address the breaches of International 
Law perpetrated through war rape and forced marriage. However, feminist theories 
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highlight that International Criminal Law reduces complex social problems to individual 
crimes, simplistic assertions of (ir)responsibility and binaries of good/bad, innocent/guilt 
and not-criminal/criminal. Moreover, the international legal system is a male structure that 
subordinates, stereotypes, controls and excludes women. International courts and tribunals 
silence survivors through rigid courtroom procedures that determine what counts as 
knowledge and limit the range of truths which can be testified while at the same time 
disregarding conventions of social forgetting. They also neglect material understandings of 
justice. In addition to feelings of fear and shame as well as information deficits, this 
contributes to survivors’ reluctance to participate in international court proceedings.1452 
These shortcomings of the international legal system raise doubt as to whether 
International Criminal Law is an appropriate way to deal with war rape and forced 
marriage. Gender- and context-sensitivity as well as maintaining a high level of 
information would be necessary to improve International Criminal Law as a means to 
achieve justice for survivors of sexualised crimes, to deter future crimes and to raise 
awareness about them. 
 In addition, to adequately address war rape and forced marriage, international 
courts and tribunals should consider the causes, meanings and purposes of the crimes. The 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL recognised that war rape and forced marriage are grounded in 
patriarchy and that both can be attributed to peacetime gender norms and stereotypes. The 
perpetration of war rapes is linked to the gender stereotype of male aggressiveness as an 
exercise of power over vulnerable women. While this also applies to forced marriages, 
they place more emphasis on a man’s role as husband and father who provides for and 
protects his family against outsiders, and a woman’s role as wife, housewife and mother. In 
regard to both crimes, the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL recognised that men exercise control 
over someone including that person’s sexuality. Based on this, it can be argued that war 
rape and forced marriage are a way to regulate gender relationships. In addition, the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL confirmed that war rape and forced marriage are weapons of war, aimed 
at demoralising, disabling and destroying the opponent. At the same time, forced marriages 
and resulting forced pregnancies are intended to create bonds within fighting groups. War 
rape also serves as a means of propaganda. Since international courts and tribunals took the 
nature of war rape and forced marriage into account in their deliberations and 
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categorisations of the crimes, it could be said that International Criminal Law is an 
adequate way of addressing war rape and forced marriage. 
 In addition to the causes, meanings and purposes of the crimes, international courts 
and tribunals should take into account that war rape and forced marriage have various 
serious long-term consequences for survivors as well as for their social environment. The 
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL recognised that war rape and forced marriage have physical and 
psychological consequences. While these are largely similar, the SCSL stressed that, 
contrary to war rape, the imposition of a conjugal relationship manipulates forced wives 
into loyalty towards their forced husbands. Furthermore, while war rapes can result in a 
feeling of insecurity, being forced into an exclusive relationship and at the same time 
experiencing ongoing abuse at the hands of their forced husbands can make forced wives 
simultaneously loose and gain a feeling of security. The ad hoc tribunals as well as the 
SCSL also considered the social consequences of war rape and forced marriage in their 
processes and deliberations. Survivors of both crimes are stigmatised and often excluded 
from their families and communities. However, while survivors of war rape are held 
responsible for what happened to them, the SCSL called attention to the perception of ex-
forced wives as rebel collaborators. Survivors of war rape and forced marriage are seen as 
tainted and therefore unmarriable, a situation which is aggravated when they have children 
conceived in rape or forced marriage. However, unlike survivors of war rape, (ex-)forced 
wives have the possibility to stay with or return to their (ex-)forced husband in hope for 
socio-economic support. The stigmatisation of survivors and the exclusion of their children 
indicate that war rapes and forced marriages create mistrust and even destroy social 
networks, as recognised by the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.1453 Since the deliberations of 
international courts and tribunals also took some consequences of war rape and forced 
marriage into account when categorising the crimes and determining adequate processes to 
address them, it could be said that International Criminal Law is an appropriate way of 
addressing war rape and forced marriage.  
If one concludes that the advantages of the international legal system outweigh its 
shortcomings and that it is an adequate way to address war rape and forced marriage, 
arguably war rape can be more easily addressed through International Criminal Law than 
forced marriage as it is understood to be a narrow act rather than a complex process. Rape 
is clearly framed as a coerced or non-consensual act that starts and ends with physical 
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invasion/penetration. In contrast to rape, forced marriage is framed to include various 
steps. Someone is forced into marriage first and then this person is subjected to acts of 
sexual violence and forced labour. This indicates that the crime of forced marriage is 
perpetrated over a period of time during which its precise form can change. It might 
include rape from the beginning which can lead to forced pregnancy later. While forced 
wives are expected to cook and clean for their husband in times of low-intensity fighting, 
they might be forced to participate in direct combat when necessary. However, even 
though it might be more demanding for international courts and tribunals to address forced 
marriage, it is necessary for them to attend to it to reduce diffusion and advance clarity so 
that it can be addressed adequately.1454  
 
 
 
10.6 Potential contributions  
 Firstly, contrary to the generally very positive view of the ICC rape definition, this 
thesis contributed a more critical interpretation.  
 Building on this and deepening the understanding of the ICC negotiations of war 
rape and forced marriage, this thesis narrowed two gaps in the existing literature on the 
process of defining war rape and forced marriage in the ICC negotiations. While the 
process of including rape in the Rome Statute and the final definition of the crime are well-
researched, the process of defining rape itself, which took place after the Rome Conference 
in the PrepCom2, is seldom analysed. This thesis contributed a detailed analysis of the 
record of the making of the ICC from the 1994 ILC draft statute to the adoption of the 
Elements of Crimes in 2000. A focus was placed on the PrepCom2 negotiations as they 
dealt with the definition of crimes including rape rather than their categorisation discussed 
in the PrepCom and at Rome. In addition to describing what happened, this thesis 
contributed an analysis of key actors and their motivations and influences. This way, 
developments in states’ positions on war rape could be traced, potentially indicating 
broader shifts in attitudes towards sexualised (war) violence against women. Identifying 
who pursued which interests can also facilitate effective coalition-building. An 
understanding of how actors came to hold certain views is crucial as a starting-point for 
effective engagement and advocacy to influence their positions in the future.  
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 The second gap this thesis addressed is the neglect of forced marriage in the context 
of the ICC negotiations. While previous research mentioned forced marriage in relation to 
the definition process of the crime of sexual slavery, this thesis contributed an analysis of 
the reasons why forced marriage was understood as a form of sexual slavery, providing the 
background for an analysis of the SCSL’s elaboration on forced marriage.  
 By addressing forced marriage, this thesis raised awareness of the crime and how it 
has been dealt with outside the framework of the SCSL. Awareness-raising gives a voice to 
(ex-)forced wives and educates people about their experiences. A greater awareness of 
forced marriage is needed to develop a better understanding of the crime and to increase 
advocacy. It is a first step to changing how people and institutions think about and address 
forced marriage. As part of this necessary awareness-raising, the thesis contributed towards 
the theorisation of forced marriage. It advanced a new explanation of the causes and 
meanings of forced marriage that is grounded in hegemonic masculinity theory.  
 The analysis of the process of defining war rape, a well-theorised and well-
established crime, and forced marriage in times of armed conflict, which is still undergoing 
definition and theorisation, highlights relevant factors that need to be considered in the 
process of internationally criminalising yet unrecognised acts of sexualised war violence. 
First, a form of conduct has to be established as a serious problem. Then it can be 
internationally criminalised in its own right. Precedents facilitate further discussions. In 
regard to war rape and forced marriage, their legislative histories show that (women’s) 
advocacy is crucial in developing a more progressive understanding of women’s 
experiences with, and the nature of, sexualised crimes. However, the legislative histories 
also show that the process of arriving at a progressive definition is not linear and takes 
time. 
 While this thesis identified using the term ‘penetration’ and the reference to body 
parts as shortcomings of the ICC rape definition, the whole definition of forced marriage as 
a form of sexual slavery was seen as ill-conceived. Divergent opinions on the one hand, 
and non-existent precedents resulting in a lack of discussion on the other hand, were 
established as grounds for these misconstructions. Identifying these shortcomings and how 
they came about highlights that law-makers have to be aware that International Law is a 
male structure and consider the causes, meanings, purposes and consequences of crimes 
when attempting to construct more adequate definitions of sexualised crimes in the future. 
Therefore, analysing the process of defining war rape and forced marriage in the ICC 
negotiations cannot only help legislators to make more adequate laws but also survivors 
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since they eventually benefit from definitions that more adequately capture their 
experiences as well as the nature of a crime. 
 
 
 
10.7 Problems experienced and areas of future research 
 One of the key sources of information for this thesis was the official record of the 
ICC negotiations. It includes official documents recording the negotiations, drafting and 
discussions. A comprehensive record was also understood to include academic research 
outputs, some of which were written by people who participated in the ICC negotiations. 
The challenge of working with these sources was that they mostly exclude important 
records of informal meetings and drafting work. Official documents focus on the 
contribution of states. They record outcomes but not what brought them about. Therefore, 
this thesis could not identify which individual actors within state and non-state delegations 
played a key role in the ICC negotiation of the definition of war rape and forced marriage 
and why. Even balancing the information constructed from the official record of the ICC 
negotiations with interviews with people who participated in the negotiations did not shed 
much light on questions of individual contributions. Too much time had passed since the 
negotiations took place. Memory had faded and personal records were passed on or 
destroyed. The official records of the ICC negotiations also include lists of delegates. 
However, those lists were not available for all meetings and focused on state actors, 
making it difficult to ascertain which NGOs participated. 
 The research indicated that the coalition approach taken in the ICC negotiations 
crossed traditional divides between actors in international treaty negotiations. At face 
value, it facilitated equality between the global North and South. When analysing the ICC 
negotiations, however, it became apparent that equality was superficial. Participation of 
actors from the global South, for example, was facilitated by Western states and NGOs by 
providing them with access to various necessary resources like financial support and 
information, potentially creating dependency structures. In addition, members of NGOs 
from the global North became members of Southern state delegations, influencing their 
identities, interests and actions. Civil society members of state delegations might also have 
contributed the necessary English language skills and experience in international law-
making. NGOs are often perceived to diminish power distortions among actors. However, 
even though the CICC was global in its membership, it was led by Human Rights groups 
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with headquarters in the global North. Their experience and network strengthened their 
impact on the ICC negotiations, creating inequalities with less experienced and less well-
connected organisations. Based on these comments, it could be argued that the ICC 
negotiations were dominated by the global North, highlighting the applicability of 
postcolonial approaches.1455 Furthermore, the relevance of postcolonial theories becomes 
apparent when considering that the ICC negotiations were understood by some actors as an 
imposition of a legal reform process and an attempt at social engineering. The Arab block, 
for example, “feared that the law on crimes against humanity was too ambiguous and 
might be used by activist judges […] as a tool of ‘social engineering’”.1456 It was 
concerned that new laws might alter the distinct gender roles within the family structure 
that the states constituting the Arab block understand to be required by religious principles 
and cultural norms. Future research could approach the ICC negotiations explicitly within 
a postcolonial framework and contribute towards a thicker analysis of the actors involved, 
and the relevance and role of national normative structures.  
 Focusing on the process of defining war rape and forced marriage under the ICC 
raised the question whether it was more important to achieve a satisfactory overall 
outcome than to include certain wordings in the ICC instruments. Future research could 
explore more generally if what words are used in a definition of a crime is only interesting 
from an academic point of view but less so in practice. After all, in practice, it has to be 
kept in mind that meanings of terms may change from one language to the other and 
distinctions may exist in one but not the other. 
 As this thesis focused on how the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage 
came about, it did not focus on the impact of the definitions. On the face of it, both the 
definition of war rape and forced marriage serve survivors. The definition of war rape 
recognises various sexual acts and a range of coercive situations under which they could be 
perpetrated. However, it also refers to body parts which could make it more challenging for 
survivors to testify because they have to give a detailed account of the physical aspects of 
the rape. Including forced marriage in the ICC instruments as a form of sexual slavery 
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made it possible for survivors to bring a claim for the first time. Both definitions, however, 
have gendered effects. The use of the term ‘invasion’ makes the definition of war rape 
gender-neutral. At the same time, however, the use of the term ‘penetration’ makes it male. 
During the ICC negotiations of sexual slavery and, by extension, forced marriage, an 
underlying presumption existed that sexual slavery is perpetrated by men against women. 
This reinforced gender stereotypes of women as victims. In addition, the categorisation of 
forced marriage as a form of sexual slavery narrowly focuses on sexual crimes, neglecting 
other experiences of women in wartime. These comments indicate that what looks like 
progress at first sight may not be so progressive after all, and does not fully serve survivors 
and their experiences. Therefore, future research needs to explicitly address in detail whose 
interests the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage serve as well as their 
gendered effects. 
 In addition to the impact of the ICC definitions of war rape and forced marriage, 
this research did not address the court’s application of these definitions. Future research 
could analyse if, and to what extent, the ICC is guided by the definitions that were set out 
in the Elements of Crimes and how that impacts on the cases before it and the people 
involved. 
 The thesis analysed the SCSL’s approach to forced marriage and how it identified 
the nature of the conduct. This, however, took place after the ICC Elements of Crimes had 
been adopted. Therefore, the SCSL could not have influenced the ICC negotiations of 
forced marriage. Building on the findings of this thesis, future research could explore 
whether the ICC negotiations influenced the SCSL, its instruments and jurisprudence. The 
legislative history of the definition of war rape show that the ICC negotiations built on the 
experience of the ad hoc tribunals which were influenced by international agreements and 
documents of the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s which were set off against the IMT and 
IMTFE as well as international agreements of the early and mid-20th century and bilateral 
and multilateral conventions concluded in the 18th, 19th and early 20th century. From this it 
can be deduced that the SCSL might have drawn on previous discussions of forced 
marriage that happened in the context of the ICC negotiations. Exploring continuities and 
discontinuities, it would be interesting to analyse in detail which actors influenced the 
making of the SCSL, especially its statute, as well as its jurisprudence and the impact of 
the ICC negotiations on the SCSL’s statute and jurisprudence. In addition, the sources of 
information the SCSL drew on in its elaboration of forced marriage would offer a welcome 
addition to the theorisation of forced marriage in times of armed conflict. 
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 In addition to the ICC’s impact on the SCSL, its impact on domestic rape and 
marriage laws could be analysed. Where domestic laws changed, it could be explored if 
and how these laws are implemented. If domestic implementation is ineffective, it could be 
examined why, and what could be done to improve it. Where domestic laws have not 
changed, the reasons for this could be analysed.  
 Another opportunity for future research lies in a comparative study of the impact of 
treaty negotiations and the judicial process of courts and tribunals on definitions of 
sexualised crimes. It could be argued that treaty negotiations as a political process result 
more easily in watered-down definitions of sexualised crimes than when a court considers 
a definition in the context of a case. Definitions of crimes determined in court cases, 
however, are unpredictable, depending, for example, on the persons involved and the 
context in which the court considers a case. Therefore, it could be asked whether judicial 
processes or treaty negotiations hold more potential to move definitions of sexualised 
crimes forward. Should we have lower expectations on treaty negotiations?  
 
 
 In conclusion, by unravelling the process of how war rape and forced marriage 
were defined in the ICC instruments, this thesis demonstrated that non-state actors 
facilitated de-politicised discussions. Nevertheless, concerns regarding national 
sovereignty and the protection of national normative structures limited the potential of the 
ICC negotiations to develop progressive definitions of war rape and forced marriage that 
adequately reflect women’s experiences as well as the nature of the crimes. 
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